Page 188

E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. ARMY AIRCRAFT.  On Sunday, December 7, 9141, the status of the island 
defenses was at the minimum.

As General Burgin testified:

"A peculiar thing attaches to that.  For at least six weeks or two 
months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these 
exercises with the Navy.

"Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions.  They 
would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and 
they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out 
mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced 
simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy.  And 
were out just one week prior to December 7.

"General Frank:  On Sunday?

"General Burgin:  On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on 
December 7.  The fleet was in the harbor."  (R. 2603)

On that morning, due to Alert #1, all planes, with some minor 
exceptions, were grouped together wing to wing.  There were 80 pursuit 
planes in commission and 69 out of commission in various states of 
repair.  There were 39 bombers in commission and 33 out of commission.  
Of the bombers in commission the only ones available for a real mission 
were 6 flying fortresses and 10 A-20s.  The old B-18s were of minor 
value.  There were a few fighter aircraft that morning that were at a 
remote field, apparently unknown to the Japanese, where a squadron was 
practicing short landings.  It was out of this group that there came the 
brilliant performance of Major (then Lieutenant) Welch, who courageously 
got his ship off the ground, together with his wing man.  Major Welch 
and his wing man shot down a number of Japanese



Page 189

aircraft.

The Navy had no PBYs in the air that morning, although they usually had 
four to six for doing reconnaissance.  Perhaps this is explained by 
General Burgin's testimony that while Sunday morning the antiaircraft 
artillery had an exercise with the Navy when the Navy sent its carrier-
based planes from ship to shore, and this continued up to the Sunday 
before December 7th, the Navy planes did not get into the air on this 
particular December 7th.  (R. 2603)  The fleet was also in the harbor 
that Sunday, the only vessels of material character that were out being 
the carriers ENTERPRISE and LEXINGTON.  The ENTERPRISE, with the 
addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, was about 200 
miles west of Oahu.  Task Force No. 12 was approximately 425 miles 
southeast of Midway, with the carrier LEXINGTON (R. 444-445); therefore 
there was not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning.  (R. 540)

2. NAVAL LONG-DISTANCE RECONNAISSANCE.  The situation as to the long-
distance reconnaissance supposed to have been conducted by the Navy is 
admirably and frankly explained by Admiral DeLany, who was assistant 
chief of staff for operations on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, 
United States Fleet, during this period: Admiral DeLany testified that 
there was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out by the Navy on 
the morning of December 7th, and no attempt to obtain information about 
the launching of an attack upon Oahu.  He further testified, "There were 
neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities available to conduct and 
maintain such a



Page 190

continuous reconnaissance" as would be necessary in order to maintain a 
360-degree reconnaissance around the island.  They realized the danger 
but there was nothing that could be done about it.  (R. 1728)

Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander of the Navy Base Defense Air Force, 
Commander, Patrol Wing 2, and Commander, Task Force 9, said that on the 
morning of December 7th he had a total of 81 PBYs in Patrol Wings 1 and 
2, which included those at Midway, leaving a total of 69 on Oahu, with 9 
out of commission.  The reconnaissance work that was being conducted 
normally each morning at sunrise was merely to search the fleet 
operating areas for submarines so that the fleet could operate on 
exercises without molestation.  He usually sent out three to six planes 
"to guard against submarine attack."  He testified that the only 
patrolling being done as a defense against a surprise attack was in the 
vicinity of Midway.  (R. 1600)  He testified as follows:

"General Frank:  You had no instructions from anybody to conduct any 
search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?

"Admiral Bellinger:  We had had on specific occasions, when there was 
some apparent reason for doing so.  That instance had occurred for one 
or two different sectors over the periods during the year."  (R. 1601)

Admiral Kimmel summarized the situation when he testified as follows:

"General Russell: You have testified, and it has been supported by a 
line of evidence here, that there was not available to the Army and Navy 
any means for distant reconnaissance to ascertain the location of a 
Japanese task force.

"Admiral Kimmel: That is correct."  (R. 1805)



Page 191  

"General Grunert:  Were there any planes on distant reconnaissance on 
that morning?

"Admiral Bellinger: There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in 
the true sense of the term 'distant reconnaissance'."  (R. 1629-1630)

This failure to do distant reconnaissance cannot be excused for lack of 
planes under Navy control because the Navy had 50 PBYs available.  The 
only excuse for not using them was, as stated by Admiral Kimmel:

"We wanted to maintain our training status.  Up to the last minute we 
had received no orders to mobilize."  (R. 1811)

Admiral Bellinger testified that the relationship between the Navy and 
the Army for the use of Army planes from the fighter group of the Army 
was not in a functioning status.  (R. 1622)  He had 33 scout bombers, 7 
fighters, and 9 scouts available on the morning of December 7th, but 
they were not being used.  (R. 1623)  As witness testified, they were 
accustomed to seeing PBYs out each morning, but on Sunday morning, 
December 7th, they did not go out.  (See General Rudolph's and Colonel 
Brook's testimony, R. 993-994, 1232-1234)

3. AIRCRAFT WARNING SYSTEM.  The radar aircraft warning system had the 
information center completed and organized with five mobile radar 
stations which were operating.  They had been in operation from four to 
seven o'clock each morning for training purposes but had not gone into 
regular operation.  It was because of their being in operation that 
Lockard and Elliott picked up the Japanese attack force 132 miles from 
Oahu, and this organization functioned continually after the attack, so 
it can be assumed it was in operating condition.  (R. 439-440-441) (See 
Lockard in other testimony.)



Page 192

As General Short said:

"I think the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained 
to the point where they could do pretty well,"

as of December 7, 1941.  (R. 508)  They had three heavy radar sets 
complete and six mobile sets complete.  (R. 509)  The mobile sets were 
operating.  (R. 510)

"General Frank: ... the AWS system was operated with mobile sets up to a 
distance of about 130 miles.  Is not that correct.?

"General Short:  That is correct."  (R. 512)

The Interceptor Command "was actually operating," according to General 
Short.  He said, "it was actually operating daily."  (R. 525)  An order 
had not gone out to Burgin and Martin, but it was working.

4. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES.  As to the antiaircraft, much of it had never 
gone into position so far as mobile guns were concerned, and none of the 
mobile guns was in position on the morning of December 7th.  Ammunition 
had not been issued because the Ordnance Department objected to having 
it out convenient to the guns because it might get dirty.  As General 
Burgin said, "they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition... 
and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any 
occasion arise."  (R. 2608)

As General Burgin again testified:

"It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out 
because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at 



Page 193

heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated.  
The same was especially true here.  It was extremely difficult to get 
your ammunition out of the magazines.  We tried the ordnance people 
without results.  General Max Murray and myself went personally to 
General Short.  General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field 
artillery.  I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft.  We were put 
off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty 
of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck."  (R. 
2607)

The two division were in their quarters so that it took them a number of 
hours to move out after the attack.  One of the principal difficulties 
was the necessity of drawing their ammunition, as elsewhere discussed.

The status of the antiaircraft was this:  The mobile guns had to secure 
their ammunition from Aliamanu Crater, between two and three miles from 
Fort Shafter.  The fixed guns had their ammunition in boxes adjacent to 
the guns.  He had 60 mobile guns and 26 fixed buns and the usual 
complement of 50-caliber and 30-caliber.  He testified as follows:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception 
that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition." (R. 2604)

On the morning of December 7th he had not gone into operation with the 
Navy as on previous Sundays.  (R. 2603)  This was due to the fleet being 
in the harbor on that Sunday, and for some reason the Navy was not 
conducting its usual Sunday exercises with him.  (R. 2603)

5. SUMMARY.  Therefore, the situation on December 7th can be summed up 
as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy;  
the usual four or five PBYs were not out;  the antiaircraft artillery 
was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with the fleet air arm;  the 
naval carriers 



Page 194

with their planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the 
aircraft were on the ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely 
adjacent to one another; the fleet was in the harbor with the exception 
of Task Forces 9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and 
the two carriers LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE.  Ammunition for the Army was, 
with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance 
storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft 
artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions.  
Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the 
antisabotage alert No. 1.  This made them easy targets for an air 
attack.  In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect 
for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it.



Page 195

F. THE ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941.

1. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE.  The details of the attack have been already 
adequately described.  To have a competent understanding of the attack 
and the perfection with which it was executed, we should remember that 
the Japanese had had exceptional opportunities for securing the very 
latest information from a wide variety of sources in the islands as to 
the exact dispositions of the fleet and of our military forces.  The 
maps that were found upon Japanese aircraft that were shot down or on 
Japanese aviators or upon Japanese submarine crew men indicated a vast 
amount of meticulously accurate, up-to-date information.  The fact that 
one or more submarines were in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th and 
had circulated in the harbor and then gone out again showed a knowledge 
of what was going  on in Pearl Harbor that was substantially complete.

It is interesting to contrast this activity of the Japanese Navy in 
gaining detailed information of our Fleet with the failure of our Navy 
to glean any information concerning the task force that attacked Pearl 
Harbor from the time that it left Japanese home waters, about November 
22, 1941, and left Tankan Bay about November 28, 1941, until the attack 
took place.

For instance, the map found on a Japanese aviator brought down at Fort 
Kamehameha on December 7th, Exhibit No. 22; Exhibits 23, 24, 25, and 26; 
and Exhibit No. 48, illustrate with what meticulous detail the entire 
operation was worked out, based upon adequate and complete intelligence 
by the Japanese.  It is difficult to understand this attack and its



Page 196

perfection without first studying these maps.  The Japanese came to the 
attack with full information of our dispositions and defenses; we met 
the attack with absolutely no information about the Japanese attacking 
force.  The details of the securing of this information are set forth 
elsewhere in this report.  The Japanese realized that this was the 
foundation of their war and that perfection of execution would have a 
profound effect politically upon their allies and upon the countries of 
the Far East in which they intended to operate.

2. NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE ATTACKING FORCE.  The strength of the 
attacking force has already been state in this report, based upon the 
extended testimony of Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton.  It was one 
of the most powerful naval attacking forces ever assembled up to that 
time, because of the large complement of carriers.  Its aviators were of 
the highest quality of Japanese encountered during this war.  After they 
were finally disposed of during the later days of the present Pacific 
war, the testimony is to the effect that no equal or superior Japanese 
aviators have been met.

Japan evidently brought to bear upon this attack the best brains, the 
best equipment, and the finest intelligence, with the most expert 
planning, which it had.

The first indication of the attack on the Island of Oahu was the 
detection by the U.S.S. ANTARES of a suspicious object in the prohibited 
area off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a.m.  This was found to be a small two-man 
submarine, which was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of the 
U.S.S. WARD and a naval patrol plane between 6:33 and 6:45 a.m. on 
December 7th.  The WARD sent a report of this action to the Naval Base 



Page 197

watch officer at 7:12 a.m., who immediately notified his chief of staff.  
A ready destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warning 
was issued base upon the report.  This was one of the most important of 
a succession of mistakes made during this fateful morning.  The Navy 
admits that it did not advise General Short as it should have done.

A second small two-man submarine was sunk inside the harbor between 8:35 
and 8:43 a.m., and a third one was grounded in the Kaneohe Bay and was 
captured.  There was a total altogether of five such submarines equipped 
with two-man crews, one of which was captured.  The remaining nine crew 
members were killed, as confirmed by a Japanese citation later given to 
these ten men raising them in rank.  (R. 3038)  These two-man submarine 
were launched from mother submarines a short distance from the Island of 
Oahu.

While Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net to prevent the 
entrance of submarines and this net was kept closed during the hours of 
darkness, being opened only when necessary for a vessel to pass through 
the net, it was kept open continuously during daylight hours, upon the 
assumption that the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and 
other vessels in the neighborhood, would detect any submarines.  On the 
morning of December 7th, the net was opened at 4:58 a.m. for the 
entrance of two minesweepers and was left open until 8:40 a.m. when it 
was closed by order as a result of the attack.  The net was not damaged 
and it was fully functioning.  Apparently the submarine got into the 
harbor at 7 a.m.  It will be recalled that prior to December 7th one or 
more Japanese submarines had already been in this harbor, passing



Page 198

Through the net when it was opened at 4. a.m. to permit the garbage scow 
to go through.

The attacking planes from the six carriers  of the attacking force 
numbered approximately 424.  (R. 3048)

Of this number about 250 to 300 took part in the attack.  They consisted 
of fighting, bombing and torpedo planes that simultaneously and 
successively attacked Pearl Harbor and the adjacent air bases and 
airfields on Oahu, starting at about 7:55 a.m.  The attack was over by 
11 a.m.  On these fields the aircraft were carefully lined up, wing to 
wing, tip to tip, in the most perfect target position for both bombing 
and machine-gun strafing.  This is true both of the Army and of the 
Navy.  The PBYs of the Navy were substantially all destroyed, and a 
large number of the Army aircraft met a similar fate.  The landing 
strips were substantially without damage, possibly indicating some 
subsequent intention of the part of the Japanese to employ those landing 
strips.

Immediately upon the attack being known to General Short he ordered 
Alert No. 3.  This was executed with more than expected promptness.

As already related, this force of attacking Japanese planes was detected 
about 132 miles north of Oahu.  The Japanese force came over the island 
as follows: One force came from the north directly across the island, 
over Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field, to Pearl Harbor, attacking 
Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor, Bellows Field, and Pearl Harbor, and a 
third force came in from the south attacking Hickam Field and Pearl 
Harbor.  The torpedo planes devoted their



Page 199

attention to the ships in the harbor.  A study of the bomb pattern of 
such places as Hickam Field shows that the attack was concentrated upon 
the aprons where the planes were parked and upon the hangars as well as 
upon the machine shops.  All objectives were entered and carefully 
identified by legends placed upon the U.S. Geodetic Survey maps used by 
the Japanese.

It is significant as to maps secured by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, that there is an abbreviation of a code which takes care 
of every major contingency before, during and as result of the attack.  
Nothing was left to chance.  It is particularly noted that the 
information of construction was shown by the fact that as to Hickam 
Field the legend indicated,  "All concrete structures -- or in the 
process of construction."



Page 200

G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE UNEXPECTED ATTACK; THE EFFECT OF USING HAWAII AS 
A TRAINING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST.

1. ATTACK A SURPRISE.  The Chief of Staff and all other witnesses, 
including Kimmel and Short, have without exception stated that the 
attack was a surprise.  General Marshall testified that the Hawaiian 
commanders indicated their views that an air attack was their very 
serious concern.  (R. 52)  Yet he also testified:

"We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the 
reason being that we though, with the addition of more modern planes, 
that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely 
hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack."  (R. 9)

An analysis of the probabilities of success from the Japanese point of 
view shows that the Japanese took an extraordinary chance, if the facts 
as to their strength as we now know them are reasonably accurate.  In 
race track parlance, it was a "long-shot" and an extraordinary risk 
because the consequences of failure to the Japanese might have been 
greater than those to the United States in the event of success.  It was 
a bold and considered venture.

Japan knew with reasonable accuracy the movements and location of our 
fleet.  It knew weekend conditions in Hawaii with the fleet in the 
harbor as well as we did.  It apparently knew of our assumption that 
Japan would not dare attack the United States and that if it did, it 
would be in the remote islands of the Pacific, including the 
Philippines.  It accurately gauged our belief that Japan had its eyes 
turned on Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and was proceeding southwardly 
with its conquest.

Based upon this shrewd estimate of our national psychology  and our 
estimate of their intentions, Japan proceeded to the



Page 201

execution of the unexpected, the gain from which it estimated would be 
of incalculable value.  In the daring attack Japan was compensated by 
the gain to her of immobilizing and substantially destroying the Pacific 
Fleet, which was a major threat to Japan's left flank in its southward 
move.  The value of such a result was tremendous.

It gave both safety and freedom of action to Japan; and the ability to 
concentrate both on the Pacific Islands of the United States and the 
Philippines.  By that time Japan believed it would be so entrenched that 
dislodgment would be substantially impossible.

Japan use in this attack from four to six carriers out of the total of 
eight available for its fleet. The failure of this mission, by the 
destruction of such carriers, would have been really fatal to its fleet, 
at least for long months to come.  The daring, therefore, of this attack 
was out of all proportion to its value because had it not been 
successful and had its carriers been destroyed it would have been 
disastrous to the Japanese Navy.

But in making this estimate of Japan's risky action and its considered 
chances, we were doing so from the occidental point of view.  We were 
completely ignoring the oriental attitude, the Japanese cheap price of 
life, and her willingness to conduct a suicide attempt without any 
foundation of occidental reasoning in order to gain an extraordinary 
advantage.  Hull and Grew had warned of this psychology and her penchant 
for unexpected, reckless, and suicidal moves.

This national urge to take a desperate chance of a military nature has 
since then become well-known.  It was our failure to take into 
consideration this extraordinary chance-



Page 202

taking characteristic, due to the violent and uncivilized reasoning of 
the Japanese mind, that would approve the making of such a long military 
and naval chance for the satisfaction of the first blow, and a 
disastrous one, that was so satisfactory to the oriental mind, which 
misled us.

2. TIME ELEMENT - THE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN ALL ESTIMATES.  This analysis 
is recited for the reason that apparently no one from the Chief of Staff 
down considered *at the time the attack was made* that any such attempt 
would be made.

This *time* element is important in understanding the state of mind of 
the responsible authorities of the United States.  The military estimate 
of the situation from the War Department, the Navy Department, and in 
Hawaii, clearly show a reasoned and correctly stated analytical estimate 
of the situation.  The missing link in our search for the reason why 
steps were not taken to carry out the logic of the military and 
psychological estimate of the situation seems to be in this belief that 
there was ample time to prepare Hawaii.  It was generally thought that 
Japan would not attempt this attack, if at all, until some time later 
after it had made its attacks upon the Philippines and intermediate 
islands.  In that, the United States' calculations went far astray for 
lack of understanding of the long-chance type of the military and naval 
minds of oriental Japan.

As a consequence a policy was followed that was disastrous to the 
defense of Hawaii.  They gamble upon having time fore preparation that 
did not exist.

3. EXPECTED TIME TO CONTINUE TRAINING.  That assumption of time for 
preparation resulted in using a portion of the Hawaiian Army Air Force 
and the Navy as a training force for the train-



Page 203

ing of green personnel followed by the removal of experienced personnel 
thereof, as they were trained, to other theaters.  The Board, although 
it realizes the great need of organized air forces to serve as training 
units and that the Hawaiian Air Force was one of the few unavailable, 
nevertheless it considers it a mistake to so utilize this outpost which 
should have been on a purely combat basis and not subject to the 
weakening process of a periodic turnover.

Let us look at the consequences of this.  The navy was either training 
ashore or constantly training at sea through its three task forces.  
Those operations in the areas were not, as Short though, for the purpose 
of combat reconnaissance or defense duty, but they were training 
maneuvers for the constant training of new personnel to be used 
elsewhere.

The training problem, which had been frequently discussed with the War 
Department and was well known by it, had assumed a position of 
importance in Hawaii.  This evidently strongly influenced Short's 
decision to adopt Alert No. 1.

He testified:

"In addition to that, it was a question of training.  Alerts Nos. 2 and 
3 would require so many men on duty.  Alert No. 3 would take every man, 
practically, so it would eliminate any training.  Alert No. 2 would 
practically put every man of the harbor defense, the antiaircraft, and 
the air on duties that would prohibit training.  The situation in the 
air with regard to training was quite serious.  We had been given the 
mission of ferrying B-17s to the Philippines.  We had already sent, I 
think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12.  We had also sent some crews 
to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the Philippine 
Island.  We had only 6 flying fortresses in commission to train all of 
these crews.  If you remember, at that time a flying fortress was 
relatively now and you could not just pick up a pilot here and there and 
say he could fly a flying fortress.  He had to be stepped up.  We had a 
bunch of the old obsolete B-18 bombers that were death traps if you put 
anybody in them to fight, but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to 
handle larger ships.  They were put on those.  They were put on A-20s



Page 204

for a little time, and finally got to the B-17s.  With the limited 
number of ships we had it took time to train these crews;  not just the 
pilots.  In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the 
gunners so they could protect themselves from the Japanese going over 
the Mandated Islands.

"General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we 
should do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferrying 
group.  The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department.  
It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there without loss; 
and we could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews.

"That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 
rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3.  (R. 285-286)

"... We felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air 
Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the 
Philippines.  Just as soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by 
transferring it to the Philippines."  (R. 390)

And again he testified before the Roberts Commission:

"Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about 
training rather than expecting something to happen at the time."  
(Roberts Record 1622)  (See page 531 of the Grunert Record.)

General Martin, Chief of the Hawaiian Air Force, testified even more 
vigorously that the selection of Alert No. 1 was largely influenced by 
their desire to keep on training.

"General Frank:  Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps 
training in any one of the three alerts?...

"General Martin:  There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed 
to get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new 
organization.

"General Frank:  Could you do more technical training for the Air Force 
in No. 3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference?

"General Martin:  Of course there was a difference.  There would be more 
under Alert No. 1."  (R. 1864-1865)

Admiral Kimmel said:

"The principal one that arises at once is the question of personnel, the 
necessity for training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy 
was training personnel and shipping them back to the States, that we 
were constantly getting new personnel.  That intensive training program 
was essential if we were not to have a fleet that was utterly impotent.  
I have been informed, and I believe firmly, that




Page 205

the Army had just as many troubles as we had, if not more.  They brought 
pilots out there that needed training, and they were depleting their 
trained airmen of all ratings, and in the weeks immediately preceding 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air 
Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic 
station, and they very greatly depleted their stuff."  (R. 1764-1765)

It is therefore apparent that both services were placing great emphasis 
on training, possibly to the detriment of preparedness to meet an 
attack.

4. SHORT'S TRUST IN NAVY TO GIVE HIM TIMELY NOTICE.  TIME ELEMENT AGAIN. 
General Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a cordial 
and friendly relationship with the Navy.  His instruction from the Chief 
of Staff to do this were not for purpose of social intercourse, but for 
more effectively accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete 
detail working agreement with the Navy to get results.  He successfully 
accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite 
numbers in the Navy, i.e., the top rank of the Navy; he did not 
accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own 
full information, the complete execution of his own job and the 
performance of his mission.  The claim of a satisfactory relationship 
for practical purposes is not substantiated.  General Short testified:

"The one thing that that letter (General Marshall's first letter of 
February 7th, 1941) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, 
was the necessity for the closest cooperation with the Navy.  I think 
that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else."  (R. 
355)

Apparently Short was afraid that if he went much beyond social contacts 
and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right 
to know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the Navy and 
lose the good will of the



Page 206

Navy which he was charged with securing.  That is evidenced by his 
following statement:

"I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel 
would have resented it if I had tried to have him report every time a 
ship went in or out, and as I say, our relations were such that he gave 
me without and hesitancy an piece of information that he thought was of 
interest."  (R. 363)

He testified that he relied  for reconnaissance upon the task force of 
the Navy, which employed carriers to search the ocean 300 miles to each 
side, giving each task force 600 miles of reconnaissance area, and with 
three forces that would have meant covering 1,800 miles.  (R. 284, 384) 
Admiral Pye, commander of one of three task forces of the Pacific Fleet, 
testified that:

"The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically 
all the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period 
normally of about eight days and about fourteen days in port."  (R. 
1036)

Kimmel testified the task forces were in training and not out for 
reconnaissance.  (R. 1773, 1794-1795; Cf. Pye 1037, Burgin 2673)  He 
said that this was well known and undoubtedly Short knew it.  (R. 1771-
1773); Cf. Short 359)  The Short and Kimmel testimony is in conflict on 
this point.

Again, Short said he was dependent on the Navy, and particularly the 
14th Naval District, or the War Department for securing information as 
to the movement of Japanese ships.  (R. 291)  He said that the 
combination of the continuous flow of information that the Navy 
Department had as to the location of Jap ships and the Navy task forces 
doing long-distance reconnaissance with their carrier-borne planes, led 
him to the position that "it was a natural thing that I should accept 
the opinion of the Navy on that particular subject.  It seemed to be the 
best informed opinion that there was in the vicinity."



Page 207

(R. 300-301) It was for that reason that he accepted the Captain 
McMorris statement, when visiting with Admiral Kimmel and his staff, 
that there would be no Japanese attack in early December.  (R. 299-301)

He said he was further strengthened in his opinion, during the period of 
the 27th of November to the 6th of December, that the Navy either knew 
"where the Japanese carriers were, or had enough information that they 
were not uneasy, and with the task forces that I knew they had out, that 
they felt they could handle the situation."  (R. 303)

Short evidently believed that he was getting full information from the 
Navy that was available to them.  There does not seem to have occurred 
anything that led him to think he was not being told all the pertinent 
official naval information there was available.  He relied upon complete 
official interchange which was not in practice.

An examination of the facts showed that the naval forces were 
insufficient for long-distance patrol, and General Short frankly 
confesses this situation.  (R. 375); General Short further points out 
that the Army had insufficient planes for reconnaissance" (r. 384), he 
did not know nor try to find out their routines.  (R. 359-360, 475)   
Short could easily have learned that the task forces conducted only 
incidental reconnaissance (R. 1773, 1794-1795) and that the Navy was 
devoting itself to the submarine menace in the areas in which they had 
their exercises.  (R. 1040, 1757, 3041)  Short knew that his inshore 
patrol was of limited value.  (R. 473); that Admiral Bloch did not have 
the planes to carry out the agreement (R. 375); and that all that 
Admiral Bellinger has was a limited number of PBY reconnaissance planes 
(R. 456, 1589, 1810); that Bloch had none (R. 1493, 1526, 



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1532, 1751) and the carrier-borne planes were normally used for 
antisubmarine reconnaissance. (R. 1039-1040)

General Short's knowledge of the situation at the time of these events 
in 1941 is shown in the testimony of General Martin, who said:

"I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain extent by the fact 
that the Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had 
no knowledge.  Now, as to what areas they were covering, we did not 
know, but it did affect a decision as the paramount danger coming from 
within rather than from without."  (R. 1856)

General Martin said emphatically the fact that the Navy had task forces 
out influenced his decision, saying:

"...I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct a 
reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me;..." (R. 
1873)

This was despite the fact, as he said:

"...we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance 
was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your 
reconnaissance from the air would extend over a larger territory in the 
limited amount of time, and that was the thing I was complaining to 
Admiral Bellinger about."  (R. 1857)

As an indication that Short was not getting the information is his own 
admission:

"General Frank:  Another thing:  Do you now feel that the Navy withheld 
from you certain information that they had available that would have 
been invaluable to you?

"General Short:  I don't believe that the purposely withheld anything 
from me that they thought really concerned me.

"General Frank: Don't you think that that information about the naval 
task force with carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jaluit 
would have vitally affected you?

"General Short:  Yes, probably.

"General Grunert:  Did the Navy understand your mission and your 
responsibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should 
be passed to you or what shouldn't be passed to you?

"General Short:  Oh, I think they did, definitely."  (R. 409-410)



Page 209

He did not learn of the early visit on the morning of December 7th of 
the Japanese submarine.  He did not learn of it until the 8th, when 
Admiral Kimmel himself told him about it.  (R. 364-365)  By his implicit 
trust in the Navy he let them not only get the information but to 
evaluate it.  In connection with the information about the Japanese 
submarine sunk by the Navy early December 7th, he said this as to the 
Navy action:

"They did not connect it(the submarine which was sunk by the Navy) with 
the general raid, they thought it was separate." (R. 365)

But the point is that Short should have been given this information and 
have made his own evaluation.  As he now testifies, if he had known of 
this submarine information it "might have worked out to our very great 
advantage if they (the Navy) had been handled differently."  (R. 310)  
In this connection he said, "It was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of 
the District to get that information to me right away.  He stated to me 
in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only 
as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed 
to notify me;  that he (Bloch) could see then, after the fact, that he 
had been absolutely wrong..." (R. 311)

Again, he was not advised of the Japanese task force in the Marshalls, 
between the 25th and the 30th of November.  (R. 361) He said he was not 
advised of the naval dispatch of December 3rd, 1941, and never saw the 
message.  That was the message that showed that the Japanese diplomatic 
and consular posts were destroying certain codes and ciphers, and 
burning certain documents.  He said that he did not receive the naval 
messages of December 3rd, December 4th, and December 6th from



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the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, 
regarding the destruction of confidential documents. 

He said:

"General Grunert:  You had none of the information that was disclosed in 
those three messages?

"General Short:  No, sir."  (R. 425)

He expressed his relationship with the Navy in this wise:  "I felt that 
Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely 
given me anything they though had nay bearing on my job; that if they 
were sure it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that did not 
concern me in any way they might not have given it (the information) to 
me."  (R. 358)

This situation was summed up as follows:

"General Frank:  The question as to whether or not you got the 
information was placed upon a trust that you had that they would have 
given it to you?

"General Short: Absolutely.

...

"General Frank:  Do you feel that you were secure in that?

"General Short:  I do not know what other basis you could work on.  I 
had no right to demand that they give me all information they had."  (R. 
358)

As to naval task forces on which he so thoroughly relied for 
reconnaissance, he did not have any regular means of knowing where they 
were or what they were doing, "except as we (Admirals Kimmel, Bloch and 
Bellinger) happened to talk about in a personal kind of way."  (R. 359)

This brings us to the further observation that Short in dealing with the 
Navy was trying to do the job himself (R. 1248-1249), which resulted in 
that he neither got the information completely, accurately, nor 
consistently, instead of delegating it to his trained staff officer 
dealing with equally trained



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staff officers of the Navy so a professional, systematic job could be 
done.  He relied on confidence and natural trust rather than certainty 
of information; and on personal visits and informal conferences instead 
of the definitenss of an established organization smoothly operating to 
an effective end.

H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK?

1. REASON FOR ANALYSIS OF ACTION TAKEN AFTER 7 DECEMBER, 1941:  The 
question of insufficient means with which to adequately defend Oahu has 
been raised.  General Short's energy was admirable and well directed 
towards improving the defense of Oahu.  As a consequence, we have 
examined the situation as to what he did before the attack and what he 
did after the attack with what he had.  The first part of the 
examination has already been related in the previous portions of the 
report.  We now propose to examine two questions:  How effectively was 
Short able to use this very same materiel, personnel, and available 
facilities after the attack; and what did Washington do after the 
attacking in giving help to Hawaii that might have been done before?

2. HAWAII AND WASHINGTON ACTION: Upon learning of the attack General 
Short immediately ordered the Number 3 Alert. (R. 1118)  The 24th 
Division was in all battle positions by 1600 hours 7 December 1941.  The 
Division Artillery drew its ammunition and secured its issue of a unit 
to fire to take to beaches within one to two hours.  It is significant 
that the war garrison was increased by Washington from 59,000 to 71,500 
after December 7 to defend Kaneohe Bay, "back door to the island," and 
that increases in air strength and in engineers for



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aviation purposes were granted.  (R. 325)  Harbor troops had ammunition 
"immediately at hand."  The antiaircraft had theirs sometime later.  The 
first of the sixteen surgical teams reported to the hospital at 0900.  
At noon there was started evacuation of women and children from Hickam 
and Wheeler Fields and harbor defense positions.  The Ordnance Depot 
went into two underground rooms.  Slit trenches were then dug.  (R. 316-
317)

The Department Engineer, under the Department Commander, was put by 
Washington in complete control of building of field fortifications.  The 
troops on field fortifications.  The slit trenches were not completed 
until December 8.  (R. 321)  The outlying islands were further 
garrisoned.  (R. 332)  Orders were issued in connection with the defense 
against chemical air attack, air raid instructions were issued, klaxon 
horns were distributed for the aircraft warning service and old gas 
masks were exchanged for new.  (R. 529-531)  The Interceptor Command, 
inactive before December 7 and still in the training stage  (R. 1825), 
was activated December 17.  (R. 4136-4137)   After December 7 "the Navy 
took us over body and soul...we did exactly as they ordered us to.  We 
were a part of their Naval Air Force, so to speak" said General Rudolph.  
(R. 1223)  Washington gave unity of command.  Directives came from the 
War and Navy Departments to establish a joint operating center for a 
joint staff of Army and Navy.  This was done in tunnels in the Aliamanu 
Crafter and put into use in February 1941.  (R. 1534)

Daily reconnaissance was made after December 7, using Army B-17s and 
Navy PBYs and "anything they had," even the B-18s.  Navy planes were 
sent from the mainland by Washington after December 7; many B-17s came 
out almost immediately.  Additional PBYs were received and those damaged 
on December 7 were repaired.




Page 213

If the planes that were available by Washington after December 7 had 
been available before December 7, distance reconnaissance could have 
been made, according to the testimony of Admiral Bloch.  (R. 1532-1534)  
However, the necessity for the ferrying of bombers to the Philippines 
ceased since they, too, were under attack.

The Interceptor Command was activated immediately after December 7.  (R. 
2064)

The status of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery was as 
follows.  After December 7 the ammunition was issued for use with the 
guns in the field.  (R. 2605)  The skeleton crews were replaced with 
full crews on the fixed coastal guns.  (R. 2611)  Only 40 per cent of 
the allowance of automatic weapons existed before December 7, which was 
rectified after that date.  (R. 2613)  The whole command was put on a 
five-minute alert and old Alerts Number 1, 2, and 3 became obsolete, the 
men in camp after December 7 remaining right at their guns.  (R. 2639)  
The radar and Interceptor Command installations, formerly under the 
control of the Signal Corps, were taken away from the Signal Corps, were 
taken away from the Signal Corps immediately after December 7 and placed 
under the Interceptor Command.  (R. 2644)

The aircraft warning system was started full time on December 7 as it 
could have been weeks before, had the order been given.  (R. 4133)  
After December 7 the aircraft warning system personnel continued to 
operate efficiently.  They did so in conjunction with the 24-hour duty 
of the Interceptor Command.  As Colonel Berquist said, in contrasting 
his efforts to get the aircraft warning service and the Interceptor 
Command



Page 214

cooperating before December 7, after December 7 "I just had to snap my 
fingers and I got what I wanted."  (R. 1205-1206)  The AWS work moved 
much faster after December 7.  (R. 1218)  After December 7 the 
controversy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, which 
contributed to the delay in the activation of the Interceptor Command, 
disappeared.  (R. 1216-1217)

After December 7 the fighter planes were kept ready to take off 
instantly (R. 3911) and the antiaircraft warning service was put on a 
24-hour basis, as it could have been before, said Colonel Powell, Signal 
Officer of the Hawaiian Department Corps.  (R. 3913)  The aircraft 
warning sets were in continuous operation after December 7 with three 
groups operating four hours each. (R. 1029)

Tillman, an Engineer Corps civilian employee, testified that he as a 
trouble shooter took charge of construction pertaining to the aircraft 
warning service after Colonel Wyman was relieved because progress was 
unsatisfactory.  (R. 2135)  He found he was able to complete certain 
construction projects at aircraft warning stations by scouting around 
for parts.  Prior to December 7 the crews on those projects were not 
working because they said they had nothing to work with.  (R. 2149-2151)

The most remarkable change between December 6 and December 7 was the 
change in construction activities under the District Engineer, Colonel 
Wyman.

A new field was begun a Kahuku on December 7.  Bunkers were built at 
Hickam Field;  the field at Haliewa was expanded; construction of a new 
field at Kipapa was started; a temporary field was put on the Schofield 
golf course.  The troops started on field fortifications.  (R. 321)  
Authority was requested to



Page 215

build ten airfields.  Bombers were put on the outlying islands.  "We 
were able to go ahead and do a lot without funds."  Barracks were built 
with WPA money.  (R. 325)  A pool of lumber was authorized for the 
Quartermaster.  (R. 328)

All the material and contractors with their machinery were taken over 
and put to work.  Priorities were established on jobs to get more work 
accomplished, according to Benson, President of the Hawaiian Contracting 
Company.  (R. 3737)  A job at Wheeler Field had not been completed for a 
long time, due to the delay of plans from the Engineers. (R. 2542)  
Barking Sands airport and Kokee radar station jobs had been delayed for 
many weeks with the material on the ground awaiting someone to act.  The 
Hawaiian Constructors had not put it up.  After December 7 the witness 
Bartlett went to the site, erected the tower in five days and the 
station operating.

On December 7 the runways under construction at Bellows Field were 
incomplete.  On the Wednesday after December 7 the work began on a 24-
hour-a-day basis.  The second runway was completed in seven days, that 
is, by the following Thursday, said Colonel Weddington, base commander 
at Bellows Field.  (R. 3020)  After December 7 antiaircraft emplacements 
were constructed at Bellows Field. When the attack struck, the planes 
were concentrated practically wing to wing, but after the attack they 
were dispersed on the field, 50 to 75 feet apart. (R. 3014)

The Corps of Engineers also  evidenced an appreciation of the situation 
by raising the contracting authority of the District Engineer from 
$50,000 before December 7 to $5,000,000 after December 7.  The Corps of 
Engineers' red tape of sending



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all contracts and changes to Washington to the Chief of Engineers was 
then eliminated by Washington; testimony of Colonel Wyman.  (R. 3434, 
3874) The Robert E. McKee Company, which had been discarded by Wyman 
when he went to the islands in the middle of 1904, was invited by him 
after December 7 to join Hawaiian Constructors.  (R. 2405-2407)

Slit trenches had not been built until the day of Pearl Harbor (R. 
1916), but they were built extensively, together with air raid shelters, 
after December 7.  (R. 838)

After December 7 Admiral Pye testified the Navy kept its forces out of 
the harbor fairly continuously except for the time necessary in port to 
overhaul material and receive supplies.  (R. 1045)

We, therefore, find that after December 7 an active and vigorous 
employment of facilities, materiel and personnel was made, and full 
support and supplies were furnished by Washington some of which might 
have been done before December 7.  The support from the mainland was 
vastly different after December 7 than before, and the record so 
reflects this condition.  For instance, before December 7 G-2 did not 
submit to General Short any strategical estimates but after December 7 
they submitted such a statement weekly.  After December 7 the suspected 
aliens were rounded up and interned, the Japanese consul and his 200 
agents were put out of business and all necessary steps were taken to 
monitor both telephone and radio communication, all of which might have 
been done without stirring up the civilian population or the Japanese 
prior to December 7, 1941

Footnotes:

List of things done and action taken on or after 7 December 1941 by 
persons in the Hawaiian Islands:  Bloch, volume 13, pages 1653-34; 
Klatt, v 13, p 1465-66; Pye, v 9, p 1045; Phillips, v 10, p 1118; 
Murray, v 27, p 3080; Martin, v 17, p 1825, 1850, 1911; Lockard, v 9, p 
1029; Bartlett, v 22, p 2510-11;



Page 217

I. SUMMARY

The foregoing concludes the story of Pearl Harbor with the exception of 
the matter of the construction of the Hawaiian defenses and the 
particular part of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., with respect to those 
defenses.  Col. Wyman's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster is treated in 
Chapter V.

In order to not disturb the continuity of the complete Pearl Harbor 
story both at Hawaii and in Washington, the next succeeding Chapter No. 
IV is devoted primarily to the responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor 
disaster of those in Washington who had some part in the matter.  In 
this way Chapters III and IV, when read together, will give a balanced 
and complete picture of the principal events and actions taken which 
contribute to the result of the attack on December 7, 1941.

Footnotes:
(continued from preceding page) Midkiff, v 25, p 2805-07-14-40-41; 
Bergquist, v 10, p 1205-06-16-17-18; Rudolph, v 10, p 1223;  Weddington, 
v 27, p 3020-13-14; Howard, v 17, p 1916; Pratt, v 18, p 1986; Locey, v 
25, p 2790; King, v 23, p 2542-37-38; Fielder, v 26, p 2981; McKee, v 
21, p 2405-07; Burgin, v 24, p 2603-04-07-09-11-13-14-15-39-44; Reybold, 
v. 6, p 580; Davidson, v. 36, p 4133-36-38-42; Powell, v. 32, p 3904-11-
13; Wyman, v 29, p 3435-36 - v 32, p 3874 (affidavit - v 29, p 3433,34;  
Perliter, v 30, p 3712; Benson, v 30, p 3737; Farthing, v 7, p 838; 
Tillman, v 19, p 2135-49-51; Short, v 4, p 314-15-16-17-19-20-21-22-25-
28-30-31-32-37 - v 5, p 500, 529-30-31-34-36.