Chapter 13
British-American Plans and Soviet Expectations
August--November 1943

Preparing for a final showdown with the British on European strategy, the U.S. Army planners and leaders were acutely concerned in the fall of 1943 over the need for closer unity among the three major allies--the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR. Through the elaborate machinery of the CCS system and through common undertakings in the theaters, much progress had already been made in pooling British and American ideas, plans, and resources, but with the Soviet Union military relations had not been as close, nor had understanding been as genuine. The USSR, outside the CCS committee and conference system, had remained on the periphery of the Anglo-American coalition.

The survival of the USSR and its continued active participation in the war against Germany had been a prime factor in Anglo-American strategic thinking for nearly two years. As Admiral King had put it at Casablanca: "the geographical position and manpower of Russia is the key to the defeat of Germany."¹ But down to the fall of 1943 at least, no effort to co-ordinate western strategy and planning directly with those of the USSR had been successful. For the Soviet Union the critical question from the beginning of the war had been a second front, and its long-continued postponement had added to Soviet suspicions of the West. As the War Department had come to recognize, until definite signs of a resolute British-American understanding on this issue were shown, the West could expect no improvement in military relations with the Soviet Union.

By the fall of 1943 bridging the gap between Western plans and Soviet expectations had become more imperative than ever to the U.S. military staff. Never had the circumstances seemed more opportune. After much debate and sparring, a pattern of strategy against Germany had finally been evolved by the Western Allies. The massive Soviet drive from the east then in progress and the developing plans for the Mediterranean and the cross-Channel invasion had to be firmly and finally linked if the Allies were to pool their

efforts effectively to achieve the one common goal--an early victory over Germany.

The USSR in British-American Planning

To the fall of 1943 United States military collaboration with the Soviet Union had been effected chiefly in connection with intergovernmental arrangements on lend-lease. On 6 January 1943 President Roosevelt had reaffirmed the importance of lend-lease to the USSR as a cornerstone in the U.S. war effort:

I understand both the Army and Navy are definitely of the opinion that Russian continuance as a major factor in the war is of cardinal importance and therefore it must be a basic factor in our strategy to provide her with the maximum amount of supplies that can be delivered to her ports. I fully endorse this concept.²

Lend-lease aid to the USSR was a cardinal objective of U.S. policy, but even in that sphere there was much room for improvement in mutual understanding of respective capabilities, limitations, needs, and aims.³ Americans who had come into close contact with Soviet military leaders, Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley for example, felt that the USSR, involved in a land war on one main front, did not appreciate the shipping problems confronting the United States in its multi-front global war.⁴ Similarly, there was growing impatience in U.S. military quarters over Soviet refusal to exchange information freely on the use and effectiveness of U.S. military equipment in combat.⁵

Much could be tolerated and excused in 1942 when the USSR was fighting with its back to the wall and U.S. forces and mat&ecute;riel were only beginning to become effective in the international conflict. In 1943 irritations increased. The Russians were safely past the critical turning point in their military fortunes and showed more and more signs of strong staying power. To the Army staff it sometimes seemed that aid to the USSR was a one-sided affair with little appreciation on the part of the Russians of the costs involved--of the serious drain on vitally needed ships, of the postponement in programs of training and equipping American units and deploying them in combat. On those occasions the staff was inclined to doubt the wisdom of U.S. policy, in practice from early in the war, of giving the Soviet Union preferential treatment in the allocation of munitions over all other Allies and even, at times, over the armed forces of the United States. The desire for reciprocal treatment and a stiffening of American policy toward the Soviet

was reflected in a comment of the Operations Division's Policy Committee on 23 January 1943:

. . . the United States should continue to furnish Lend-Lease supplies to Russia to the full extent of our capacity, provided--and provided only--that Russia cooperates with us and takes us into her confidence. As we grow more powerful (and 1943 will most certainly see the United States far stronger, at least on the sea and in the air, than any other belligerent) we can afford to, and in simple self-interest must start exercising the dominant influence to which such power properly entitles us. The time is appropriate for us to start some straight from-the-shoulder talk with Mr. Joseph Stalin.⁶

Irritation with Soviet behavior also appeared in General Handy's comment to General Marshall in early March 1943:

Russia has given the United Nations little credit for the munitions which we could ill afford to spare and which we have sent in our much-needed ships. Stalin, on the other hand, has consistently called for a second front. Originally our lend-lease was designed to keep our Allies fighting until such time as we had built up our own armed forces. This objective has been achieved, and the time has come when we must complete the equipping of the forces that we have placed in being and move them to the combat zones in order to gain victory in the shortest possible time. Consideration should be given to reducing our aid to Russia and using this equipment to create the conditions and forces required for establishing a second front.

Looking ahead to the end of the conflict and to the time of a political settlement, he went on to say:

Victory in the war will be meaningless unless we also win the peace. We must be strong enough militarily at the peace table to cause our demands to be respected. With this in view, we should give only such equipment to our Allies that they can put to better and quicker use than we can.⁷

During the discussion in the spring of 1943 on the Third (London) Protocol to cover lend-lease to the USSR for the fiscal year 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1944 some Army and Navy support arose for inserting a clause calling for all authorized military and naval attaches and observers to be given the same rights of visit and access to information in the Soviet Union as those extended to their Soviet counterparts in the United States.⁸ Not all military men were in agreement on the wisdom of inserting such a provision. On 22 May General Marshall reported to the JCS that he felt such a proviso would be ill advised. The cardinal principle, he pointed out, was still to help the USSR as much as possible.⁹ In any event, military sentiment for circumscribing U.S. aid to the USSR with a proviso for a freer exchange of data continued to be blocked in 1943 by the White House policy that lend-lease to the USSR was not to be used as a basis for bargaining. Like the two earlier protocols, the Third, signed on 19 October in London by representatives of the United States, the United

Kingdom, Canada, and the Soviet Union, contained no such proviso.¹⁰

Lend-lease to the Soviet Union remained an important commitment for U.S. shipping, planes, equipment, and supplies. The magnitude of the aid during 1943 is indicated in the dry statistics of the tonnage and aircraft deliveries. As of 31 August 1943 the total number of airplanes due under the three protocols was 6,448; factory deliveries had been made to the number of 6,514. Of the 6,207 departures from the United States, 5,389 arrived at their destination, 4341 passed to Russian control, 556 were lost en route, 1,048 were in American hands at their destination, and the remainder were en route. The AAF and the War Department were directing their efforts toward overcoming the difficulties encountered and expanding the Alaskan and Persian Gulf routes to take care of the normal flow of 495 planes per month called for under the Third Protocol. The number of aircraft leaving Great Falls for the Alaska-Siberia route rose steadily from 54 during September 1942--the month the route opened--to over 300 aircraft per month during June, July, and August 1943. As of 31 August there were in the Persian Gulf area about 1,000 planes, all still in American hands. This route also showed a great increase over 1942, though not the same steady rise that occurred on the Alaskan route--transportation difficulties at Abadan, Iran, especially complicating the delivery problem.¹¹ By mid-1943 the mounting production of American factories, the decline of shipping losses, the increased pace of shipbuilding, and improved capacity on routes of delivery had reacted favorably upon lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union.¹² In terms of cargo shipped from the Western Hemisphere to the USSR, the year 1943 was to see the dispatch of 4,794545 long tons as compared with 2,453,097 for 1942. The principal routes in 1943 for this traffic were the Persian Gulf, Soviet Far East (for nonmilitary supplies), northern Soviet ports via the Atlantic (with the exception of the hiatus in convoys from April through October 1943), and the Soviet Arctic via the Pacific (from May through August).¹³

Continuing the work it had begun in 1942, the Army staff paid increasing attention in 1943 to plans for improving the Persian Corridor as a supply route to the USSR.¹⁴  An interesting experiment in international co-operation in a wartime theater thereby resulted--involving Americans, Englishmen, Russians, and Iranians.¹⁵ For the Americans

the problems in the Persian Corridor were complicated by a number of special conditions. Though the whole Middle East theater was recognized by the United States and the United Kingdom as one of British strategic responsibility, the U.S. Army forces in it had been given by mutual agreement a unique responsibility for expediting lend-lease to the USSR. With the concomitant decline in 1943 of the rest of the Middle East theater as an area of active operations for U.S. forces, the Persian Gulf Service Command became increasingly important. Amid the varying national interests, problems constantly arose calling for a conciliation of views as the Americans took over more and more control of the supply functions in the Corridor. To help Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, U.S. commander of the Persian Gulf Service Command, General Marshall early in the spring of 1943 had directed him to send monthly reports to Washington. The reports were to describe especially any difficulties with the British or Russians and were to be written with a view to being forwarded to the President by the Chief of Staff.¹⁶

Growing importance of the American contribution in the Persian Gulf area was reflected not only in the rising figures of lend-lease dispatched to and handled there but also in the increase of U.S. personnel. During 1942 only a few hundred U.S. Army troops were in the Persian Corridor, but in 1943 the assigned Army strength steadily rose, exceeding 28,000 at the end of the year.¹⁷ The increasing importance of the U.S. Army role in the supply of the USSR through the Corridor was also reflected in the growing independence of the Persian Gulf Service Command from USAFIME--culminating in the establishment of the Persian Gulf Command as a separate command directly under the War Department on 10 December 1943.¹⁸

Outside the field of lend-lease, attempts to correlate U.S.-Soviet efforts to the fall of 1943 had been much less successful. The American offer during the siege of Stalingrad to send a group of heavy bombers to Soviet bases in the Caucasus to assist in the defense operations of the Soviet Army had been rejected.¹⁹ The Russians were intensely interested in receiving the planes, but not the men--a solution Marshall thought unwise since it would withhold striking power against the enemy for too long a period while the Russians learned to operate and maintain the aircraft.²⁰²⁰ The U.S. military proposal--backed by

the White House--to co-ordinate planning for the use of American airpower in the event of war between the USSR and Japan had also been rebuffed. In rejecting the proposed survey of Siberian airfields by Gen. Follett Bradley, Stalin, on 13 January 1943, stated to Roosevelt: "It would seem obvious that Russian military objects can be inspected only by Russian inspectors, just as American military objects can be inspected only by American inspectors. In this respect [there] must be no misunderstanding." ²¹ President Roosevelt's suggestion at the time of the Casablanca Conference to send General Marshall to the Soviet Union to discuss Allied plans and problems in the war against the Axis Powers also met with a cool reception from Moscow.²²

Such developments convinced the military planners that the USSR would not go to war against Japan until after the German threat to the USSR had been eliminated. Beginning with TRIDENT, the U.S. and British staffs joined with the President and the Prime Minister at the end of each of their big midwar conferences in expressing the hope that, upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, the USSR would help the others bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan. Despite apparent Soviet disinterest and the absence of adequate data, U.S. staff planners continued in 1943 to study the possibilities of a Russo-Japanese war and to keep plans for such an eventuality on a stand-by basis.

During the Anglo-American debates over European strategy, Soviet behavior and tactics were, for the West, as puzzling as they were disturbing. The USSR's curious position as half-ally--in the alliance yet outside of it--meant that the Soviet Union did not directly participate in most of the debates. The Soviet Government nevertheless resorted to a variety of tactics and pressures to influence the result. At the end of each of their conferences, the Western partners announced to the Soviet Union the general decisions reached and their expectations for the second front. Cycles of irritation followed those of good feeling as the prospects of the second front gradually receded from 1942 to 1943 to 1944. A chain reaction of displeasure was generated throughout that part of Soviet officialdom that came into contact with the West and affected dealings on all levels and problems--even those only remotely associated with the issue at hand. Shortly after the TRIDENT Conference in May 1943, the Soviet Government tried a diplomatic gambit, going so far as to recall its ambassadors from London and Washington. There is fleeting evidence--difficult to weigh--suggesting that at least at one point in the summer of 1943 the Soviet Union may even have seriously considered a separate peace with Germany and entered into tentative negotiations.²³ The Soviet

press kept up its campaign of registering displeasure at the delay of the second front, at times even questioning the good faith of the Western Allies, especially of the British .²⁴ The Soviet attitude made any attempt to bring about close military co-operation extremely difficult.

Over-all U. S. military planning continued to be vitally affected in 1943 by events on the Eastern Front. At every international conference, the Western planners sought to achieve one of the most determining factors in British-American strategy--the relief of German pressure on the Soviet Army. Even the planning for the over-all strength and the extent and type of cutting edge of the U.S. Army needed to carry out the American role in global strategy continued, as from the outset of the war, to be directly related to the Soviet military situation.²⁵ Thus, as the USSR had increasingly demonstrated its ability to hold and fight back, the Victory Program had been progressively revised downward in armored and motorized units.²⁶

Appreciative of the fact that the United States was associated with allies over whose "most fateful decisions"--as General Embick phrased it--they might have no control, U.S. Army planners did not rule out the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal or a Soviet-German rapprochement.²⁷ Nor were they blind to the fact that the Soviet Union might be fighting the war for completely different ultimate ends from those of Great Britain and the United States. But, aside from examining direct military implications, they usually refrained from speculating openly on policy conflicts developing among the Allies and international political issues likely to arise at the close of the armed conflict. By training and habit, U.S. military men had been nurtured in the tradition of the separation of military and political

spheres in national policy. While, as General Marshall had earlier put it, they could not help having "the thought of political matters" always on their minds, they carefully avoided trespassing on what they regarded as the political field. The absence of clear-cut American political guidance and concrete political objectives susceptible to military implementation in the war reinforced U.S. staff preoccupation with ending the war as quickly as possible and letting those responsible for political problems worry about ultimate political implications and goals. This state of affairs led one U.S. Foreign Service officer in the summer of 1943 to draw a sharp contrast on the points of view of the United States and its allies on military policy in over-all national policy:

Most American military men think of war as a soldier's job to be done .... Most of our officers want the job accomplished as soon as possible, with a minimum of fuss over international political and economic issues, which they regard as of secondary importance. Political and economic questions, they feel, can be discussed and decided after the defeat of the Axis. To our allies the conduct of the war is a function of overall political and economic policy. Military logic is therefore always subordinate to and sometimes violated in favor of political and economic considerations.

. . . . . . . . . . Our wartime policy is directed at defeat of the Axis. . . . Certainly they [political and economic principles] have never appeared, to override the purely military policy of defeating the Axis.²⁸

Whatever the ultimate political disadvantages of concentrating on the military task of winning the war--a problem much debated in western circles after the close of hostilities--there are indications that the Army staff was not entirely unaware that the conduct of the war would shape the conditions of the peace. This was reflected in General Marshall's expression of concern to the President, in the early spring of 1943, over the possible postwar chaos in Europe if the Western and Soviet drives against Germany did not keep pace.²⁹ But the Army staff also was not without hope that the build-up of American strength during the war would make the United States, as Handy had said, "strong enough militarily at the peace table to cause our demands to be respected." The precise definition of those demands would, in conventional U.S. military practice, be left for others to decide. There was even an occasional expression of foreboding over the likely differences in approach between the United States and the USSR to the political problems of the eventual settlement. Since such questions were considered outside conventional military interests and concerns and more properly in the sphere of the political branch of government, a Washington Army staff officer was the more likely to express his reservations, doubts, or suspicions on the ultimate political aims and intentions of the Soviet ally only in the privacy of his own thinking or to a circle of his closest associates. One such recorded case--as revealing as it is rare--was the view expressed in August 1943 by a General Staff officer in connection with the question of a possible agreement with the USSR on "post-German Europe." The fact that the comment was offered by an

officer not actually responsible for strategic planning for coalition warfare may make it all the more--rather than less--an accurate index to Army sentiment at large. He warned that, in dealing with the Soviet Union, the following ideas had to be borne constantly in mind:

1. Russia is concerned solely with Russia.

2. Any agreement or treaty with Russia will endure only so long as it is expedient for Russia.

3. Even though Russia might enter into negotiations with the expectation of breaking the agreement, she would not even initially come to any agreement which is not heavily weighted in favor of Russia.

4. The Third International is not dead by a long shot. The real objective of Russia is the Sovietization not only of Europe but of the world. Therefore even if Russia came to a satisfactory agreement with us, and to all appearances, lived up to, it, we should still be on the losing end. That is, the agreement would be lived up to by the facade of the Russian Government but all the energies and resources of Russia would flow through the Third International into the fertile fields of a disillusioned Europe.

5. In the final analysis the only language understood by Russia is force.

6. In the course of history practically every plan has been tried to hold down powerful nations and preserve peace. The only (repeat only) effective method has been genuine "Balance of Power." Wars have broken out only upon the break-down of the "balance." We should, therefore, seek to provide balanced power in Europe.

To prevent Soviet dominance in postwar Europe, he went so far as to recommend:

1. Seek our own councils only for the time being.

2. Pour in the power and forces to the Nth degree in western Europe.

3. Get to Berlin FIRST.

4. Line up our allies, particularly France and Turkey.

5. Then try to gain what we can through agreement with Russia.

6. As for Germany, the mere threat of our alliance with her will suffice to give pause to Russia.³⁰

Despite such occasional expressions of pessimism over ultimate political prospects, the task at hand, in the opinion of the Army planning staff, was to get on with the war. The Soviet Union was still an ally whose military might was being counted on heavily to defeat Germany, and, whatever the differences in national policies and ultimate political aims of the three allies, the immediate and pressing aim was to establish closer unity in military action. To secure their basic goal of a quick, decisive, and relatively inexpensive victory over Germany and prosecute the war against Japan the Army planners in the summer of 1943 called for co-ordination of Soviet offensive efforts from the east with British-American air-ground offensive from the west.³¹ They particularly feared that if, as a result of differences in British-American views over European strategy, the Soviet Army alone was relied upon for major ground operations, a protracted European war would follow and might result in unilateral action culminating in a peace short of complete victory. It was also apparent to the planners that before closer unity of action could be established the Western Allies would have to overcome the suspicion of the Russians that had been building tip as a result of the long-promised and

much-postponed second front. They would have to convince the Russians of the sincerity of their intentions and the firmness of their plans to carry out the invasion from the west and fulfill the long-disappointed Soviet expectations.

Establishment of the U.S. Military Mission to the USSR

Down to the fall of 1943 close collaboration with the USSR was, perhaps, not immediately necessary. The major Soviet and Anglo-American efforts against Germany were still far apart, and overall purposes would seem to have been satisfied if the Allies fought vigorously in their respective theaters and retained the initiative. Following QUADRANT the improved prospects for a second front and the consequent prospective link-up of Soviet and Anglo-American efforts changed the picture. Acceptance by the United States and Great Britain of an agreed European strategy at Quebec made improved collaboration with the USSR appear imperative to the Army and other American leaders.

To gain the confidence of the Soviet staff and win the fullest co-operation of the Soviet Government for the over-all strategic objectives, the Americans proceeded to set their own house in order. As a first step they reorganized the U.S. liaison machinery in Moscow, which had all but broken down as an effective unit in the face of internal and external difficulties in the Soviet capital. In the early stages of the war the United States had been represented in Moscow by its ambassador, its military and naval attaches, and an agency known as the U.S. Supply Mission that handled the lend-lease supply program. The divergent aims of these representatives had led to internal friction and even instances of working at cross purposes. Differences had developed between Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, the lend-lease representative, and Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Michela, the military attach&ecute;, and General Michela had also encountered difficulties with the Russians. In addition, Admiral William H. Standley, the U.S. Ambassador, had not been kept informed of U.S. military planning. Since he was the only American who had ready access to Stalin, this gap, too, had militated against effective military liaison in the Soviet capital.³² When, in the fall of 1943, these chief United States representatives were withdrawn, a new U.S. politico-military team was dispatched.

The new ambassador was Mr. W. Averell Harriman. The choice of Mr. Harriman was especially fortunate and was to prove popular with the Russians. Long an intimate adviser of the President, he had played a leading role in the lend-lease program. Together with Lord Beaverbrook, he had negotiated the initial lend-lease agreement with the Soviet Union in 1941; he had served as the President's representative at the first military discussions between Churchill and Stalin in August 1942; and he had attended many high Anglo-American politico-military conferences.

Late in September 1943 Mr. Harriman, with General Marshall, determined the nature and function of the new military mission.³³ It was to be a small group and was to be set up under the direction of the ambassador and headed by Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, From his earlier service in Washington as secretary of the General Staff and from his more recent vantage points as secretary of the JCS and as U.S. secretary of the CCS, Deane had become intimately familiar with high-level strategic plans and military policies. His staff in the USSR was to include Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding of the, Army Service Forces and Brig. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg of the Air headquarters staff in Washington. General Spalding was to be responsible for handling lend-lease matters in the USSR in accord with policies established by the Lend-Lease Administration, tae U.S. ambassador, and General Deane. General Vandenberg's assignment was to be a temporary one and he was to return to Washington within six weeks after the establishment of the mission. To avoid embarrassing and complicating the work of the new delegation in Moscow, General Marshall and Mr. Harriman decided that no military attaché or direct representative of G-2 should be appointed for the time being. Attempts would be made to obtain information required by G2 either from the British or directly from the Russians, if such efforts could be made without interference with the mission's primary objective.

The primary objective of the military mission--and of Harriman--was to break down Soviet suspicion. The hope was to obtain better knowledge of Soviet plans and to establish closer co-operation in carrying out operational plans against Germany. Harriman and the military mission also were to look toward obtaining Soviet participation in the Pacific war. General Deane was to be at liberty to discuss with the Russians all information concerning U.S. strategy, plans, and operations that might promote the primary objective and that in his and the ambassador's judgment was appropriate.³⁴

On 1 October the War Department informed General Deane of his designation as the head of the mission and gave him a directive.³⁵ He was cautioned to make no commitments that might cause an increased deployment of U.S. Army supplies or troops, without first securing War Department approval. He was to report in his new capacity to the U.S. ambassador at Moscow immediately upon completion of the coming tripartite conference (United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Union) in Moscow, to which he had in the meantime been designated as a military observer. Later, General Deane's directive was amended to include a naval division in his mission and thereafter he was to report to the JCS rather than to the War Department

as specified in his original instructions.³⁶ On 3 October the Soviet Government agreed to the proposal to establish the U.S. military mission to Moscow.³⁷ On 1 November--upon the conclusion of the Moscow Conference--General Deane proceeded to organize the new mission in the Soviet capital. This fresh attempt to unify Allied planning through an effective extension of the Washington politico-military staff and improved liaison mechanisms in a far-off capital was to open a new phase in Soviet-American military collaboration in World War II.³⁸

The Moscow Conference

Preparations and Instructions

A second and far more ambitious effort to secure closer co-ordination of British-American and Soviet national policies and planning took place at the Moscow Conference, 19-30 October 1943. Toward the end of the QUADRANT Conference, Washington learned that Stalin had agreed to a conference in Moscow of the U.S., British, and Soviet foreign secretaries. The meetings were to be exploratory in character and were to pave the way for a later conference of the three heads of government.³⁹ The news was received with enthusiasm by the Western Allies since, as Churchill later recorded, "This was the first favorable mention from the Russian side of a meeting between the three Allies at any level."⁴⁰

During the pre-conference exchanges, between Moscow, London, and Washington, Stalin laid considerable stress on the need for military discussions centering on the second front in Europe. It was apparent that, above all, he would want to hear about Allied plans for a landing in France. Though the British and U.S. Governments viewed the forthcoming tripartite meetings in the Soviet capital primarily as a political conference, it seemed wise therefore to include military advisers among their representatives. In late summer and early fall each government prepared to send along a well-briefed military observer to assist the political head of its delegation. In early September General Deane received his first inkling--from British sources--of the President's intention to have him participate in the conference as the United States military observer. At the same time he learned that the Prime Minister intended to designate General Ismay, Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense, as his opposite number at the meetings.⁴¹

At General Deane's request, the JSSC drew up and the JCS approved instructions for the U.S. military observer in late September.⁴² According to these instructions, the primary duty of the military observer was to act as military adviser to the senior United States representative--Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In that capacity he was to advise concerning the military aspects of proposals under consideration and emphasize "the inseparable interrelation between political proposals and military capabilities." He was to make clear that prospective United States military capabilities could be estimated only on the basis of agreed global strategy. Though he was to present the JCS point of view, he was not authorized to commit the JCS without their specific authority. In matters within the province of the CCS, he was to co-operate closely with the British military adviser, who would be furnished with appropriate extracts of these instructions. The U.S. military adviser was to attend the meetings of the conference and be available on request to present facts, figures, and arguments on military questions.

For Deane's guidance, the JCS also outlined their position on military aspects of subjects likely to come up for discussion. Thus, in connection with co-ordination of military efforts for the defeat of Germany, he was authorized to divulge such additional details of Anglo-American operations in Europe agreed upon at QUADRANT and not already given to the Russians as the timing and reasons therefore, if warranted by developments at the conference. If he revealed the OVERLORD target date, he was to emphasize the importance of timing Soviet operations in support of OVERLORD. Plans for the war against Japan were to be disclosed only in general terms, with stress to be put on the solidarity of the British-American effort and on the great advantage to the USSR should it join that effort.⁴³ The United States was prepared, the JCS also stated, to open a military air route on a reciprocal basis between Seattle and Moscow and hoped that an early agreement to this effect might be reached.

The JCS summed up the U.S. staff position on the role of the USSR in grand strategy. They foresaw that, when Germany was defeated, the powerful Soviet military machine would be in a dominant position east of the Rhine and the Adriatic, and the Soviet Union would be able to impose whatever territorial settlements it desired in Central Europe and the Balkans. At the same time, the USSR's continued and full cooperation in the war against Germany was of cardinal importance in order to achieve the basic U.S. strategic objective for the earliest possible defeat of Germany.

If the Soviet Union withdrew from the war and the German military machine was essentially intact, Anglo-American operations on the Continent would become impracticable and the effort against Germany would have to be limited on the whole to an air offensive. Similarly, full Soviet participation in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany was of the highest importance in order to assure the prompt and decisive defeat of Japan and at far less cost to the United States and Great Britain than would otherwise be possible.⁴⁴ These views on the military value of the Soviet Union as an ally were but a reaffirmation of the basic Army stand from early in the war.⁴⁵

While the JCS were outlining the course for the military observer to follow at the forthcoming conference, the Army planning staff was busy collecting background data for him on the problems and difficulties involved in establishing a second front .⁴⁶ In early October the War Department also instructed Generals Faymonville and Michela, who were being relieved from duty in Moscow and returning to the United States, to await in Cairo the arrival of the Harriman-Deane party en route to Moscow and consult with them.⁴⁷ after his departure from Washington, Deane stopped off in England and North Africa. With Mr. Harriman, he met the rest of the United States delegation headed by the Secretary of State en route, and proceeded with them in mid-October to Moscow.⁴⁸

The Meetings and Their Consequence's

At the Moscow Conference, in addition to Secretary of State Hull, Mr. Harriman, and General Deane, the American party included a number of State Department officials and a few officers from the Washington staffs.⁴⁹ The British

sent Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in Moscow, William Strang, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, and General Ismay. The Soviet delegation included Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Foreign Minister, Andrei Y. Vishinsky and Maxim M. Litvinov, also of the Foreign Office, Marshal Klementy Voroshilov, Vice Commissar of Defense and deputy to Stalin, and Lt. Gen. A.A. Gryzlov of the Soviet Army General Staff.

Before the conferees assembled there had been a considerable exchange of correspondence among the three Foreign Secretaries about the agenda. The Americans had advanced a number of suggestions, including a four-power declaration and the treatment of Germany during the armistice period. The British had put forward a much longer list of suggestions--also on political questions--including a common policy toward Turkey and Iran and relations between the USSR and Poland. The Russians proposed one topic--and one only--"the consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe." It became apparent from the outset that the Russians were not prepared to discuss anything else until this military question had been fully explored. At the first formal meeting, on 19 October, Molotov was chosen chairman and the agenda was settled.

The Russians immediately proceeded to a discussion of the one topic they had put on the agenda, dividing it into three parts: (a) vigorous preparations during the rest of 1943 to insure an invasion of northern France; (b) the possibility of inducing Turkey to enter the war immediately; and (c) the possibility of persuading Sweden to permit immediate use of her air bases.⁵⁰ The British and Americans agreed to turn the first phase of the discussion--the cross-Channel operation--over to their military observers, Generals Deane and Ismay. Describing the plans for the invasion of Europe, the two generals assured the Russians that at each of the successive British-American conferences from Casablanca through QUADRANT the necessity of aiding the USSR had been a cardinal consideration. They set forth the anticipated role of the Combined Bomber Offensive and briefly outlined various preparations then under way for OVERLORD. Requirements for the build-up for the cross-Channel operations such as landing craft, transportation, and supplies were explained in some detail. The decision of the TRIDENT and QUADRANT Conferences to invade in the spring of 1944 was reaffirmed. At the same time, the two Western military advisers outlined the conditions the United States and Great Britain had accepted as a prerequisite for launching OVERLORD. It was the expectation of the Western Allies, they informed the Russians, that these conditions would be created through the combination of the Combined Bomber Offensive, continued pressure in Italy, secondary landings in France, guerrilla activities in the Balkans, and, most of

all, through Soviet pressure on the Eastern Front.

At the conclusion of this presentation, Marshal Voroshilov and General Gryzlov asked some pointed questions about the conditions necessary for the launching and pressed for an exact date. Fearful of jeopardizing security by a premature announcement so far in advance of the then tentative planning date, early May, the British and American representatives went only so far as to state that the operation would be launched sometime in the spring.⁵¹ In reply to Mr. Molotov's question about the validity of the decision on the cross-Channel operation, General Deane hastened to reassure him, pointing to the action taken at the Quebec conference and affirming the confidence of the United States and Great Britain that the prerequisite conditions would exist. ⁵² It was the hope of the United States, Deane went on, that its military mission in Moscow would be used as a medium for closer collaboration between the respective staffs. That mission was authorized, he pointed out, to keep the Soviet staff fully informed of the progress of preparations for OVERLORD.⁵³ The Soviet delegation appeared to be completely satisfied with the sincerity of British and American intentions. They assured the Anglo-American representatives that they would continue the pressure on the Eastern Front and do all they could to help create the conditions necessary for the invasion. The Anglo-American representatives, who had expected another Soviet demand for a "second front right now," thereupon felt relieved.⁵⁴

Taking advantage of the understanding that then appeared to exist among the delegates, General Deane proceeded to put forward for adoption three U.S. proposals to hasten the conclusion of the war against Germany. First, bases should be made available in the USSR for the use of U.S. aircraft in order to execute shuttle bombing against industrial Germany; second, a more effective interchange of weather information should be instituted and, to accomplish this, an improvement of United States and Soviet signal communications should be effected; and, third, air transport between the two countries should be improved. These proposals were made specifically at General Arnold's request.⁵⁵

General Deane later reported that the proposals took the Soviet representatives

completely by surprise.⁵⁶ He stated that, as a result of the action taken on the proposals, he learned two important lessons for his subsequent dealings with Soviet officials--no subordinate official in the USSR could make a decision on matters involving foreigners without consulting higher authority, and "an approval in principle" by the Soviet Government was not necessarily an indication of a binding agreement. Two days after General Deane had made the proposals, Molotov announced to the conference that the Soviet Government had considered them and approved them "in principle."⁵⁷ Secretary Hull thereupon suggested that the details be worked out immediately by the Soviet Army General Staff and the U.S. military mission. Mr. Molotov agreed.

In Washington the JCS, abreast of General Deane's negotiations in Moscow, quickly moved to develop the three proposals in some detail for his guidance in exploring the subject further with the Soviet representatives. The JCS approved with some modifications a reply proposed by General Arnold. They estimated the requirements for shuttle bases for U.S. aircraft at approximately ten sites, so located as to aid heavy bombers striking targets on the way to and from the United Kingdom. They called for an exchange of basic weather ciphers. The interest in the USRR weather was in connection with shuttle bombing, the transport route north of Tehran, Chinese operations, and the Siberian air route. In connection with air transport, the JCS expressed interest in the Alaska-Siberia route as first in importance; service from the United States to Moscow via the United Kingdom and possibly Stockholm second; extension of current service north from Tehran to Moscow third; and improved connecting services at Tehran fourth.⁵⁸ Actually, General Deane was to find that not until February 1944 were the Russians to enter upon conversations on the proposals and "then only after continuous pressure by the President on Stalin, by Harriman on Molotov, and by me on the General Staff."⁵⁹

Following the discussion of British-American plans for the invasion, Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden took up the questions raised by the Russians with respect to the neutrals, Turkey and Sweden.⁶⁰ At this time, Mr. Eden took a somewhat more cautious position on the entry of Turkey into the war than Mr. Churchill had previously supported. He declared that Turkey's entry could be effected only at the expense of the Italian operations and of the build-up in the United Kingdom for OVERLORD and the Combined Bomber Offensive. Moreover, since bases were then available in Italy, Turkish airfields from which the Balkan oil fields might be bombed were no longer so important. But, he went on to say, if the rest of the delegates believed

that Turkey's entry into the war should be pressed, the British would give the matter serious consideration. Secretary Hull felt that the question was essentially a military one, but he presumed that the views expressed by Mr. Eden would also reflect those of the U.S. Government.

Like Turkey, Sweden had long managed to stay aloof from actual hostilities. This course was made all the more complicated for the northern neutral as a result of its exposed geographic position and important trade relations within the German orbit. While Sweden found it difficult to resist German economic and military demands, the Allies were becoming more and more concerned over continued permission extended to the German troops to cross Sweden to and from occupied Norway and over the valuable supplies such as iron ore and ball bearings going from Sweden to Germany. As for the Soviet proposal to obtain the use of air bases in Sweden, Mr. Eden pointed out that vital Allied resources would be drawn off in the process of assuring Sweden protection. Mr. Hull took the position that since these matters were "primarily military in character" they should be left for settlement by the heads of government in consultation with their Chiefs of Staff. He referred both Soviet proposals to Washington for further instructions.

In Washington the propositions were immediately turned over to the joint staff and Army planning committees for exploration.⁶¹ Some differences of views among Washington military planners soon became apparent. The Army planners, intent upon concentrating Allied efforts for the cross-Channel effort, currently took a dim view of Turkey's entry into the war. ⁶² In their opinion, no action should be initiated by the Allies to draw Turkey into the war. They advanced a number of arguments. The active participation of Turkey would require the British to honor their agreements to furnish aid to Turkey, and such action would constitute a drain on Allied resources, especially on heavy bombardment aircraft, thus jeopardizing the success of Allied effort in Italy as well as of other operations. Turkey did not want Soviet help and would probably demand British and American guarantees to protect it against the USSR before it would consent to enter the war. As an ally, moreover, Turkey would not contain additional German divisions in the Mediterranean--a major purpose of prospective Mediterranean operations as agreed at QUADRANT. The acquisition of air bases in Turkey, Army planners also pointed out, had become less important as a result of the newly obtained Italian airfields.

The JSSC reached the opposite conclusion--that the United States should take

the position that it would be very desirable to have Turkey enter the war immediately.⁶³ Among the advantages of bringing Turkey into the war, the JSSC maintained, were further increase of German commitments in the Balkans and consequent increased dispersion of their forces, the possibility of forcing a German withdrawal from Greece and the Aegean, the access of air bases in Turkey, and the possibility of opening a direct supply route to the USSR via the Dardanelles and the Black Sea. However, the JSSC qualified its recommendation. Action to bring Turkey into the war must not entail commitments of military assistance that would jeopardize projected operations in Europe; and the United States was not in a position to furnish Turkey with substantial military assistance.

The Army planners and JSSC were in somewhat closer agreement on the question of gaining access to Swedish bases. To secure their use, both concluded, would be very advantageous for the Allies--especially for air operations to supplement the Combined Bomber Offensive. But, to the Army planners, the whole proposition was not feasible at that time, since Sweden could not provide adequate protection for the bases and the Allies were unable to supply or reinforce the Swedes via ground lines of communications. Because of Sweden's fear of the USSR, moreover, the forces involved would in all probability have to be American and British, thus jeopardizing OVERLORD. The Army planners recommended, therefore, that efforts to secure air bases in Sweden be deferred until such time as means became available for opening a land route through Norway from the Atlantic or through Finland from the USSR.⁶⁴

The JSSC agreed that a major British-U. S. amphibious operation would be necessary to seize the necessary lines of communications across Norway--an operation that would imperil OVERLORD. On the other hand, they maintained; it would be practicable to use Swedish air bases for small numbers of fighter bombers, thus aiding the Combined Bomber Offensive.⁶⁵ General Marshall and General Arnold, in accord with the Army planners' views on Turkey and Sweden, expressed their disagreement with the JSSC.⁶⁶

The result of staff discussion and study in Washington was to sound a note of caution for United States delegates at the conference with reference to committing the United States to the Turkish or Swedish ventures. The JCS concluded that it would be desirable to have Turkey enter the war and to secure air bases in Sweden, but only if planned operations in Europe were not thereby jeopardized.⁶⁷ Since such assurance

could not be given, the United States military position was that no definite decision could be reached on the issues. Absence of information on the Soviet position concerning assistance to Turkey was an additional reason given by the JCS for delaying the decision. On 28 October Secretary Hull presented to the conferees the President's reply to Molotov's proposals concerning Turkey and Sweden.⁶⁸ The answer--in accord with the cautious United States military views--was in the negative on both issues. The British expressed agreement with the American reply. As a result of the British and American stands, the USSR yielded on both proposals. The conferees concluded that final action on Turkey and Sweden would have to be postponed until the three governments had given the problem further study.

How strongly the Soviet delegates felt about the decision on Turkey became apparent to General Deane on the final day of the conference. Their displeasure took the form of refusing to put Deane's proposals concerning shuttle bombing, exchange of weather information, and improved communications and their approval "in principle" into the record of the conference. Molotov contended the proposals had not been discussed in detail. Vishinsky asked--with considerable bitterness--why the Russians should obligate themselves when the United States refused to join them in inducing Turkey to enter the war. That entry would remove fifteen German divisions from the Soviet front and enable the USSR to advance into Prussia in two months. The U.S. proposals and the Soviet agreement in principle were finally entered into the record only as a result of a strong stand taken by Secretary Hull and the promise of generous treatment of the USSR in the distribution of Italian naval and merchant vessels.⁶⁹

Conclusion of the discussion of questions involving military considerations enabled the three Foreign Secretaries to turn their full attention to the more purely political problems facing the conference--with important results. Their agreements were embodied in a secret protocol. It was at this international conference that the leading Allied Powers agreed that the united action pledged for the prosecution of war against their respective enemies was to be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security after the close of hostilities. The agreement was incorporated in the "Four-Power Declaration," proposed by the United States and signed by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China.

It proved difficult to obtain the USSR's consent to include China as a signatory. The U.S. Government, anxious to raise China's morale--then at a low ebb--and to secure the recognition of China's status as one of the big four, was insistent. Only through the persistent

efforts of Secretary Hull, acting on President Roosevelt's instructions, was the Soviet delegation finally won over to accepting China as one of the big four signatories.⁷⁰

The declaration provided for unanimity on surrender and disarmament terms, the necessity of establishing an international organization (later to be known as the United Nations Organization), and agreements in connection with postwar employment of military forces within the territories of other states and for postwar regulation of armaments. The Americans, British, and Russians also agreed to establish a European advisory commission in London to begin the study of questions connected with the termination of hostilities in Europe, including the terms of surrender to be imposed upon the enemy states and the machinery to implement them. In addition, they decided to establish an advisory council--to include a Russian delegate--for Italian affairs.⁷¹ Thus was the machinery of co-operation among the three principal Allies to be extended.

In the wake of the conference, decisions on political policy were made that brought the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union closer on the Turkish question. The formal meetings had barely ended when the British and Soviet Foreign Secretaries in Moscow signed a protocol (on 1 November) embodying a compromise agreement that the British would make immediate demands on Turkey for air bases and the two governments would undertake joint action later to bring pressure on Turkey to come into the war before the end of the year.⁷² Thereupon, the President reached the decision that the U.S. Government would join in these efforts, subject to the proviso that British and American resources that in the opinion of the responsible commanders were necessary for OVERLORD or for operations' in Italy would not be committed to the eastern Mediterranean area.⁷³

Perhaps the most encouraging signs were the indications at Moscow that the Soviet Government wanted to establish friendlier relations with the United States and Great Britain. The talks among the three Allies had been conducted and concluded in a generally conciliatory manner. Exemplifying the favorable atmosphere and undoubtedly contributing to it was the removal of points of friction in the way of resuming Anglo-American convoys to the USSR on the northern route. Sorely disappointed when the northern convoys had

been postponed in March 1943 and suspended in April, the Russians had pressed for the reinstatement of the railings. On 21 September Molotov had gone so far as to call in the British ambassador in Moscow and urgently request their resumption. The general situation then seemed to the Prime Minister more favorable. Especially encouraging was the heroic attack of British midget submarines on the Tirpitz, disabling her and removing her as an immediate threat to the convoys. On 1 October the Prime Minister had revealed to Stalin his intention of reinstituting the northern convoys--planning to sail one convoy a month in November, December, January, and February, each to consist of approximately thirty-five ships, British and American. But misunderstandings and irritations had soon developed over the question of whether his intention was a firm contract or an "earnest resolve," as well as over his concurrent request for better treatment of British personnel in the USSR. The Russians had argued that the Soviet Union was bearing the brunt of the fighting against Germany, that the Allies were falling seriously behind in their lend-lease commitments, that the northern route permitted delivery of armaments to the Eastern Front in the shortest time, and that deliveries through the ports and by rail in Iran could in no way compensate for those not delivered on the northern route. During the Moscow Conference, talks by Eden and Stalin smoothed the irritations and removed the misunderstandings. In November shipments via the northern route were reinstituted.⁷⁴

The Moscow Conference is generally known for its political achievements and, in fact, ended without reaching outstanding military decisions. This was more in accord with the President's and Prime Minister's original anticipation that the Moscow Conference was not one to plan or recommend military strategy than with Stalin's evident determination that military strategy be discussed. Nevertheless, the by-products and offshoots of the meetings at Moscow were to prove of considerable significance in the story of strategic planning in World War II. Marking the first time since the outbreak of war that British and U.S. staff officers had met face to face with Soviet military representatives and discussed strategic plans, the conference was a landmark in the development of closer collaboration among the Allied Powers in World War II. The meetings at Moscow laid the groundwork and helped pave the way for later agreements that finally linked Anglo-American strategy with Soviet operations against Germany--a result that was to become apparent only in time. Pointing to an even broader international military collaboration further in the future was a by-product of the discussions at Moscow reported by Harriman to General Marshall on 2 November. This was the confidential assurance given by Molotov to Harriman that the USSR expected to join in the war against Japan "at the appropriate time."⁷⁵ It echoed a concurrent promise made by Stalin to Secretary

Hull.⁷⁶ Of immediate significance to the U.S. military planners, preparing for the final showdown with the British on the cross-Channel-Mediterranean issue, was the opportunity afforded by the conference to obtain valuable glimpses of Soviet politico-military thinking on the projected operations to end the war against Germany. That preview disclosed both a promise and a potential threat to furtherance of their own strategic thinking and planning. Encouraged by Soviet reception of plans for OVERLORD and the Combined Bomber Offensive, they were alerted to possible dangers to the execution of their own basic concepts by the expressed Soviet interest in the Mediterranean and particularly in the eastern Mediterranean. There were even intimations during the conference--as puzzling as they were disturbing--that the Russians might be willing to accept Allied operations in Italy, in which they expressed great interest, as constituting the second front.⁷⁷ The conference therefore served the unexpected purpose of disclosing to the United States planners unanticipated areas of possible disagreement with the USSR--especially in connection with the Mediterranean--that might upset the accepted QUADRANT decisions. Such signs, added to the more familiar British pressure for Mediterranean ventures, gave them pause. At the Moscow Conference, as Stimson has recorded, there were "further alarms" from the Prime Minister.⁷⁸ Through Eden, Churchill informed the Russians that a postponement of OVERLORD for one or two months might be necessary if the Italian campaign did not progress satisfactorily.⁷⁹  It was apparent that it was necessary not only to achieve a final understanding with the British on an integrated strategic pattern in the war against Germany but with the Russians as well.

The meeting with the Soviet politico-military delegation, furthermore, added to the store of American staff experience in international conference techniques and procedures gathered in dealing with British teams from Casablanca through QUADRANT. The somewhat painfully acquired knowledge of the U.S. staff in the "surprise paper" and "agreement in principle," British model, was extended to include "approval in principle," USSR version, in the meaning of which the U.S. staff was initiated at Moscow. The necessity of making thorough staff preparations and achieving closer coordination with the political head of state--hammered home to the American staff as lessons of the earlier conferences--became all the more apparent in order to cope with the peculiarities of a third ally at subsequent meetings. Past experiences with the British, as well as the brief but valuable insights into Soviet

strategic thinking gained at Moscow, were to help prepare the staff to meet the British and Russians on even terms at the first full-dress, formal staff conference among the three allies later in 1943

"Fish or Cut Bait"

The British-American pledge to the USSR at the Moscow Conference that a second front would be launched in the spring of 1944 strengthened the conviction of the U.S. Army planners in Washington that the decision to undertake the cross-Channel operation this time must be firmly held. Faithful adherence to that promise was essential not only in order to avoid the creation of a strategic stalemate in Europe but also in order to maintain and strengthen the favorable relations of the "United Nations" foreshadowed by the accomplishments of the Moscow Conference.⁸⁰ But, in probing the implications of current Allied pressures--both British and Soviet--the Army planners felt uneasy lest the over-all strategic pattern in the war against Germany as outlined at QUADRANT and the prospective linking of that pattern with Soviet operations be upset.

The Army planners were particularly alerted to this possibility through General Deane's warning cables from Moscow. On 9 November General Deane informed the JCS of his impressions that the Russians might attach "less importance to Overlord than heretofore"--as indicated by their acceptance at the Moscow Conference that OVERLORD take place in 1944 without pressing for an advance in the date.⁸¹  The Soviet desire to get Turkey and Sweden into the war and concern over British-American pressure in Italy seemed to indicate that the USSR was now more interested in immediate measures than in a second front. Deane warned the JCS that the Americans might be confronted at the next international conference with a demand that further action be undertaken in the Mediterranean immediately, for example, increased pressure in Italy and some operation in the Balkans for the purpose of drawing off German strength from the Eastern Front. The Russians might even urge some delay in OVERLORD if more immediate results thereby became possible. In his opinion, the Russians particularly wanted to end the war quickly and were now confident of their ability to do so. General Deane also relayed Mr. Harriman's impression that the Russians were as keen as ever about the second front. But, Deane stated, Harriman agreed with him that the choice between OVERLORD In the spring of 1944 and more immediate assistance elsewhere would be a very difficult decision for the USSR to make.

Two days later General Deane confirmed these impressions in a message to the War Department.⁸² He informed General Marshall that, in a talk with Marshal Voroshilov that day, the Soviet official had stated that the Germans had moved eleven divisions to the Eastern Front in the previous forty days--five

from France, four from the Balkans, and two from Italy. He repeated Soviet dissatisfaction, earlier voiced by Molotov and reported to Washington, over insufficient Allied pressure in Italy to prevent the Germans from moving divisions to the Eastern Front. General Deane reported that he had given the American side of the story--the narrow front, terrain obstacles, the landing craft bottleneck, and so forth. British-American pressure in Italy would be an issue at the next meeting with the USSR, General Deane advised. While Voroshilov and other Soviet officials seemed content to wait until next year for OVERLORD, they were insistent that more be done immediately to relieve pressure on the Soviet front.

Within the War Department, the Army planners studied these warning signals and sought to prepare the military case to counter the potential threat to basic United States strategic concepts.⁸³ The Army planners doubted that any British-American operations that could be undertaken in the Mediterranean before spring--in addition to those currently planned--would be on a large enough scale to force the Germans to withdraw forces from the Eastern Front. An increased effort in the Mediterranean might take one of the following forms: more divisions in the line in Italy; an assault on the Adriatic coast of the Balkans; an amphibious assault on the Aegean islands; or operations through Turkey. These possibilities were ruled out largely because of logistical considerations and because initiation of any of them would result in delaying OVERLORD. The planners pointed to a survey of logistical factors involved, which revealed that additional forces could not be used effectively in the Mediterranean until more bases were captured and additional ports were opened. A decision to put greater stress on Mediterranean operations would probably accelerate those operations before the target date to OVERLORD and might possibly even prevent the Germans from moving more divisions to the Eastern Front, but, in contrast with OVERLORD, would yield only slight results in the long run. To put increased emphasis on the Mediterranean, furthermore, would mean stopping the buildup in the United Kingdom and would enable the Germans to move divisions from northwest Europe to the Eastern Front. The Army planners concluded that the pressure of the British for increased emphasis on the Mediterranean was "becoming very hard to resist." Should the British receive Soviet support for their projects, it would probably be most difficult not to yield. The Russians must, therefore, be clearly informed of the choice before them. They would have to choose between a decision to undertake a major and decisive military offensive in the following spring or to proceed immediately with a series of indecisive efforts in the Balkan-eastern Mediterranean area.

Strength and materiel for such efforts would have to be withdrawn from allocations

to OVERLORD.⁸⁴ The Russians, who were not faced with the necessity of conducting amphibious operations, must be made to understand the difficulties and demands inherent in those undertakings. The planners warned that the discussions at the next conference might even reach the point of calling for a firm decision either to continue with OVERLORD as then planned or to accede to the Soviet demands and establish the second front in the Mediterranean.

The Army planners concluded that the British and the Russians both must be made to realize that the success of OVERLORD was vitally dependent on a number of factors--continuation of pressure against the Axis in Europe in the Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front; continuation of the Combined Bomber Offensive; and retention of all resources then allotted to OVERLORD for that operation, with the possibility of having to add to them.⁸⁵ The Russians and British must recognize, therefore, that the price of immediate aid on a relatively small scale would be cancellation of the decisive operation in the spring of 1944. The disturbing possibility remained that even such arguments at the next conference might not put an end to British and Russian demands for increased pressure in the Mediterranean at the expense Of OVERLORD. Continued insistence, in the opinion of the planners, would indicate that the Russians and the British firmly believed that, with additional pressure in the Mediterranean coupled with the Soviet advance, a cross-Channel Operation of the RANKIN C variety would suffice.⁸⁶ In that event, the planners argued, American resources released by the cancellation Of OVERLORD should be allocated in part to the United Kingdom to execute RANKIN, and in part to the Mediterranean for operations in Italy and for minor undertakings in the Balkans. The remainder--in the familiar vein of the "Pacific Alternative" argument--should be diverted to the Pacific to hasten the defeat of Japan.⁸⁷

By early November 1943 the Army planners preparing for the full-dress, formal conference with Great Britain and the Soviet Union believed themselves to be faced with a fundamental dilemma. Anxious as ever to end the war in Europe as quickly as possible, they had continued to put their faith in a major cross-Channel operation. For the same reasons they had remained opposed to strikes at the "soft underbelly" of Europe--to them a war of attrition. QUADRANT had given an acceptable formula--for which they had been searching since the diversion from BOLERO for retaining the primacy of a cross-Channel operation--OVERLORD--and weaving the Mediterranean and Combined Bomber Offensive into its support. Nevertheless, the complete resolution of the cross-Channel versus Mediterranean debate and the end of the sparring

with the British over that issue had not followed in the, fall of 1943. Signs of Soviet, as well as British, support for immediate Mediterranean ventures threatened not only to upset the QUADRANT pattern but also to reopen the whole problem of European strategy. It had become apparent to the Army planners, in probing the subsequent course of the USSR in the European war, that they were still faced with imponderables. As one of the Army planners put it, ". . .&nbp;the Russians, due to their successes, are a bigger question mark than ever."⁸⁸

Army planners could take a measure of comfort from the fact that through the Moscow Conference the areas of possible agreement and disagreement with the USSR--as well as with Great Britain--had become more clearly defined. But the fundamental problem remained of drawing the Allied Powers firmly together in support of the cross-Channel operation and keeping other operations subsidiary. Basic Army views on overall strategy and on the wasteful effects of past diversions from agreements reached convinced the planners that a final decision on European strategy with the British vas long overdue. The war with Germany was lengthening, and the three major Allied Powers had still not completely agreed on European strategy or taken basic measures to integrate their efforts in support of it. The lack of a definitive decision in the conflict against Germany, moreover, not only was holding up the progress of the war in Europe but was also threatening to postpone the defeat of the other major enemy, Japan. "The time has now arrived," concluded the planners, "when further indecision, evasion, and undermining of agreements cannot be borne. In plain American words, the talking stage is over and the time has arrived to 'fish or cut bait.'"⁸⁹

Table of Contents
Previous Chapter (12) * Next Chapter (14)

Footnotes

1. Min, 53d mtg JCS, 17 Jan 43.

2. Memo, Roosevelt for SW, 6 Jan 43, no sub, WDCSA Russia (Secret).

3. (1) Memo, Handy, ACofS OPD, for CofS, 8 Mar 43, sub: Heavy Bombers for Russia, WDCSA Russia (Secret). (2) OPD brief, title: Notes, 97th mtg JCS, 20 Jul 43, Third Soviet Protocol (JCS 322/1), with JCS 322/1 in ABC 400.3295 Russia (19 Apr 43). 1.

4. See especially, msg, Gen Hurley, Moscow, to President, 8 Dec 42, Case 4, Book 7, Exec 8. The message from General Hurley, sent via the State Department, was circulated in the War Department. General Hurley had reported his visit to the Soviet front and discussions with Soviet officers: "It was evident from conversations with these officers that they were unfamiliar with our transport problems. While discussing in great detail their own transport shortage, they expressed surprise that Great Britain and the United States were experiencing difficulties in getting , supplies to South Russia by way of the Persian Gulf and to North Russia by way of the North Atlantic.

5. See, for example, OPD draft msg [CofS for President] [no addressee], 7 Apr 43, Item 20, Exec 1. The message was not sent.

6. "The Weekly Strategic Resume," 23 Jan 43, 23d mtg PC, ABC 334.3 PC (1 Aug 43), 3.

7. Memo, Handy, ACofS OPD, for CofS, 8 Mar 43, sub: Heavy Bombers for Russia, WDCSA Russia (Secret).

8. (1) Memo, CofS, CinC U.S. Fleet, and CNO for President's Soviet Lend-Lease Committee, 11 Apr 43, sub: Clause To Be Inserted in the Third Soviet Lend-Lease Protocol, WDCSA Russia (Secret). (2) Ltr, Robert P. Patterson, Actg SW, to Harry Hopkins, President's Soviet Protocol Committee, 17 Apr 43, before JPS 28/D in ABC 400.3295 Russia (USSR), 8. (3) Memo, Somervell for CofS [20 Apr 43], sub: Third Russian Protocol, WDCSA Russia (Secret).

9. Min, 88th mtg JCS, 22 May 43.

10. (1) Third Soviet Protocol, 19 Oct 43, Paper 89, Book 13, Exec 9. (2) CCS Memo for Info, 161, 10 Nov 43, title: Third Soviet Protocol.

11. (1) Memo, Maj Gen James H. Burns, Exec, The President's Soviet Protocol Committee, for CG AAF, 21 Sep 43, sub: Airplane Deliveries to Russia. (2) Memo, Brig Gen Bennett E. Meyers, Actg .ACofS MM&D, for Chief, President's Soviet Protocol Committee, 28 Sep 43, sub: Protocol Aircraft for the USSR. Both in AAF Foreign File, Russia No. 4521-B.

12. See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-45.

13. (1) State Department work sheets used in compiling Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the USSR, November 28, 1945, Item OPD Hist Unit File. (2) See also Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Table 1, App. A.

14. See, for example, ltr, Actg SW Patterson to President, 9 Dec 42, incl to memo, Somervell for CON [7 Dec 42], sub: Dec Rpt to the President Showing the Progress of the WD in Mtg the Second Russian Protocol, WDCSA Russia 1942-43 (Secret).

15. The fascinating story of the U.S. Army experience in the Persian Corridor--including relations of the Americans with the Russians, British, and Iranians-is treated in Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia. For the detailed story of lend-lease to Russia see Motter and also Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943, and Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945.

16. Memo, Handy [for himself], 7 Apr 43, sub: Instrs from Marshall Prior to Departure, Paper 51, Book 8, Exec 8. The instructions were given to General Handy for transmission to Connolly shortly before Handy's departure for an extended tour of the theaters.

17. (1) STM-30, 1 Jan 48. (2) See also, Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, Table 12, App. A.

18. (1) OPD Diary, 10 Dec 43. (2) OPD memo for rcd, appended to ltr, Marshall to CG's AGF, ASF, etc., to Dec 43, sub: Establishment of Persian Gulf Command, OPD 384 Middle East, 28.

For earlier suggestions along this same line, see memo, Wedemeyer for Hull, 25 May 43, no sub, OPD 381 Security, 141; and msg, McNarney to Eisenhower for Marshall, 27 May 43, CM-OUT 11444

19. For discussions of United States offer and Soviet reaction, see especially Item 20, Exec 1 and OPD 381 Russia.

For a discussion of this episode and of the USSR in Anglo-American plans and operations in 1942, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. XV.

20. Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.

21. Quotation is from msg, Stalin to Roosevelt, 13 Jan 43, incl to memo, Hammond, JCS, for Handy, 21 Jan 43, sub: Bradley Mission, Item 20, Exec 1. See also: (1) OPD draft Msg [CofS to President], 7 Apr 43, Item 20, Exec 1; (2) min, 6th mtg CCS, President and Prime Minister at White House, TRIDENT, 25 May 43, Official TRIDENT Conf Book; and (3) Ch. IV above.

22. (1) Msg, Roosevelt to Stalin, 8 Jan 43, Item 20, Exec 1. (2) OPD draft msg [CofS to President], 7 Apr 43, Item 20, Exec 1. (3) Msg, Stalin to Roosevelt, 13 Jan 43, incl to memo, Hammond, JCS, for Gen Handy, 21 Jan 43, sub: Bradley Mission, Item 20, Exec 1.

23. (1) William H. McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, Their Co-Operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (London, Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 277-78, 324. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 734.

In August 1943 the State Department, in response to a request from Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, G-2, forwarded to him a memorandum on the subject of current indications of Soviet policy. The memorandum, not an official State Department communication, was in General Hull's opinion an excellent paper. It concluded that the Soviet Government was removing obstacles in the way of a negotiated peace with a non-Nazi German government in the event that such an act might be in accord with Soviet self-interest. From all indications the paper was widely read by top Army planners. See memo, James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations, Dept. of State, for Gen Strong, 11 Aug 43, no sub, Paper 103, Book 11, Exec 9, preceded by informal memo, Gen Hull for Gen Handy, 14 Aug 43, no sub, forwarding the State Dept. memo for General Handy, General Wedemeyer, and other top Army personnel.

24. Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), pp. 60ff.

25. (1) OPD brief [for CofS, 7 Jun 43, sub: Revision of Current Military Program, Item 18, Exec 1. The report of the Special Army Committee on manpower, approved by the War Department, stated that if the USSR could continue to contain the major portion of the German air and ground forces and the Combined Bomber Offensive proved effective, the United States would require about too combat divisions and supporting and service units, in addition to those of the other Allies, to bring about an unconditional surrender of the Axis. See Ch. VIII, above. (2) Total Forces Required for Completion of the War Size of the United States Army, Tab B to memo [OPD] for ACofS OPD, 12 Jul 43, sub: Notes for Testimony before WD Procurement Review Bd, Item 18, Exec 1.

26. Interim rpt by Sp Army Committee, 1 Jun 43, Revision of Current Military Program, Item 18, Exec 1.

27. (1) SS 131 [about 1 Jul 43], title: To Determine the Proper Course of Action for the United Nations in the Event Russia and Germany Effect a Compromise Peace in July or August 1943, Tab 131 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131-59 (7 Jan 43). (2) Memo, Embick for Marshall, 12 Jul 43, sub: Informal Comments on OPD Paper on "Conduct of the War 1944-45," with Tab 111 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 96-126/3 (7 Jan 43). (3) For similar expressions on the joint level of reservations on Soviet policy, see JIC 129, 19 Aug 43, title: USSR Situation Capabilities and Intentions (as of 15 Aug 1943).

28. Paper, John Davies, 17 Sep 43, title: Policy Conflicts Among the United Nations, with memo, Brig Gen John Magruder to Brig Gen Frank N. Roberts, 15 Dec 43, in ABC 092 (15 Dec 43).

29. Memo, G.C.M. for Handy, 30 Mar 43, no sub, WDCSA 381 Super Secret, I.

30. Memo, Col Ordway, asst Exec OPD, for Col Roberts, 27 Aug 43, no sub, Paper 107, Book 11, Exec 9.

31. SS 90, 8 Atlg 43, title: Conduct of the War in Europe, Tab 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43). A copy of this paper was distributed to all U.S. officers who attended QUADRANT.

32. A brief description of these difficulties is given by Deane in Strange Alliance, p.10. For an account of Admiral Standley's service in the USSR, see William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago, H. Regnery Company, 1955).

The differences between General Faymonville and General Michela, and General Michela's difficulties with the Soviets are reflected in the exchange of messages between General Michela in Moscow and General Strong, G-2, in Washington. See Item 20, Exec 1.

33. (1) Memo, Harriman for Marshall, 23 Sep 43, no sub. (2) OPD memo, CofS for Harriman, 24 Sep 43, no sub. Both in Item 21, Exec 1. (3) Memo, CofS for Harriman, 25 Sep 43, no sub, OPD 336 Russia, 28.

34. (1) Memo, Harriman for Marshall, 23 Sep 43, no sub, Item 21, Exec 1. (2) See also msg, Harriman to Marshall, 2 Nov 43, CM-IN 1946.

35. Ltr, CofS to Deane, 1 Oct 43, sub: Letter of Instrs, Tab 1, Item 12, Exec 5.

General Deane actually knew of his appointment earlier. He himself drafted an early version of his letter of instructions, which closely resembled the final product. See: (1) informal memo, Deane for Handy, 28 Sep 43, no sub, and incl draft ltr of instrs; and (2) memo, Deane for Handy, 29 Sep 43, no sub; both in Item 21, Exec 1.

36. (1) JCS 506/1, 5 Oct 43, title: Instrs for Members of U.S. Military Mission to USSR. (2) Deane, Strange Alliance, p. 12.

37. Msg, Hamilton to Secy State, 3 Oct 43, Tab 9, Item 12, Exec 5.

38. For a discussion of the work of the Deane mission and Soviet-American collaboration during 1943-45, see Deane, Strange Alliance.

39. (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 749. (2) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 277-83, contains a discussion of the background of the Moscow Conference including exchanges of messages among the three heads of government. (3) Hull, Memoirs, 11, 1247-80, discusses in detail the political background of the conference from the U.S. point of view.

40. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 278.

41. (1) JCS 506, 18 Sep 43, title: Instrs Concerning Duty as Military Observer at American-British-Soviet Conf. (2) Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 9-10. Deane learned of his own and Ismay's designation from a message sent to London by the Prime Minister from Washington, shown to him confidentially by the British secretary of the CCS, his colleague. It was not unusual for members of the JCS to obtain information about the contents of communications between the President and Prime Minister informally from British sources. What was clone here by Deane and his counterpart was often repeated by Marshall and Dill and exemplified the close working arrangements that developed between the two staffs.

42. (1) JCS 506, 18 Sep 43, title: Instrs Concerning Duty as Military Observer at American-British-Soviet Conf. (2) Min, 115th mtg JCS, 21 Sep 43. At this meeting the JCS approved JCS 506 with some modifications and ruled that the paper was not to be taken from the United States. Its contents were to be carried mentally by the military observer.

43. Admiral King was reluctant to have either Deane or Harriman reveal the United States' Pacific plans. He felt that since the USSR and Japan were at peace, discussion of Pacific plans was undesirable and unnecessary at that time. See JCS 506/1, 5 Oct 43, title: Instrs for Members of U.S. Military Mission to USSR.

44. JCS 506, 18 Sep 43, title: Instrs Concerning Duty as Military Observer at American-British-Soviet Conf. As to arrangements for the post-hostilities period, the JCS instructed the U.S. military observer that U.S. military resources would be available and adequate to implement any organization for maintaining international peace upon which the United States might agree.

45. In this connection, see also the statements on the wartime role of the Soviet Union contained in the document, "Russia's Position," taken by Hopkins to the QUADRANT .Conference and quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 748-49. This document also advances the view that the Soviet Union's position in postwar Europe would be "a dominant one" and that, with Germany defeated, no power in Europe could oppose Soviet military might successfully. No copy of the document, evidently representing an informal, unofficial position, has been found in Defense Department files.

46. Memo, Handy for Deane, 24 Sep 43, sub: Difficulties of Establishing a Second Front, OPD 381 Security, 217. The memo, and the appended inclosure, grew out of the Chief of Staff's instructions to General Deane to collect such data in advance of his trip. General Deane requested OPD to prepare a short study covering bottlenecks in landing craft, transportation, shipping, and so forth.

47. (1) Msg (originator OPD) to Hamilton for Faymonville and Michela, 2 Oct 43, CM-OUT 904.

48. For a description of General Deane's trip, see ltr, Deane, Moscow, to Marshall, 29 Oct 43, before Tab 22, Item 12, Exec 5. For the exchange of messages between the War Department and the theater commanders in the course of the delegation's trip to Moscow, see the series of exchanges filed with Tab 10, Item 12, Exec 5.

49. Other U.S. military representatives besides General Deane in the U.S. delegation included General Vandenberg of the AAF Washington staff and Cols. Harry H. McBride and Charles W. McCarthy, War Department liaison officers with the State Department. State Department officials and consultants included Green Hackworth, James C. Dunn, Dr, Matthew W. Perry, and Charles E. Bohlen, the department's Soviet expert. See: (1) list, Military Members of U.S. Delegation to Three-Power Conf [early Oct 43], Tab 6, Item 12, Exec 5; (2) msg, Marshall to Connolly, 6 Oct 43, CM-OUT 2564; (3) msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Oct 43, CM-OUT 2345; and (4) msg, Marshall to Royce, 12 Oct 43, CM-OUT 5200.

50. (1) Msg, Deane, Moscow, to JCS, 19 Oct 43, CM-IN 11822. (2) Ltr, Deane, Moscow, to Marshall, 29 Oct 43, before Tab 22, Item 12, Exec 5. (3) JCS Memo for Info 146, 13 Nov 43, title: Tripartite Conf, Moscow, 19-30 Oct 43.

51. Deane, Strange Alliance, p. 19.

52. Rec of Mtg of Tripartite Conf Held at the Guest House of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 20 Oct 43, Tab 20, Item 12, Exec 5.

53. In connection with the disclosure of information on the OVERLORD build-up, delicate questions were soon to arise as to the extent of the detail to be furnished the Russians, as well as the amount of collaboration of the U.S. military mission with its British counterpart in Moscow on such data. The problem of maintaining security, as well as Soviet confidence in British and American intentions, was to concern War Department, joint, and combined military authorities in late 1943, See: (1) informal memo, T.T.H. [Handy] for Hull and Roberts, 24 Oct 43, no sub, with CPS 61/D in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 3; (2) memo, Gen Handy, ACofS OPD, for Capt Royal, USN, Secy JCS, 27 Oct 43, sub: Deane's Request for Periodic Rpt on OVERLORD, Item 69, Exec 10; (3) min, 125th mtg CCS, 29 Oct 43; and (4) memo, Sexton, SGS, for Secy JCS, 5 Nov 43, sub: Information Furnished to Russians, Item 69, Exec 10.

54. Ltr, Deane, Moscow, to Marshall, 29 Oct 48, before Tab 22, Item 12, Exec 5.

55. (1) Rec of Mtg of Tripartite Conf Held at the Guest House of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 20 Oct 43, Tab 20, Item 12, Exec 9. (2) JCS Memo for Info 146, 18 Nov 43, title: Tripartite Conf, Moscow, 19-30 Oct 43. (3) Msg 3, Secy State to President [21 Oct 43], Incl B to JCS 546, 25 Oct 43, title: Swedish and Turkish Participation in the War.

56. Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 20-21.

57. Msg, Deane to JCS, 22 Oct 43, CM-IN 13360.

58. See: (1) "Proposed Cable to General Deane (re CM-IN 13360, 22 Oct 43)" by Gen Arnold, Incl B to memo, Capt Royal, USN, JCS for Adm Leahy, Gen Marshall, and Adm King, 25 Oct 43, sub: Proposed Reply to General Deane's Msg No. 7, 22 Oct, Tab 14, Item 12, Exec 5; (2) min, 120th mtg JCS, 26 Oct 43; and (3) msg, JCS to Deane, Moscow, 26 Oct 43, CM-OUT 11636.

59. Deane, Strange Alliance, p. 21.

60. For the following discussion on Turkey and Sweden at the conference, see especially Msg 3, Secy State to President [21 Oct 43], Incl B to JCS 546, 25 Oct 43, title: Swedish and Turkish Participation in the War.

61. (1) The President directed that the Secretary of State's message be turned over to the JCS for preparation of a reply. In turn, the JCS directed the JSSC to draft a reply. See memo, Col Lemuel Mathewson for Adm Leahy, 21 Oct 43, no sub, Paper 37, Book 13, Exec 9. (2) On 22 October General Handy instructed Colonels Roberts and Todd--Army planners--to study the Secretary of State's message for matters to be brought to the attention of the JSSC. See memo, T.T.H. for Roberts, 22 Oct 43, no sub, with Tab 14, Item 12, Exec 5.

62. (1) Memo, Roberts, Actg Chief SS OPD for ACofS OPD, 23 Oct 43, sub: Studies on Sweden and Turkey, with Tab 164 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43). (2) OPD Notes on JCS 546, [n.d.], prepared for JCS mtg, 26 Oct 43, Paper 84, Book 13, Exec 9. Similar points of view are contained in the paper "Notes on JCS 546" filed with Tab 165 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43). (3) See Ch. XI, above.

63. JCS 546, 25 Oct 43, sub: Swedish and Turkish Participation in the War. Inclosure A of JCS ,46 is a report by the JSSC on the message of 21 October from the Secretary of State to the President.

64. (1) SS 164, 23 Oct .13, title: Sweden, Tab 164 in .ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43). (2) OPD notes on JCS ,46, [n.d.J, prepared for JCS mtg, 26 Oct 43, Paper 84, Book 13, Exec 9.

65. JCS 546, 25 Oct 43, title: Swedish and Turkish Participation in the War.

66. Memo, Col Todd for Capt Royal, USN, 26 Oct 43, no sub, Folder Oct 1944-USSR and Oct 1913Turkey, Item 22, Exec 17. For JSSC disagreement with the proposed War Department draft reply from the President to Secretary of State, giving a definitive negative on Turkey, see memo, Adm Willson for JCS, 26 Oct 43, sub: Entry of Turkey into the War, Folder Oct 44--USSR and Oct 43--Turkev, Item 22, Exec 17.

67. (1) For the discussion in the JCS on Army and JSSC drafts of proposed replies, see min, 120th mtg JCS, 26 Oct 43. (2) The draft of the JCS proposed reply from the President to the Secretary of State is contained in JCS 546/1, 27 Oct 43, title: Swedish and Turkish Participation in the War.

68. Hull, Memoirs, II, 1301. No copy has been found in Army files of the President's reply to Cordell Hull. According to Admiral Leahy, the President had tentatively approved the JSSC draft reply of 21 October 1943. Presumably, he also saw the final draft prepared for him by the JCS (JCS 546/1) on the basis of revised JSSC and Army views. See min, 120th mtg JCS, 26 Opt 43.

69. This description of the Soviet reaction is based on Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 22-23.

70. The Chinese Ambassador to the USSR, Foo Ping-sheung, was empowered by the Chinese Foreign Office to sign for China. See Hull, Memoirs, II, 1306.

71. For a summary of political understandings reached at the Moscow Conference, see: (1) Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; (2) Annex to Secret Protocol of Conf, circulated as Annex 2 to Incl A of JCS Memo for Info 146, 15 Nov 43; (3) Department of State, Publication 2423, The Axis in Defeat: A Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany and Japan (Washington, Government Printing Office, n.d.), pp. 2-9; and (4) Hull, Memoirs, II, 1280-1307. The Hull volume contains a detailed first-hand account of the political discussions and agreements at Moscow.

72. (1) Msg, Secy State, Moscow, for President, 2 Nov 43. (2) Msg, Br COS to Br Joint Staff Mission, Washington, and CinC Middle East, 8 Nov 43. Both in Folder Oct 44-USSR and Oct 43-Turkey, Item 22, Exec 17.

73. (1) Msg, President to Harriman and Prime Minister, 4 Nov 43, Folder Oct 44-USSR and Oct 48-Turkey, Item 22, Exec 17. The appended penciled notation, bearing General Marshall's initials, indicates that the message was sent. (2) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 13 Nov 43, CM-OUT 5480.

74. The question of the resumption of the convoys is treated in detail in Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 256-96. See also JCS 517, 2 Oct 43, title: Convoys to North Russia, containing the Prime Minister's plan.

75. Msg, Harriman to Marshall, 2 Nov 43, CM-IN 1946.

76. Secretary Hull has since recorded that at a banquet on the last day of the conference, 30 October, Stalin "astonished and delighted me by saying clearly and unequivocally that, when the Allies succeeded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan." The statement was "entirely unsolicited, and he asked nothing in return." So secret did Hull regard this information that he sent it to the President, one half over the Army code, and the other half over the Navy code. Hull, Memoirs, II, 1309-11.

77. Msg, Secy State to President, 31 Oct 43, Item 63c (2d part), Exec 10. For further references to the Soviet position on the relationship of the Italian operations to the second front, see also, Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 121.

78. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 439.

79. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 289-93.

80. OPD draft memo, CofS for President, 8 Nov 43, sub: Conduct of the European War, with Tab go in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43). This sixth draft of a Strategy Section memo was taken by General Handy to the SEXTANT Conference. An earlier version, dated 29 October 1943, is also filed with Tab 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. R-95 (7 Jan 43).

81. Msg, Deane to JCS, 9 Nov 43, CM-IN 5951.

82. Msg, Deane to Marshall, 11 Nov 43, CM-IN 7461.

83. Memo, OPD for CofS, 10 Nov 43, sub: Message From Gen Deane With Reference to Possible Russian Desire for Increased Activity in the Mediterranean, Tab SS 181/1 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43). A notation, appended to the memo by Col. G. A. Lincoln of the Operations Division, indicated that the OPD planners did not know whether General Handy had discussed the memo with the Chief of Staff. General Handy had, however, directed that the memo be taken by General Roberts, Chief of S&P Gp OPD, and Army planner, to the SEXTANT Conference.

84. SS Study, 11 Nov 43, title: Operations in the Mediterranean, with Tab 173 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 48).

85. OPD draft memo for CofS, 12 Nov 43, sub: U.S. Course of Action at SEXTANT in Case Conf Decisions Do Not Guarantee OVERLORD, With JWPC 103/D in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1-A.

86. For Case C of RANKIN, see above, Ch. X.

87. (1) SS Study, 11 Nov 43, title: Operations in the Mediterranean, with Tab 173 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43). (2) OPD draft memo for CofS, 12 Nov 48, sub: U.S. Course of Action at SEXTANT in Case Conference Decisions Do Not Guarantee OVERLORD, with JWPC 105/D in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1-A.

88. The observation was made by Colonel Lincoln, Acting Chief Strategy Section, OPD, in reviewing changes since the Quebec conference. See memo, Col G. A. Lincoln, for Col Roberts, 3 Oct 43, sub: JWPC Review of Adequacy of QUADRANT Strategy, with JPS 253 in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1-A.

89. OPD draft memo, CofS for President, 8 Nov 43, sub: Conduct of the European War, with Tab 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (11 Jan 43). This paper was taken to SEXTANT.