UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor
Advisory Committee
James P. Baxter
President, Williams CollegeWilliam T Hutchinson
University of ChicagoHenry S. Commager
Columbia UniversityS. L. A. Marshall
Detroit NewsDouglas S. Freeman
Richmond News LeaderF. Dwight Salmon
Amherst CollegePendleton Herring
Social Science Research CouncilCol. Thomas D. Stamps
United States Military AcademyJohn D. Hicks
University of CaliforniaCharles S. Sydnor
Duke UniversityCharles H. Taylor
Harvard University
Office of the Chief of Military History
Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief
Chief Historian Kent Roberts Greenfield Chief, War Histories Division Col. George G. O'Connor Chief, Editorial and Publication Division Col. Breckinridge A. Day Chief, Editorial Branch Joseph R. Friedman Chief, Cartographic Branch Wsevolod Aglaimoff Chief, Photographic Branch Capt. Kenneth E. Hunter
Foreword | ix | ||
Preface | xi | ||
Chapter | Page | ||
PART ONE The United States and China Become Allies | |||
---|---|---|---|
I. | Aid to China Involves the U.S. Army | 3 | |
China Seeks U.S. Aid | 7 | ||
Origins of Lend-Lease Aid for China | 13 | ||
Putting Air Power in China: The AVG and Currie's Lend-Lease Program | 17 | ||
The Indochina Crisis and Aid to China | 21 | ||
The Thirty Division Program | 25 | ||
Creation of the American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA) | 27 | ||
AMMISCA Receives Its Orders | 29 | ||
The Chinese Army, Fall 1941 | 32 | ||
The Generalissimo Warns of Peril | 37 | ||
AMMISCA's Appraisal of the Thirty division Program | 41 | ||
AMMISCA, Lend-Lease, and the Line of Communications | 44 | ||
Summary | 48 | ||
II. | War Creates a China Theater and a U.S. Task Force to China | 50 | |
The Chungking Conferences | 52 | ||
The Tulsa Incident | 57 | ||
The Creation of an Allied China Theater | 61 | ||
The U.S. Role: A Second Mission or a Theater? | 63 | ||
Selection of Stilwell and His Directive for China | 70 | ||
Moving Toward a Larger Concept | 76 | ||
Summary | 80 | ||
III. | Stilwell Begins His Mission | 81 | |
The Command Situation, China-Burma-India, March 1942 | 86 | ||
Early U.S. Logistical and Administrative Problems | 90 | ||
Stilwell's First Problems | 93 | ||
Darkening Prospects for Burma's Defenders | 99 | ||
The Chinese Expeditionary Force | 103 | ||
The Chinese Begin Their Fight | 105 | ||
The Loss of Air Cover | 109 | ||
The AVG Keeps Up the Fight | 112 | ||
The Attempts To Reinforce | 114 | ||
Summary | 117 | ||
IV. | China's Blockade Become Complete | 118 | |
The Pyinmana Plan and the Irrawaddy Front | 121 | ||
The Collapse of the Irrawaddy Front | 125 | ||
The Japanese Drive to Lashio | 127 | ||
Attempts to Prevent the Debacle | 132 | ||
Plans for the Future | 135 | ||
The Evacuation of Burma | 138 | ||
The Chinese Withdrawal | 140 | ||
Summary | 148 | ||
PART TWO Plans for Breaking the Blockade of China (May 1942-March 1943) | |||
V. | Stilwell's Mission Interrupted by an Ultimatum | 151 | |
Stilwell's Proposals To Reform the Chinese Army | 152 | ||
Beginnings of Trouble | 157 | ||
Air Transport Disappoints the Chinese | 163 | ||
Soong's Warning | 167 | ||
The Generalissimo's Anger | 169 | ||
Stilwell's Staff and Command Roles Upheld | 173 | ||
Moving Toward a Compromise | 177 | ||
The Generalissimo Modifies His Demands | 180 | ||
Planning the Air War in China Theater | 187 | ||
Summary | 190 | ||
VI. | U.S. Forces Organize and Prepare for New Tasks | 191 | |
Expansion of Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, CBI, July-December 1942 | 192 | ||
Tenth Air Force Plans and Organization | 198 | ||
The Services of Supply: The Indian Base | 202 | ||
First Plans and the Karachi Area | 204 | ||
SOS Expands Across India Into China | 206 | ||
Local Procurement | 207 | ||
The Reciprocal Aid System at Work | 209 | ||
Lend-Lease Responsibilities | 211 | ||
Ramgarh Training Center | 212 | ||
Operation of Ramgarh Training Center | 214 | ||
Summary | 220 | ||
VII. | The Attempt to Plan a Spring Campaign | 222 | |
U.S. Answer to the Three Demands | 222 | ||
The October Negotiations | 225 | ||
The Generalissimo Will Be Ready | 229 | ||
Japanese Plans and Dispositions in Burma | 232 | ||
Preparations in China for the Offensive | 234 | ||
Plans and Preparations in India | 241 | ||
More Than JCS Support Required | 245 | ||
The Emergence of the Chennault Plan | 250 | ||
The Chinese Hesitate | 254 | ||
The Generalissimo Says No | 258 | ||
Summary | 261 | ||
VIII. | ANAKIM Marks Time | 262 | |
Talks About Reform Continue | 262 | ||
Administrative Changes for U.S. Forces | 266 | ||
The Arnold-Somervell-Dill Mission | 269 | ||
The Conferences in Chungking and Calcutta | 274 | ||
The President Overrules Marshall and Stilwell | 277 | ||
Moving Toward an Expanded Air Effort in China | 283 | ||
Obstacles in Chennault's Path | 288 | ||
U.S. Forces Establish Training Centers for Y-Force | 292 | ||
Marshaling the Yunnan Force | 296 | ||
British Operations and ANAKIM | 302 | ||
American Preparations in India-Burma | 306 | ||
Summary | 310 | ||
PART THREE U.S. Air Power Given the Stellar Role in China Theater | |||
IX. | Air Power Rather Than Army Reform | 313 | |
The Air War Begins Over Burma | 314 | ||
Chiang Promises To Hold East China | 317 | ||
Chennault and Stilwell Present Their Cases | 320 | ||
The President's Decision | 324 | ||
TRIDENT Decision To Take North Burma | 327 | ||
Reactons to TRIDENT | 333 | ||
The Generalissimo Weighs TRIDENT | 335 | ||
Expediting the ATC Airfield Program | 341 | ||
Improving Chennault's Position | 345 | ||
Stilwell Shakes Up the Rear Echelon | 347 | ||
Apathy in Yunnan | 350 | ||
Japanese Reactions to Allied Preparations | 353 | ||
Summary | 354 | ||
X. | Putting Weight Behind the TRIDENT Decisions | 355 | |
Allied Discussions of Southeast Asia Command | 355 | ||
The QUADRANT Conference, Quebec, 19-24 August 1943 | 357 | ||
Planning Logistical Support | 360 | ||
SEAC's Organization and Directive | 363 | ||
Stilwell Resumes His Chief of Staff Role | 367 | ||
Soong Attempts To Have Stilwell Recalled | 374 | ||
Stilwell Restored to Favor | 376 | ||
Questions of Boundary and Command | 379 | ||
Somervell's Trip to India | 381 | ||
"What More Can I Do?" | 384 | ||
Summary | 385 |
Appendix | |||
Bibliographical Note | 390 | ||
Glossary | 400 | ||
Index | 405 |
The Frontispiece is a photographic copy of an oil painting by Howard E. Smith. The painting is a part of the memorial collection at West Point.The photographs are from the files of the Department of Defense.