Appendix N

EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF
STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER AT THE
TRIDENT CONFERENCE, APPROVED 25 MAY 1943
(CCS 242/6)

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

1. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

   In conjunction with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS Powers.

2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

   1. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.

   2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

   3. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.

3. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

   Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

   1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE and the BRITISH ISLES.

   2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

   3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

   4. Intensify the air offensive against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE.

   5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the AXIS citadel.

5. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of RUSSIA.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of CHINA as an effective ally and as a base for operations against JAPAN.

7. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of TURKEY in the war on the side of the Allies.

8. To prepare the French Forces in AFRICA to fulfill an active role in the war against the AXIS Powers.
4. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943/44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT....

   3. Operations for the defeat of JAPAN. We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of JAPAN, including an estimate of the forces required.

      1. Operations in the BURMA-CHINA Theater.
         The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

         1. The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the ASSAM-BURMA Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to CHINA to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early Fall, and the development of air facilities in ASSAM with a view to:

            1. Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in BURMA;

            2. Maintaining increased American air forces in CHINA; and

            3. Maintaining the How of airborne supplies to CHINA.

         2. Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from ASSAM into BURMA via LEDO and IMPHAL, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from YUNNAN, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to CHINA, and as an essential step towards the opening of the BURMA road.

         3. The capture of AKYAB and of RAMREE ISLAND by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

         4. The interruption of Japanese sea communications into BURMA.

         5. The continuance of administrative preparations in INDIA for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.

      2. Operations in the PACIFIC.
         Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

         1. Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.

         2. Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.

         3. Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.

         4. Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.

         5. Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

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