Foreword

On 6 June 1944 American and British troops invaded the continent of Europe over open beaches in one of the most revolutionary operations of World War II. Invasion was the climax of many months of planning, training, enthusiasm, disappointment, and continual trial and error. Neither doctrine nor tradition pointed the way. When it became evident that there could be no victory without invasion, there were no up-to-date field manuals, no approved training techniques, no specialized troops, no training centers, and no equipment. The landing and supplying of a great military force on a hostile shore over open beaches was an operation which began from scratch.

Consequently the history of the invasion of France and the subsequent beach operations which permitted Allied troops to burst from their bridgehead and advance east is long and complicated. It began in Spring 1940, on the sands of Dunkirk, and ended in the early winter of 1944 when the last few tons of cargo were brought across the beaches during a lull in a Channel storm. Its roots were complex and widespread, winding through London and Washington, and through countless army and navy bases, training camps and experimental stations in the

United States, the United Kingdom, and North Africa.

This study, therefore, can be no more than a part of the complete history of the invasion, which eventually must be compiled from source materials now in many parts of the world, and from the files and records of the armies, navies and air forces of the two nations. What follows is a record of the training of American troops in Great Britain for the landing operation, the preliminary assault landings in the Mediterranean, the mounting of American troops for the Normandy landings, the beach assault, and the establishing and operating of the two American beaches in France--OMAHA and UTAH.

The first part of the study includes a brief sketch of the background of amphibious doctrine and the effect of early operations in the Mediterranean area on planning for the invasion of France. This section is far from complete, since much of the pertinent source material is not available in the European Theater. It should be taken as an indication of the effect that the Mediterranean operations had upon planning and training for the Normandy operation. The main body of the study is divided into two parts. The first concerns planning and training in the United Kingdom for the beach operation, the schools and training centers set up, the procurement of invasion equipment, and the final mounting and loading for the operation. The second covers the landings, the setting up of the two beach ports, and their operation to early

winter 1944, when they were forced to close.

In general, the compiling of the first part of the study suffered from the unevenness of source material. As an example, a rather exhaustive search of records available on the continent in the Fall of 1945 failed to disclose much trustworthy material dealing with the activities of the all-important Southern Base Section in England. Important records of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade were lost in transit from Africa to the United Kingdom. There was more material concerning the Assault Training Center than could be used, but very little concerning important phases of some of the exercises. These gaps are indicated in the bibliography which is appended.

For the most part, material dealing with the second, or post D Day, part of the study was entirely adequate, but time was lacking to do as much work as had originally been planned on this phase. This probably is not too disadvantageous, since the future researcher should have far less trouble in compiling information regarding post D Day beach operation than he will have in covering the planning and training period. Chapters IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII may be used as a general survey of the post-D Day period, and the researcher may then proceed to a more involved study of those bases which interest him.

This study, particularly the second half, is based, no only on the study of the sources, but also on experience. The writer, Lt. Clifford L. Jones, was a member of an historical team which joined the headquarters of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade on UTAH Beach. The study which follows was written at Paris and St. Germain, France, between late June 1945 and January 1946.

Considerable historical material was not available in Europe during the latter period. Important records of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade had been sent to the War Department in Washington some time before the study began. Most of this material, however, had been seen by the writer in 1944 and is incorporated in Operation Report NEPTUNE of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, and in Notes on UTAH Beach and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade in the files of the Historical Section, ETOUSA.

It must be remembered that an amphibious landing is fundamentally a supply project rather than a tactical maneuver. For a few hours, while the assault troops are fighting on the beaches, tactics and logistics meet, but once the infantry begins to slash its way inland, the beach area ceases to be a battlefield and becomes a highly specialized port and depot whose main purpose is to insure a steady flow of supplies and reinforcements to the front. It is in this flow of supplies and reinforcements which provides the theme of this study.

Tactics are discussed only as they affect logistics, or as they are affected by logistics. This is the story of how the United States Army landed its forces on two open beaches, and then turned those beaches into one of the greatest military supply installations in history.

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