The Last Offensive
February-May 1945

Chapter XIII
Tactical, Logistical, and Organizational Aspects of the Last Offensive

(1) Tactical Developments, 8 February-8 May 1945

The Ardennes operation not only proved to be the enemy's last major offensive effort; it had weakened his defensive capabilities beyond recovery. Allied might, on the other hand, continued to grow, and by the end of January 1945 was greater, both in numbers and in the logistic capability to support sustained operations, than it had ever been before. Early in February the Allies launched offensives which did not relax in intensity until victory was finally won.¹

The basic plan for the spring offensive had been laid down some time before. It called for closing to the Rhine and then crossing that barrier to envelop the Ruhr, the main effort to be made in the north. The first phase was conceived of as a series of hammer blows, beginning in the north. (Map 6)

In accord with these plans Field Marshal Montgomery's 21 Army Group launched the first attack in the battle for the Rhineland on 8 February. The First Canadian Army, operating from the vicinity of Nijmegen over ground either waterlogged by thaws or completely flooded, drove southeastward between the Maas and the Rhine, fighting one of the most bitterly contested battles of the war (Operation VERITABLE). The Ninth U.S. Army, also under 21 Army Group control, was by plan to have launched a complementary attack (Operation GRENADE) two days later, driving northeastward across the Roer to meet Canadian forces and clear the area west of the Rhine between Duesseldorf and Wesel. These plans were temporarily frustrated on 9 February when the enemy blew the critically important Roer dams just as the First Army's V Corps captured the controlling ground, creating a formidable water barrier and forcing the postponement of the Ninth Army's attack for two weeks. Ninth Army, aided by an extensive air interdiction operation and by a shattering forty-five minute artillery preparation carried out by the guns of three armies, finally launched its assault of the Roer River line on 23 February, putting twenty-eight battalions of infantry across

Map 6
Tactical Developments
8 February-8 May 1945

LUDENDORFF RAILWAY BRIDGE over the Rhine River at Remagen captured by men of the 9th Armored Division.

on the first day. After several days of hard fighting General Simpson's forces broke out of the bridgehead and began making excellent progress. On 2 March elements of one corps reached the Rhine, and on the following day elements of another joined with British forces at Geldern. By 5 March the Ninth Army had closed to the Rhine in its entire sector.

Farther south First Army also crossed the Roer on 23 February and within another five days the Erft River as well. General Hodges' troops pushed rapidly eastward in the next few days and closed to the Rhine. By 5 March most of the west bank of the Rhine north of Cologne was in Allied hands, and on the 7th Cologne itself fell. The capture of this important prize was overshadowed by a more dramatic event on the same day farther south in the First Army zone when the 9th Armored Division seized a railway bridge intact over the Rhine at Remagen. First Army promptly established a bridgehead there and reinforced it as rapidly as possible.

By this time operations to close to the Rhine were also under way still farther south. Third Army, beginning with probing attacks in accordance with an injunction from higher authority to limit its action to an "aggressive defense" during 21 Army Group's operation, steadily chewed its way through the Siegfried Line fortifications in its sector. By 23 February, the date of the Roer assaults farther north, Third Army had battered through the enemy's main defenses in the western Eifel, the area of

the December counteroffensive. In the next ten days it captured Trier and advanced beyond the Kyll River. On 6 March the XII Corps erupted from its Kyll bridgehead and in less than two days advanced fifty miles along the ridge roads of the Eifel to the Rhine. By 10 March another sizable stretch of the Rhine's west bank, from Koblenz northward, was in Allied hands.

Third Army's quick success north of the Moselle made possible a favorable development in operations farther south. After a few days of mopping-up operations north of the Moselle, General Patton's forces on 13 and 14 March launched attacks eastward from Trier and southeastward across the lower Moselle, advancing rapidly across the rugged Hunsruck far to the rear of the German forces. On 15 March the Seventh Army joined the attack from the southeast, driving into the Saar industrial area. While General Patch's forces slugged their way through the heavily fortified West Wall in the south, Patton now sent armored columns racing south and east from the lower Moselle, rendering the entire enemy defensive position in the Palatinate untenable. Within a week of the Moselle crossing Third Army forces had cleared the entire Rhine from Mannheim to Koblenz. On 21 March the enemy's defenses in the Saarbruecken area finally crumpled, and Seventh Army broke through to link up with the Third Army and complete the clearance of the area west of the Rhine. By this time the First Army held a bridgehead at Remagen eight miles deep and six divisions strong.

While isolated enemy pockets west of the Rhine were being eliminated and while preparations went forward with great deliberation for a Rhine crossing north of the Ruhr, Third Army had brought its bridging forward in the wake of its advancing infantry, and on the night of 22 March, unaided by either artillery or air support, launched a surprise crossing at Oppenheim, fifteen miles south of Mainz. Within two days three divisions had crossed the Rhine and had carved out a bridgehead ten miles wide and nine miles deep. Other Third Army units made additional crossings which were quickly joined. Patton's forces rapidly expanded these bridgeheads in the next few days. By 28 March most of the army was east of the Rhine, and armored units had already crossed the Main and thrust forty miles beyond.

The 21 Army Group operation, employing units of both the Second British and the Ninth U.S. Armies, got under way on the night of 23 March. The northern crossing was aided by a huge air interdiction program designed to isolate the Ruhr, and on the morning of the 24th the assault was further supported by the dropping of two airborne divisions beyond the river. Resistance was heavy, but there was never any question of success, and by the end of the first day the Ninth Army held a bridgehead about nine miles wide and from three to six miles deep.

Reinforcing these successes, the First Army on 25 March launched attacks from the Remagen bridgehead and within the next three days drove eastward as far as Marburg and Giessen, and southeastward to link up with Third Army units north of Wiesbaden. Finally, additional crossings of the Rhine were made on 26 March, when the Seventh U.S.

Army crossed both north and south of Worms, and on 31 March, when the First French Army crossed near Speyer. By the end of the month, therefore, five Allied armies were firmly established east of the Rhine, the enemy's last great natural bulwark. Two U.S. armies, the First and Third, were already advancing up the Frankfurt corridor into the heart of the Reich.

In the first days of April all efforts were focused on the encirclement of the Ruhr. Contrary to the scheme of maneuver originally envisaged, tactical developments now favored a major effort in the center, where both armies of the 12th Army Group had already made deep thrusts beyond the Rhine, rather than in the north, where the bridgehead was still small. Accordingly, the First and Third Armies were now ordered to advance shoulder to shoulder in a northeasterly direction, the Third on the axis Hersfeld-Kassel, and the First on the axis Marburg-Paderborn, to make contact with 21 Army Group. General Devers' 6th Army Group was to protect the southern flank of this drive.

These missions were largely accomplished within two days. On 1 April the Third Army reached Kassel, and then shifted its attacks eastward across the Werra River. In the meantime the First Army, while guarding with its left along the Sieg River and the rough Rothaar Gebirge, jabbed due north through the Hessian hills with its armored and motorized right to join up with armored elements of the Ninth Army at Lippstadt. On 1 April the Ruhr "pocket," an area of 4,000 square miles and containing the entire German Army Group B, was finally a reality.

First and Ninth Armies immediately began regrouping in preparation for the final elimination of the huge pocket, the Ninth Army once more reverting to 12th Army Group control, and on 4 April General Bradley issued instructions for attacks by the three U.S. corps which contained the large enemy force from the south, east, and north. A corps of the Fifteenth Army had already assumed responsibility for the area west of the Rhine. The encircled enemy forces counterattacked repeatedly in the next few days, and heavy fighting ensued at some points. But all attempts to break out of the pocket proved abortive, and the ring was steadily drawn tighter. On 14 April First and Ninth Army forces met at Hagen, splitting the pocket in two. Two days later the eastern half collapsed, and on 18 April all resistance came to an end. The Ruhr pocket had yielded nearly a third of a million prisoners.

The advance eastward had continued after only a brief pause for reorganization. On 2 April General Eisenhower had issued instructions for the drive into central Germany, specifying that the main effort was to be made in the center with the intent of splitting the Reich and then destroying enemy forces on either side. The 12th Army Group, with twenty-two divisions initially available for the eastward drive, surged forward on 6 April on a 150-mile front. Resistance thereafter diminished rapidly, and the enemy's central front soon lost all semblance of cohesion. Armored units now slashed forward at will, leaving pockets of resistance to be eliminated by the infantry. Only in the Thuringian Forest and the Harz Mountains did the enemy offer serious opposition. By 18

April, the day on which the Ruhr pocket was eliminated, all three armies had reached the restraining line drawn along the Elbe and Mulde Rivers and through the cities of Chemnitz and Bayreuth. British forces in the meantime had cleared a part of the coastal area in the north and were not far from Bremen and Hamburg. General Devers' forces, in addition to protecting Third Army's flank, had driven southeastward as far as Nuremberg. Well over a million prisoners had been taken since the Rhine crossings.

These swift advances brought the Allies into imminent contact with Russian forces, which were fast approaching the Elbe River from the east, and which were also driving up the Danube. With Germany virtually split in half, General Eisenhower now halted the advance in the center in order to reinforce and provide logistic support for drives to the southeast and the north. Assigning both the First and Ninth Armies a largely defensive role along the Elbe and Mulde Rivers, General Bradley now swung the Third Army southeastward and launched a powerful thrust down the Danube Valley. Simultaneously with this operation General Devers' two armies also drove southward to destroy the myth of a German redoubt in the Alps, and far to the north Field Marshal Montgomery's two armies continued their sweep of the north German plain.

Resistance melted away rapidly in the final weeks, and by the end of the month the once formidable German war machine lay broken and overpowered. In the first days of May the 21 Army Group completed clearing the north German plain westward to Holland and eastward to Luebeck, Third Army drove into Austria and western Czechoslovakia, and General Devers' two armies drove southward and made contact with the Fifth Army at the Brenner Pass. First Army in the meantime had overcome the remaining pockets of resistance in the center, capturing Leipzig and closing up to the Mulde in its sector, and had made contact with Russian forces at Torgau. On 7 May Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, representing the German high command, signed the Act of Surrender which finally brought an end to hostilities in Europe.

(2) Logistic Factors in Planning the Last Offensive

The problem of crossing the Rhine was inevitably the central feature of all planning for the spring offensive, and its logistic aspects had a prominent place in all such planning. Detailed planning for the Rhine crossings had begun early in the fall of 1944, and every operation envisaging a possible break-through to the Rhine gave fresh impetus to such preparations.

In all the planning for the Rhine crossings the SHAEF staff invariably considered three areas in which crossings were deemed feasible--the Emmerich-Wesel area, the Cologne-Koblenz area, and the Frankfurt-Mannheim area. Terrain considerations and the importance of the Ruhr as a major military objective had led to the early assumption that the major effort would be made in the Emmerich-Wesel sector, north of the Ruhr. One of the early appreciations spoke of committing twenty-seven divisions in the northern bridgehead, leaving a slightly smaller number for a subsidiary offensive, either in the Cologne-

Koblenz or the Frankfurt-Mannheim sector. A later study considered the establishment of bridgeheads in all three areas, building up the northern operation to a strength of thirty-one divisions and exploiting only one of the others depending on the prospects for success.²

Crossing the Rhine was from the start looked upon as more than just another river crossing operation. Because of the width of the river the problems of the operation in some respects resembled those of a short sea voyage. As in the cross-Channel attack, speed in building up Allied strength in the bridgeheads was all important. The main logistic problem, consequently, was one of transportation. Good road and rail networks on both sides of the Rhine were obviously necessary. The Rhine bridges, like the Normandy beaches, would be the bottlenecks through which Allied forces and supplies would have to be funneled and would largely determine the rate of build-up and the size of forces that could be supported.

Planning, which had been interrupted by the enemy counteroffensive in December, was renewed with fresh vigor early in the new year. On 8 January SHAEF issued a directive to the major subordinate commands summarizing the assumptions on which planning for the spring offensive should proceed. Although SHAEF planners continued to consider the possibilities of attacks in all three of the areas mentioned above, the directive of 8 January dealt only with an operation north of the Ruhr. It emphasized that a major offensive would probably be launched in that area, and concluded that a maximum force of 36 divisions (15 British and 21 U.S.) could eventually be supported in the northern bridgehead. In arriving at this total SHAEF planners believed they were planning the maximum potential exploitation of logistical resources, and the chief of staff emphasized that the support of these forces would require a "drastic curtailment of ordinary standards of administrative convenience." They had figured maintenance requirements at 600 tons per division slice per day in the combat zone, including sixty tons of common supply items per division required by tactical air units. An important feature of planning from this time on was the decision to lay pipelines across the Rhine to carry three fourths of the POL requirements east of the river. Laying pipelines beyond the German border had previously been considered inadvisable. But since POL constituted a third or more of all tonnage requirements, the use of pipelines obviously would mean a tremendous saving in traffic over the Rhine bridges.³

Both the 12th Army Group and the Communications Zone concluded that the operation could be supported under the conditions outlined by the SHAEF

directive, and differed on only one major point. Apprehensions growing out of past experience led the Army group to ask for 650 tons per division slice per day as insurance against what it termed "misdeliveries," admitting that the smaller figure more nearly represented actual consumption needs. SHAEF, the Communications Zone, and 12th Army Group all based their estimates on the assumption that there would be no rail service into the bridgehead until about D plus 63, and that the armies would be able to transport their own supplies east of the river until D plus 50. The 12th Army Group figured that it might require truck support by the Communications Zone before that date only under conditions of rapid advance--that is, if points of delivery were thirty miles beyond the Rhine and fifty-five miles beyond the service areas. POL pipelines over the Rhine were counted on to be in operation by D plus 21.⁴

The SHAEF planning staff had also studied the logistic implications of an offensive in the south. An offensive north of the Ruhr would employ less than half of the divisions expected to be available for the spring offensive; logic seemed to dictate that preparations should be made for an offensive in the south to achieve the maximum strategic flexibility. A planning appreciation prepared in mid-January considered two possible alternatives for a southern offensive--either a subsidiary to the attack north of the Ruhr, or a larger effort assuming the use of less than maximum forces in the north. A study of logistic implications indicated that as many as fifty divisions could be supported in a southern bridgehead if it was developed to maximum capacity. This assumed, as in the north, that railways would be pushed close to the Rhine and that motor transport would be reserved for use forward of rail and pipeheads.⁵

General Eisenhower's plans, which contemplated offensives by both First and Third Armies, raised fears among British officials that a northern offensive might be prejudiced, and led them to insist on a more unequivocal commitment on a northern operation and a promise that an assault north of the Ruhr would not await the closing to the Rhine along its entire length. After discussions between Generals Eisenhower and Marshall at Marseille, and between General Smith and the Combined Chiefs at Malta at the end of January, the Supreme Commander early in February issued a new directive for long-range planning designed to dispel any doubts as to his intentions. In it he announced his intention of carrying out the main offensive north of the Ruhr, and he also gave assurances that crossings would be made as soon as feasible and without waiting to close to the river along its entire length. He made clear, however, that the possibility could not be ignored that circumstances might compel a switch of large forces to the Mainz-Karlsruhe area, and he considered it prudent to

make logistical preparations for such an eventuality and for the support of an alternate offensive.

General Eisenhower directed the Communications Zone to prepare to support such an offensive, operating northeast out of a southern bridgehead beginning as soon after 15 April as tactical conditions permitted, on the assumption that the force employed would eventually build up to a strength of forty divisions. Logistical resources were not considered adequate to permit the support of both offensives simultaneously at maximum scale--that is, thirty-six and fifty divisions. But the planners believed that the maximum strategic flexibility would be achieved if logistical preparations were made for the maximum force on either of the two axes. The 5 February directive specified that in any question of priorities, preparations for the northern offensive were to have overriding priority.⁶

The possibility of crossings in the Cologne-Koblenz area was no longer given serious consideration. The central sector had always been the least favored for both tactical and logistical reasons. Road communications to the northeast led through highly defensible terrain, and most of the important rail routes ultimately ran northward into the built-up area of the Ruhr. The maintenance of large forces northeastward in that area was considered infeasible without rail and therefore extravagant of engineering effort. Moreover, the area west of the Rhine in the Cologne-Koblenz sector did not lend itself to the establishment of the large depot and maintenance installations needed for the support of a major operation. A build-up east of the Rhine in that area consequently would be at the expense of support in the other bridgeheads.⁷

The Communications Zone proceeded to plan on the basis of the directive of 5 February, and on 2 and 3 March issued outline plans for the logistic support of spring offensives in the north and in the south respectively. The two plans differed very little. Both called for pushing rail support well forward into the army areas up to the time of the crossings and constructing rail bridges over the Rhine, and they designated the general lines along which the railways would be rebuilt east of the river. Both also called for POL pipelines across the river. As usual, the two advance sections were to provide support for the armies, and their role east of the Rhine was conceived as being highly mobile. Both planned to turn over their depots to other sections after the crossings--the Advance Section to Channel Base Section and Oise Intermediate Section and the Continental Advance Section to Oise--and to operate only mobile depots east of the Rhine and some dumps west of the river. Neither was to have territorial responsibility within Germany. In the main, the northern bridgehead was planned to receive its support from the Liège-Charleroi-Lille depots and the

southern forces from the Verdun-Nancy-Toul-Langres-Dijon installations. The Communications Zone had from the beginning had apprehensions about supporting U.S. forces in the Wesel area because of congested communications and conflict with British installations, and had asked for additional depot space in the north and for running rights over some of the British-controlled railways. While some pause for regrouping and gathering of supplies was recognized as possible before the actual Rhine assault, the Communications Zone wisely directed that for planning purposes administrative preparations should assume that bridgeheads would be established immediately upon closing to the Rhine.⁸

Ironically, fate decreed the capture of the first bridgehead in the area least favored in all the planning estimates, partially upsetting the carefully laid plans for the spring offensive. Nevertheless, commanders at all echelons acted swiftly to exploit the unexpected capture of the Remagen bridge, and immediately studied its logistic implications. Plans were promptly made to extend rail service to the site from both the northwest (via Dueren) and the southwest (via Trier). Preparations for the latter were almost immediately canceled as the result of the collapse of the captured rail bridge. The build-up went ahead, nevertheless, and the bridgehead was quickly exploited eastward along the axis of the Autobahn, which led directly to objectives in the Giessen area, and to an eventual link-up with forces in the southern bridgehead area, where support could more easily be given by rail from the Metz-Verdun depots. POL pipelines never extended to the Rhine in the Remagen area, but a short pipeline was eventually built at Mehlem to pump gasoline from a west bank terminal to the storage tanks near the Autobahn east of the river. Plans now called for a buildup of thirteen to eighteen divisions in the Remagen bridgehead. Sixteen divisions were eventually supported on the central axis.⁹

Barely two weeks after the First Army's crossing at Remagen the Third Army's surprise assault raised the question of the advisability of strengthening the southern bridgehead at the expense of the northern. No decision was immediately made, although it was decided that the operation north of the Ruhr should not fall below twenty-four divisions in strength. The build-up in the north eventually reached thirty-one divisions, and that in the south 35.¹⁰

The actual course of operations beyond the Rhine strikingly emphasized the conservatism and caution of the planners, despite SHAEF's injunction against "over-insurance" in the matter of logistic support. The Allied build-up in the Rhine bridgeheads eventually totaled

eighty-two divisions, of which sixty-six were US.-supported, and was effected at a much faster rate than was originally thought feasible. Moreover, within the time limits adopted, Allied forces were supported at much greater distances than originally believed possible.

Forecasts of tactical progress which SHAEF planners made even after the Rhine assaults, assuming "optimistic conditions, with organized but weak enemy resistance," showed a bridgehead with a depth of only fifty miles north of the Ruhr and sixty miles in the south on 15 May, and extending generally along the line Luebeck-Magdeburg-Regensburg-Munich in mid-July.¹¹ Logistic plans had not counted on Rhine rail bridges being in use until nine weeks after the crossings, an estimate which proved far too conservative. Moreover, they had calculated maintenance requirements at substantially higher rates than either past or current experience warranted.¹²

Logistic planners at the Communications Zone fortunately had made preparations to support a much more rapid advance than was assumed in SHAEF forecasts. Undoubtedly recalling the experience of the preceding summer, the Communications Zone as early as 19 February had issued a planning directive and outline plan keyed to rapid advance conditions which called on both advance sections to plan for an emergency marshaling of truck transport in the event of an accelerated advance.¹³ Logistical planners realized that such a coralling of transportation for use in the forward areas would mean a curtailment of other COMZ activities, such as port clearance and static interdepot hauls, and would result in a heavy drain on forward depots. But it was felt that the logistic structure was strong enough to withstand such a sacrifice for as much as thirty days without adverse effects, even though it might eventually have repercussions on port discharge.

The speed of the advance in the last month actually exceeded even these plans for "rapid advance." As in the summer of 1944, the prospect of great tactical gains led to an even more extraordinary marshaling of resources and sacrifice of normal operations than the Communications Zone had considered safe. But its foresight paid good dividends, and there was no hesitation in stretching resources to the limit when opportunity beckoned the armies forward. Success in supporting the final drive can be attributed in large measure to the flexible plans which COMZ organizations had worked out for the expansion of transport in the forward areas and the rapidity with which rail bridges were installed. The decision to prepare simultaneously for alternate offensives with maximum strength in both the north and south likewise proved wise, for these preparations made possible the prompt exploitation at Remagen and adequate support of the crossings in the Frankfurt-Mannheim sector. Once again, however, the Allies, conscious of the logistic difficulties which had hampered

operations since September, appear to have underestimated their capabilities.

(3) Command and Organization, February-August 1945

ETOUSA's command and organizational structure had been substantially completed by the end of 1944, and, except for the dissolution of SOLOC, no further major alterations were made in either the field or service force commands. In the ground forces the only changes of importance concerned the operational control of the First and Ninth Armies and the role of the Fifteenth Army. The First Army, which along with the Ninth, had been placed under the control of 21 Army Group during the Ardennes battle, was returned to the 12th Army Group on 18 January 1945, after its juncture with the Third Army in the Houffalize area. The Ninth Army remained under Field Marshal Montgomery's control for the Roer and Rhine crossing operations, and finally reverted to General Bradley's control after the encirclement of the Ruhr early in April. The Fifteenth Army, which had been activated late in December, was limited for several weeks to an almost purely administrative and planning role, handling the staging and equipping of newly arrived units in the theater and planning for the occupation. Late in March it took command of the forces containing the Brittany ports, and early in April it relieved other 12th Army Group units of occupation duties west of the Rhine. Fifteenth Army had only a minor operational role in the final offensive beyond the Rhine.¹⁴

In the Communications Zone the only changes of importance were those involving adjustments in section boundaries and in COMZ headquarters organization which were made in response to special needs and in the search for greater efficiency. Changes in the territorial organization of the Communications Zone arose largely from tactical developments and from the continued shift away from the Normandy and Brittany areas in logistical affairs. Brittany Base Section had absorbed Loire Section as a district in December 1944. On 1 February 1945 Normandy Base Section in turn incorporated Brittany as a district. Brittany Base's headquarters was given a new mission. Brig. Gen. Roy W. Grower now took control of a sizable portion of the Continental Advance Section known as Burgundy District to assist in the support of the 6th Army Group. Burgundy District occupied a rather special status in the COMZ command and organizational structure. Although General Grower's command was operationally under the control of the Continental Advance Section, he reported directly to General Lee, and transfers of personnel between CONAD and Burgundy District could be made only on the authority of COMZ headquarters. In some respects Burgundy District more nearly resembled a section, for it enjoyed considerably greater administrative powers than were normal for a district.

The dissolution of SOLOC, which was formally accomplished on 12 February, did not alter this arrangement, but it finally brought all COMZ sections in both the north and south directly under the control of General Lee's headquarters.¹⁵

In mid-February the Communications Zone thus consisted of eight sections--two advance sections providing direct support to the two U.S. army groups, three base sections controlling the coastal areas and operating the ports, and, in addition, the U.K. Base, Seine, and Oise Sections.

Steps were also taken early in 1945 to form a separate French line of communications to support the First French Army in the south. On 19 February Base 901 was officially activated as a subcommand of the Communications Zone with the mission of assisting CONAD and Delta Base Section in co-ordinating and supervising the supply of French forces. French units attached to CONAD and Delta Base Section actually remained under the control of these commands for operations, but for administrative purposes they now came under the control of Base 901, which was commanded by Brig. Gen. Georges Granier. It was intended that Base 901 should eventually assume complete responsibility for the support of French forces, but that stage was never reached.

French authorities had long agitated for the establishment of a French zone of interior, and SHAEF had promised as early as August 1944 to turn over control of French territory to the French Committee of National Liberation as rapidly as possible for that purpose. It took the first step late in October 1944, turning over the control of eight departments in the north to the French national authorities. In accord with promises made to General Charles de Gaulle, the Supreme Commander at that time proposed a similar transfer in the south. But General Larkin, the SOLOC commander, opposed such a step, arguing that port, signal, rail, and highway operations in the south were too critical to risk the possible interference of civil authorities. General Lee supported the SOLOC commander, and the proposed transfer was postponed.¹⁶

The last changes in COMZ territorial organization were occasioned by the advance across the Rhine. Early in March plans for the spring offensive announced the principle that the two advance sections would move into Germany with the armies and continue under COMZ control, but that they would have no area responsibility there. Both Oise and Channel Base Sections were to extend their control in the north, Oise absorbing all French territory, part of Belgium, and the Duchy of Luxembourg, and Channel taking over the remainder of Belgium and whatever area was necessary in the Netherlands. In the south Burgundy District was to become part

of Oise Section and take over the territory released by CONAD, and Oise itself was to become an "intermediate" section, stretching the entire length of the front.

Implementation of the plan began on 21 March, when Burgundy District was absorbed by Oise. On 2 April Oise was redesignated Oise Intermediate Section in line with the aim of establishing intermediate depots which were intended to hold the major portion of the theater's stocks of supplies, as urged by General Somervell. Oise subdivided its huge territory into three districts--Burgundy, Luxembourg, and Marne, Burgundy shortly thereafter being renamed Lorraine District.

Meanwhile the process of freeing the two advance sections of all territorial responsibility was also completed. On 1 April, with large forces operating east of the Rhine, the Advance Section relinquished its territory to the Channel Base and Oise Intermediate Sections, continuing to carry out its supply responsibility to the 12th Army Group in Germany without area control. A week later CONAD likewise turned over its territory to Oise, although certain stations remained exempted to CONAD's control. Both the Advance Section and Continental Advance Section now established headquarters in Germany, the former initially at Bonn and later at Fulda, and the latter at Kaiserslautern. (Map 7)

Such was the COMZ territorial organization until V-E Day. Except for boundary changes and the establishment of the principle that the Communications Zone should exercise no area control in Germany, no major alterations had taken place since February. The introduction of an intermediate section in line with the recommendations of Generals Lutes and Somervell hardly constituted more than a change in names, for the organization of a system of depots in depth was only partially realized.

Command of the various COMZ sections had remained relatively stable, except in the case of Normandy, and only two changes were made in the final months, one of them only a few days before the end of hostilities. In mid-March Brig. Gen. Egmont F. Koenig came up from North Africa to take command of the U.K. Base from General Vaughan, who was given a new assignment. And, in the only other change, General Aurand, the commander of Normandy Base Section, was succeeded on 4 May by Brig. Gen. Jesse A. Ladd, who had been his deputy.¹⁷

Internally, the COMZ sections on the Continent developed along much the same lines as had the former base sections in the United Kingdom. Not all of them developed a district organization, although such territorial subdivision was authorized. The Advance Section, operated two fairly distinct lines of communications and depot complexes, one, known as ADSEC North, in support of the First and Ninth Armies, and one, known as ADSEC South, in support of Third Army. CONAD's operations were fairly well channeled along one line of communications. Oise Intermediate Section's organization into three districts has already been mentioned.

The old conflict over the division of authority between the section commanders and the chiefs of the technical services

Map 7
COMZ Boundaries
April 1945

was never fully resolved and caused grief to the very end. General Lee had consistently favored the division of authority along territorial lines and preferred to delegate maximum responsibility to section commanders in the direct chain of command. As late as mid-April 1945, for example, a circular delineating COMZ organization and functioning attempted to fix more clearly the authority of section commanders over the "allocation, assignment, transfer, and command" of all COMZ personnel and units assigned to the sections. The control of depot operations, on the other hand, required a more nearly equal division of authority between section commanders and technical service chiefs. The operation of depots was the responsibility of the section commanders, and all matters relating to operating policies, procedures, and reports on operations were handled through command channels, while the technical control of stock and reporting procedures remained the responsibility of the chiefs of the supply services. In some matters, notably intersectional movements via rail and highway, and in the operation of the pipelines, the tendency was toward less control by the sections and for greater centralization of authority. In a system in which territorial and functional organization existed side by side there obviously was no single guiding principle which could be consistently applied. Many differences therefore had to be considered on individual merit and resolved on a pragmatic basis. Personal co-operation and teamwork obviously counted for much in a system which was administratively imperfect.¹⁸

Changes in the organization and functioning of the COMZ headquarters itself resulted in part from the Lutes-Somervell visit, in part from the necessity to meet certain ad hoc requirements, in part from the absorption of SOLOC, and in part from the anticipation of necessary posthostilities adjustments. The establishment of a control division followed directly from the criticisms and recommendations of General Somervell. Certain of the staff sections and services already possessed control divisions, but no agency had existed to enforce uniform practices and procedures for the entire command. Such an agency, established early in 1945, now undertook to keep a close check on progress in carrying out the Lutes-Somervell recommendations, and made frequent studies of the progress of the Communications Zone. On the recommendation of the ASF commander the Communications Zone also took steps to remove the G-4 office from the field of operations and restrict it to its more proper role as a staff section. Late in February the G-4's Transportation Section was transferred to the Office of the Chief of Transportation, which was thereafter given more complete control over all movements. The Office of the General Purchasing Agent was also removed from G-4 control and was again given separate general staff status. General Somervell's recommendation regarding the appointment of an assistant chief of staff for plans on the COMZ staff was not carried out as promptly. After some delay the theater finally created the position of deputy chief of staff for planning early in April, placing him directly under the chief of staff and charging him with broad co-ordination,

supervision, and control of planning activities, while detailed planning itself remained the responsibility of the various staff sections and commands. Col. Ira K. Evans, who was requested from the War Department, was the first to be assigned to the post.¹⁹

The dissolution of SOLOC left certain problems of readjustment, both as to supply procedures and the disposition of personnel. Adjustments in supply procedure had long been under way, and the transition took place without too much difficulty. Responsibility for establishing shipping priorities for southern France finally passed to ETOUSA with the disbanding of SOLOC early in February. Many of SOLOC's staff officers were absorbed by ETOUSA-COMZ as deputies. In this way, for example, Brig. Gen. William H. Middleswart, chief quartermaster of SOLOC and the quartermaster officer of the original Special Observer Group in 1941, now returned to the theater after a long absence to become deputy chief quartermaster. In the first change in the ETOUSA-COMZ general staff since before the invasion General Gilland, who had been chief of staff of SOLOC, became the new G-4. General Stratton, after serving briefly as his deputy, went to a new post in the United States.

General Larkin, who had commanded SOLOC, went to Paris to become the deputy commander of the Communications Zone for operations. General Lord was also a deputy commander, as well as chief of staff, and it was not long before the question of their respective authority and responsibility arose. Late in February General Lee stepped in to clarify their relationship, specifying that General Lord's authority was to be in the administrative sphere and General Larkin's in the operational. General Larkin enjoyed seniority and was designated to assume command in the event of Lee's absence. A general order published on 26 February tried to make the distinction clear. Apparently some doubts remained, however, and on 12 March General Lord's title of deputy commander was dropped. General Lord shortly thereafter took command of the Assembly Area Command, charged with the planning and execution of the redeployment of U.S. forces at the end of hostilities. General Larkin thereupon took over the assignments which Lord had held since early in 1944--that is, as Chief of Staff, Communications Zone, and Deputy Chief of Staff, ETOUSA.²⁰

A third category of changes in ETOUSA-COMZ headquarters organization had been occasioned by the arrival of General Lear in the theater, to which reference has already been made.²¹ Lear was to hold a rather special position in the theater's organizational setup. Shortly after his arrival he was named deputy theater commander and authorized to act for the theater commander in "matters involving Theater administration." The appointment of a deputy theater commander with powers in the field of administration threatened to further obfuscate already poorly defined relationships and balances of power.

Theater officials were aware of the danger and took pains to define Lear's authority as precisely as possible. The letter

announcing his functions specifically limited General Lear's duties and responsibilities to the field of manpower and morale and made it clear that his functions did not extend to any authority over the theater chiefs of services. Most important of the various manpower and morale functions brought within Lear's cognizance was the problem of the reconversion training which was at its most acute stage at this time. Concern with this problem brought within Lear's purview the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, which underwent several changes in command late in 1944 and early in 1945. In addition, the assignment gave Lear direction and control of the General Inspectorate Section, the U.S. Theater Manpower Section, and the ETO Section of the War Department Manpower Board. Also included under his general supervision were the functions then being performed by Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis in connection with Negro affairs, and by General Hughes, who was specially assigned to the deputy theater commander on matters of manpower, morale, and Negro troops.

The General Inspectorate Section, not to be confused with the Office of the Inspector General, had been created as a special staff section of ETOUSA late in 1944 as the result of complaints reaching the War Department of poor treatment of soldiers overseas. General Marshall had asked the theater commander in October 1944 to investigate the conditions reported. After considering two or three alternative methods of dealing with the problem General Eisenhower created a special staff section which reported directly to his chief of staff, General Smith. General Bonesteel, who had once commanded the Iceland Base Command, was appointed head of the General Inspectorate Section late in December 1944. Field teams appointed by the section made trips of inspection and had the authority to correct certain conditions on the spot. But for the most part the section confined itself to reporting conditions, at first to the SHAEF chief of staff, and then to the deputy theater commander, General Lear.

The U.S. Theater Manpower Section, which had been established early in January 1945 to cope with the serious infantry manpower shortage in the theater, was charged mainly with making allocations of critical personnel and with implementing the recommendations of the ETO Section of the War Department Manpower Board headed by General Gasser. The section had operated at first under the supervision of the U.S. element of the G-1 Section at SHAEF. Late in February it was reconstituted as a special staff section of ETOUSA directly under the deputy theater commander. Colonel Shannon, who had headed the section under General Barker at SHAEF, remained as chief of the section under Lear.

The control and discipline of Negro troops had always been a special problem in the theater, particularly in the Communications Zone, because a large percentage of Negro troops served with service units. General Devers had taken cognizance of the problem in 1943 and had instructed each subordinate command to appoint an officer to study Negro troop problems. The SOS at that time had appointed a special deputy provost marshal to co-ordinate all matters concerning such troops in the SOS. No

co-ordination of policy at the theater level was attempted until January 1945, when the theater announced the appointment of General Davis, highest ranking Negro officer in the U.S. Army, as special adviser on matters relating to Negro troops and as head of a theater special staff section called the Negro Affairs Section. Like the Manpower Section, General Davis' office initially reported directly to the theater commander. Like the other agencies dealing with manpower and morale activities, this office now came under General Lear's jurisdiction.²²

A fourth category of changes in ETOUSA-COMZ organization resulted from the necessity to plan for the posthostilities period. In general, planning for the period after V-E Day was divided. ETOUSA-COMZ was responsible for redeployment planning and the U.S. component at SHAEF for planning the occupation of Germany. Redeployment planning got under way in November, 1944 when a Redeployment Planning Group was established as a special staff section of ETOUSA, operating under the direct supervision of the ETOUSA deputy chief of staff, General Lord. This section operated until March 1945, when a Redeployment Planning Committee, headed by Brig. Gen. George S. Eyster, the G-3, was created, on which each of the general staff sections of ETOUSA-COMZ was represented by a senior planning officer. Late in April a Redeployment Coordinating Group was added, operating directly under the deputy chief of staff, then General Larkin, for the purpose of keeping the theater commander informed on the status of redeployment. Earlier in the month the Communications Zone had established the Assembly Area Command with headquarters at Reims to handle the vast troop movements which were expected to take place after V-E Day. The new command had established camps and had already begun to process units when hostilities ended on 8 May.

The agencies which were to be concerned with the occupation of Germany functioned more directly under the U.S. component at SHAEF. The U.S. Group Control Council, established in August 1944, was the most important of these, for it was the nucleus for the organization which eventually participated with British and Russian representatives in forming a tripartite group for the control of Germany. Early in March 1945 the group ceased to be merely a planning agency and officially became a command, and under the direction of General Clay prepared to assume its role in the military government of Germany.²³ The Communications Zone entered into occupation planning in at least one important respect--the operation of the port of Bremen, for which a U.S. enclave in the Bremen-Bremerhaven area was marked out. On 11 April a separate COMZ command known as the Bremen Port Command was created to operate the port and administer the area. General Vaughan, who had once been in charge of the Bristol Channel ports and more recently had commanded the U.K. Base, was named to command the new

organization and to plan for the time when the port would be turned over to U.S. forces. The Communications Zone was to assume other occupation responsibilities, but these were not added until after V-E Day.

One other change in the ETOUSA-COMZ staff organization took place as the end of hostilities approached. In anticipation of the need to keep troops occupied after V-E Day, the theater planned a great expansion in special service activities, one feature of which was an enlarged information and education program involving the use of European schools and universities as well as Army facilities. Early in April, on the recommendation of Maj. Gen. Frederick H. Osborn of the Information and Education Division of the War Department, the theater separated information and education activities from Special Services, creating a separate special staff section for the former. Information and education, or I&E, was to come under the supervision of the G-3 and was to be responsible for information, education, and orientation, including such organs as the American Forces Network, Stars and Stripes, and Yank magazine. General Osborn himself served as the first chief of I&E, but returned to the United States in mid-April and was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Paul W. Thompson. Special Services, as before under the supervision of the G-1, was to handle the more purely recreational activities such as motion pictures, music, the USO, theatrical entertainment, athletics, library services, and vocational arts and crafts. Brig. Gen. Oscar N. Solbert, the incumbent chief of Special Services, continued in charge of these activities.²⁴

The theater's command and organizational structure presented something of a puzzle to the very end, particularly in regard to ETOUSA-COMZ's position and its relationship with other commands. Much of the difficulty stemmed from the fact that no genuine U.S. GHQ had ever really developed. At best, theater headquarters retained a kind of ectoplasmic character. Until the end of 1944 the functions of a GHQ had been divided between SHAEF and ETOUSA-COMZ. With the appointment of General Lear as deputy theater commander those functions were divided between three agencies.

Residing at SHAEF were the theater commander, his chief of staff, and several influential general staff officers, who determined over-all policy and rendered many decisions normally made by a theater staff. The official theater staff, however, resided with the commanding general of the Communications Zone at the ETOUSA-COMZ headquarters and served also as General Lee's staff. While the COMZ commander no longer held the title of deputy theater commander for supply and administration, his authority had not really changed, for his headquarters handled virtually all supply and administrative matters for the theater, including correspondence with the War Department, and it continued to issue theaterwide instructions on administrative matters in the form of ETOUSA orders and circulars. The authority

of the ETOUSA-COMZ general staff was actually restricted somewhat by the actions of the U.S. component at SHAEF. But the special staff, and particularly the chiefs of services, exercised theaterwide control in their respective fields. Finally, a third agency possessing powers normally exercised by theater headquarters was the office of the deputy theater commander, General Lear, who had taken over certain functions regarding manpower and morale from the U.S. component at SHAEF, and authority over the Replacement System from the Communications Zone. As deputy theater commander General Lear could of course issue directives in General Eisenhower's name.

While Headquarters, ETOUSA, was theoretically the top U.S. echelon of command, the split in its authority left it in an ambiguous position. Important decisions were naturally usually made at SHAEF, where the theater commander tended to seek advice on most matters from the staff that was physically present. Consequently U.S. representatives at Supreme Headquarters, rather than the official theater staff residing in Paris, habitually served in the capacity of the senior U.S. staff. To the extent that they did so, and concerned themselves with U.S. as distinct from Allied matters, they added to ETOUSA's difficulties in establishing its primacy with the air force and army groups. The latter tended to regard ETOUSA as a co-equal command and the chiefs of services as essentially COMZ officials, since they had been under the SOS-COMZ almost from the start and physically separate from the theater commander. "This view was intensified," as General Lord observed, "because of the fact that ETOUSA was largely the former SOS headquarters, for which combat elements traditionally have little respect." Instead, both the air force and the army groups tended to look to SHAEF as the next higher echelon of command, and as a consequence many matters were handled at the SHAEF level which were normally the province of the theater headquarters. This practice not only impaired ETOUSA's authority, but resulted in the expansion of the U.S. representation at SHAEF to much greater size than should have been necessary. Much worse, in the view of COMZ officials, decisions involving supply and administrative matters were made between SHAEF and the field commands, which were too far removed from the supply operation of the theater to be properly informed.²⁵

The 12th Army Group likewise assumed administrative duties to an extent quite at variance with field service doctrine. General Bradley's staff had become accustomed to dealing with supply matters in detail even before the invasion, for it had been assigned responsibility for much of the administrative planning for the first ninety days. It had therefore fallen into the habit early of performing certain functions with regard to supply which were more properly a part of routine theater administration. It had continued this practice throughout the period on the Continent. Officers of General Bradley's staff admitted at the end of the war that the army group's deep involvement in supply matters had been improper. But it had been necessary,

they explained, because of lack of confidence in the Communications Zone and lack of direction from a true theater headquarters. The field commands could never regard the decisions emanating from ETOUSA-COMZ headquarters as anything but the decisions of General Lee's Communications Zone--decisions which in some instances, they felt, affected the field commands adversely. They took the view, moreover, that if the over-all co-ordination of administrative matters could not be performed by the theater commander or a U.S. commander who was clearly superior to the three major commands of the theater, it should logically be performed by the field force (army group) commander, since he was most directly responsible for the success of operations.²⁶

A genuine theater headquarters eventually emerged in Europe, but only as the result of the adjustments incident to the end of hostilities. Beginning about March 1945 there was an increasing tendency to recognize that, technically at least, there was a difference between COMZ and ETOUSA headquarters, for the U.S. element of SHAEF assumed more and more the role of the real U.S. theater headquarters, and General Lee's headquarters more and more that of a strictly COMZ headquarters. The appointment of General Lear as deputy theater commander can be regarded as the first step in that direction, for it had removed some of the administrative setup of the theater from General Lear's control.

Early in March, in anticipation of the eventual elimination of the combined command at SHAEF, the Supreme Commander and his chief of staff formulated a plan which called for a clear-cut separation of COMZ and ETOUSA headquarters. It provided that the U.S. component at SHAEF was to become the theater general staff, and that the technical service chiefs would thereafter be resident at the new theater headquarters. The Communications Zone's mission, as before, was to provide administrative support for all U.S. forces on the Continent and in the United Kingdom and service functions in connection with redeployment; the theater would have the normal role of over-all direction.

In mid-April, three weeks before V-E Day, the theater commander actually issued orders designating the U.S. staff members at SHAEF as the acting general staff of ETOUSA, which included General Clay as deputy chief of staff, General Barker as G-1, General Betts as G-2, General Bull as G-3, General Crawford as G-4, and Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry as G-5. No change in missions or in the method of doing business actually occurred at this time. The previous incumbents of the above positions now became acting deputies on the theater general staff. They continued to serve in dual capacities, however, for they were almost immediately designated chiefs of the respective general staff positions in the Communications Zone. Most of the ETOUSA special staff offices remained for the time being as part of the Communications Zone.

A modified dual staff setup continued, therefore, and did not come to an end until after V-E Day. On 12 May a theater general order announced a fairly complete separation of the theater and COMZ staffs, although certain of the special staff officers were still to serve in a dual role. The new arrangement did not go into effect until 1 July, however, when ETOUSA was officially redesignated U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET). The Communications Zone came to an official end on 1 August, when it was redesignated the Theater Service Forces, European Theater (TSFET).

Headquarters, USFET, established in Frankfurt, Germany, became the true theater headquarters, maintaining a general control over all subordinate elements, including 12th Army Group, the Theater Service Forces, the U.S. Group Control Council, and U.S. Strategic and Tactical Air Forces (now redesignated U.S. Air Forces in Europe, or USAFE). TSFET headquarters, which remained for the time being in Paris, was made responsible primarily for administration outside Germany and Austria, for carrying out the redeployment plan, for the shipment of supplies and personnel into Germany, and for the liquidation of U.S. installations in the liberated countries.

The end of the war meanwhile had brought about the liquidation of the functions of the deputy theater commander, General Lear. Effective 15 May the Ground Force Reinforcement Command began to report directly to the theater commander, the Theater Manpower Section reverted to the supervision of the theater G-1, and the General Inspectorate Section formed the nucleus for the office of the theater Inspector General, absorbing also the functions of Generals Davis and Hughes.²⁷

The closing months of the war had also brought a final change in the theater's boundaries. Late in January Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, commander of the Mediterranean theater, had recommended the transfer of Spain, Portugal, and the Azores to ETOUSA on the ground that the European theater was in a better position to control those areas in the event operations ever became necessary there. General Eisenhower concurred in the recommendation, and the War Department ordered the change effective 1 March. The Azores, which had been a separate command under the Eastern Defense Command and a month before had come under administrative control of the North Atlantic Division of the Air Transport Command, continued to be administered by the Air Transport Command.²⁸

Footnotes

1. For the full account of tactical operations in the final months see Fred J. Meyer and William G. Bell, The Last Offensive, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

2. For early planning estimates and studies on the Rhine crossings see the following files: SHAEF G-3 370-47, Plans--Rhine River; SHAEF G-4 381 War Plans General, II; 12 A Gp 800.23 River Crossings; SHAEF G-4 Logistical Planning--Future Operations; SHAEF G-3 Plans I Future Operations--1945.

3. Logistical Implications of Operations in the Northern Bridgehead--Spring Offensive 1945, G-4 SHAEF, 7 Jan 45, SHAEF G-4 381 War Plans General 1945, I; Ltr, Smith to CGs COMZ, 21 A Gp, and 12 A Gp, 8 Jan 45, sub: Adm Plans and Preparations for Future Opns, 12 A Gp 370 Operational Planning; Brig Gen C. Ravenhill, "Logistics in Northwest Europe 1944-1945," digest in Military Review, XXVII (November, 1947), 77.

4. Ltr, Lord to Smith, 24 Jan 45, sub: Adm Plans and Preparations for Future Opns, EUCOM 381/2 War Plans General, I; Ltr, 12 A Gp to SAC, 25 Jan 45, sub: Adm Support and Preparations for Future Opns, and Ltr, Osmanski to Whipple, 6 Feb 45, sub: Adm Plans and Preparations for Future Opns, both in SHAEF G-4 Logistical Implications Future Operations--1945.

5. Logistics of Operations in the Southern Bridgehead--Spring Offensive, G-4 SHAEF, 27 Jan 45, SHAEF SGS 381 Post-OVERLORD Planning.

6. Ltr, Smith to CG COMZ, 5 Feb 45, sub: Adm Preparations for Spring Offensive, and Ltr, Crawford to Smith, 30 Jan 45, sub: Adm Preparations for Spring Offensive, both in SHAEF G-4 381 War Plans General 1945, I; see Pogue's Supreme Command, Chapter XXI, for a full discussion of the controversy over closing to the Rhine and the priority to be given an offensive in the north.

7. Development of Operations, 1945, Appreciation 1, Planning Staff SHAEF, 11 Feb 45, SHAEF G-3 Plans I, Future Operations--1945.

8. Ltr, Hq ETO to SvC Chiefs, CONAD, and ADSEC, 8 Feb 45, sub: Plng Directives, EUCOM 381/2 War Plans General; Outline Plans for Administrative Support of Spring Offensive in the North and South, Hq COMZ, dated 2 and 3 Mar 45, respectively, 12 A Gp 370 Operational Planning.

9. Memo, Vissering for G-4 Exec, 10 Mar 45, sub: Outline Plan for Adm Support of Spring Offensive in the South, Memo, Whipple for G-4, 12 Mar 45, sub: Remagen Bridgehead, Memo, Osmanski for Mov and Tn Sec G-4 SHAEF, 18 Mar 45, sub: Railroad Dev, all in SHAEF G-4 381 War Plans Gen 1945, II.

10. Appreciation of Effect of UNDERTONE's Success on Future Operations, SHAEF G-3, 21 Mar 45, G-3 Plans I, Saar Operations.

11. Study, Logistical Factors of Future Operations, April-September 1945--Tonnages, SHAEF 2 15/4 GDP-2, Tonnage Requirements.

12. See Chapter XV, Section 5, below, for a summary of consumption factors.

13. Emergency Plan for Support of Rapid Advance, Hq COMZ, 19 Feb 45, 12 A Gp 370 Operational Planning.

14. Organization and Command in the ETO, II, 258-64.

15. See Ch. II, Sec. 2, above.

16. SHAEF finally decided to extend the French zone of interior early in April 1945, when it transferred eleven additional departments to French control, some in the north, some in the south, and expressed the intention of turning over all French territory to French authorities in the near future except for the departments actually lying within the combat zone. Allied military installations, however, were to continue in those departments as long as needed, and the Communications Zone insisted, on the basis of experience with all-French railway operations, that military control over the railways and communications facilities was also to continue. General Larkin protected the extension of the French line of communications even with these provisos, arguing that complete control of all logistic facilities was needed for both the conduct of the war and for the redeployment program. In any event, hostilities ended before the intended transfer was made. Organization and Command in the ETO, II, 221-22, 271-72, 283-86.

17. Organization and Command in the ETO, II, 266-67, 274-81.

18. Ibid., II, 287-91.

19. Ibid., II, 292-98, 302-04.

20. Ibid., II, 298-302.

21. See above, Ch. XI, Sec. 3.

22. Organization and Command in the ETO, II, 312-20.

23. See Pogue's Supreme Command for details on the occupation organization.

24. Organization and Command in the ETO, II, 322-29.

25. Ibid., II, 215-17, 336-37.

26. Memo, Moses, n.d. (c. Feb 45), SHAEF 12 A Gp G-4 Memos for Record, File 77; Memo, G.A.C. of G-4 Sec 12 A Gp for G-4, 3 Jun 45; Memo, Col McCormack, Chief Plans Br G-4 12 A Gp, for G-4, n.d., and Memo, Col R. C. Kyser, Chief M&I Br G-4 12 A Gp, for G-4, 21 May 45, sub: Functions of A Gp, all in 12 A Gp Functions of Army Groups, File 98A.

27. Organization and Command in the ETO, II, 337-41.

28. Ibid., II, 347-49.