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DISPATCH

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Pursuing Peace in the Middle East and Bosnia

Palestinian Self-Rule Marks A Key Step Toward Lasting Peace

Address by Secretary Christopher to the American Jewish Committee, Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.

Before reporting to you on aspects of my recent trip, let me take a moment to commend the AJC and the outstanding leadership of Al Moses. Al, a long-time friend, exemplifies the best of a uniquely American brand of public service: balancing responsibilities to his family and profession with the demanding obligations of helping to lead his community. You are indeed lucky to have him as your president.

The AJC has done pioneering and persistent work against bigotry. You have spoken out against those who practice or preach anti-semitism and you have condemned every other form of intolerance. Your support for religious freedom is a gift for children of every faith. You know that hatred cannot be quarantined; it must be confronted wherever it is found.

Tragically, new evidence of prejudice abounds. Some nations have banned the film "Schindler's List." As you learned yesterday during your time with some of those saved by Schindler, that film's importance to the collective conscience of humanity cannot be overstated and must not be ignored.

Regrettably, in America, too, new signs of intolerance have appeared. Recent eruptions of anti-Semitism and racism have degraded our political dialogue and diminished our society.

What those in this room tonight know only too well is that bias and prejudice do not disappear of their own accord. I learned that lesson during my years at the Justice Department following the Watts riots. I learned it again when I was involved in the independent commission that recommended reforms in the Los Angeles Police Department after the Rodney King beating.

Given our common vision of an America drawing strength from diversity, it is no coincidence that the newly empowered L.A. Police Commission is headed by a distinguished member of your organization, Rabbi Gary Greenebaum.

The AJC has been an advocate of tolerance not only at home but a compelling voice for human rights around the world. In the United States, we are still working to form a "more perfect union." And yet I would say that America's elevation of human dignity, in this country and around the world, is unmistakable and really quite uncommon.

A Gift From Cairo

In view of the historic events of the last few days, I want to focus my remarks tonight on developments in the Middle East peace process. It's customary to bring a gift for your host whenever you're invited to dinner. Well, tonight, I bring a precious gift from Cairo—a gift that didn't come easily but clearly reflects the commitment Israel and the Palestinians have made to creating a future of coexistence and a future of reconciliation. Formally, it's known as the agreement on Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho. But let me be a bit less opaque in describing what it really is: an important step forward on the road to a lasting and secure peace for Israel and the Middle East.

This is, indeed, an achievement to be cherished. We must use it to send a simple message to a still-troubled world: Negotiations do work. Peace between former enemies is possible.

Starting today, the Palestinians and the Israelis, joined by their friends in the United States, Egypt, and the rest of the world, have rolled up their sleeves and joined the real battle for peace. This is a battle that must be waged every day, on the ground, in the hearts and minds of people on both sides of this long and bloody conflict:

a conflict that can only end when individual Israelis and Palestinians see evidence in their lives that mistrust and violence need not be a permanent state of affairs—that in fact they can live together side by side in a relationship of mutual respect and mutual benefit.

Within a matter of weeks, the Israeli army will withdraw from Gaza and Jericho. For the first time in their history, almost a million Palestinians will assume responsibility for the day-to-day decisions that shape their lives. And in time, self-government will be extended to Palestinians throughout the West Bank.

For its part, Israel will be free—free of what Prime Minister Rabin has called the bloody costs of "ruling over another people who do not want our rule." What Israeli soldier ever looked forward to serving in Jericho? What Israeli mother will not now rejoice knowing that her child will never again be sent to patrol the back streets and alleyways of Gaza?

Israel's Courage: Taking Risks for Peace

To reap these benefits fully, both parties must continue to demonstrate the courage and vision that brought them to yesterday's signing ceremony. Israel, besieged by war and terror for four decades, must transfer to yesterday's enemy, the PLO, sufficient authority so that self-rule can succeed. Prime Minister Rabin intends to do precisely that without compromising Israel's security.

The Prime Minister's determination to go the extra mile for peace has been evident at every stage of these negotiations. In 1985, I had the pleasure of introducing then-Defense Minister Rabin at a function in Los Angeles, never dreaming that a different day would come and that we would have the relationship we have now. I emphasized the courage and leadership he had repeatedly demonstrated in times of war. Over the last 15 months, as we've worked together to build a lasting peace, my admiration for him has only grown. He has applied the courage and experience he acquired in war to the difficult task of making peace.

In those 1985 remarks, I also underscored Israel's tremendous courage as a country. Compelled by circumstances to fight for its survival, Israel has never stopped striving for peace. In pursuit of that goal, it repeatedly has shown itself ready to make painful choices and undertake significant risks for peace. As it does so yet again, Israel should know that America's bedrock commitment to its security remains unshakable. As President Clinton has said, "it is the job of the United States to minimize Israel's risks." Toward that end, we must continue to guarantee and enhance Israel's qualitative military edge.

Palestinian Courage: Ending Terror, Building Self-Rule

The Palestinians have much to gain from yesterday's events. In taking on the powers of self-rule, they also have a great responsibility for ensuring that the process succeeds. They can be assured of the goodwill and support of the United States and the world community. Last October, we organized the Donors' Conference to Support Middle East Peace, which raised more than \$2 billion to assist Palestinian economic development. The United States alone pledged \$500 million toward that effort.

By embracing this historic opportunity, the Palestinians can build a freer, more prosperous society—a society based on accountable, democratic institutions of self-government, where the rule of law and human rights are upheld. That is the kind of self-government that Palestinians want and deserve. To achieve it, however, they must first live up to all the solemn commitments their leaders have undertaken but that they must now carry out. One stands out among all others: to root out terrorism and violence against Israel. The peace process simply will not be sustained unless Israelis are convinced that it will bring them greater security.

The U.S. Role

For our part, the Clinton Administration has been pushing the peace process forward since its first days in

office. Indeed, my first trip outside the United States as Secretary of State was to the Middle East. Since then, we have maintained constant contact with the parties and have played what we hope will be a significant role. There are four aspects to that:

First, through our co-sponsorship of the Madrid process, we have provided the parties a framework for direct negotiations.

Second, we have defused several crises that threatened to derail the talks—for example, the crisis over deportees in early 1993 and the *Katyusha* crisis in Lebanon last summer. And only a few weeks ago, when negotiations were suspended following the Hebron massacre, we worked out a formula acceptable to Israel that brought the Palestinians back to the peace table.

Third, when necessary, we have acted as an active intermediary to move negotiations forward, particularly on the Israeli-Syrian track.

Finally, we have mobilized the political and economic support of the international community to ensure we have the resources to help make peace a reality in that region.

Without the United States playing this kind of a leadership role, I believe the peace process simply will not succeed. With it, yesterday's agreement can become the first step on the road to a lasting Middle East peace.

Expanding the Peace

The successful implementation of the Gaza-Jericho accord must be followed by the expansion of self-rule to the rest of the West Bank and then by negotiations on the difficult issues of final status.

But the Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough we saw finalized yesterday also must be accompanied by accelerated progress in Israel's negotiations with its other neighbors—Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Only a comprehensive Middle East peace will provide the strategic underpinning for long-term regional stability.

On my recent trip, I spent many intense and interesting hours with Prime Minister Rabin and President

Asad of Syria, discussing their important set of negotiations. I believe there is a renewed seriousness of purpose on both sides to engage comprehensively on all the issues that must be resolved across the broad range of the relationship between the two countries. The gaps that separate them remain wide. But the level of detail in their respective ideas is unprecedented and created a much stronger basis for negotiations. A new, more substantive phase of these talks has been opened. The United States intends to remain deeply engaged. I have agreed to travel again to Israel and Syria in the near future.

Building Cooperation, Containing Extremism

Last week, I also traveled to Riyadh for talks with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council. I stressed the importance of expanding the zone of peace to the entire Arab world. Here, the Gulf states' active participation in the multilateral phase of the peace process is essential.

The multilateral process doesn't get much attention. But quietly it continues to topple long-standing taboos. Last month, for example, the water working group met in Muscat and approved an Israeli proposal for rehabilitating water systems in the region. Think about that fact. A group including 13 Arab delegations endorsed an Israeli proposal for addressing a common problem affecting all the countries in the region. The venue for the meeting—an Arab capital—is also a symbol of falling taboos. I talked to the Israeli representative and was touched by the way he was received. The process continues this week in Qatar, where the arms control group is meeting.

In Riyadh, I also urged the Gulf states to further demonstrate their interest in reconciliation with Israel, and I told them that ending the Arab boycott is the place to start.

The boycott has always been detestable. Now, with the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian economic agreement a few days ago, it has become a dangerous anachronism that hurts the very people it is supposed to help. Implementation of the Declara-

tion of Principles will be completed soon. At that point, tangible steps need to be taken to dismantle the boycott.

The second issue dominating my discussions in Riyadh was the need to maintain tight economic sanctions against Iraq. If Saddam Hussein is allowed to escape his current containment, he would pose an immediate threat to his neighbors as well as to Arab-Israeli peace. I am gratified that I found strong support for our position among the Gulf countries for maintaining the sanctions. It is essential that our other coalition partners remain equally steadfast.

Creating a Middle East Community

I want to conclude by saying that yesterday's landmark agreement in Cairo represents another key building block in America's long effort to help secure a more stable, peaceful Middle East. This represents a sustained bipartisan effort by Democratic and Republican Administrations alike. The costs have been substantial. But the returns are well worth the investment, not simply because it allows us to help reconcile long-term adversaries but because it promises to advance America's vital interests in a critical region of the world.

The potential strategic benefits of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict are difficult to exaggerate. Our aim is nothing less than to create a new Middle East community of nations that share a common interest in peaceful relations, stability, economic development, and the advancement of the region's peoples. Such a community would not solve all the region's problems. But it would provide a far more solid foundation for the well-being of Israel and our Arab friends. It would better secure the region's vast oil supplies. And it would serve as a powerful bulwark against the growing threats of political extremism, weapons proliferation, and the growing threats from renegade countries like Iraq, Libya, and Iran.

With the help and support of groups like the AJC, I am convinced that America can help Israel and her neighbors achieve peace. Through patience, persistence, and strength, we

can advance our interests in this vital region. I assure you that the Clinton Administration remains dedicated to this vision of a more stable and secure Middle East.

Turning Principles Into New Realities in the Middle East

Remarks by Secretary Christopher at the signing of the "Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area," Cairo, Egypt, May 4, 1994.

President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Arafat, Foreign Minister Peres, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Mr. Abbu Mazin, distinguished guests: Representing President Clinton and the United States, I am privileged and honored to stand with you today in this wonderful city, as we witness the signing of this remarkable agreement and pay tribute to those who made it possible.

Eight months ago, many of you stood with me in another great city to witness another historic handshake. The signing of the Declaration of Principles last September in Washington committed long-time adversaries to mutual reconciliation. It gave them a way out of the bitter conflict that has so long entrapped them.

Now they stand on the verge of implementing that agreement. Though we live in an age of political wonders, where old hatreds are giving way to new hopes, these achievements cannot be forgotten. Indeed, we must use them to send this simple message to a world still beset by conflict: With vision, leadership, and courage, peace between former enemies is possible.

The months between these two agreements have not been easy. They have tested our faith in the power of reasoned compromise. Israelis and Palestinians have wrestled with the complicated questions like transfer of authority, economic integration, and security—and perhaps also with their own doubts about the possibility of success. They searched for—and in the end, they found—ways to turn principles into new realities.

To their eternal credit, Israelis and Palestinians pressed forward in the face of extremists who sought to kill hope for the future by inflaming the hatreds of the past. We are here today because unspeakable acts of violence could not still the voices of peace or weaken the resolve of the peacemakers. We are here to send a message to all who would use terror to keep Arabs and Israelis mired in the politics of hatred and despair: The children of the Middle East will not be condemned to a future of perpetual conflict. Negotiations work; peace is possible.

For Palestinians, the challenge now is to build accountable, democratic institutions of government; to provide for the economic well-being of their people; to uphold the rule of law; and to guarantee respect for human rights. That is the kind of self-government that Palestinians want and deserve. The international community must stand ready to assist them. The challenge is not merely to secure the peace but to take full advantage of it.

For Israelis, the immediate task will be to establish a new relationship with their Palestinian neighbors, to forge bonds of cooperation that can bring benefits to both peoples—to reach the undiscovered promised land of peace.

For Palestinians and Israelis alike, the challenge will be to create a common basis of respect and tolerance. The challenge will be to help all the peoples of the Middle East fulfill, in the words of President Clinton, the "great yearning for the quiet miracle of a normal life."

There is still important work to be done. We have not seen the end of contention in the Middle East. But we are changing the manner of contention. We are coming closer to the day when disputes once inflamed by the argument of force will be settled by the force of argument.

The spirit of compromise we see today must not fade. Israelis and Palestinians have a fundamental stake in this process. For the first time, Palestinians have the chance to govern themselves. For the first time, Israelis have the chance to forge a truly

constructive relationship with Palestinians. I believe that together they can—and must—succeed.

In the end, the goal we seek is not simply peace as the absence of war. It is a just and enduring and comprehensive settlement based on genuine cooperation, mutual respect, tolerance, and the normal interaction of diplomacy and trade that binds nations together.

With the support and determination of the friends of peace, that goal can be reached. In this regard, I pay special tribute to President Mubarak, whose efforts were so instrumental in helping us reach this moment. Egypt has again demonstrated that it is an essential bridge, linking Arabs and Israelis in the pursuit of peace. It is also fitting to honor the memory of the late Foreign Minister of Norway, Johan Holst, who worked tirelessly in pursuit of this agreement, and who is, I am certain, with us in spirit.

Forty-five years ago, on the island of Rhodes, the great American peacemaker Ralph Bunche mediated the first armistice between Arabs and Israelis. His words then capture our spirit now. He said:

I have a bias against war; a bias for peace. . . . I have a bias in favor of both Arabs and Jews in the sense that I believe that both are good, honorable and essentially peace-loving peoples, and are therefore as capable of making peace as of waging war.

The same motivations that brought Arabs and Israelis to Madrid, to Oslo, to Washington, and here today to Cairo will carry this region forward to lasting peace. Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Arafat, we salute you today for taking an extraordinary step toward this noble goal.

Signing of Agreement To Implement Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles

Statement by President Clinton released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, May 4, 1994.

The signing today in Cairo of the agreement to implement the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles

Bosnia: U.S. and Russia Call for Meeting Of Contact Group Foreign Ministers

Statement by Department Spokesman Michael D. McCurry, released by the Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, May 3, 1994.

United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Andrei V. Kozyrev met today in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss a number of issues. Most importantly, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister expressed serious concern over the continuing instability of the situation in Bosnia, which could spark another dangerous point of conflict.

They called on all the parties for:

- Immediate and full compliance concerning the withdrawal of forces from proscribed areas around Gorazde;
- Immediate steps to reduce tension and prevent offensive military action in the Brcko area;

- Agreement on an urgent basis to a complete cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, to include separation of military forces, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and interposition of UN forces; and
- Immediate resumption of negotiations without precondition for conclusion of an overall settlement.

Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev are convinced that a new, powerful political impetus is required for a Bosnia settlement process. They believe that a meeting involving the foreign ministers of the participants in the Contact Group should be convened as soon as possible. Based on discussions with their colleagues, they believe such a meeting could probably take place on May 13 in Geneva. □

marks another milestone in progress toward a lasting peace in the Middle East. On behalf of all Americans, I have called Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat to congratulate them for this accomplishment. I expressed my high regard for Prime Minister Rabin's courageous leadership and stressed to Chairman Arafat the importance of moving without hesitation to make this agreement a reality. I also telephoned yesterday, and again today, President Mubarak to underscore our gratitude and appreciation for the key role he played in making this historic step forward possible.

Now the focus must be on implementing the Declaration of Principles in as rapid and successful a manner as possible. The process of transforming the situation on the ground for the better must begin. The promise of a new future of hope for Israelis and Palestinians alike must now be realized. I assured Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat that the United States would do everything possible to make this happen.

Building on the progress achieved today and our ongoing discussions with parties in the region, I am hopeful that

this can be the year of breakthrough to a lasting and comprehensive peace for all the peoples of the Middle East.

Secretary Christopher's Consultations on Peace in the Middle East and Bosnia, April 25 to May 3, 1994

ASCOT, UNITED KINGDOM APRIL 25, 1994

Opening statements at a news conference by Jordanian King Hussein and Secretary Christopher.

King Hussein. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to express before you once again my joy at having the opportunity to meet a very dear and old friend, Secretary Christopher, here. We have had some very, very fruitful, open, frank discussions on a number of issues that are of mutual interest to us but also to all of you. I am very happy indeed to have had this chance. I am sure you have questions, which you should address to the Secretary and myself, and we would be more than happy to respond to them.

Secretary Christopher. I just had the honor of meeting with King Hussein again, here at his residence in

[Ascot], and I am glad to say that we have had a very constructive discussion of a number of issues.

We, of course, discussed the peace process and the importance of pushing for progress on all four of the tracks, looking toward and understanding the great importance of a comprehensive peace. We talked about resumption on the four bilateral tracks in Washington, DC, rather soon after I complete this visit to the Middle East. We particularly agreed on the importance of moving forward to rapid implementation of the Declaration of Principles between the Israelis and the Palestinians after they conclude their agreement, which we hope will be in the very near future.

On another matter of importance, I informed His Majesty that, subject to some fine tuning, the United States Government will support establishment of a land-based regime for verifying enforcement of sanctions against Iraq. The inspections will be carried out by a private, independent, not-for-profit company of international stature and integrity, Lloyds Register of the United Kingdom, which will operate at the Port of Aqaba.

The United States is convinced this new inspection regime will be as effective as the MIF—Multinational Interception Force—effective in guaranteeing that no Iraqi trade will transit Aqaba other than transactions which have been specifically permitted by the United Nations. Indeed, we believe that in some respects land-based inspections will be an improvement in our ability to enforce sanctions against Iraq. I want to emphasize that the King and I discussed these matters today, and the United States, Jordan, and our MIF partners are all fully and definitely committed to the enforcement of these sanctions.

After careful study, I am glad to say, we became convinced that this proposal for a new inspection regime not only takes into account—in response to legitimate concerns that His Majesty has indicated to me on a prior occasion—but will also make it easier to sustain and enhance the sanctions against Iraq. The King and I have agreed that Jordan and the United States will cooperate closely together

with the UN Sanctions Committee and other interested parties to effectuate and establish this new on-shore enforcement regime to make it work efficiently and expeditiously.

The Government of Iraq continues to thwart the will of the international community by its refusal to comply with United Nations resolutions. It certainly continues to inflict great damage on the people of Iraq. The King was very eloquent today in pointing out to me the harm that the people of Iraq are suffering at the hands of the Government of Iraq. Last week, we saw another example of Iraq's promotion of terrorism when its agents assassinated an Iraqi opposition leader in Beirut. In the face of this kind of behavior, we believe that we have no alternative but to continue with the enforcement of the sanctions regime.

**GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
APRIL 26, 1994**

Opening statements at a news conference by Secretary Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev.

Secretary Christopher. Good afternoon. I will start with a brief opening statement, and then Foreign Minister Kozyrev will make a brief statement in Russian, which will be translated. And then we'll be glad to try to respond to your questions.

We've just had a very productive meeting which covered several important international issues. The chief subject, of course, was Bosnia. Throughout this crisis in Bosnia over the Gorazde issue, the United States and Russia have retained and had very close consultations at every stage. We have a common objective in Bosnia. I believe we have a common view as to events on the ground. Russia's support for the steps taken in Gorazde—and with respect to the other safe areas—by NATO has been very important and highly desirable.

We discussed here this afternoon the importance of finding a diplomatic solution, for it is clear that there can be no military solution to this long-standing conflict. We have recognized the importance of the Contact Group—which was formally recognized yesterday—which will, of course, combine the

efforts of Russia, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations. I think the task of that Contact Group, of course, is to try to bring the parties back to the table and into serious negotiations. To that end, the first task will be to achieve a genuine cessation of hostilities between the parties. At the same time, the Contact Group will be working to bring the parties into serious discussion of a final settlement. We are already at work, I think, on both of these urgent goals; and as you know, the members of the Contact Group are preparing to go to Sarajevo to meet with both of the parties commencing on Thursday and Friday of this week.

We had a good discussion—changing the subject—on the Middle East peace process and our concerns about making progress there. Foreign Minister Kozyrev gave me an account of his important meetings today with Prime Minister Rabin, who had been in Moscow, and I told him of my plans over the next several days to try to move the peace process along. We discussed North Korea and the proliferation problems there. That's a problem on which our two countries have common goals and common interests, and we will work closely together on that problem.

We also discussed the issue of Russian troop withdrawals from Latvia and Estonia. We, I think, share the hope that there can be a signature, in the next few days really, of the troop withdrawal agreement between Russia and Latvia. We also hope that the talks between Russia and Estonia, which will take place in the early part of May, will be successfully concluded as well.

Finally, we discussed Russia's interest in joining the Partnership for Peace; and the partnership, of course, is moving forward with, I think, 14 countries now having indicated interest in joining. And, of course, NATO will welcome Russia's participation at the time when they are ready to enter into those discussions.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Well, I think that this is an objective description of the subjects we discussed. The only thing I would like to add is one question that we discussed regarding the new COCOM and the participation

of Russia in the practical work in the development of this regime along the lines as we agreed in Vladivostok.

RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA
APRIL 27, 1994

Opening statements at a news conference by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud and Secretary Christopher.

Foreign Minister Saud. I'd like to say that the Secretary has had a very wide-ranging, thorough, extensive, fruitful discussion with the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, and the Secretary will give you a briefing on these discussions.

I would like to concentrate my comments on the discussions that were held between the Secretary and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries; and, in this regard, I would like to say that we were pleased to have hosted the meeting today with Secretary of State Christopher and the ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The GCC and the United States have a long history of close relations marked by advances in regional peace and security to the benefit of all states in the region. In our discussions, we reviewed with Secretary Christopher our common stance with regard to the effect which Iraq continues to pose to regional security. We agreed on a common resolve to stand vigilant and determined to ensure full compliance with United Nations sanctions in accordance with Security Council resolutions—especially Resolution 833, pertaining to the demarcation of borders between Kuwait and Iraq.

The Secretary, on behalf of the President of the United States, reiterated the commitment of the United States to the defense of the Gulf—a commitment that is appreciated by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

The Secretary also briefed the GCC ministers on the state of progress in the peace process and the objectives of his current trip to the region. The GCC reiterated its full support for a negotiated peace settlement; and, in this regard, the GCC ministers recognized the progress being made in the PLO-Israel agreement and reiterated the need for a speedy implementation of that agreement.

The ministers also pledged to continue to do what they can to support negotiations and agreements reached on the other tracks as well. They will also continue their active engagement and participation in the multilateral negotiations. One meeting of the multilaterals has already taken place in the Gulf area; another one is about to convene.

The GCC ministers believe all sides should do what they can to advance the prospects of peace. They condemn terrorism everywhere in the world and abhor extremism that threatens the peace process. The ministers appreciate the President's and the Secretary's efforts to promote Arab-Israeli peace and reconciliation. And the ministers look forward to the day when a new page is turned in the Middle East and a just and comprehensive peace is achieved for all the peoples in the region.

As regards the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the GCC ministers expressed their deep appreciation for the firm stand taken by the United States and hoped this position will continue until a peaceful resolution is achieved.

The two sides expressed their appreciation for the efforts exerted by the United Arab Emirates aiming at reaching an agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the issue of the three islands—Greater Tumbs, Lesser Tumbs, and Abu Musa—which belong to the UAE.

They called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to start serious negotiations with the UAE in order to arrive at a peaceful solution to this problem.

Secretary Christopher. First, let me express my appreciation to Prince Saud, the Foreign Minister, as well as to all the officials of the Saudi Arabian Government for the warm hospitality that we've had here and for the pleasant time that they've provided for us.

Of course, I am especially grateful to His Majesty, the King, for receiving me. We met for about an hour and 15 or 20 minutes today. We discussed a very wide variety of world problems. The King expressed his concern about the situation in Iraq and expressed his support for the maintenance of the United Nations resolutions and the

sanctions. He expressed his concern for the situation in Iran. He expressed his firm support for the Middle East peace process and urged the United States to continue its efforts to produce peace in the area.

We discussed European matters—including Bosnia and the path of reform in Russia—and the King discussed a great many of the world's problems and had acute observations and deep insights as to many of these problems. I am sure that we will benefit from the comments that he made.

I would say and emphasize that my presence in the region today is a manifestation of President Clinton's Administration's commitment—which is an ironclad commitment—to the defense of the countries in the Gulf. Our resolve to defend against aggression in this region is no less strong than it was at the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. We will remain determined and vigilant in this region, constantly aware that there are threats to peace and security in the area.

The regime in Baghdad, in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, continues the suppression of its own citizens: the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. Its refusal also—three years after the liberation of Kuwait—to recognize Kuwait's independence and its borders is obviously a troubling phenomenon. Its resort to terrorism, as illustrated by its attempt to assassinate President Bush last year and its assassination of an Iraqi dissident in Beirut last week, shows that they remain in clear violation of United Nations resolutions.

I am pleased to say that we join with our GCC partners in unanimously and strongly expressing our resolve to maintain sanctions on Iraq until they fully comply. I want to send a message to the people of Iraq that, certainly, we have no interest in prolonging their suffering. We would like to see a united and democratic Iraq, a country that might then resume its rightful place in the community of nations. The problem and the reason for the delay lie with the regime that is in power in Iraq.

I would say to the people of Iraq: Ask your rulers why there are shortages of medicine and food. The United

Nations resolution specifically exempts food and medicine from the sanctions. I would say to the people of Iraq that your suffering today has one cause, and that is Saddam Hussein's refusal to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions—his regime's rejection of the resolutions that would allow oil to be exported in exchange for food and medicine and his harassment of UN officials engaged in humanitarian efforts in Iraq.

We are using today's meeting not only to address our common concerns with respect to Iraq but also to review with the ministers here our efforts to help to achieve a peaceful settlement of the various controversies in the Middle East. We agreed on the great importance of the early implementation of the Declaration of Principles. We are pledged, I think, to provide not only moral support but tangible support to the implementation of this important Declaration of Principles.

We agreed on the value of the multilateral talks, which can generate broader regional development and show the people of the region what peace can mean.

We note the success of the water working group of the multilaterals last week in Muscat, and we are looking forward to the meeting in Doha next week on arms control and regional security matters.

Finally, I'd like to indicate that we greatly appreciate the support of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries in the efforts to pursue peace in the region. As you know, I'm going from here to Cairo, where I'll meet with President Mubarak, Chairman Arafat, and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres as they draw close to reaching an agreement on the implementation of the Declaration of Principles.

Thereafter, I'll be traveling to Israel and Syria, all to try to advance the cause of comprehensive peace in the Middle East. This area has suffered too long from bloody conflict and oppressive rule. For the first time, I believe that this region has an excellent opportunity to turn a new page, to put aside war and to choose peace instead, to end the Arab boycott of Israel, and to lay the foundation for permanent and lasting peace. Our nation, the United States, looks forward to continued close consultation with our

close friends here in Saudi Arabia as well as the other countries of the Gulf.

TEL AVIV, ISRAEL APRIL 29, 1994

Opening statements at a news conference by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Secretary Christopher.

Prime Minister Rabin. Mr. Secretary, we welcome you to Israel and more than appreciate your efforts in advancing and assisting the negotiations for peace between us and the Palestinians, between us and the three neighboring Arab countries. We appreciate the efforts that you have put forth since you became Secretary of State in bringing about a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. You have spent some days now in Cairo with President Mubarak, Chairman Arafat, and our Foreign Minister Peres and helped to bring about the beginning of the end of the negotiations about "Gaza-Jericho first."

I know that a date was set for the signing of the agreement, but there are still some issues to be negotiated, formulated, and brought into the context of the agreement which we will sign.

I know that now you will go to other countries, especially to Syria, in an effort to revive the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria. Israel is interested in achieving peace treaties with the three neighboring Arab countries beyond the peace with Egypt. We appreciate your efforts in bringing the Syrian and the Israeli positions closer, and I wish you all the success on your road to Damascus.

Secretary Christopher. As you know, I've just completed a full day of talks with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Peres, and I must say it was wonderful to be back in the company of such good friends and allies. My visit here comes at a time of great hope for peace. We devoted our sessions today to ways in which we might improve our effort to achieve peace.

As the Prime Minister said, we had an opportunity to review the few remaining steps necessary to come to closure on the Gaza-Jericho agreement. These negotiations have been long and

hard, but with the signing ceremony in Cairo next Wednesday, it's clear that Israel and the Palestinians will be embarking on a new road—a new venture together.

This will transform their relations from conflict into peaceful co-existence. To address the point that the Prime Minister raised with me today, we both feel that entering into this agreement and implementing it is the best answer to the terrorists who have inflicted so much pain on all the parties who have been negotiating.

My presence here is a reflection of our continued engagement with the parties. But it's only really one aspect of our commitment to peace and to the people of Israel. We've been on your side—at your side—during time of war. We'll be at your side in this new era filled with the hopes and the fears and the challenges that come with the difficult task of making peace.

As you said, Mr. Prime Minister, my goal on this trip is to facilitate, as well, the progress on the other three tracks. Our goal is a comprehensive peace. The completion of the Gaza-Jericho agreement to be signed on Wednesday will be only one step—but an important step—to facilitate progress in the other negotiations which are necessary to achieve a comprehensive peace. We now need to make progress on the Syrian track, as the Prime Minister said, as well. We spent a good deal of time today discussing various aspects of the negotiations between Israel and Syria.

I'm afraid I am going to have to disappoint you: I think you'll understand that I'm not able to go into any of the details of our discussion. What I will say is that the Prime Minister and the Government of Israel and the Foreign Minister are absolutely serious about this matter, and they have urged me to attend to it with the utmost seriousness and determination.

I would want to say also in the presence of the Prime Minister that in Yitzhak Rabin the people of Israel have a steadfast and resolute leader who is very determined to protect the security of Israel. He is the kind of wise and courageous leader that Israel needs at this kind of a moment in its history.

Tomorrow, as the Prime Minister said, I'll travel to Damascus. I expect the conversations there to be as serious

and substantive as the conversations here. We've got a lot of hard work ahead of us, but as we enter this very difficult stage, I want to say to you, Mr. Prime Minister, that it's a great honor to have an opportunity to join in this noble pursuit with you.

DAMASCUS, SYRIA

MAY 1, 1994

Opening statement at a news conference by Secretary Christopher.

As you know, I met twice in Jerusalem with Prime Minister Rabin and his colleagues. They gave me some ideas, which I presented at some length yesterday to President Asad. Today, I met again and I have received some ideas from President Asad, which I will be taking back and presenting to Prime Minister Rabin tomorrow. Let me characterize the discussions I have had as being very serious and substantive. I think, from my standpoint—my own evaluation—we have entered a new, more substantive phase in the negotiations. But it is clear that there is a good deal of work to be done—a lot of work to be done ahead.

I would indicate to you that the United States is going to play the most effective and determined role that we can to try to aid the parties in coming to some resolution of the situation. But I am afraid that I can't go much further than what I have said. I do believe we have entered a new, more substantive phase, based upon the discussions that I have had with the leaders of the two countries over the last three days.

EN ROUTE JERUSALEM TO CAIRO

MAY 3, 1994

Press briefing by Secretary Christopher.

I haven't seen as much of you as I would like to have done or normally would do. There are two reasons for that. As you know, I have been working pretty well around the clock. Second, the role of the mediator is such that you have to be very careful not to disclose the parties' positions, or you become quite useless to them.

I thought I might come back and just say a few words on two subjects. In connection with the Israeli-Syrian track—to repeat what I think you all know—I have spent a lot of time with the two parties over the last three or four days. Last Friday, I had two extensive meetings with Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Peres, and his group. Then on Saturday, I went to Damascus, where I had a long session with President Asad where I basically passed on the views of Prime Minister Rabin. As I have said before, I did most of the talking in that meeting, which is not the usual way in those meetings.

The following day, because the President asked me to stay over and to give them an opportunity to insert their views and to react to the views of the Israelis, we had a long meeting again on Sunday night—I am sorry for such a late arrival on Monday morning. Yesterday I had, once again, a very extensive session with the Israelis: first in the morning with the Prime Minister and in a larger group; and then, last night, another session with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and General Barak and other Israeli officials.

I find in this situation a sense that there is a willingness on the part of all the parties to examine the positions across a wide range of issues. One of the things that strikes me about this is that for the first time, you are able to compare comprehensive proposals with other comprehensive proposals. I don't want to say that the architecture is the same on both sides, but, nevertheless, there are proposals that can be examined.

We are in what I would describe as an exploratory stage. Each party is serious about having to explore the views of the other parties to see if there is some way to bridge the very considerable gaps that exist. I don't want to in any way mislead you into thinking that the parties are close together. There is a long road to travel. But I think that there is a seriousness about the exploration I have not seen before.

Both parties are probing for new approaches to bridge gaps. My own feeling is that I ought to be available to

help keep the momentum up, and so I have told both parties that I would try to return mid-month. I wish I could be more precise about that. Several factors are involved. First, I'm—as you probably know—going to Mexico next Sunday and Monday. I also have a trip to meet with the foreign ministers of Europe and elsewhere on Bosnia, and the date of that has not been set. Also, as you probably all know, there are important holidays for both parties sometime in mid-month. So, we'll have to work around all of that; but what I want to do is make myself available for a meeting approximately in the middle of the month, or whenever the parties can be available, to try to keep up the momentum that's been achieved—not because the parties are so close together but because they are both dealing in comprehensive approaches.

Now, just a few words about today's situation. The timing of my visit and my meeting in Cairo, I think, served an important purpose. We were able to help the parties identify the remaining open issues and, together with a good deal of leadership from President Mubarak, to persuade them to set the signing date for tomorrow. The Egyptians asked us to summarize the results of the meeting in which the issues were defined, and we did that and presented a U.S. summary to both parties which I think has helped them to sharpen the issues. I feel quite confident, although there are some issues that remain to be decided, that there will be a signing ceremony tomorrow.

So, what is my role for the remainder of the day? I think the best way to state it is that I'll be available to try to help the parties—I'll be there to help keep the parties on track, to help them to identify the open issues. Of course, this is for the parties to resolve on their own, and I do want to emphasize the great importance of Egyptian leadership and the debt that is owed to the leadership of President Mubarak, which I witnessed firsthand. It's very impressive leadership, together with Foreign Minister Moussa. ■

A New Consensus of the Americas

Secretary Christopher

Address before the Matias Romero Institute for Diplomatic Studies at the Mexican Foreign Ministry, Mexico City, May 9, 1994

I am delighted to be in this vast metropolis, the cradle of the New World and now the largest city on earth. As a Californian and a Los Angeleno, I am particularly proud to be with you in this vital center of modern Hispanic culture in the Americas. This afternoon, I will visit one of Mexico's national treasures, the anthropology museum in Chapultepec Park. There, I will have a chance to reflect upon the richness of the pre-Columbian cultures that are part of the heritage of this nation.

An involvement with history comes with my job. When it is being made, I often can see it and feel it and lend my hand. I had that privilege last Wednesday in another city of ancient greatness, Cairo. There, Israel and the Palestinians agreed to implement the Declaration of Principles that, we hope, will transform the war-torn Middle East. Thankfully, our task today is not a matter of war and peace. But I think that history will remember well the importance of the work we are undertaking here.

Earlier this morning, I joined members of President Salinas' cabinet, along with several of my Cabinet colleagues, in opening the first Binational Commission meeting since NAFTA went into effect. Only with Mexico does the United States convene every year on such a basis. In that setting and in others, I have found that the quality of Mexico's leadership—its technical expertise and its political vision—is a match for that of any other nation in the world.

I am confident in saying today that relations between our nations have never been better, stronger, or more important.

We recognize that NAFTA is not just a turning point for free trade but a transforming event in the history of our relations. It is a platform for

prosperity and a bridge to greater trade and investment throughout the Americas. For the United States, Mexico, and Canada, NAFTA represents a monumental decision to strengthen cooperation, widen integration in our hemisphere, and deepen our engagement in the global economy.

NAFTA reflects and reinforces the new reality in the Americas. The historic movement over the last decade toward democracy and economic liberalization has resulted in an unprecedented convergence of values and interests among Latin nations—and between them and the United States.

When I visited Latin America in 1977 as Deputy Secretary of State, most Latin countries were stagnating under military rule. Now, virtually every nation in the Americas is a democracy—and proud of it. Not coincidentally, economies have expanded, and trade has multiplied. This progress is gaining irreversible momentum. And, not surprisingly, it has set important precedents for political and economic change around the world.

Today, a new consensus of the Americas has formed. Open markets work. Democratic governments are just. And together they offer the best hope for lifting people's lives.

This morning, I will focus on the progress we have made and the work that remains to be done to build on this new consensus of the Americas.

Binational Commission Meeting Material

Material from the Secretary's trip to Mexico and Binational Commission meeting will be printed in *Dispatch Supplement* Vol. 5, No. 3. □

Let me begin with economic reform. Latin America is capturing the imagination, and attracting the trade and investment, of the United States and the world. Exports to the region have more than doubled within the last six years alone, and Mexico has become our third-largest trading partner and our fastest-growing major export market.


Liberalization is opening markets, lowering barriers, cutting tariffs, and creating jobs. Inefficient state enterprises are giving way to privatized companies that enhance productivity. Debt crises are passing. Latin America is growing faster, on average, than the advanced industrial nations of the OECD. Latin "jaguars" are in hot pursuit of Asian "tigers."

The modernizing economic reforms of the Salinas administration have made Mexico a pacesetter for the region and for the world. By becoming a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, Mexico is extending its dynamism and its destiny to the west. And by becoming the first Latin member of the OECD, Mexico is gaining new responsibilities as a leader of the global economy.

President Clinton has reaffirmed our intention to negotiate free trade agreements with other market democracies in the hemisphere. We are committed to begin with Chile, another country on the cutting edge of reform. We are consulting with Congress on broad, fast-track authority for these negotiations.

As we expand trade, we must also build a new architecture for regional integration and investment. Regional development banks are vital if we are to enlarge the circle of prospering democracies. Last month in Guadalajara, we took an important step with the landmark replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank. Together, we provided \$40 billion in new capital that will allow the IDB to advance several new priorities: investing in education and human resources, protecting the environment, and supporting the private sector.

For the full promise of open markets and trade to be realized, the vital arteries of a liberal market economy—from banking to transportation to communications—must carry commerce more efficiently. The reforms of



the last decade must be sustained. Inflation must continue to be curbed, public debt contained, corruption combated.

We understand, as did Mexico's great 19th-century president, Benito Juarez, that even if reform requires "immense sacrifice," it is essential to freedom and modernization. In the spirit of Juarez, reform must also benefit every segment of society and narrow the gap between rich and poor. All our governments, including mine, have a responsibility to help those who are left behind: those who have lost their jobs and those who never had them.

Democracy is the single most effective link between prosperity and equity. Strengthening that link not only will empower our nations, it will enrich them.

The movement to democracy in Latin America is a great epic of the late 20th century. It is not captured in any single image as indelible as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the sight of South Africans marking their ballots and claiming their freedom. But democracy's victories in this hemisphere—from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala—are just as vital to the cause of liberty.

In El Salvador, political movements no longer field armies; now they field candidates for public office. In many other countries, civic groups that once conducted their work underground now work openly to monitor human rights and to advocate the needs of women, minorities, and the poor. They are advancing democracy's agenda for the 1990s: They are building strong civil societies that countervail the power of strong states; they are making governments more accountable to their people.

Here in Mexico, the government led Latin America by reforming the economy, opening markets, and negotiating NAFTA. Now Mexico, with its proud revolutionary heritage, is in the process of revitalizing its democratic institutions.

In response to events in Chiapas, the Mexican Government has fostered political dialogue and paved the way for national reconciliation. In announcing

a cease-fire, in issuing a unilateral amnesty, and in openly acknowledging the legitimacy of grievances, the government has shown sensitivity and responsibility.

In the period since the tragic assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, Mexicans have come together to uphold democracy and oppose violence. The death of such a promising leader would be a terrible loss for any nation. But Mexico is revealing its strength and courage. I believe that out of this tragedy will come renewal.

This August's elections will demonstrate the vitality of Mexico's democracy. We applaud the far-reaching electoral reforms that Mexico has adopted over the last several years, including the agreement of January 27 of this year. We trust that these reforms, combined with your new election technology, will produce a free and fair election that will give all Mexicans confidence in its outcome.

We have a strong and productive relationship with President Salinas and his administration. I am confident that we will have an equally strong and productive relationship with the government that Mexican voters choose in the August election.

Democracy and human rights are cardinal principles of the Americas. Unfortunately, Haiti and Cuba remain outside the orbit of democracy.

President Clinton is committed to the restoration of democracy and the return of President Aristide to Haiti. The hemisphere is united in opposition to the unconscionable usurpation of power by the coup leaders. The Haitian people have suffered gravely under their repressive rule.

This is why, last Friday, the UN Security Council adopted tough, new, comprehensive sanctions, including immediate measures targeted at the coup leaders and their supporters. If Haiti's military leaders refuse to give up power, they will find that the international community has both the will and the means to make them pay the price for their illegal actions. At the same time, the international community will step up its efforts to ensure that those who need humanitarian assistance receive it. President

Clinton announced yesterday that for its part, the United States will increase its humanitarian feeding and health programs in Haiti to reach 1.2 million beneficiaries.

All the nations of the Americas have an interest in preventing a return to the rule of dictators. The United States is committed to working with the nations of this hemisphere to meet this shared objective. We are working with the Dominican Republic to tighten sanctions along the Haitian-Dominican border. We will seek to increase the number of UN and OAS human rights monitors in Haiti. And we will seek the participation of other countries in the region in an effort to assist Haitian political refugees. Working together, we can restore democracy and hope to the people of Haiti.

The people of Cuba, like all other citizens of the Americas, deserve the right to choose their leaders and to take command of their destiny. Instead, their nation is caught in a downward economic spiral. Cuba can escape its plight only by joining the hemispheric tide of open societies and open markets.

As we acknowledge this hopeful tide, we recognize that more must be done to fulfill the promise of democracy in the Americas. We must build on the progress that Latin militaries have made in accepting the primacy of civilian authority. We must also encourage the development of fully independent judiciaries. They are essential to guarantee that the rule of law prevails for all.

Public institutions must become more efficient and accountable. Unresponsive bureaucracy undermines productivity and saps trust in democracy. That is why in the United States Vice President Gore is leading an ambitious effort to "reinvent government."

To sustain trust in democracy, governments must attack the scourges of corruption and drug trafficking. Government cannot be held accountable if its power can be bought. Authority will not be respected if the rule of law can be defied with impunity.

Drug production and trafficking remains a vicious enemy. Drugs destroy lives and fuel violence. The

drug trade breeds official corruption and distorts economies by diverting private resources to criminal empires.

Under President Clinton's leadership, the United States is taking responsibility for its share of the problem. Blaming other countries for our drug problems will not help addicts in Los Angeles or New York get off drugs. Our first line of defense is to reduce demand at home. President Clinton's drug strategy and crime bill will allow us to step up street-level drug enforcement, expand drug abuse prevention, and provide treatment to hard-core drug abusers in prisons.

We recognize that many nations in the hemisphere have taken grave risks and demonstrated remarkable resilience in the fight against drugs. Cooperation between the United States and Mexico against narcotics is at its highest level ever, although much remains to be done.

We must help strengthen democratic institutions so that they can resist intimidation. We will back sustainable development programs to strengthen the economies of drug-producing and -transit countries. We will enlist, for the first time, the international financial institutions in this effort. And we will reinforce global law enforcement against drug cartels. The virtual "state of siege" they impose on cities and even nations must be lifted—forever.

Like drugs, environmental pollution respects no borders; it cannot be contained by customs officials. It must be fought domestically, regionally, and globally. Two years ago in Rio, leaders of 120 countries met at the Earth Summit. It was right that the summit was held in the Americas, for we face urgent environmental problems. But we have the chance to lead the world

toward sustainable development that balances the environment, population pressures, and economic growth.

By undertaking the commitments made in the NAFTA side agreement on the environment, Mexico, the United States, and Canada joined in an unprecedented international effort to curb pollution. In 1994, Mexico will spend more than 1% of its GDP on environmental programs—a significant increase. Nowhere are these efforts more important than here in Mexico City.

President Clinton has returned the United States to the mainstream of global efforts to curb too-rapid population growth. Ten years ago in Mexico City, we watched the major population conference from the sidelines. This year, in Cairo, we will help forge a global action plan on population growth. We will draw on the experiences that have enabled Latin America to cut its rate of population growth in half over the last 20 years. And we will seek to expand health care and empower women.

We can gain confidence from the close political and diplomatic cooperation that is building from Central America to the Southern Cone. With the advance of democracy and integration, the chance that Latin neighbors will go to war has dramatically receded. Once, Brazil and Argentina decided to design bridges on their border so they would collapse in case tanks ever crossed over. Argentinians, Chileans, and Peruvians once mined their border roads. Today, bridges and roads carry trade, not tanks. Engineers dig tunnels and pipelines through the Andes. And military spending is down.

Soon, we expect Brazil to join Argentina and Chile in renouncing a nuclear arms race in Latin America by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a landmark agreement made possible by Mexico's leadership. Argentina has

also recently joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. At a time when the nuclear ambitions of rogue states like North Korea pose a threat to peace, the nations of this hemisphere have set a different precedent: Nuclear and missile proliferation can be reversed.

The Summit of the Americas will be a catalyst for even greater cooperation in the hemisphere this year. The United States is already engaged in intensive pre-summit consultations with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. We will develop initiatives to encourage effective democratic government, strengthen the collective defense of democracy, fight the drug trade, liberalize trade and investment, and promote sustainable development.

Looking ahead to the summit, President Clinton has said:

We have a unique opportunity to build a community of free nations, diverse in culture and history but bound together by a commitment to responsive and free government, vibrant civil societies, open economies, and rising living standards.

This generation's task is to defend and develop the powerful movement to market democracy. We must accept the responsibility to ensure that this great, transforming change becomes truly irreversible.

People from the United States like to come to Mexico and quote Octavio Paz. Being a young man, I tried to resist this venerable practice. But I couldn't. That great poet, essayist, Nobel laureate, and, I should add, diplomat, wrote this of our hemisphere: "America is not so much a tradition to be carried on as it is a future to be realized."

Octavio Paz was right. The task still lies before us. ■

The Americas: New Priorities in A New Partnership

Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

Address to the Council of the Americas, Washington, DC, May 2, 1994

It is a truly great pleasure to be here this morning with so many friends in the Council of the Americas. I have enjoyed a very close association with the Council and the Americas Society for many years—but most intensely during my 3½ years as the Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations in New York immediately before I assumed my current position. I am pleased to be able to continue that association now.

Today, we do not really have time for me to present a full overview of the Clinton Administration's policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean. So I will focus on some of the broader trends I believe will be of particular interest to the Council. I will be glad to discuss other issues—including the Administration's energetic new efforts to restore democratic governance to Haiti—during the discussion period following my remarks.

From Consensus to Partnership

The theme for this, the Council's 24th Washington conference—After NAFTA: The Road to Hemispheric Growth—is very well chosen. I believe we have entered a period in which the countries of our hemisphere have within their grasp the ability to generate long-term, broad-based, sustainable economic growth and development. Of course, all of our countries face very difficult problems in this regard. We always have, and we always will. But we are better positioned to overcome these problems than before. In fact, I submit that prospects for our countries and, more importantly, for our people generally are brighter than at almost any of your previous 23 Washington conferences.

It is a very exciting moment in our hemisphere for political as well as economic reasons. Reflect for a moment, if you will, on political developments over the past year. How many free, fair, legitimate elections have there been since your last conference? Look at the quality of the chiefs of state and heads of government that those elections have produced in Bolivia, Paraguay, Belize, Venezuela, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Chile—to name a few. And there will be more elections this year. There is a strong commitment throughout the hemisphere that elections must be fair—that victory in an unfair contest is not really a victory and that the resulting regime will suffer severe problems of legitimacy at home and internationally, to the serious disadvantage of the country concerned.

This consensus that only freely and fairly elected, democratic governments are legitimate is profoundly important in facilitating relationships of confidence and trust between our countries, in laying the basis for broad cooperation between governments and societies, and in enhancing possibilities for hemispheric integration.

Similarly, economic reform has proceeded apace. Governments, by and large, have put their macroeconomic houses in order, and, in many cases, this has not been easy.

The fiscal and monetary discipline which is at the base of these reforms is being reinforced with fundamental tax reforms, restructuring of financial markets, privatization, and establishment of independent central banks.

These efforts are bearing fruit, however, as tariffs and inflation rates tumble into the low teens in most countries. Latin America is experiencing its third year of solid growth with capital flows that continue to be high despite some setbacks.

Most important of all is the synergy among these political and economic reforms. They give our governments the political incentive and economic capacity to address more effectively the social needs our people face. President Clinton is endeavoring to address those needs in his powerful initiatives on health care, welfare reform, and crime, to mention only a few. Leaders throughout the hemisphere are making similar efforts.

Addressing these social needs and providing greater social equity and more responsive, honest, and effective government generates greater popular support for democratic government, increasing social stability and broadening the base for economic growth. These, in turn, reassure investors and encourage flows of capital and technology and trade which produce growth.

Some have described this next phase as the “second generation” of reforms. The first generation of reforms aimed at taking government out of the things that it didn't do well and probably shouldn't do at all and at empowering markets to be the main decision-makers for the economy.

The second generation of reforms aims at giving government the capacity to do well what only governments can do and what markets cannot do or do only imperfectly. The idea here is shared growth to benefit all elements of society and to benefit future as well as present generations.

In a broad sense, we are all facing similarly daunting new challenges, within the U.S. as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean:

- Redefining our communities so that growth and job opportunities reach all parts of our society;
- Reforming our social systems so that health, educational, and welfare services are delivered efficiently, free of abuses, and responsive to the needs of all our people; and
- Restructuring incentives so as to protect our countries' resources for sustainable, environmentally sound use.

There is considerable work already underway. A couple of examples follow.

- The recent historic capital replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank—which increased the IDB’s capital from \$60 billion to \$100 billion and added almost another billion dollars to its fund for special operations—also marked agreement on reorienting IDB lending to investment in health and education, to protection of the environment, and to harnessing the energy of the private sector. As Under Secretary of the Treasury Summers said at the IDB annual meeting last month, “growth must be inclusive if it is to be enduring.”

- Another innovative example is Bolivia’s “capitalization” program, which will simultaneously privatize a large part of its state enterprises while giving every Bolivian over age 21 assets to use toward his or her retirement.

In addition to the essentially domestic political and economic reforms I have mentioned, one of the most significant trends in the hemisphere is that of regional integration. For those of us in North America, certainly, the most dramatic manifestation of this trend was approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA was a historic watershed, the full effects of which we will only realize years from now. It is already making a profound difference in the nature and intensity of relations among the three partners. In speaking to the Council of the Americas, which played such an important role in the genesis and approval of NAFTA, I need not dwell on its virtues and significance, although I will return to some aspects of NAFTA later in my remarks.

But I would like to note here that many other manifestations of integration have taken place. For example, bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization arrangements are burgeoning. At last count, there were 23 bilateral and multilateral subregional trade arrangements.

One noteworthy example is the Andean Pact that, next year, is expected to become a single market with free internal trade and a common external tariff no higher than 20%. To give you a notion of the size of this integrated market, at that point, the five members of the pact will become one of the top 12 markets for the U.S., ac-

counting for more than \$10 billion in U.S. exports. We sell more to the Andean Pact’s 95 million people than to China’s 1.2 billion.

Economic reforms and trade liberalization have caused trade within the region to boom. Intraregional trade is outpacing growth in both regional GDP and overall world trade expansion. During the past five years, world imports as a whole increased 19%. Latin American imports from the world increased 79%. I believe we are at a defining moment in hemispheric relations. You have heard this Administration’s emphasis on the convergence of values and interests that has emerged among us. The challenge we face is to transform this broad, although far from perfect, consensus into a new partnership for action to address our common problems and approach our common goals. We must consolidate and institutionalize our domestic gains in mutually reinforcing fashion and shape a new web of relationships which define our hemisphere’s future. That’s what the Summit of the Americas is all about.

The Summit of the Americas

In describing his vision of the Americas, President Clinton said:

We have a unique opportunity to build a community of free nations, diverse in culture and history but bound together by a commitment to responsive and free government, vibrant civil societies, open economies, and rising living standards.

Our effort to realize this vision will be one of history’s exciting endeavors. We believe the Summit of the Americas, which will take place in Miami on December 9-10, will be an unparalleled opportunity to consolidate our achievements and chart our future course.

We envision that the summit will produce a declaration of principles that will guide relationships among our nations and an action plan of specific initiatives. We have found support and enthusiasm for a summit built on the themes of democracy and effective governance on the political side and trade expansion, investment, and sustainable development on the economic front. We are developing many specific ideas to present to our partners in an intense

process of consultations during which we expect to hear many other proposals.

We have met with our Mexican neighbors and will continue our discussions next week during our Binational Commission meeting in Mexico. The U.S. delegation will be led by Secretary of State Christopher and will include other Cabinet secretaries.

We hope to complete the first round of consultations on the summit this month, meeting with representatives of CARICOM, Central America, the Rio Group, and Canada. Of course, we will continue discussions at the OAS General Assembly in Belem next month and follow up with many other meetings throughout the year to make the Summit of the Americas as substantive and significant an event as possible.

We also look forward to receiving input on the summit agenda and specific initiatives from a wide variety of sources—certainly the Council of the Americas, as well as other private sector and non-governmental groups. We eagerly invite your views. We hope that the summit will provide impetus and direction on issues such as the consolidation and defense of democracy; government accountability, efficiency, and transparency; empowerment of civil society; and the rule of law, including steps to combat the dangerous narcotics cartels. We will offer ideas for harmonizing financial, legal, fiscal, and other regimes to facilitate hemispheric integration. We may examine innovative ideas for developing health, labor, environmental, and educational standards. We will seek ways to enhance hemispheric cooperation on security issues in the post-Cold War era.

Trade expansion will be a major focus of the summit. There is overwhelming regional interest in this subject. The President remains fully committed to his desire to expand NAFTA to include other market-oriented democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean. While I know you are eager to know what future steps on trade the Administration has in mind, I will defer to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, who will speak to us at lunch today.

I will say here, however, that our concept of free trade expansion includes underlying components such as

investment agreements and understandings concerning intellectual property rights, the environment, and labor. As Vice President Gore said in Marrakesh on April 14:

The relationship between trade and the creation of wealth is manifest. . . . However, economic growth cannot be pursued without vision or compassion for the way it may affect working men and women and without regard for its environmental consequences.

For expanded free trade to reach its potential, these underpinnings are essential.

Similarly, free trade means not just new opportunities for exports but also stronger linkages among our societies. More open economies, based on competition rather than access and privilege, provide more opportunities for economic and social mobility; stronger economic growth and broader markets; and greater flows of capital, goods, ideas, and technology. The promise of a hemisphere united by open markets is a powerful tool in the hands of reformers throughout our hemisphere.

The Impact on American Business

This congeries of developments and trends in our hemisphere has profound implications for American business. The Western Hemisphere is the United States' largest trading partner. President Clinton is committed to reaching out to the other market-oriented democracies of Latin America to join what he called "this great American pact." This will be good for American exports and American jobs. Some facts follow.

- 37% of U.S. exports go to Western Hemisphere nations.
- The U.S. sells as much to Brazil as to China, more to Venezuela than to Russia, and more to Ecuador than to Poland and Hungary combined.
- The value of U.S. exports to Latin America and the Caribbean has increased 144% since 1986, while our exports to the rest of the world rose 90%.

- Latin America is the largest developing country destination for U.S. private investment, accounting for \$5.1 billion in 1990-92, or almost 70% of all our investment in developing countries.

- The IMF predicts that "upper-middle-income markets" in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Argentina are among those likely to grow fastest.

- Proximity, investment patterns, and established cultural ties all help to give American products important advantages in these markets, which have a high propensity to purchase our products.

- The countries of the region are moving rapidly beyond traditional Third World status. Mexico has just joined the OECD as its first Latin American representative, and Brazil and Argentina have been admitted to the OECD's development center. The U.S. strongly supported—in fact, proudly led—these initiatives in the OECD.

- The major components of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean—promoting democracy and human rights, strengthening U.S. economic security, and building cooperation on global issues—are at the heart of the Administration's overall foreign policy agenda. This endows our efforts in the hemisphere with consistency and sustainability.

Thus, our interest in the region is clear. Our engagement is firm. Our vision is powerful.

The rapid evolution of our hemisphere is a complex phenomenon involving many intertwining strands. Far-sighted American business leaders understand this and are among the strongest proponents of market-driven change throughout the region. It is strongly in your interest, I believe, to support Latin American and Caribbean leaders who undertake the second generation of reforms I mentioned earlier—those aimed at making growth

inclusive and at giving a stake to all parts of society in the market-based democracies.

Structural reforms bring some costs, as all change inevitably does. We are aware that elements of the business community, as well as other groups, opposed and still oppose the dismantling of special privileges and protection. But it is a credit to the vision of many business leaders that they see beyond the temporary costs of transition and change and recognize the immense benefits to themselves and to all in their societies which come from greater competition and democracy. Your vision, energy, and talents are urgently needed in making sure that the ideals of political and economic democracy become a reality for all.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by observing that what we are pursuing in our hemisphere is more than expanded free trade. We seek a community of nations committed to democracy and human rights, bound together by open markets and rising standards of living, and dedicated to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Such a community implies a new kind of relationship between the United States and our neighbors: a more mature partnership, based on mutual respect and cooperation and on the convergence of our values, interests, and objectives.

President Cesar Gaviria of Colombia, whom we are proud to have supported in his successful candidacy for Secretary General of the Organization of American States, expressed this idea eloquently a month ago:

From the Americas of the past with its arms extended and crying out for its proper destiny, we will see born a new hemisphere that calls for solidarity and cooperation to develop economic and trade relations based on parity and dignity.

We look forward to working together with him and with all of you to realize this vision. ■

The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations

Madeleine K. Albright, Anthony Lake,
Lieutenant General Clark, Executive Summary

Madeleine K. Albright

Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here this morning, along with my colleague, Assistant Secretary of State Doug Bennet, to discuss U.S. policy toward the UN and the Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1995.

For purposes of time, I will confine my remarks to an issue of central importance to the Administration and of demonstrated interest to the Congress: the future of UN peace-keeping. Although this is an issue which appears to be constantly in the news, it raises fundamental questions that are anything but new.

Today, we can look back at centuries of international efforts to deter conflict through a combination of force and law. Before the UN, there was the League of Nations; before that, the Congress of Vienna; before that, the Treaty of Westphalia; before that, medieval nonaggression pacts; and before that, the Athenian League.

Obviously, no magic formula has been found. Today, some Americans see UN peace-keeping as a dangerous illusion. Others consider it the linchpin of world peace. The Clinton Administration has a more balanced view. We see UN peace-keeping as a contributor to, not the centerpiece of, our national security strategy. We see it as a way to defuse crises and prevent breaches of peace from turning into larger disasters. It lends global legitimacy to efforts to mediate disputes, demobilize

armed factions, arrange cease-fires, and provide emergency relief. It reduces the likelihood of unwelcome interventions by regional powers. And it ensures a sharing of the costs and risks of maintaining world order.

But for reasons that may be inherent in the institution, the UN has not yet demonstrated the ability to respond effectively when the risk of combat is high and the level of local cooperation is low. The UN's impartiality can be a key to diplomatic credibility, but it is of less help when military credibility is what is required. And the UN's resources have been stretched perilously thin by the dramatic increase in peace-keeping requests it has received.

So UN peace-keeping is not, in our view, a substitute for vigorous alliances and a strong national defense. When threats arise to us or to others, we will choose the course of action that best serves our interests. We may act through the UN, we may act through NATO, we may act through a coalition, we may sometimes mix these tools, or we may act alone. But we will do whatever is necessary to defend the vital interests of the United States.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Administration has just completed a comprehensive review of peace-keeping policy. The one-sentence summary of our policy is that it is not intended to expand UN peace-keeping but to help fix it. We have already taken the first step by insisting that the Security Council overhaul its process for deciding when a peace-keeping operation should be initiated or extended.

More Rigorous Decision-making

Last year, soon after I arrived in New York, I began to ask: What criteria have we been using to decide whether

or not to support a peace mission? What criteria did the previous Administration use, for example, when it voted to support new operations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, the Western Sahara, Mozambique, and Kuwait? What criteria were other members of the Security Council using? There was no clear answer.

We have changed that. We believe that the value of UN peace-keeping does not depend on how many missions are attempted but on how well each mission is conducted. So we are insisting that the key questions be asked before, not after, new peace-keeping obligations are undertaken. These questions include the following.

- Will UN involvement advance U.S. interests?
- Is there a real threat to international peace and security?
- Does the proposed peace-keeping mission have clear objectives, and can its scope be clearly defined?
- If the operation is a peace-keeping—as opposed to peace enforcement—mission, is a cease-fire in place, and have the parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence?
- Are the financial and personnel resources needed to accomplish the mission available?
- Can an end point to UN participation be identified?
- What happens if we do not act?

These questions are intended to serve as an aid to decision-making, not as a substitute for it. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors with no single factor being an absolute determinant.

Already, our new policy is making a difference. For example, we have made our support for potential expansion of missions in Angola and Liberia contingent on sustained progress in peace negotiations. We supported an increased UN police presence in Mozambique—but on the condition that the additional costs be offset by reductions in the military presence. We are insisting that "sunset" clauses be inserted in resolutions authorizing or extending peace-keeping missions so that the burden of proof rests on those who favor extension rather than termination. We have established what we hope will be a precedent by

encouraging Cyprus—with help from Greece—and Kuwait to pay a significant portion of the costs of peace-keeping operations on their territory. We are relying on regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the CSCE wherever appropriate. And we review regularly the status of each UN operation to determine whether its objectives are being achieved or can be achieved.

I also must observe that no new UN peace operation has yet been proposed formally for Burundi, Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, or Sierra Leone despite the terrible violence that has occurred in each. This reflects not callousness on the part of the international community but rather a recognition of the limits of what UN peace operations can achieve in the absence of a demonstrated will on the part of contending factions to choose negotiations over force of arms.

Enhancing Capabilities

We also are working to make UN operations more efficient and effective once they are approved. Currently, the UN does not have the ability to manage peace-keeping as an integrated whole. Instead, each mission is financed and run separately by an understaffed Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As a result, support to the field suffers, economies of scale are lost, work is duplicated, and missions are delayed. The UN is left to scrape together the money, troops, and logistical support necessary for each operation essentially from scratch. To remedy these and other problems, the Administration is proposing or supporting:

- A unified budget for peace-keeping to replace the current ad hoc system;
- Reforms in procurement that will ensure competitiveness and provide economies of scale;
- The development of a computerized data base and a modular budget template that would allow for standardization of costs, enable quick and accurate budget estimates, and prevent over-assessments;
- A rapidly deployable headquarters unit with logistics support so that the UN can respond to emergencies in a timely way; and

- Improvements in planning, training, communications, intelligence, and logistics.

Our purpose in all of this is not to create some sort of global high command but rather to raise the level of performance to the point where UN peace-keeping is credible, cost-effective, and professional.

The Value of Peace-keeping

Of course, none of this would matter if carefully defined and well-executed UN peace operations did not serve the best interests of our people. This Administration, like prior Administrations, believes that they do; we think that most Americans agree.

First—to put things in perspective—the world spends about \$900 billion each year for military forces. The UN spends about one-third of 1% as much on peace-keeping. Here in the United States, we allocate roughly \$250-\$300 for defense for every \$1 we allocate to peace-keeping. The recent increase in peace-keeping costs brought about in part by the end of the Cold War remains far less than the savings that have been made possible by the relaxation of East-West tensions.

Second, the United States is one of five countries with the power to veto any UN peace-keeping operation. I can assure you that we will use our influence—and if necessary our veto—to block operations that would harm our interests. I can also assure you that our continued right to the veto is not negotiable.

Third, a narrow but not insignificant point: In 1993, UN Headquarters purchased more than \$250 million worth of goods and services from American sources—36% of the total value of UN Headquarters' procurement for peace-keeping.

Fourth, well-planned and well-implemented UN peace operations do contribute to goals of direct interest to us.

In Cambodia, the UN was asked to run elections, clear mines, repatriate refugees, disarm the Khmer Rouge, and help administer the country. The result was less than some hoped but far more than skeptics predicted. The Cambodian people responded overwhelmingly to the promise of peace and

to the opportunity to vote. The result was an election with more than 90% participation, a constitutional government taking power, the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of refugees, and further discrediting of the Khmer Rouge.

In El Salvador, the UN helped end a 12-year conflict that took 70,000 lives. Observers from all sides agree that only the UN had the credibility to oversee demobilization, monitor human rights, assign responsibility for past atrocities, verify implementation of the peace agreement, and pave the way for elections which—despite significant problems—were the freest and most peaceful in the nation's history.

In Cyprus, the UN has prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO allies. Through its presence on the Golan Heights, it has helped to preserve peace between Israel and Syria for more than two decades. In Namibia, it helped to create an outpost of democracy and stability in a strategic part of Africa. In Mozambique, it is arranging elections this fall and demobilizing factions that had waged a bloody civil war. UN sanctions against Iraq, combined with a UN presence on the Kuwait border, are helping to keep Saddam Hussein's ambitions in check.

A few weeks ago, I traveled to South Africa, where UN observers worked hard to make last week's elections a success—to drive the final nail into the coffin of apartheid and make possible a government that is truly responsive to the people. There is an abundance of bad news in the world today; there remain enormous obstacles for South Africa, but the miracle of a democratic transition in that country should inspire us all. President F.W. de Klerk and President-elect Nelson Mandela found a useful ally in the UN.

In Croatia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UN forces are helping prevent a wider Balkan war. And in Bosnia, the UN has worked in a sometimes uneasy partnership with NATO to restore a semblance of normal life to Sarajevo, to open the airport in Tuzla, to end the violence between government and Bosnian Croat factions, to lend belated credibility to the safe-haven concept, and to maintain a humanitarian lifeline to those in desperate need.

Last weekend, for the fourth time, the U.S., NATO, and the UN acted in tandem to implement Security Council directives aimed at ending the violence and encouraging peace. The first time was in February, when a NATO ultimatum resulted in the removal or control of heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo. The second was in late February with the shutdown of Serb planes violating the no-fly zone. The third was three weeks ago, when limited air strikes were ordered in response to the initial Bosnian Serb attacks against Gorazde. The fourth was the NATO ultimatum demanding a withdrawal of Serb forces and heavy weapons from around that same town.

The purpose of these actions is to see that the will of the Security Council is respected and that the parties are encouraged to negotiate seriously for peace. The Bosnian Serbs must understand that continued aggression will be met by internationally sanctioned military force.

We Americans support these operations because they contribute to a world that is less violent, more stable, and more democratic than it otherwise would be. History teaches us that democracies rarely commit aggression. And experience warns us that when small powers fight, larger powers are often drawn in and that aggression, when unchecked, only leads to more aggression. It is far more effective and far less risky to treat the symptoms of global disorder when they appear than to wait until the consequences of conflict arrive at our door.

In summary, we should not ask the UN to take on jobs that we have not equipped it to do. And we should equip the UN to do the jobs we would like it to do. The United States will be better off if the United Nations is better able to prevent and contain international conflict.

Paying for Peace-keeping: The U.S. Share

Despite the burden-sharing aspects of UN peace-keeping, the United States remains by far the largest single financial contributor to the UN, and no one should forget that. This reflects our position as a permanent member of the Security Council and as the world's leading economic and military power.

The system for assessing peace-keeping costs was created in 1973 with U.S. support. For a variety of reasons, the share of peace-keeping costs we are assessed has risen in recent years from about 28% to more than 30%. In December 1992, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the resultant decrease in contributions from that source caused the UN to raise our assessment even further—to 31.7%. We made it clear that we did not accept this most recent change, however, and continue to acknowledge an assessment rate of 30.4%, upon which our budget calculations are based. The Administration believes that the 30.4% rate is still too high, and we are seeking support at the UN for a reduction to the 25% rate recently mandated by Congress beginning in 1996.

We have informed the Secretary General of our determination—and of yours—to see that the U.S. assessment is reduced. He shares our concern and has sent emissaries to conduct consultations in key foreign capitals. We are conducting our own consultations both in New York and abroad. We note that the General Assembly will be reviewing requests for alterations in the current assessment scale this spring and fall. I can assure you that we will keep you informed of developments as they occur.

The Administration's Budget

Successful UN peace-keeping operations serve our interests. But they will more likely succeed if we have met fully our obligation to help pay for them and if we encourage other member states who have fallen behind in their payments to do the same.

The funds appropriated by Congress last year for peace-keeping in FY 1994 had to be used to meet prior-year commitments. Thus, our entire assessed share of UN peace-keeping costs in the current fiscal year—an amount we expect will exceed \$1 billion—is currently unmet. We will need your help to find a way to provide that money. We also face the possibility of additional costs associated with new or expanded peace operations, both this year and next. As President Clinton made clear during his recent meeting with congressional leaders, funding for

our peace-keeping obligations is a high priority, and we are prepared to work closely with you on this matter.

Our specific requests include \$670 million in FY 1994 supplemental funds and \$533 million in FY 1995, including funds for additional payments on our estimated FY 1994 requirements. We are also requesting from your subcommittee \$75 million in voluntary contributions for multilateral peace-keeping in FY 1995.

Because we believe that the Departments of State and Defense should have shared responsibility for peace-keeping, the Administration is requesting, in addition, an appropriation of \$300 million for a new Department of Defense peace-keeping account. Under the "shared responsibility" concept, the Department will have lead management responsibility within the U.S. Government for those UN peace operations involving the presence of U.S. combat units. This approach will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those peace operations that have a significant military component.

The State Department will continue to have lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peace-keeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, the State Department will retain its traditional diplomatic responsibilities with respect to all peace-keeping operations and activities.

In urging favorable consideration by Congress of our peace-keeping budget requests, I stress three points.

First, UN peace-keeping will not be fixed unless it is supported financially by UN members. The current funding shortfall complicates efforts to plan efficiently, to implement reforms, and to make the investments that will save money in the long run. Already, the UN has fallen well behind in reimbursing troop contributors. We know that some nations have informed the UN that they will not contribute troops to future operations until past bills are reimbursed. This makes it harder to find additional troops for places like Bosnia and to maintain troops at adequate levels in places like Somalia. This, in turn, jeopardizes the success of such operations and puts the peace-keepers who are deployed at greater risk.

Second, we are already facing situations—and we can foresee others—in which we must choose between rejecting an operation we believe is very important to our interests or voting for an operation for which funds are not assured. This past week, for example, the Security Council voted—with U.S. support—to expand the authorized strength of UNPROFOR. This expansion is essential if our policy of extending real protection to designated safe areas such as Gorazde is to succeed. But expanded capabilities do not come without increased financial obligations.

We also have a strong interest in seeing that conflicts in the former Soviet Union are resolved in ways that maintain the integrity of the New Independent States. UN involvement is one way to advance that goal. But if we can't support an operation due to lack of funds or if UN members won't contribute troops because they fear they will not be reimbursed, the option disappears. This, in my personal judgment, is how grave historical errors come to be made.

Third, my ability to push our reform agenda at the UN would be enhanced greatly if I were able to say with confidence that we are going to pay our bills fully and promptly. This is true both with respect to the inspector general issue—which Mr. Bennet will discuss—and gaining a reduction in the U.S. share of peace-keeping costs.

An Appropriate Role for Congress

America cannot lead in international organizations by executive action alone. Congress must play an important role because Congress, like the President, is accountable to the people. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that with respect to both funding and policy, we want to work with you and with your subcommittee. We have initiated and we will maintain close and regular consultations concerning all aspects of our peace-keeping policy.

In that connection, I will end by citing the conclusion of an excellent recent study on peace-keeping that was prepared under the auspices of the Stimson Center with the participation of Members of the House and Senate from both parties. That conclusion is

also a pretty good summary of the Administration's own approach to peace-keeping policy.

The US can be as tough on approving new UN operations as it wants to be, and as selective in deciding whether or not US forces should participate as it wishes to be. But if the UN's capacity for peace operations is improved successfully, it would provide a new security option to the United States, to be used at the US Government's discretion, permitting us to avoid the necessity of choosing between unilateral action and standing by helplessly when international conflict and atrocities occur.

Anthony Lake, Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark

Opening statements at a press briefing on the peace operations presidential decision directive (PDD) by Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.

Anthony Lake. This week, President Clinton signed the first comprehensive U.S. policy on multilateral peace operations suited to the post-Cold War era. This policy has the full support of the entire Administration. It benefited very greatly from the work that had been done in the previous Administration on this issue and from very detailed consultations in the Congress with dozens of key legislators. In fact, in drafting the final policy, we incorporated many very useful contributions by Members of Congress.

The central conclusion of the Administration's study is that, when properly conceived and well-executed, peace-keeping can be a very important and useful tool of American foreign policy. Our purpose is to use peace-keeping selectively and more effectively than has been done in the past.

The post-Cold War era is, as we see every day, a very dangerous time. Its defining characteristic is that conflicts in this era take place more within nations than among them. And this makes it a particularly difficult time, both conceptually and practically, for

us in the international community to come to grips with questions of when and how and where we will use force.

Some of these internal conflicts challenge our interests, and some of them do not. But the cumulative effect of all of these internal conflicts around the world is significant. We have all, over the last year—you and I and the others in the Administration—spent a great deal of time working on various conflicts of this kind, whether in Somalia, or Rwanda, or Haiti, or Bosnia, or elsewhere.

The further problem here is that these kinds of conflicts are particularly hard to come to grips with and to have an effect on from outside because, basically, of course, their origins are in political turmoil within these nations. And that political turmoil may not be susceptible to the efforts of the international community. So neither we nor the international community have the mandate to, the resources for, or the possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind.

When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I want to work to end every conflict. I want to work to save every child out there. I know the President does, and I know the American people do.

But neither we nor the international community have the resources or the mandate to do so. So we have to make distinctions. We have to ask hard questions about where and when we can intervene. And the reality is that we often cannot solve other people's problems—and we can never build their nations for them.

So the policy review is intended to help us make those hard choices about where and when the international community can get involved; where and when we can take part with the international community in getting involved; and, thus, where and when we can make a positive difference.

Let me emphasize again that, even when we do take action, the primary responsibility for peace rests with the people and the parties to the conflict. What the international community can do is to offer a kind of a breathing space for the people involved to make and preserve their own peace.

That's the principle, for example, that we have employed in recent months in Somalia. We continue to urge the Somali people to take advantage of the breathing space that we helped provide for them and to seize this opportunity to resolve their differences peacefully. While we are hopeful—and there are hopeful signs—that they can do so, there are also disturbing signs in Somalia in recent weeks, and we do not know what the outcome will be. But we did our job, we believe, in providing that breathing space, and we believe that the more than 15,000 UN personnel there are doing theirs today.

So we must be selective, as I have just said, and we must also be more effective. The U.S. is committed to strengthening UN peace-keeping capabilities, because effective peace-keeping serves both America's and the world's collective interests. It can produce conflict resolution and prevention, as on the Golan or in El Salvador; it can promote democracy as it has in Namibia and in Cambodia and, again, in El Salvador; and it can serve our economic interests as well, as, for example, in the Persian Gulf.

And peace-keeping is burden-sharing, which is certainly in our interests. We pay less than one-third of the costs of the UN troops and UN operations—and less than 1% of UN troops in the field are, in fact, American.

While there are limits to peace-keeping—and even setbacks, as we have seen in Rwanda in recent days—we have to be careful never to overlook the impressive successes and the personal courage that have been shown and are being shown today by UN peace-keepers around the world.

Since 1948, over 650,000 men and women from all over the world have served in UN missions, and over 1,000 have given their lives—for example, some 200 in southern Lebanon, over 70 in Bosnia, 100 in Somalia, more than 150 in Cyprus. In Cambodia, Bulgarians and Japanese and Chinese and Bangladeshis and others were victims of the Khmer Rouge, who attacked UN peace-keepers trying to oversee the elections there and make them possible. There were stories that I'm sure some of you recall of villagers stuffing messages into the ballot boxes in Cam-

bodia thanking the UN peace-keepers for what they were doing and imploring them to stay on.

In the Bosnian town of Bakovici, some of you may remember that there were 100 patients in a mental hospital who were trapped there without heat or electricity over the winter, and UN peace-keepers were going in, back and forth, bringing in supplies to the mental hospital across the lines and getting fired at from both sides.

My point is that it is easy for all of us, when there is a setback, to dismiss the UN and the peace-keepers as a whole. We must not do that, because it does a disservice to the courage that they are showing today and to the sacrifices they have made in the past. Even so, because the needs for peace-keeping have outrun the resources for peace-keeping, it's important that we ask the tough questions about when and where we will support or participate in such operations. We are the first government that has—and this is the first time in the history of the U.S. Government that we have—cared and dared enough to do so and to ask those questions.

Peace-keeping is a part of our national security policy, but it is not the centerpiece. The primary purpose of our military forces is to fight and win wars—as specified in our bottom-up review, to fight and win two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously and to do so unilaterally when necessary.

If peace-keeping operations ever conflicted with our ability to carry out those operations, we would pull out of the peace operations to serve our primary military purposes. But we will, as the President has said many times, seek collective rather than unilateral solutions to regional and intrastate conflicts that don't touch our core national interests. And we'll choose between unilateral and collective approaches, between the UN and other coalitions depending on what works best and what best serves American interests.

The policy review addresses six major issues. First, ensuring that we support the right operations; second, that we reduce the cost of peace-keeping operations; third, that we improve UN peace-keeping capabilities; fourth, that we ensure effective command and control of American forces; fifth, that

we improve the way the American Government manages the issue of peace-keeping; and, sixth, to enhance the cooperation between the Congress and the executive branch. Let me say just a word about each.

First—ensuring that we support or participate only in the right types of peace-keeping operations. Not all such operations, obviously, make sense. We are, as I said, I believe the first nation to ask the tough questions at the UN before committing to costly new peace-keeping operations. The President said that we would do so in his General Assembly speech last fall, and we are, indeed, doing just that.

We've developed two sets of questions in the study to determine, first, when the United States should vote for such operations and, second, when the U.S. should participate in them. In the unclassified document we've handed out—"The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," which summarizes the PDD—we have a complete list of those questions. They include such questions as:

- Does the mission advance American interests?
- Is there a threat to international peace and security?
- Does it have a very clear mandate?
- Does it have clear objectives?
- Are the forces and the funds actually available for such an operation?

Second, we believe that we have to reduce the peace-keeping costs to the United States and to the United Nations. Peace-keeping simply costs too much right now. It can be a very good investment for us, but it would be an even better investment if it were less costly. So, first, we are working to reduce American costs. As the President has said, we are committed to reducing our peace-keeping assessment to 25% by January 1996, and we believe that other newly rich countries should pay their fair share. And, second, we all save when the costs of UN peace-keeping operations are reduced generally. In the study, we propose—have proposed already in a number of cases—numerous financial and budget-management reforms to make UN

peace-keeping operations more efficient and cost effective. For example, we would like to see a unified UN peace-keeping budget; we would like to see better procurement procedures; and, as a top priority and something we are working on right now, we would like to see a wholly independent office of an inspector general with oversight for peace-keeping.

Third, we think we have to improve the UN's peace-keeping capabilities, and we are committed to doing this. So we're going to work with the UN and member states on steps to improve the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its field missions—for example, enhancing planning, logistics, procurement, command and control, public affairs, intelligence, and civilian police capabilities. And we will lead an effort in the UN to try to redeploy resources within the UN system to fund these reforms.

Fourth—and this is tremendously important—we have to ensure that there is effective command and control of American forces when they are engaged in peace-keeping operations. I will ask Lt. Gen. Wes Clark to address this for a moment.

Lieutenant General Clark. There has been a great deal of discussion on the issue of command and control, so let me begin by laying out the definitions that are relevant here. First of all, by command, what we're speaking of is the constitutional authority to establish and deploy forces: to issue orders, separate and move units, resupply, provide medical support, enforce discipline. The President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces; that is inviolable.

Operational control is a subset of command. Operational control can be given for a specific time frame—for a specific mission in a particular location. Operational control may be the assignment of tasks to already-deployed forces led by U.S. officers. We may place the U.S. forces under the operational control of foreign commanders. That's the distinction that's in this peace operations document.

Now the involvement with foreign commanders, I would tell you, is nothing new. In fact, that's the news of this document—that from the perspective of command and control, there is nothing new. In World War I and World

War II, throughout our experience with NATO, and in Operation Desert Storm, we've always had the ability to task, organize, and place some U.S. units under foreign operational control, if it was advantageous to do so.

This PDD policy preserves our option to do that. We will be able to place U.S. forces under foreign operational control when it's prudent or tactically advantageous. I would tell you that, as we look at it, the greater the U.S. military role and the more likely the operations involved entail combat, the less likely we are to place those forces under foreign operational control.

Even were we to do so, fundamental elements would still apply. The chain of command will be inviolate. All our commanders will have the capability of reporting to higher U.S. authority. They'll report illegal orders—or orders outside the mandate that they've been authorized to perform—to higher U.S. authority if they can't work those out with the foreign commander on the ground.

Of course, the President retains the authority to terminate participation at any time to protect our forces. There's no intent in this language to subvert an operational chain of command. What we're trying to do is achieve the best balance between cohesive, trained, well-established U.S. chains of command and unity of command in an operation involving foreign forces in a coalition or some other grouping.

So that's the intent behind this. And, as I say, it is no change from the way we've operated in the past. I would also tell you that our military has played a major role in defining the command and control aspects of this PDD. It's been thoroughly vetted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. It's been reviewed and approved by the Chiefs of Staff of our services and by the commanders in chief of our forces overseas.

Anthony Lake. Also—**fifth**—we think it is important that we improve the American Government's management of peace-keeping. We think so because peace-keeping, as we have seen, is important and complex and dangerous—and, thus, the perspective of our military and defense leaders should be brought more to bear in it. So we concluded that the Department of Defense should join the State De-

partment in assuming both policy and financial responsibility for appropriate peace operations—what we call shared responsibility. You will not be surprised to know that each was more anxious for the policy responsibility than the financial responsibility, but it has been worked out, we think, very well.

The State Department will both manage and pay for traditional, non-combat peace-keeping operations—i.e., under Chapter VI of the Charter—when there are not American combat units involved. This represents, by far, the greatest number of such operations. The Defense Department will manage and pay for all peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the Charter—for example, in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Kuwait now—and those traditional peace-keeping operations under Chapter VI in which there are American combat units.

We believe that this shared responsibility will not only mean better management but will help us solve the long-term funding problem that we face in peace-keeping. We still have an immediate arrears problem in our peace-keeping debts, and without new funding, the American arrearage will be over \$1 billion by the end of this fiscal year—the end of September. The President is very committed to paying off this debt, and he and we are working very closely with the Congress now to devise the means to do so.

Finally, in the study, we have worked to recognize the need to improve the relationships and consultations between the executive branch and the Congress on peace-keeping operations. And we're going to take a number of steps to improve the information flow between the Administration and the Congress on these issues.

In short, the policy is designed to impose more discipline on the UN and on ourselves so that peace-keeping will be a more effective collective security tool for American foreign policy. This is a new era; we are all learning how to come to grips with the new problems that it presents to us. But there is no doubt in my mind that peace-keeping offers a very important way of making sure that today's problems don't be-

come tomorrow's crises—because those crises will cost us a lot more in the long run than peace-keeping does right now.

This is an important—not the most important but an important—part of our national security policy. It is very, very important that we and the United Nations get it right, and that's what this study is about.

Executive Summary

Text of the executive summary from "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" released by the White House, May 5, 1994.

Last year, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period. This policy review has resulted in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). The President signed this directive, following the completion of extensive consultations with Members of Congress. This paper ["The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations"] summarizes the key elements of that directive.

As specified in the "Bottom-Up Review," the primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces remains to be prepared to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts. In this context, peacekeeping can be one useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose direct threats to our national security. Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, regional security, and economic growth.

The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform and improvement:

1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support—both when we vote in the Security Council for

UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops.

To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of review for U.S. support for or participation in peace operations, with the most stringent applying to U.S. participation in missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.

2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves.

To achieve this goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce our peacekeeping assessment percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and proposes a number of specific steps to reduce the cost of UN peace operations.

3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations.

The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces. However, as Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests, just as American leaders have done numerous times since the Revolutionary War, including in Operation Desert Storm.

The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or

through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.

4. Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations.

The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace operations and directs U.S. support for strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information and command and control capabilities.

5. Improving the way the U.S. Government manages and funds peace operations.

The policy directive creates a new "shared responsibility" approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the U.S. Government. Under this approach, the Department of Defense will take lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve U.S. combat units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not U.S. troops are involved. This approach will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a significant military component.

The State Department will retain lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, the State Department remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York.

6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and the American public on peace operations.

The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and regularizing the flow of information and consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the President believes U.S. support for and participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term with the bipartisan support of Congress and the American people. ■

Annual Terrorism Report Released

Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Christine Shelly, Washington, DC, May 9, 1994.

Available in the Press Office are copies of *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993*. The report describes the dimension of the international terrorist threat during calendar year 1993, during which we recorded 427 international terrorist attacks. This is an increase from the 361 incidents recorded the previous year. The main reason for the increase was an accelerated terror campaign perpetrated by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) against Turkish interests. Most of the group's 150 attacks took place on only two days—24 June and 4 November—and were staged throughout Western Europe. Had it not been for these two days of coordinated attacks, the level of terrorism would have continued the downward trend of recent years.

The list of states that sponsor terrorism grew by one last year. We added Sudan to the list in August 1993. The other nations that remain on the list are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. All seven are discussed in the report.

The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the ensuing fire and smoke caused six deaths and 1,000 injuries. It was the only terrorist incident in 1993 that claimed American lives. Through the hard work of U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Administration successfully tracked down and brought to justice perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing. The World Trade Center bombing and the FBI's discovery of the plot to blow up selected targets in New York City, including the United Nations and the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, show that because American targets are vulnerable to terrorist threats, we cannot let down our guard.

The report also describes how the United States is countering the threat. We have been resolute in demanding justice for the families of the victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing, and we remain determined to ensure that Libya surrender the two suspects for trial in Scotland or the United States. We fought for and obtained tighter


sanctions against Libya and are vigorously enforcing them. President Clinton sent Saddam Hussein a strong and unequivocal message once evidence was uncovered that his government was responsible for the plot to assassinate former President Bush. We took military action against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters that planned the attack last June, an important and appropriate response. This Administration is committed to maintaining an effective international counter-terrorism policy. ■


How To Get the 1993 Terrorism Report

The full report is available electronically through the U.S. Government Printing Office's Federal Bulletin Board Service (BBS); the price is \$15.00. The report can be found in the Department of State Global Issues Library under Terrorism. For information on how to access the BBS, see the inside back cover of this issue.

Paper copies of the report may be obtained from:

The Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520
(FAX: 202-647-0221). □





Treaty Actions

Multilateral

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765; 28 UST 8435. *Accession:* Eritrea, Mar. 31, 1994.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Adopted by UN General Assembly at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989. *Accession:* Liechtenstein, Mar. 24, 1994. *Succession:* Slovakia, May 28, 1993.

Human Rights

International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992. *Accession:* Dominica, June 17, 1993. *Succession:* Slovakia, May 28, 1993.

International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976¹. *Accession:* Dominica, June 17, 1993. *Succession:* Slovakia, May 28, 1993.

Judicial Procedure

Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public documents, with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1981. TIAS 10072; 33 UST 883. *Succession:* Macedonia, Sept. 30, 1993.

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS 6638; 20 UST 361.

Territorial application: United States extended to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Mar. 31, 1994.

Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988. TIAS 11670.

Accession: Chile, Feb. 23, 1994³.

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948; reentered into force for the U.S. Feb. 18, 1980. TIAS 1868; 62 Stat. 3485. *Acceptance:* Oman, Jan. 31, 1994.

Narcotics

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298; 18 UST 1407. *Succession:* Slovakia, May 28, 1993.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118; 26 UST 1439. *Succession:* Slovakia, May 28, 1993.

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725; 32 UST 543.

Accession: Sudan, July 26, 1993; Zimbabwe, July 30, 1993. *Succession:* Slovakia, May 28, 1993; Croatia, July 26, 1993.

Territorial Application: Extended to Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Antarctic Territory, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands, June 3, 1993.

United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.

Accession: Zimbabwe, July 30, 1993; Latvia, Feb. 24, 1994.

Acceptance: Netherlands, Sept. 8, 1993²; Finland, Feb. 15, 1994.

Succession: Croatia, July 26, 1993.

Ratification: Panama, Jan. 13, 1994².

Territorial application: Extended to the Isle of Man, subject to reservations and notifications, Dec. 2, 1993.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.

Accession: Lithuania, Apr. 5, 1994.

Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 6923, 7727; 24 UST 2140. *Accession:* Paraguay, Feb. 25, 1994.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969¹.

Successions: Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 16, 1993; Slovakia, May 28, 1993.

Torture

Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987¹. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20.

Accession: Ethiopia, Mar. 14, 1994.

Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981¹.

Signature: South Africa, Jan. 29, 1993.

Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993.

Bilateral

Belgium

Basic exchange and cooperative agreement concerning mapping, charting, and geodesy cooperation. Signed at Fairfax Mar. 1, 1994. Entered into force Mar. 1, 1994.

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 13, 1992, regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz Mar. 2 and Apr. 13, 1994. Entered into force Apr. 13, 1994.

Brazil

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Feb. 6, 1984, as extended, relating to cooperation in science and technology. Signed at Brasilia Mar. 21, 1994. Enters into force on the date that both governments have notified each other that their respective requirements have been fulfilled.

Guyana

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Apr. 5, 1994. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Guyana of written notice from the United States that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.

Jamaica

Agreement concerning the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Signed at Kingston Mar. 17, 1994. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes indicating all legislation and regulations necessary to give full effect to obligations undertaken therein have come into force.

Kyrgyzstan

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military

Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Bishkek Feb. 7 and 25, 1994. Entered into force Feb. 25, 1994.

Mali

Postal money order agreement. Signed at Bamako and Washington Feb. 10 and Apr. 7, 1994. Entered into force May 1, 1994.

Moldova

Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of assistance. Signed at Chisinau Mar. 21, 1994. Entered into force Mar. 21, 1994.

Nauru

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Washington and Nauru Oct. 8, 1993 and Jan. 17, 1994. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1994.

Russia

Agreement to establish a joint commission for agribusiness and rural development, with annexes. Signed at Moscow Mar. 11, 1994. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1994.

Uruguay

Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. Signed at Montevideo May 6, 1991. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-19. Entered into force Apr. 15, 1994.

Uzbekistan

Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of assistance. Signed at Tashkent Mar. 1, 1994. Entered into force Mar. 1, 1994.

¹ Not in force for the U.S.

² With reservation(s).

³ With declaration(s). ■