Chapter IX
Meeting the First Test in China

Arrangements to train, arm, feed, and co-ordinate the Chinese were carefully made and reflected several years' experience. But they were, after all, only so many attempts to solve known or anticipated problems. The Chinese Combat Command, the Chinese Training Command, the emerging Chinese SOS, all had to take the field and put the new machinery into operation. Whether it would produce results was the question, and provides the next chapter in the unfolding story.

The Thirty-six Divisions Take Form

The Logan Ration and the student volunteers would, if Wedemeyer's views prevailed, lead to an over-all improvement in the ALPHA divisions. But because the ration and student projects, the suggestion for reducing the size of the Chinese Army, and the suggestions for different command procedures touched so many sensitive aspects of the Nationalist regime, it was over these that China Theater met with the greatest difficulties. With the thirty-six divisions Wedemeyer had more success, and it is there, in retrospect, that Sino-American co-operation appears at its brightest. As noted above,¹ the CCC offered a means of remedying some of the obvious deficiencies of the Chinese Army. It set up a chain of communication from higher headquarters through intermediate headquarters down to divisions. (Chart 5) It supervised reorganization and amalgamation within the six area commands. It provided Chinese commanders with competent American general and special staff assistance in operations, intelligence, and logistics. It provided technical assistance for the Chinese in handling artillery and communications. It placed competent medical personnel among Chinese who had been trained primarily by experience. In co-operation with the newly organized Chinese Services of Supply, it organized and supervised a measure of logistical support. It conducted service schools and unit training.

Chart 5
Sino-American Liaison System (Schematic)

In brief, technical assistance, professional training, and logistical support were offered to thirty-six selected Chinese divisions guarding Kunming.

The divisions the Chinese were willing to assign to the ALPHA plan were divided among six area commands. The essential Kunming supply installations were in the Reserve Command. North and east of Kunming was the Central Command, which included the vital road center of Kweiyang from which roads lead to Kunming and Chungking. Still farther east and north was Eastern Command, which included the Chihchiang airstrips, from which Chennault's airmen were currently operating, and the lost east China fields. Southeast of the Reserve and Central Commands lay the Kwangsi Command, whose farther border was the sea in the area of Luichow Peninsula and the then-obscure harbor of Fort Bayard. Directly south of Reserve Command, on the Indochina border, was the Southern Command, and to the west, on the Salween front, the Western Command. The Chungking area and the remaining 85 percent of the Chinese Army did not have a place in these area commands.

Of the six, the Reserve and Eastern Commands had the greatest initial importance--the first, because of the major role it played in training one third of the U.S.-sponsored divisions; the latter, because it lay between the Japanese and one of Chennault's most vital fields, Chihchiang. The task of reorganization facing Colonel Bowman and General Chang Fa-kwei in the Kwangsi Command was especially difficult. While a portion of the Chinese defenders of the Kweilin-Liuchow area fell back northwest toward Kweiyang, General Chang's forces had moved southwest to Poseh near the Indochina border. When Bowman opened his headquarters 27 December 1944 he found Chang with the remnants of six armies, which had "lost practically all their equipment. Their supply and medical systems had broken down. Their morale was broken." Bowman thought they could not stop a Japanese regiment. And they were in a food deficit area which meant that unless the Americans could bring in food, Chang's armies would have to desert in order to eat. So Bowman began to set up a line of communications, by airlift to Poseh and water transport forward. McClure greatly aided him by assigning a small group of liaison aircraft, which provided evacuation and courier service.²

McClure also sought to obtain rice for Chang's men. On 11 April he radioed Wedemeyer from the field that the SOS was operating in only an advisory capacity in Chang's vital area, and that food was scarce there. Chang had assured McClure that if he was given the money he could buy food from within the Japanese lines. Passing through them was easy in the Nanning

COL. EMERICK KUTSCHKO is present at a demonstration of a tactical problem by Chinese 14th Division troops for an officer candidate class.

area and done every day; the farmers would deliver rice to Chang as required. So McClure suggested that Chang be given funds to buy rice from Japanese-held Kwangsi areas, for there would be no rice available outside them after 1 May.³

The Reserve Command, whose Chinese troops were under General Tu Yu-ming, and which was commanded by Col. Emerick Kutschko, was primarily a training command.⁴ No combat took place under its authority. Its importance lies rather in its work of training and equipping Chinese divisions in China.⁵

As the basic plan prescribed, Colonel Kutschko organized his staff along the familiar general and special staff lines so that staff officers might deal with their Chinese opposite numbers, and attached a U.S. combat section to each Chinese army headquarters. These sections in turn sent liaison sections to Chinese divisions, and by cutting personnel requirements to a fine point the Americans succeeded in finding at least one U.S. liaison officer for each Chinese regiment or artillery battalion. Kutschko had the 35th and 60th U.S. Portable Surgical Hospitals and two veterinary detachments, which were used to strengthen the Chinese medical and sanitary services.

Commissioned and enlisted instructors for service schools were also available. Signal Corps men to set up and operated a communications net linking the U.S. liaison sections and detachments completed Kutschko's modest force. As of 25 March 1945 it totaled 185 officers and 401 enlisted men.

Taking up their new stations, the Americans in February found that General Tu had four armies, the 5th, New 6th, 8th, and 54th. The Americans estimated their strength at 96,316, divided among twelve divisions. Of these divisions four had fought on the Salween and were far understrength, while the 14th and 22d were veterans of north Burma. Kutschko reported that the Honorable 1st and 103d Divisions, 8th Army, "were in a deplorable state of malnutrition," and that 90 percent of the 166th Division had scabies. Transport was so scarce that central supervision of the training program was extremely difficult, to say nothing of the ration and equipment issue.

With its first directive, CCC had presented two thirteen-week training programs as guides for the American staffs of the several commands. The goal was to have each unit capable of fighting effectively three months after beginning its training. This program, plus specialist training in troop schools, was the foundation of the American program for the Reserve Command. In the first 13-week cycle Chinese Combat Command focused attention on

weapons training, for which were suggested 144 hours of the first 13-week cycle, and small unit problems, which received 116 hours, while marches and bivouacs plus sanitation were to receive 32 hours, and patrolling, 36. In the second 13-week cycle, drill in the handling of weapons received less time (78 hours) while their tactical use moved up to 60 hours. Tactics to include the battalion were to have 174 hours. Plainly then, training was to be progressive; the soldier was to learn the use of his weapon and then be fitted into the team.

In proposing these training cycles, CCC directed its subordinates to inculcate the offensive spirit. It reminded them that Chinese armies had been so long on the defensive that Chinese officers found it hard to think in aggressive terms. The Americans were cautioned not to bypass the Chinese officers in training, but rather to teach them to train their men, then to supervise the finished product. Unit training was to be practical. "No organization ever had too much training in weapons." In accord with the spirit of these instructions, McClure's headquarters limited defensive tactical exercises to security measures and protection of a captured point against counterattack.

Kutschko and his aides found that the training problem varied from one division to another. The New 6th Army's 14th and 22d Divisions were in excellent shape, thanks to training in India and combat in Burma. However, the 207th Youth Division could not begin training until after it received infantry weapons, which arrived by 1 May. The 5th Army divisions varied in quality. The 45th Division was promptly reorganized on the June 1944 Table of Organization, and was ready to begin its 13-week training cycle on 1 April 1945. As for the 96th Division, some of its officers had attended the old Y-Force Infantry Training Center; it was hoped they would be fairly well qualified. It too was to begin 13-week training on 1 April, as was the last division, the veteran 200th. The 5th Army's three battalions of 75-mm. pack artillery had had either recent combat on the Salween or American training. Some of the engineer and communication troops had already received U.S. training and equipment. For these service troops, technical schools were planned.

Two divisions of the 54th Army, 36th and 198th, spent most of the February-March period in reorganizing to conform to the newly adapted Table of Organization. Combat on the Salween had taken a heavy toll; the absorption of replacements necessarily resulted in delaying the beginning of the training cycle. The 8th Division, 54th Army, was regarded as being in good condition and well trained, with but one great lack, transport animals, of which it had none. The last of the four armies, the 8th, was handicapped by an outbreak of relapsing fever, plus a number of cases of malnutrition, in its Honorable 1st Division. Despite this, during February and March classes for officers and enlisted men were carried out in the school of the soldier, of

the section, and in the heavy machine gun. The 103d Division was training officer cadres and recruits. Schools for signalmen and 60-mm. mortar crews were also conducted in the preliminary period. The last division, the 166th, was moving into its assigned stations and so could not begin any training until 26 March. On that date all units of the 8th Army, save two regiments acting as airfield guards, began their 13-week training. Therefore, of the Reserve Command divisions that needed training all but two were ready to begin work on or about 1 April.

The equipment problem was complicated by the transport shortage which made it very hard to deliver arms to the divisions. The American SOS made deliveries to army headquarters. In order to get the weapons to divisions the American liaison personnel had to borrow Air Forces and SOS vehicles. The rate at which American equipment was being received can be estimated from a table showing the percentage of weapons, authorized by the Tables of Organization, which had been issued as of 25 May 1945:⁶

	Percent
5th Army Troops	100	(less 100 submachine guns)
45th Division	80
96th Division	100
200th Division	0	(except for artillery battalion)
8th Army Troops	80
Honorable 1st Division	100
103d Division	100
166th Division	0
54th Army Troops	80
8th Division	85
36th Division	70
198th Division	40
New 6th Army (less 14th and 22nd Divisions in Chihchiang area)
207th Division	60

In grappling with the actual training of the Reserve Command's divisions the Americans had to adjust their programs to a number of factors. For example, it was manifestly impossible to train mortar crews before the weapons were at hand. For another, because training was progressive, the American staff believed the Chinese should master one phase of the program before passing on to the next even though this called for spending many more weeks on a particularly troublesome phase than had been suggested by the Chinese Combat Command's training schedule.

There were also local problems arising from the combination of circumstances that brought the Reserve Command into being. Because the 8th, 53d, and 54th Armies had been heavily engaged on the Salween front, they had lost a majority of their junior officers, who would under U.S. Army

training methods have done a great deal of the instructing. These men had to be replaced in short order, which was done by promoting noncommissioned officers. Many of these were illiterate and had only the slenderest professional qualifications. This gap was plugged in part by special officers' training schools. Other difficulties arose because many Chinese general officers were absent from their commands and thus could not place the weight of their authority behind the American efforts to train their men. The American side of the effort was initially handicapped by the small number of U.S. troops that were in China and available for instructor duties. Transfer to Reserve Command of the 1st Battalion, 475th U.S. Infantry, in May 1945 helped meet this need. Kutschko's staff reported that the poor health of the Chinese soldiers, "particularly among recruits," in many instances reduced attendance at training to 50 percent. For a time, it seemed to General McClure, Commanding General, CCC, that the problem was primarily one of physical rehabilitation.⁷

The success of Reserve Command's efforts to carry out its mission depended on its ability to solve the problems described above. As April began, Kutschko and his 500-odd subordinates settled down to training the twelve divisions that formed one third of the total force scheduled to receive American instruction.

Eastern Command's Work Interrupted

Western Hunan Province, the area allotted to Eastern Command on 29 January 1945, is a rough, mountainous area, which was then practically roadless and depended for transport upon the coolies trudging from village to village and upon the streams that run generally north and east toward Tung-ting Lake. The local Chinese forces were the XXIV Group Army, General Wang Yao-wu, which included the 18th, 73d, 74th, and 100th Armies. General Wang's headquarters was at Sha-wan, a town just south of the main road, Chihchiang-Heng-yang, and there Eastern Command of Chinese Combat Command set up its own headquarters on 2 February. (Map 13) Its mission was to supervise the training and equipping of General Wang's troops.⁸ General Wang's XXIV Group Army divisions varied in troop strength, and had but thirty-three pieces of light artillery, French, Russian, Japanese, and Dutch.⁹

Unit	Combat Troops	Noncombat Troops
73d Army Total	12,046	15,426
Army Troops	1,547	8,318
15th Division	4,961	4,416
77th Division	4,714	2,030
Temporary-5th Division	824	652
74th Army Total (minus 58th Division)	15,497	14,562
Army Troops	3,628	6,638
51st Division	6,552	3,749
57th Division	5,317	4,175
58th Division	(a)	(a)
100th Army Total	8,508	6,774
Army Troops	924	910
19th Division	3,697	2,648
63d Division	3,887	3,216
18th Army. . . . (estimated total strength, 2,331 officers, 29,030 enlisted men)
11th Division	(a)	(a)
18th Division	(a)	(a)
118th Division	(a)	(a)

a Unknown

Col. Woods King, commanding Eastern Command, began work with nineteen officers and thirty-four enlisted men. Following the basic CCC plan of creating an organization parallel to the Chinese staff and command structure, Colonel King organized his own headquarters with a chief of staff and the four general staff sections. Combat sections were organized to work with General Wang's three U.S.-sponsored armies: 18th Army Combat Section, Col. John P. Lake; 73d Army Combat Section, Col. Lester L. Lambert; 74th Army Combat Section, Col. Alexander H. Cummings. The 100th Army did not receive a liaison section until much later. As of 1 April, King had 109 officers and 270 enlisted men under his command.

Examining their problems, the Americans received the impression that General Wang's command had little if any interest in medical matters. "There was practically no medical personnel in the area at the time that this command was established. The existing hospital facilities were deplorable." The local Chinese also seemed indifferent to problems of supply and evacuation.

Colonel King concluded that if he was to supply his own personnel, let alone get on with his mission, he would have to organize boatheads and

Map 13
The Chihchiang Campaign
8 April-7 June 1945

COL. WOODS KING

truckheads, operate and maintain ferry crossings, and arrange for barge traffic. Since there was only a very limited American SOS operating in the area at the time, King improvised a supply and evacuation system with his own personnel. SOS began to establish itself and by April had four ferry crossings organized, river transport operating on three waterways, and boatheads and truckloads at seven sites. There was still no Chinese SOS, only some supply personnel. The medical problem was alleviated by the assignment to Eastern Command of the 34th and 44th U.S. Portable Surgical Hospitals.¹⁰

Before launching the 13-week unit training program, Eastern Command planned to create specialist schools for veterinary officers and technicians, medical personnel, and radio and switchboard operators. At the command headquarters, a school for senior Chinese officers was instituted. American liaison personnel were sent out to Wang's four armies and twelve divisions around 1 April to set up the training programs, both individual and unit. In the case of the 74th Army, by mid-April plans were complete and buildings

selected for signal technicians, while classes for veterinary and medical personnel were under way. Rifle, mortar, and machine gun ranges were largely completed by 16 April. Training aids were constructed and were ready for distribution.¹¹

The team sent to the 57th Division, 74th Army, which may be taken as typical, comprised two liaison officers, one of field grade, a medical aid man, a radio team, and a Chinese major to interpret. The team had no transport and marched to its destination. Coolies helped carry its baggage. Included in the baggage were seven days' rations, later found "invaluable" as only rice and a little pork could be purchased.

On arriving at the town in which 57th Division headquarters was located the team opened for business in a school building some two miles from the Chinese headquarters, but linked by wire communication. Commanded by Lt. Col. Douglas C. Tomkies, the team spent the first two weeks of April trying to build training aids, training courses, and rifle ranges. In dealing with the Chinese the Americans at first found them reluctant to divulge information. The Chinese seemed to fear the Americans would promptly radio it to the rear and then in some way embarrass them. But gradually confidence was established, and only the barrier of language and custom slowed the flow of information.¹²

By mid-April, training areas and troop schools were ready in Eastern Command, specialist schools had gotten under way with their first classes, and the third classes for senior Chinese officers were in session.

While these Sino-American activities were in progress, the Japanese had been completing some preparations of their own. Early in 1945 China Expeditionary Army had directed Sixth Area Army to prepare two sets of plans, for a raid on Chungking and for operations against Lao-ho-kou (near Hsian in northwest China) and the American airfields at Chihchiang. This was in compliance with the 22 January 1945 order of Imperial General Headquarters, which emphasized strengthening the lower Yangtze valley and north China against possible American attack. "Prolonged and systematic raiding" of interior China was directed by small units only. Advanced American air bases were to be destroyed.¹³

References to raids in interior China represented a cherished project of China Expeditionary Army, which had long been anxious to take aggressive measures against Chungking. Sixth Area Army was less optimistic and ambitious in its outlook. As the Japanese planning got under way in February,

Sixth Area Army decided that by April, the contemplated date of the operation against Chihchiang, it would be hard to accumulate sufficient strength for it. Of the two divisions supposed to take part, the 116th had been roughly handled at Heng-yang while the well-equipped and powerful 47th was still in process of arrival from Japan. Sixth Area Army was therefore inclined to think that the operation should aim only at reaching the Yuan Chiang, a stream which flows just west of the Eastern Command headquarters at Sha-wan. In the light of past experience it seemed to the Japanese that if they reached a point near the airfield the Americans would destroy it and withdraw.

Here entered the human factor. Okamura, the Japanese commander in China, was visiting the headquarters of the Japanese 20th Army, the organization scheduled to conduct the operation. He found 20th Army supremely confident, and so he decided to proceed with an operation directly against Chihchiang (which could serve as a base for the raiding operations that Okamura wanted) even though but one regiment of the 47th Division would be on hand in time for the operation. Therefore, with four regiments the 20th Army prepared its drive on Chihchiang. This left it two divisions with which to garrison the stretch of 200 miles of vital railway from Tung-ting Lake above Changsha down to the city of Ling-ling.¹⁴ In north China the Japanese prepared to take Lao-ho-kou as soon as possible.

Examining the China scene on 1 February, Wedemeyer listed a drive through Chihchiang on Kunming as being among several Japanese capabilities but did not see any indication of it. He estimated that the Japanese would probably concentrate their forces on the coast and in the area of Changsha-Hankow-Peiping-Manchuria, an appraisal which was an almost entirely correct reading of the Japanese intentions.¹⁵ By 17 February Japanese intentions were more apparent, and Wedemeyer warned the Generalissimo that the enemy might try to take the airfields at Hsian, Lao-ho-kou, and Chihchiang.¹⁶

As China Theater's staff estimated the situation, the major Japanese threat would be against Chihchiang; Japanese attacks on or toward Hsian and its neighboring airfields would be of lesser though still considerable importance. Therefore, since Wedemeyer's U.S. resources were strictly limited, the major defensive effort would have to be made around Chihchiang. For the Hsian area, his staff carefully surveyed the situation and determined that the Chinese had some resources to supplement those in the I War Area at Hsian. The Americans believed that the forces in the Hsian area were in poor shape,

with no training program and very short of equipment. In making this appraisal, they eliminated without further description the twelve divisions they thought were watching the Chinese Communists. Their suggested solution was a liaison team to assist in a training program whose major impetus would have to come from the Chinese, and the distribution of projected Chinese arms production to the I War Area. The planners estimated this arms production for the six months March-August 1945 inclusive at:

Rifle, 7.92-mm.	50,400
Cartridge, 7.92-mm.	58,700,000
Machine gun, light	4,930
Machine gun, heavy	1,425
Trench mortar, 60-mm.	1,388
Trench mortar, 82-mm.	840
Shell, mortar, 60-mm.	385,000
Shell, mortar, 82-mm.	517,500
Gun, AT, 37-mm.	3
Shell, 37-mm. AT	5,000
Grenade	1,842,500
Mines	80,000

Having reached these conclusions, China Theater did not let itself be distracted by the opening of the Japanese northern offensive on Hsian and Lao-ho-kou on 22 March, with some twenty battalions of infantry, an armored task force, and a modest complement of pack howitzers with a few 150-mm. howitzers for siege work. To help Maj. Gen. Hu Tsung-nan's I War Area meet the drive, Wedemeyer sent a liaison team under Colonel Barrett to give training and technical advice, while Chennault sent air-ground liaison teams to direct the air support that his aircraft were soon giving under his personal leadership.¹⁷

In late March and early April, the forward movement of the Japanese toward their assembly areas in west Hunan Province began, giving an unmistakable indication of their intent to attack toward Chihchiang. Chinese Combat Command's G-2 estimated that 20,000 Japanese were massed in the area about Pao-ching (Shao-yang), a road junction west of Heng-yang, with another 5,000 to the southwest.¹⁸

On 8 April 1945, as the northern Japanese forces were entering Lao-ho-kou, strong enemy patrols probed the Chinese outposts just west of the stream Tzu Shui, which runs from south to north a mile west of Pao-ching. That same day a Japanese force estimated at 2,000 moved west out of Pao-ching,

and took up advanced positions, in the opinion of Eastern Command to cover the forthcoming offensive.¹⁹

The Japanese threat required immediate countermeasures. The Chinese forces that would have to meet it initially were substantially as they had been in previous campaigns. "Little American equipment" had been received for General Wang's troops, while the training program through sheer lack of time had not progressed beyond schools for specialists and officers.²⁰ However, Wedemeyer had made progress in the last few months, and there were assets present that were not at hand before. First, there seemed to have been no problems arising from Chinese domestic politics. Second, the American SOS helped supply food and ammunition on a systematic basis. Third, there was an American liaison net down to divisions so that there was usually timely information of Chinese movements and intentions. Fourth, Chennault's supply position was the best it had ever been. Last of all, there was what seems in retrospect an atmosphere of mutual co-operation between Chinese and Americans.

The American Share in the Chihchiang Campaign

As the Japanese were making their last-minute preparations, and as the Americans of Eastern Command were setting up their training program, the deployment of Wang's armies suggested that a Japanese drive on Chihchiang would trail its line of communications past the 73d Army at Hsin-hua, forty or so miles north of the Pao-ching-Chihchiang road, the 18th Army, at Chang-te, about 150 miles away to the north, and the 100th Army, forty-five miles northeast of Chihchiang. Only the 74th Army, deployed along the eastern edge of the hills that lie between Pao-ching and Chihchiang, was directly between the Japanese and their goal. The 58th Division of the 74th Army was forty miles south of the Chihchiang road at Hsin-ning, and well forward of the main Chinese positions. The 57th Division was at Hua-yuan-shih near Tung-kou, on the road, and the 51st was northeast of Tung-kou at Shan-men.

The first Japanese attacks on 8 April were estimated as made by two parallel columns of 2,000 men each, the northern moving west along the Chihchiang road and the southern toward Hsin-ning. The 74th Army thus faced a developing attack on a fifty-mile front. When it began, there were American liaison teams with the 51st and 57th Divisions, but the team for the 58th Division at Hsin-ning did not arrive until after that city had fallen.²¹

EASTERN COMMAND HEADQUARTERS CONFERENCE at Chihchiang. From left, General Sultan; Brig. Gen. William Barber, Chief of Staff, Chinese Combat Command; General McClure; Maj. Gen. Gilbert X. Cheves; and General Ho Ying-chin.

As evidence of the weight of the Japanese thrust started coming in, the various headquarters began to react. By the 10th, Eastern Command was asking that movement of MARS personnel (instructors and demonstration teams) into the area be halted. Two days later General Wang asked that an army be sent to the Chihchiang area to act as mobile reserve. On 13 April the Japanese began a general advance.²²

The CCC command and liaison system began to yield its first fruits on 14 April. A general conference, attended by Ho and McClure, their respective chiefs of staff, General Cheves of the SOS, and his staff, was convened. General Hsiao I-hsu, Ho's chief of staff, presented what became the basic plan of the campaign. Ho and McClure agreed to create troop concentrations on the north and south flanks of the Japanese drive. To the north three divisions from the VI War Area would be brought down to permit the 18th Army in turn to move to the east of Hsin-hua. To the south, General Tang En-po's 94th Army was to move to Ching-hsien, whence it could threaten the Japanese south flank or cover the road from Kweilin into Kweichow Province. Thus, the Chinese would be ready for a double envelopment. The center would be strengthened by moving in the elite 14th and 22d Divisions by air and truck, but only if the situation warranted. Every attempt would be made to hold the line Wu-kang-Hsin-hua, the forward edge of the hill mass mentioned above.²³

The Generalissimo attempted to take an active part in the campaign, and Wedemeyer moved to forestall him. On 17 April Wedemeyer warned McClure that the Generalissimo was issuing orders to Ho and to General Wang's troops without referring them to the Sino-American combined staff. McClure was asked to see if Ho knew of such orders.²⁴

While the Chinese regiments of the 74th and 100th Armies on the hills adjacent to the road to Chihchiang sought to stop or slow the Japanese advance, and the 73d Army, which the Japanese were bypassing, began to move south, the decisions of the 14 April conference began to take effect. Up north, at Chang-te, the American liaison team with the 18th Army, under Colonel Lake, had been setting up a line of communications by river from the Chihchiang area, in conformity with what they thought to be their basic mission, training and supply. Now that task was laid aside, and Colonel Lake with the Chinese army commander, General Hu Lien, spent several days around 23 April trying to learn just what the 18th Army's mission was to be. Colonel Lake's headquarters was shifted south and west from Tao-yuan near Chang-te to Yuan-ling, the American SOS headquarters for the area. Hu

and Lake were first told that the 18th Army was to move to An-chiang, in the rear of the 74th. Forming a mobile command post group, Lake joined Hu's headquarters in the field and accompanied it during the rest of the campaign. Before the 18th reached An-chiang, the orders were changed. About twenty miles north of the road to Chihchiang, near Shan-men, the hills are big enough to be called a mountain, Pai-ma Shan. The 18th went there.²⁵

To the south, the 94th Army, General Mou Ting-fang, was moving up to the scene of action. Troops of the 94th Army took orders from Tang En-po; that they should move from one war area to another to aid a neighboring commander was a major improvement over past practice. The 94th Army Combat Section, Col. George L. Goodridge, had joined them 6 February. He understood that his mission was to assist in training and, since he had had considerable past experience, he was authorized to prescribe his own program, to be completed 1 June. A series of movement orders made it impossible to get unit training under way, while only a few U.S. weapons were received. About 15 April the 94th Army was alerted; it received orders to move on the 16th, and got under way on the 25th. Colonel Goodridge, his G-2, and an intercepter "joined Mou's headquarters at his request and lived, ate, and moved with the general."²⁶

On 15 April Colonel King of Eastern Command recommended that flying the 22d Division to Chihchiang begin at once, and the operation was code-named ROOSTER. The supply situation there, according to the SOS, would just support the 22d plus two battalions of field artillery. About 8,000 tons of Hump tonnage would be needed to support the move, it was estimated. The progress of the Japanese advance continued over the next few days, so on 21 April ROOSTER began. By the 25th one regiment of the 22d Division with a battery of pack howitzers and a company of 4.2-inch mortars was in Chihchiang. Soon the 14th Division too was under way in trucks manned by the U.S. 475th Infantry Regiment. By 29 April there were 15,624 men of the New Sixth Army at Chihchiang, with more scheduled to arrive every day. A few days later, 3,750 soldiers of the 14th arrived by truck at An-chiang. Since but five Japanese regiments were making the attack, unless the Japanese chose to make it a major operation their last chance of taking the field probably was gone by 29 April, whatever happened on its approaches.²⁷

But though ROOSTER made Japanese success at Chihchiang most

CHINESE NEW SIXTH ARMY TROOPS and ammunition are being transported across the river to An-chiang, en route to the front.

improbable, it had negative effects elsewhere in China; the gasoline requirements of the move could only be met by cutting Chennault's operations to air defense and reconnaissance.²⁸

At the front along the road to Chihchiang and in the immediate rear, where American medical and supply installations were establishing themselves, American liaison teams were with the 58th Division, now between Hsin-ning and Wu-kang; the 57th, between Tung-kou and Chiang-kou (Ta-chiang-kou) on the road to Chihchiang; and the 51st, to the north of the main road.

The detachment with the 58th Division, a radio team and interpreter, was commanded by 1st Lt. Stan C. Hintze, a very junior officer for such a post, where he would perforce be advising a Chinese major general, but the shortage of personnel made it necessary. Lieutenant Hintze seems not to have tried to advise the commander on tactical matters but to have occupied himself "aiding the division commander with the supply problem, air support,

and keeping up on the tactical situation." On 25 April the Chinese commander began to fall back on the main Chinese forces to the northwest. He left a reinforced battalion to garrison Wu-kang, and withdrew his division westward. A U.S. air-ground liaison team joined Lieutenant Hintze on 29 April. Next day the Japanese Sekine Detachment (217th Infantry Regiment plus two battalions, 58th Infantry Brigade) opened its attack. Orders from higher authority directed the division to fall back again, this time to the Wawu-tang area, northwest and seventeen miles southwest of Tung-kou, to previously prepared positions.²⁹

The 57th Division Combat Section was commanded by Colonel Tomkies. When the division received orders to move up on the road to Chihchiang, Tomkies learned of the move through the Chinese, and since his radio was not working he had to send couriers to the 74th Army Combat Section to inform them of the move. Once the 57th was in action against the main force of the 116th Division on the Chihchiang road, Colonel Tomkies, assisted by two officers, kept in close touch with the tactical situation by having at least two U.S. officers at the front line every day. This was not easy, for the 57th was fighting on a wide front over hilly, almost roadless ground. When the staff of Tomkies' section opened their headquarters at Chiang-kou they found 130 wounded Chinese around the local bus station. There was no Chinese evacuation system; next morning thirty of the men were dead. Thereafter the Combat Section was alert to send wounded to the rear by any American vehicle that entered the area. When, on 28 April, Colonel King, commanding Eastern Command, and General Barber, CCC chief of staff, visited the 57th Division, the CCC party told the Chinese division commander that the present line had to be held until 11 May. At the meeting, the division commander remarked that the Americans had been very helpful in bringing up ammunition and evacuating wounded. Somewhat earlier, on 24 April, Tomkies took advantage of an inspection by the CCC G-2 to ask that automatic weapons be sent to the Chinese. Next day forty Bren guns arrived.³⁰

The 51st Division had been the left (north) flank of the 74th Army, whose liaison officer was Colonel Cummings. By the third week in April it was apparent that the Japanese advance was being made by infiltration on the grand scale, with columns thrusting deep into the complex and jumbled hill mass and bypassing Chinese resistance. So when the 51st Division was moved to a point about fifteen miles northwest of Shan-men, probably to prevent any bypassing of the Chinese on the road to Chihchiang, it proved difficult to put the division into contact with the Japanese. The combat section

commander, Col. Louis V. Jones, with another officer, a radio team, and an interpreter, learned from the Chinese division commander that the latter was moving out with two regiments on 14 April. The third was to follow later. Colonel Jones decided to follow in the wake of the division and with forty-four transport coolies began his hike on the 16th. The next day by inquiring he found that the Chinese commander and his two regiments had gone past the valley along which the Japanese, probably one of the three task forces into which the 116th was now divided, were approaching from the east. That left the 151st Regiment alone to go into action against the Japanese that night, 17 April. Next day Colonel Jones was able to join the division commander and recommend a deployment for the division. Jones suggested bringing the 152d Regiment up into line on the left (north) of the 151st, to link with the 19th Division, 100th Army, to the north. To the south, there was no physical contact with the 57th Division, so the division held its six-mile front with its flank in the air.

An air-ground team and air support were requested on 19 April. The air support arrived, one plane on the 20th and four on the 21st. Then the rain closed in and no air support could be given. This was unfortunate, because the Japanese 116th Division was now making considerable progress. The 133d Infantry Regiment took Shan-men, which meant the Japanese now had a foothold in the hills. The rough terrain, which made a mile and a half an hour a good pace for hiking cross country, favored the defense, and the Chinese had held stoutly.³¹

Immediately to the north of the 74th Army, in the Pai-ma Shan area, the 100th Army held positions in a line that ended about ten miles northwest of Lung-hui. The troops were in contact with the Japanese 109th Infantry Regiment all along their front, and were slowly withdrawing. Between the 100th Army and the 73d in the Hsin-hua area, thirty miles northwest of Lung-hui, was a considerable gap, into which the 18th Army was beginning to move. The 73d Army was in contact with a regiment of the 47th Division, and was facing south. The 73d was holding well, and replying to every Japanese gain with counterattacks.³²

Behind the lines on which the Chinese were holding well in the center and moving forward on the flanks, American and Chinese logistical support of every variety was building up. When the campaign opened, saving only the two portable surgical hospitals, the nearest SOS units had been those of the Kweiyang Area Command, a good 200 miles away.³³ The Chinese supply arrangements had seemed to Colonel King to be of the most inadequate

sort. Then the Japanese drive began, and more of China Theater's meager resources were deployed in that direction. On 4 June the old Communications Zone, China Theater, was subdivided into five base sections, four of which stretched out like a column of soldiers from Kunming to Chihchiang. Chihchiang became Base Section No. 4. In it by the end of the month were a base general depot, two platoons of the 21st Field Hospital, veterinary and malaria detachments, the 3447th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company, and signal troops.³⁴

The Chihchiang base supported forward truckheads and riverheads at eight different points, from An-chiang to Tung-kou on the east, and Hsin-hua to the northeast. The SOS delivered supplies to these points, where Eastern Command personnel took the responsibility of delivery by truck or sampan.

When the campaign began there had been two portable surgical hospitals in the area, the 34th and 44th. Ultimately, the 52d and 35th joined, together with the 3d Platoon, 21st Field Hospital. The American personnel strength of Eastern Command went up proportionately, to 230 officers and 1,326 enlisted men as of 1 May 1945, and to 264 and 1,509 respectively a month later.³⁵

Though in looking back on the campaign Colonel King had been very critical of the Chinese medical arrangements as he saw them and though one American observer could not find much of an evacuation system, still the Chinese must have made a very real effort to meet the needs of their troops. As of mid-July there were eight Chinese base hospitals and six evacuation hospitals in the Eastern Command, together with a number of medical detachments. The Chinese were operating a base depot at Chihchiang as of mid-July, four intermediate depots, and eighteen forward depots. Ammunition was issued from eight ammunition supply points. The base at Chihchiang had seventeen days of supply for U.S.-sponsored divisions, and sixteen days for the Chinese. Four more points had five days of supply for U.S.-sponsored and Chinese units each, and two more had two days of supply. Rice was bought in the Tung-ting Lake area, carried south by junk and sampan, then transferred to trucks.³⁶

CHINESE BOATMEN aboard small sampan pour beans into sacks before unloading at the SOS warehouse.

Over all this, the Fourteenth Air Force kept the skies. An occasional Japanese aircraft would be seen by liaison team members on what they took to be a reconnaissance mission, but the Japanese air force in China could no longer support the Emperor's soldiers in their last campaigns. The Chinese were supported in the Chihchiang campaign by the U.S. 5th Fighter Group with fifty-six fighters, and two squadrons of medium bombers. Eight air-ground liaison teams worked with the Chinese. Initially, the air-ground teams sent their requests for air support to a central control station at An-chiang, where the stream Yuan Chiang crosses the road to Chihchiang. Later, requests went directly to 5th Group headquarters. There the requests were accepted or rejected and, if accepted, given priorities. Fighters were then assigned as available, and armed with the weight and type of missile most suitable to the target.

During the two-month campaign, the fighter group used .50-caliber ammunition at the rate of 1,800,000 rounds a month, and flew 3,101 sorties.

Napalm was introduced to the war in eastern China. The six medium bombers flew 183 sorties.³⁷

The Test Successfully Passed

As April began drawing into May, the Japanese advances became ever more localized. The Chinese held ever more strongly on the flanks, and Japanese advances were confined to the Chihchiang road sector. The Japanese took Tung-kou, but the Chinese were not disheartened, and a "stubborn swapping" of hills ensued. The front line, from south to north, was an arc along the points Wu-kang-Wawutang-Tung-kou-Shan-men-Hsin hua.³⁸

From the south, the 94th Army (5th, 43d, 121st Divisions) was moving up toward the Japanese left flank and rear. The 43d Division was kept in army reserve; most of the fighting fell to the 5th Division. At 94th Army headquarters, the American liaison officer, Colonel Goodridge, his G-2, and an interpreter were in daily contact with the Army commander, General Mou Ting-fang. "Whenever the situation changed, the general called the liaison officer to the map and after explaining the situation, asked for his opinion. Usually a discussion of the merits of the plan followed with the general giving his reasons and ideas. In most cases the ensuing order followed along the lines of the plan suggested by the liaison officer."

The 5th Division's officers and noncommissioned officers had completed two weeks of training, in tactics and weapons respectively, when orders to move east, to Tien-chu, arrived. The march was halted for one day while the division was under way for it to receive summer uniforms, medical supplies, and a second issue of lend-lease ordnance, submachine guns, 60-mm. mortars, and Bren guns. By 29 April the division was at Chang-pu-tzu, forty-five miles southwest of Tung-kou, and on a road that led to the Japanese left flank. Here the Chinese turned north.

The 121st Division had also completed half of the noncommissioned and officer courses when it received orders to move. Some U.S. weapons were received, but lacked such accessories as rifle clips, bayonets, and slings. Like the 5th, the 121st received Bren guns and submachine guns while on the march. In its move eastward it took a course parallel to that of the 5th, but continued on to the next valley east of the one up which the 5th was now advancing. The 121st thus proceeded to the Wu-kang area, then moved north to Lung-tien.

The 5th Division met the Japanese on 2 May at the entrance to the Wu-yang valley. Next day a conference with liaison personnel resulted in a decision to attempt an envelopment. Completed over the 5th and 6th, the

operation was a complete success, and yielded a fair amount of Japanese equipment including artillery, some documents, and six prisoners. On 7 May the division began moving northeast into the adjacent valley where the 121st was operating. On the afternoon of the 11th it was in the area of Teng-tzu-pu, sixteen miles south of the Chihchiang-Pao-ching road, which was the main Japanese line of communications, and well east of Tung-kou. Meanwhile, the 121st Division had been moving steadily north up the Wu-kang valley, so that in effect the 5th Division crossed its line of march. The Japanese were repeatedly outflanked, and hustled north. The night of 11 May the Japanese were observed to be burning the village of Kao-sha near the Chihchiang-Pao-ching road. The 94th Army had successfully turned the Japanese left flank.

Reviewing the performance of the 121st Division, the liaison officer, Col. William M. Jackson, noted the beneficial effect of the American ration scheme, and the effectiveness of the 60-mm. mortar and submachine gun. He praised the aggressive spirit of the Chinese commanders, and the bravery of the men. The division commander discussed matters with liaison personnel and his staff, then made his decision. Airdropping of ammunition and supplies was most effective, and helped greatly to raise morale. In the liability column, he noted that small units were reluctant to envelop, and when they did left open an escape route for the enemy, a criticism also advanced by Colonel Goodridge for the 94th as a whole. There was not sufficient training in American weapons. Reconnaissance was usually poor. As a rule, unit commanders stayed in their command posts and operated with map and telephone.³⁹

From the north, the 18th and 100th Armies were swinging down behind the Japanese even as the 94th Army was coming up from the south. The 19th and 51st Divisions, 100th Army, had borne the brunt of the Japanese attempts to move west through the Pai-ma Shan area. On 11 May the 63d Division began to move, forcing the Japanese back toward Shan-men. These being flank positions, the Japanese held them stubbornly to allow their forward elements time to withdraw toward Pao-ching. But there were not enough Japanese present for them to guard every avenue of Chinese approach, and on 11 May the 11th Division, Chinese 18th Army, which had been out to the north and east, swung back west to retake Shan-men. That same day the 118th Division, 18th Army, moved troops on to the Chihchiang-Pao-ching road. During these operations the 18th Army took Japanese supply dumps and captured 500 head of horses. At this moment a Japanese disaster might have seemed inevitable, but higher Chinese headquarters

intervened and ordered the 118th to move back off the road and let the Japanese retreat.

The local Japanese headquarters, 20th Army, wanted to throw in the better part of two fresh divisions to retrieve the situation, but was overruled by 6th Area Army because the Japanese forces in China were now engaged in carrying out orders of Imperial General Headquarters for a redeployment of the greatest magnitude for operations of corresponding importance. Chihchiang airfield was not worth interfering with that. So the Japanese withdrew.⁴⁰

The Generalissimo bypassed Wedemeyer and the Chinese Combat Command, and on 6 May ordered Ho to seize Heng-yang, an action that would involve a major advance into Japanese-held territory. Learning of the order, Wedemeyer at once protested to the Generalissimo. As so often before, he pointed out that he as chief of staff could not co-ordinate Chinese and American activities if orders of which he was not informed were given to subordinate commands. He also argued that the Chinese were not ready for a major operation, and closed by stating that he did not challenge the Generalissimo's right to make decisions and would support them loyally once they were announced.⁴¹ The Generalissimo replied that the message to Ho was simply an opinion on his part, and that it had been issued as an order because of a misunderstanding by his staff.

From this point, the Chihchiang campaign is a story of Japanese retreat to the original line of departure at Pao-ching. The campaign ended 7 June 1945. The Chinese forces were not allowed to pursue the enemy farther because of logistical problems. Concentrating, arming, and supplying the Chinese in the Chihchiang campaign was a heavy drain on the air supply resources in China Theater. If the victory had been exploited, resources intended for BETA, the taking of the Canton-Hong Kong area, would have been consumed in a battle around Heng-yang and Changsha. If the Japanese had then been provoked into reinforcing the five regiments that had been so roughly handled, the outcome would have been unpredictable. So the pursuit halted, and Eastern Command was ordered on 29 May to guard against resources being drawn into a costly, premature advance by major units. On 22 June this injunction was reinforced by orders not to let the local Chinese commander, General Wang, engage in anything that might call for air supply. The Japanese were to be contained by diversionary action.⁴²

WAITING AT CHANYI AIRFIELD. Seasoned troops of the Chinese New Sixth Army are ready to emplane for the airlift to Chihchiang.

Looking back on the Chihchiang campaign, the Japanese found they had suffered approximately 1,500 men killed, and 5,000 wounded. There was much of professional interest in their opponents' conduct of the campaign. "Most distinctive," to the Japanese, was the airlift of the New Sixth Army to Chihchiang. They did not notice anything of the "publicized modernization" of the Chinese forces except an increase in automatic rifles, presumably the submachine guns. The Chinese tactics in the Chihchiang campaign seemed to be a "great advance" over the past, and the Japanese were impressed by the work of the air-artillery-infantry team, accurate artillery fire, and concentration of fire on key points. In retrospect, some Japanese officers concluded that they failed because they did not take into account what their intelligence had warned them of--the improvement in the Chinese forces.⁴³

The successful defense of Chihchiang cost the Chinese heavy casualties. The 18th, 73d, 100th Armies, plus the 13th and Temporary-6th Divisions, lost 256 officers and 6,576 enlisted men killed, and 504 officers and 11,223 enlisted men wounded. To these figures must be added the unknown losses of the 94th and 18th Armies.⁴⁴

Japanese operations in the Lao-ho-kou-Hsian area were more successful than those against Chihchiang, but only nominally, in that the Japanese did occupy the airfield at Lao-ho-kou. Chennault had been able to commit the 311th and 81st Fighter Groups and the 426th Night Fighter Squadron of the AAF plus a fighter group and two bombardment squadrons of the Chinese-American Composite Wing, but by moving at night against slight Chinese resistance the Japanese had been able to occupy Lao-ho-kou. So far events had followed a familiar pattern. But at this point General Hu Tsung-nan's troops, whom the Japanese had rated as the best in China, counterattacked heavily. The weak Japanese 110th Division was soon in trouble and had to be reinforced with one artillery and two infantry battalions. This was insufficient, and finally a total of seven Japanese battalions had to be added. The Japanese finally stabilized their lines and the fighting died down, but only after losses they called "tremendous" after the war. While the fighting was under way, Colonel Barrett's liaison group worked to set up an infantry training center, whose doors opened 13 May. The center opened too late to affect the fighting in any way, and honors went to the team formed by General Hu, his armies, and the Chinese and American airmen of General Chennault.⁴⁵

The Chihchiang campaign demonstrated that Chinese troops whose commanders were determined to stand could successfully face the Japanese if they had sufficient numerical strength and a steady supply of food and ammunition. In the Chihchiang campaign the Chinese used as many armies as the Japanese did regiments. By aggressive maneuvering they were able to outflank the Japanese and force them to retreat. The strong and weak points of Chinese commanders, staffs, and troops were fully displayed.

In the campaign, Wedemeyer's accomplishments to April 1945 were tested, and shown to be considerable. Indeed, the test was the more severe in that his system was far from being in full operation. The troops involved had not had unit training. The officers and noncommissioned officers had received only brief schooling. The Chinese soldiers had not received their full allowance of weapons, and had to get their familiarization training during march halts and between skirmishes. Had the Chinese divisions received the

contemplated twenty-six-week training, their performance would have been even better than it was.

Outweighing these handicaps were the achievements that Wedemeyer had effected: an over-all plan of campaign into which local plans might be properly fitted; a workable command system, both in the local Chinese forces and between the Allies; and a supply system which brought food and ammunition to the critical areas. They were decisive to the campaign, and indicated that real progress was being made in China Theater. That the Chinese adopted procedures which may have seemed to them contrary to their accepted practices reflected credit upon both their spirit of co-operation and the powers of persuasion of Wedemeyer, McClure, and their staffs. However, a critique of this campaign shows that there were flaws which should have been eliminated if successful offensive operations were to be conducted.

The liaison system, through which the Chinese Combat Command was to have exercised virtual operational control of the Chinese, worked at a lower level than had been contemplated. After-action reports do not suggest that the commanders of the combat sections commanded the Chinese armies. Rather, the impression given is that the more aggressive and experienced American officers forcefully advised their Chinese associates, and that those less capable simply acted as liaison officers, with reportorial and supply functions. Several factors probably tended to make this so:

1. For logistic reasons, the American physical contribution to the campaign did not go beyond a modest level of air support, some heavy weapons and ammunition, and some medical aid. Having largely to rely on their own resources, the Chinese tended to follow their own counsel. Had the Americans paid more to the piper, they might have done more toward calling the tunes he played.

2. The system was meeting its first test. None of the parties to it were quite certain of their roles. Had time permitted, the workings of the liaison system might have conformed completely to Wedemeyer's intentions. Therefore, on all levels of command Chinese officers did things, such as allowing surrounded Japanese units to escape, which were completely contrary to Western ideas of war.

The CCC's ingenious command and liaison arrangements took a long step forward toward a fully integrated Sino-American command structure during the Chihchiang campaign, but more months of training and campaigning would be needed before it could justly be said that CCC was functioning at full efficiency.⁴⁶

Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (8) * Next Chapter (10)

Footnotes

1. Ch. V.

2. (1) GO 7, Hq CCC USFCT, 29 Jan 45. (2) History, Kwangsi Command, CCC, Jan-Mar 45. CCC Files, KCRC. (3) Bowman comments on draft MS.

3. Rad CYF 13495, McClure to Wedemeyer, 11 Apr 44. AG 311.23, CCC Files, KCRC.

4. For General Tu's background, see Stilwell's Mission to China. Chapters III and IV.

5. Save as otherwise indicated, data on the Reserve Command may be found in two historical reports, sent by letters. Ltrs, Capt George E. McLaughlin, Actg AG, Hq Reserve Comd, CCC (Prov), USFCT, to CG CCC (Prov), 30 Aug 45, 7 Sep 45. OCMH.

6. Ltr, Col Laurence B. Bixby, CofS Reserve Comd CCC (Prov), to McClure, 25 May 45, sub: Progress Rpt. CCC and Asgd Units Hist Rpt, OCMH.

7. McClure comments on draft MS.

8. Save as otherwise indicated, this section is based on MS, Formal Historical Record, for the Period 29 Jan 45-1 Sep 45, for Brig Gen Woods King, Hq IV Army Group Comd CCC USFCT, 1 Sep 45. OCMH.

9. (1) 1st Ind, Lt Col Ivan W. Ward, Actg AG CCC, 14 Jan 45, to CG CT&CC. G-3 Rpts, AG (CCC) 319.1, KCRC. (2) Special G-1 Rpt, Hq Eastern Comd CCC, 22 Jul 45. Folder, Histories 1945, 74th Army Combat Section CCC Files, KCRC. (3) Combined Staff Mtg 36, 14 Apr 45. AG (CCC) 338.1, KCRC. (4) When Eastern Command was set up the strength of the 18th Army was not known. However, strength figures obtained later suggest the estimate given above as the army's strength before it became engaged with the enemy in mid-April.

10. Hist Rpt, CCC, Apr-Sep 45 p. 9. OCMH (2) Min, SOS General Staff Conf, 5 Apr 45. SOS China Theater Files, KCRC.

11. Hist Data, LXXIV Army Hq, U.S. Combat Sec, Qtrly Rpt, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45, Sha-wan, Hunan Province. OCMH.

12. Hist Data, Hq 57th Div, U.S. Combat Sec, Qtrly Rpt, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45, Yungkow, Hunan Province. OCMH.

13. Japanese Study 129, pp. 70-74.

14. Japanese Study 130, Map 3, pp. 56-59, 74.

15. Rad CFB 32476, Wedemeyer to MacArthur and Nimitz, info Marshall, 5 Feb 45. Bk 2 ACW Personal File.

16. Min, Mtg 40, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 17 Feb 45. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.

17. (1) Japanese Study 78. (2) Min, Mtg 48, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 5 Apr 45; Mtg 40, 24 Apr 45. (3) Ltr, Col Barrett to Wedemeyer, 7 May 45, sub: Conf with CG First War Area. AG 337 Misc, Folder, Meetings from 1944 to 30 Aug 45, China Theater Files, KCRC. (4) Staff Study 11, Theater Planning Sec, 24 Mar 45. Register No. 06106-R, USFCT Files, DRB AGO.

18. Ltr cited n. 6.

19. (1) Ltr cited n. 6. (2) Japanese Study 78.

20. Annex I to MS cited n. 8.

21. (1) G-3 Per Rpt, Hq CCC, 11 Apr 45; Hist Rpt, IV Army Gp Comd (successor to Eastern Command). Folder, Histories 1945, 74th Army Combat Sec; CCC Files, KCRC. (2) Hist Data, Hq, 58th Div, U.S. Combat Sec, Qtrly Rpt, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45. OCMH.

22. Rads, Eastern Comd to CCC, 10 Apr, 12 Apr 45. AG (CCC) 311.23, KCRC.

23. (1) In Radiogram CYF 13528, McClure to Wedemeyer, 15 April 1945, McClure's language indicates the plan is basically American. (2) Combined Staff Mtg 36, 14 Apr 45. AG (CCC) 337.1, KCRC. (3) McClure comments on draft MS.

24. Rad CFB 35833, Wedemeyer to McClure, 17 Apr 45. CCC Files, KCRC.

25. History of the American Combat Section [18th Army], 1 Jan 45-31 Mar 45, 1 Apr 45-30 Jun 45. CCC Files, KCRC.

26. Rpt, 94th Army, American Liaison Team. Folder, History of III Group Command. CCC Files, KCRC.

27. (1) Combined Staff Mtgs 38-46, 20 Apr-9 May 45. AG (CCC) 337.1, KCRC. (2) Ltr, Col Heavey to CG SOS, 28 May 45, sub: Rpt of Opns of Provisional Truck Organization. OCMH.

28. (1) Min, Mtg 50, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 24 Apr 45. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes. (2) Rad CAK 10127, Chennault to Wedemeyer, 22 Apr 45. CCC Files, KCRC.

29. (1) Hist Data, Hq, 58th Div, U.S. Combat Sec, Qtrly Rpt. 1 Apr-30 Jun 45, Wu-kang, Hunan Province. OCMH. (2) Japanese Study 78.

30. Hist Data, Hq 57th Div, U.S. Combat Sec, Qtrly Rpt, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45, Tungkow, Hunan Province. OCMH.

31. (1) Hist Data, 74th Army, U.S. Combat Sec. CCC Files, KCRC. (2) Hist Data Hq 51st Div, U.S. Combat Sec, Qtrly Rpt, 1 Apr-Jun 45. OCMH.

32. (1) Per Rpt, G-3 Hq CCC, 2 May 45 (for 21-28 Apr 45). CCC Files, KCRC. (2) Japanese Study 78.

33. Tab 22, G-4, China Theater, Per Rpt, 1st Qtr 1945. CCC and CT Records, KCRC.

34. See map opposite p. 227, G-4, China Theater, Per Rpt, 2d Qtr 1945. CCC and CT Records, KCRC. (2) GO 45, Hq SOS USFCT, 4 Jun 45.

35. (1) Special G-1 Rpt, Hq Eastern Comd, 22 Jul 45. CCC Files, KCRC. (2) MS cited n. 8.

36. (1) Special G-4 Rpt, Eastern Comd, Hq CCC, 21 Jul 45. CCC Files, KCRC. (2) A day of supply in terms of rounds per weapon per day was prescribed by the War Department for each weapon. As of 31 March 1945, days of supply for certain important weapons in China Theater were: rifle, 3 rounds; machine gun, Bren, Maxim, Browning, 70 rounds; 37-mm. antitank, 5 rounds; 75-mm. howitzer, 25 rounds; 81-mm. mortar, 8 rounds. Cir 36, Rear echelon, Hq USFCT, 19 Mar 45. Reproduced as Tab 4, G-4 Per Rpt, 1st Qtr 1945. CCC and CT Records, KCRC. (3) Ltr, Heavy to CG SOS cited n. 27(2) says the 475th's trucks were used as ambulances on one occasion. The accompanying Chinese arrangements seemed to him inadequate.

37. The Army Air Forces. V, Ch. IX.

38. Summary, G-3 Rpts, Hq IV Army Group (Eastern) Comd USFCT. Folder, Histories, 1945, 74 Army Combat Sec, CCC Files, KCRC.

39. Report by 94th Army American Liaison Team, from which the quotation was taken; A History of 5th Div, 94th Army, 2 Sep 45; A History of 121st Div, 94th Army, 2 Sep 45. Folder History of III Gp Comd, AG (CCC) 314.7, KCRC.

40. (1) Japanese Study 130, p. 69. (2) For a discussion of current Japanese strategy, see below Chapter XI.

41. (1) Memo 562 and Incls, Wedemeyer for Generalissimo, 9 May 45. Item 37, Bk 9, ACW Corresp with Chinese. (2) Min, Mtg 54, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 8 May 45. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.

42. (1) Annex III to MS cited n. 8. (2) Missions, Eastern Command and Fourth Area Army, Annex to MS, Historical Data of Eastern Command, 16 Aug 45. Folder, Histories, 1945, 74 Army Combat Sec, CCC Files, KCRC.

43. (1) Japanese Study 78 has the casualty figures. (2) Japanese Study 130, p. 68. (3) The thirty-six-division program was discussed in the Chinese press, much to U.S. displeasure. Memo 458, Gen Gross, Actg CofS, for Generalissimo, 22 Mar 45. Bk 16, ACW Corresp with Chinese. (4) Japanese Officers' comments on draft MS.

44. (1) Special G-1 Rpt cited n. 35(1). (2) The disparity between Chinese and Japanese casualty figures does not necessarily reflect on the accuracy of the latter. As a rule, a force of higher professional quality than its opponent will inflict more casualties than it suffers itself.

45. (1) Japanese Study 78. (2) The Army Air Forces, V, 264. (3) Hq Rpt, Hq I War Area Infantry Training Center to CO I War Area Liaison Team, 10 Jul 44, sub: Training Rpt. OCMH.

46. For a lengthy criticism of the campaign see Training Memo 8, Hq Eastern Comd, CCC, 12 Jul 45, Notes on Western Hunan Campaign. Folder, Histories 1945, 74 Army Combat Sec, CCC Files, KCRC.