a.weu/documents File: 1337defc.mar Document 1337 5th November 1992 WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis ______ REPORT(1) submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee (2) by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur ______ TABLE OF CONTENTS ================= DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. WEU: the operational organisation III. Operational developments (i) WEU planning cell (ii) WEU satellite centre (iii) The European Corps IV. Recommendations and responses (i) Recommendation 519 on the application of United Nations Resolution 757 (ii) Extraordinary meeting of WEU Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia (Helsinki, 10th July 1992) (iii) Fact-finding in the Adriatic area (24th-27th August 1992) (iv) 3rd September: urgent meeting of the Standing Committee V. Conclusion --------------- Draft Recommendation ==================== on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis The Assembly, Recalling Recommendations 506, 512, 519 and 525 which have all sought to prompt precise action by WEU to help solve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia; Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713, 757, 770, 771 and 781 and the efforts being made by Lord Owen and Mr. Vance to resolve the crisis; Dismayed that so little apparent progress has been made in finding a political solution to the crisis and that the suffering of the peoples concerned is likely to be intensified still further with the onset of winter; Urging the Council to multiply efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new WEU Forum for Consultation with the Central European states, to seek greater co-operation at all levels in a further attempt to convince the various belligerents to stop fighting; Disappointed that the United Nations Security Council has not heeded WEU's call for reinforcement of the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and that consequently the fighting is being prolonged; Congratulating the Council for promptly following up a number of the Assembly's recommendations and applauding the Italian presidency for its pragmatic and positive initiatives over WEU co-ordination and liaison with the United Nations, CSCE and NATO; Pleased that all WEU countries have offered to contribute either forces, logistic support or facilities, or a combination of such assets, but insisting on the need for an equitable sharing of costs; Convinced that an air defence capability plus associated intelligence-gathering measures to help protect United Nations forces are essential; Considering that similar WEU and NATO naval and maritime air assets might well be combined to form composite forces to stress complementarity and in a demonstration of cost-effectiveness rather than duplication; Believing that when WEU forces are operating as such they should be readily identifiable, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL Intensify efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new WEU Forum for Consultation to support Lord Owen and Mr.Vance's endeavours in Geneva and to sponsor a possible fresh initiative to convince the belligerents in all parts of the former Yugoslavia to stop fighting and seek a political solution to their grievances; Prepare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council to reinforce the present embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in 1990/91 and in particular to take account of the problem of cargo in transit and also of the complications of the Danube Convention and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant breach of the embargo; Fulfil its pledge for WEU member states to "offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757" and in particular respond to Romania's request for assistance; Ensure that all WEU nations which have offered forces, logistic support or facilities are permitted to participate in operations, although not necessarily those organised exclusively under the direct aegis of the United Nations. Both the CSCE and the EC, for example, require considerable support for observer missions; Prepare a special supplementary budget for 1992 to take account of operations concerning the former Yugoslavia and also to enable the WEU planning cell to function correctly; Make contingency arrangements to provide an adequate air defence capability to help protect United Nations forces engaged in the former Yugoslavia; In conjunction with the NATO authorities, rationalise naval and maritime air operations in the Adriatic area to form composite and cost-effective forces; Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to use it to distinguish their military forces - ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel - taking part in WEU operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell should be among the first recipients of such a badge. --------------- Explanatory Memorandum ====================== (submitted by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur) I. Introduction The aim of the present report is to acquaint members of the Assembly with the series of developments concerning both WEU's operational organisation and the former Yugoslavia, and which have occurred since the last plenary session in June. The report concentrates particularly on recommendations for action, the Council's replies and initiatives and parallel and complementary actions in other bodies. The period in question has been particularly rich from every point of view, but particularly where WEU and its operational role is concerned. The following chapters mark the principal milestones. II. WEU: the operational organisation In Recommendation 518(3), the Assembly adopted a series of recommendations designed to give an impulse to the Council's deliberations scheduled for the then imminent meeting at the Petersberg near Bonn on 19th June 1992. The Assembly was certainly not disappointed in the Council's Petersberg Declaration which took up the majority of the Assembly's detailed recommendations and announced an array of action for the immediate future: "II. On strengthening WEU's operational role 1. In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's operational role. 2. WEU member states declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU. 3. Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions. 4. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: - humanitarian and rescue tasks; - peace-keeping tasks; - tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. 5. The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies. 6. Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions - in this case after consultation with NATO - and will be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis. 7. All WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations. 8. WEU member states intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks. 9. A planning cell will be established on 1st October 1992, subject to practical considerations, under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels. The Council has today appointed Maj. Gen. Caltabiano (Italian Air Force) as its first Director. The planning cell will be responsible for: - preparing contingency plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices; - preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected; - keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations. 10. The Council of Ministers approved the terms of reference for the planning cell." The formal reply of the Council to Recommendation 518 was somewhat slower in arriving (received by the Assembly on 16th October) but, as well as reiterating the appropriate parts of the Petersberg Declaration, added a number of extra details which demonstrate the Council's readiness now to progress operational matters in a particularly pragmatic and constructive manner. These extra details are highlighted in the following text of the Council's reply to Recommendation 518: "1. In accordance with the decision contained in the declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's military role. (a) At its meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed that "a planning cell will be established on 1st October 1992, subject to practical considerations, under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels." The Council of Ministers also approved the terms of reference for the planning cell. (b) Questions pertaining to closer military co-operation complementary to the alliance, in particular in the fields of logistics, transport and training remain on the agenda of the Council's Defence Representatives Group. Whenever appropriate, information on the outcome of the discussions on this issue and their follow-up will be fed into the ongoing dialogue with the Assembly. (c) On 19th June 1992, WEU ministers agreed "that the chiefs of defence staff should meet twice a year prior to the regular Ministerial Councils and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary". The Council does not envisage, at present, the creation of a WEU "Military Committee". However, it should be recalled that - according to paragraph 12 of Part I "on WEU and European security" of the Petersberg Declaration - following the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brussels, national delegations could be reinforced with "military delegates" to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views of the chiefs of defence staff to the planning cell and to monitor the professional standards of the planning cell's work. In the future, an enhanced role of the WEU chiefs of defence staff would be envisageable in principle, in line with the organisation's evolution. (d) In its reply to sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 1 of the recommendation, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to Part II, "on strengthening WEU's operational role", of the Petersberg Declaration. In this declaration, WEU member states "declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU". Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU "will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions." The declaration also specifies that "military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions - in this case after consultation with NATO - and will be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis". Furthermore, "all WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations." WEU member states "intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks." The possibility of the creation of a European aeronaval force with the capability for force projection is currently under consideration by the Council and its working groups, as are the related technical questions. The Assembly will be kept informed on the outcome of these discussions and on any follow-ups in due course. 2. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, Part II "on strengthening WEU's operational role" of the Petersberg Declaration identifies the following tasks for which military units of WEU member states, acting under WEU's authority, could be employed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. The Petersberg Declaration specifies: "The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies." 3. On 19th June 1992, WEU ministers agreed that a number of points should be made in extending the invitation to the countries interested in becoming members, observers or associate members. In this context, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to Part III "on relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance" which specifies: "Other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council - without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty - of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies", subject - inter alia - to the following provisions: (...) they will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a permanent liaison arrangement; (...) they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces (...)." For "practical reasons", however, "space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of the experimental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new members and associate members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be made for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the same time as decisions are taken on the continuation of such activites." The possibility of observers participating in the WEU planning cell and in WEU's space activities is not foreseen in the Petersberg Declaration. While possible, in principle, the inclusion "of other NATO states or European Community associates in WEU operations on an ad hoc basis" would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 4. Possibilities for co-operation between the experimental WEU satellite centre and the planning cell as well as the desirability and feasibility of ensuring "firm links" of the WEU satellite centre in Torrejon with non-WEU bodies will be examined in due course, as the satellite centre becomes more operational. 5. WEU's relations with the IEPG are addressed in the Council's replies to Recommendations 517 and 523. 6. The declaration adopted in Bonn on 19th June 1992 by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe states that "the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation could be set up in the light of the development of these relations." Ministers agreed to strengthen existing relations between WEU and these states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation. The declaration specifies that "the focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring regions will be of particular interest to the participants. In this way, WEU's Central European partners will be able to acquaint themselves with the future security and defence policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with the defence component of the union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these develop." 7. Questions pertaining to the "maintenance of an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent" and to the desirability of instituting a WEU "nuclear consultation group" are not at present on the agenda of the Council and its working groups. 8. The contents of the Petersberg Declaration as well as the declaration of the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe, both adopted on 19th June 1992, testify to the fact that WEU member states are fully conscious of the need to develop relations between NATO and WEU on the basis of the dual purpose of transparency and complementarity." Your Rapporteur would like to make a point of drawing the extra information given to the attention of members: (i) "The Council of Ministers also approved the terms of reference for the planning cell." The terms of reference adopted were broadly in line with the outline given in Sir Dudley Smith's report which also mentioned arrangements for appointing and paying the staff. (See below for further details.) (ii) "...national delegations could be reinforced with "military delegates" to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to the planning cell and to monitor the professional standards of the planning cell's work. In the future, an enhanced role of the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff would be envisageable in principle, in line with the organisation's evolution." At least one country has already earmarked an officer as a "military delegate" and advisor to the Permanent Representative. Others will follow in due course. It is important that such posts are kept separate from those in the planning cell in order to preserve the integrity and "objectivity" of the latter. The WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff are already assuming an enhanced role (c.f. the last meeting on 16th October 1992 in Rome) and the Assembly has not hesitated to make suggestions regarding subjects for future discussion.(4) (iii) "The possibility of the creation of a European aeronaval force with the capability for force projection is currently under consideration by the Council and its Working Groups, as are the related technical questions." The creation of a European aeronaval force was first suggested in a 1988 report of the Defence Committee entitled "Naval aviation"(5) and it is good to hear that the Council is now to study and develop the idea. The Defence Committee intends to keep a watching brief on the subject and will be reporting progress to the Assembly. (iv) "While possible, in principle, the inclusion "of other NATO states or European Community associates in WEU operations on an ad hoc basis" would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis." Ad hoc co-operation in WEU operations is already starting, although not yet with the planning cell which will take time to establish. In particular, "bilateral" co-operative arrangements with the United States and Canada, albeit separately, are about to be developed. (v) "Possibilities for co-operation between the experimental WEU satellite centre and the planning cell as well as the desirability and feasibility of ensuring "firm links" of the WEU satellite centre in Torrejon with non-WEU bodies will be examined in due course, as the satellite centre becomes more operational." Your Rapporteur is pleased that the idea of links with non-WEU bodies has not been excluded definitively. The work of the satellite centre in Torrejon must be complementary to that of other bodies working in the same domain. As the satellite centre becomes operational it will have to rely on other agencies for certain information and should obviously be in a position to reciprocate. III. Operational developments (i) WEU planning cell As forecast in the addendum to the report on WEU: the operational organisation (Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith), Lieutenant-General Marcello Caltabiano (Italian Air Force) was duly appointed to head the WEU planning cell, seconded by Brigadier-General Jean-Philippe Roux (French Army). The cell was established on Thursday 1st October 1992 in premises kindly made available by the Belgian Ministry of Defence at Laeken in the suburbs of Brussels. The cell will move into the same premises as the Secretariat General at 4 rue de la Regence when that building is ready. At the time of writing, the cell is staffed by a single representative of each member country. Others will soon join and there have been many more volunteers than places for this first operational facet of WEU's new role. Apart from the problem of premises not yet being ready, the most immediate requirement is to establish a budget for the planning cell so that it may begin work in earnest. As colleagues will know from the Assembly's perennial problems over its own budget, our governments have been slow to commit the necessary funds to the Western European Union in spite of a particular requirement now for WEU to play a more central role. Some of the former Warsaw Pact countries with which your Rapporteur has had contact of late have pointed out a definite lack of effective democracy in the way in which the Assembly has been continually hamstrung by governments when it comes to adequate finance. It is obvious that a proper budget must be provided for the planning cell and your Rapporteur would therefore urge that a supplementary budget for 1992 be agreed immediately to allow the cell to function as soon as possible. (ii) WEU satellite centre The Technological and Aerospace Committee's report on European armaments co-operation after Maastricht(6) makes reference to the problems of equipping the satellite data interpretation and training centre at Torrejon near Madrid. These problems which relate especially to the choice of computer software to be used are in the process of being resolved and your Rapporteur trusts that suitable solutions, allowing for further developments of the centre in the future, have prevailed. There has been a consequent delay in inaugurating the centre. (iii) The European Corps In an effort to ensure transparency with NATO, France and Germany have decided to bring their intentions on the Eurocorps officially to the attention of the North Atlantic Council. This is an excellent way to proceed and should result in SACEUR being charged formally with working out the modalities of co-operation with all concerned. Meanwhile, the corps headquarters is in the process of being established in Strasbourg where two Spanish army officers are now also present as the precursor for likely Spanish participation. Belgium should also declare its intention to take part once the formal relationship with WEU and NATO is established. France has given further details regarding the formation of the Eurocorps: "The decision to set up a European corps, announced on 14th October 1991 by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, then confirmed in La Rochelle with the adoption of the report and time-table submitted by the defence ministers, is seen to be the logical follow-up to this overall political approach. It foreshadows European integration in defence matters, and, being multinational and having a flexible organisation, it is adapted to the new strategic context. >From the outset, France and Germany opened the project to participation by any other WEU member states so wishing. Advance officers from countries that are the most interested, e.g. Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, are henceforth invited to take part in the work of the corps headquarters in Strasbourg. This corps, the joint instrument of the governments of participating nations, is under the command of a staff officer and is to allow Europe to have its own military capability. Its creation shows the will of participating states, in the framework of a European Union that will eventually include a joint defence policy, to assume their security and peace-keeping responsibilities jointly and by common agreement. Its missions are as follows: - joint defence of the allies, in application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, or Article V of the Brussels Treaty; - keeping and restoring peace; - humanitarian action, particularly disaster and famine relief, assistance to refugees and evacuation operations in crisis areas. The European Corps has a multinational headquarters of mainly ground forces, but with air and naval components, and a number of national units (with the exception, however, of the Franco- German brigade) which are assigned to it as a matter of priority. In any event, they remain in a central chain of command. The range of possibilities for the use of the European Corps may allow it to be deployed in very different frameworks, either under the aegis of WEU or as a special contribution to NATO. It may also be the preferred structure for conducting a peace- keeping action in the framework of the United Nations, be it inside or outside Europe. Today, it is a Franco-German initiative that is being worked out, but the philosophy underlying this project encourages the integration of components from other countries, either within the headquarters or as additional units. The time-table for setting it up is as follows: - July 1992 to June 1994: progressive build-up of the bi- or multinational headquarters, which will be fully operational in July 1994. The first general commanding the European Corps will take up his duties in October 1993; - October 1993 to September 1995: French and German units composing the corps will be assigned progressively. The following are already earmarked: the Franco-German brigade, the first armoured division stationed in Germany and the equivalent of a German division that still has to be determined; - 1st October 1995: the European Corps, or at least the French and German units assigned to it, will be finally created and available operationally. As the first European multinational unit, this corps will be able to give WEU the military means it now lacks. It is the first demonstration of a will for joint defence alongside and not in opposition to NATO. Further multinational (in particular naval or air) units might be envisaged subsequently." It will be seen from the above remarks that we are in a period of consolidation of the operational arrangements for the WEU in the aftermath of the Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations. The bulk of initiative has concerned the crisis in former Yugoslavia and it is to consideration of such practical aspects that your Rapporteur wishes to devote part two of the present report. IV. Recommendations and responses (i) Recommendation 519 on the application of United Nations Resolution 757 The draft recommendations were proposed by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee(7) and adopted during the special debate devoted to the Yugoslav crisis on Tuesday 2nd June 1992. The recommendation reads: "The Assembly, (i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511 and 512 on the Yugoslav crisis; (ii) Anxious that the peoples concerned should no longer be exposed to the terrible suffering which is currently prevailing, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia; (iii) Wholeheartedly endorsing United Nations Resolution 757 voted in the Security Council on Saturday, 30th May 1992; (iv) Determined to ensure that the trade and oil embargo designed to bring Serbia and Montenegro to realise the errors of their actions should prove effective; (v) Strongly supporting the WEU Secretary-General's appeal for European action and calling for the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL Take immediate steps to invoke Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and prepare appropriate action by WEU states to help apply United Nations Resolution 757. Further measures should be considered if Resolution 757 does not have the desired effect; Take immediate initiatives to ensure that war criminals will be judged following the guidelines of the proposal of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of May 1992." The Council met on the Petersberg near Bonn on 19th June, as already mentioned, and, after underlining the extreme urgency of humanitarian assistance, principally to the Bosnian people, and the need to establish a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its surroundings, particularly the airport so that it might be reopened, expressed its support for the active participation of member states in this operation in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 758. The ministers also declared that WEU was prepared, within the limit of its possibilities, to help ensure effective implementation of Security Council resolutions relating to the Yugoslav conflict. To this end, the Ad Hoc Group of representatives of foreign and defence ministries was instructed to study specific aspects of the task. The Ad Hoc Group met in Rome on 3rd July 1992 and the incoming Presidency of the WEU Council (Italy) acted swiftly in deciding to call an extraordinary meeting on 10th July 1992 in the wings of the Helsinki CSCE Summit. (ii) Extraordinary meeting of WEU Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia (Helsinki, 10th July 1992) The following text was issued at the conclusion of the extraordinary meeting: "The ministers of the WEU countries, having taken note of the report of the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, adopted the following decisions: 1. Decision to implement the monitoring at sea operations as proposed by the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia at its meeting of 3rd July in Rome. Surveillance of the embargo set by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 will involve the participation of at least five to six ships, four MPA, one support ship, ground base helicopters. Such surveillance will be carried out in international waters, in the Otranto Channel and on other points off the Yugoslav coast, including off the Montenegro coast, following consultations with UNPROFOR. - The said naval operations will start at the earliest moment under Italian co-ordination. The participation of the member states will be subject to the provisions of their national constitutions. These WEU operations will be open to the participation of other allies and co-ordinated in co-operation with NATO. Rules of engagement and operational co-ordination will be established by the competent naval authorities at the initiative of the Presidency. - The ad hoc group will constantly update options concerning naval embargo enforcement for which a further United Nations Security Council resolution would be necessary. 2. Decision on WEU efforts in the field of humanitarian aid on the basis of the recommendations of the ad hoc group. - The presidency will present an inventory of contributions by WEU partners to the competent United Nations authorities. - The presidency is also requested to promote a further rapid exploration by the ad hoc group on the options of ground transport through humanitarian corridors. - In this context the ad hoc group will identify possible modalities and list logistical and other means that partners would be willing to make available. The group will also consider, in consultation with NATO, the need for contributions by other allies. - Any operation concerning the establishment of humanitarian corridors would have to be subject to further decisions by the Security Council and be co-ordinated with the United Nations in particular for the aspects concerning protection. Appropriate contacts would be established in a timely fashion. - Co-ordination with United Nations, UNCHR and EC Commission, through the Presidency will also aim at identifying additional needs of the populations and ways to meet them more effectively. 3. Immediate information on our initiatives will be passed to the United Nations Secretary-General and to the Chairman-in- Office of the CSCE." Your Rapporteur would draw colleagues' attention to one particular phrase which acquires some significance below: "The Ad Hoc Group will constantly update options concerning naval embargo enforcement for which a further United Nations Security Council resolution would be necessary." (emphasis added). On the same day, subsequent to the WEU Council meeting, the North Atlantic Council, in ministerial session also in Helsinki, took the following decisions: "Ministers - agreed on a NATO maritime operation, drawing on Stanavformed and other assets as appropriate, to monitor compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 in co-ordination and co-operation with the operation decided by WEU. The participation of the member states will be subject to the provisions of their national constitutions; - agreed that practical details and modalities to implement the decision by Ministers should be worked out by NATO Military Authorities, in co-ordination with those of WEU, for decision by the appropriate fora." The result was that a series of operations began in July in the Adriatic in an effort to enforce the United Nations embargo, such as it was. From 16th July, a WEU flotilla alternated in the southern and centre part of the Adriatic with ships of NATO's recently-formed Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. American ships from the 6th Fleet (under national command) also sailed into the area to provide communications facilities and radar surveillance for the aircraft taking part in humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo. (iii) Fact-finding in the Adriatic area (24th-27th August 1992) Your Rapporteur accompanied the Chairman of the Defence Committee to Italy on 24th August 1992. After briefings in the Ministry of Defence and at naval headquarters, the delegation flew to Brindisi to embark successively in the Italian frigate Scirocco, in command of the WEU flotilla, the German frigate, Niedersachsen, which was part of the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean with a Turkish Commander, and thence to the American aircraft carrier, USS Saratoga. We also met the Commanders of the Spanish and Portuguese ships taking part in the WEU force and flew over the area in an Italian maritime patrol Atlantic. After briefings in Cagliari, in Sardinia, where we met the German maritime patrol crews, the team returned to Rome for discussions. Main impressions gained from the visit were: - Embargo at sea: exellent organisation by the Italian Navy. Good co-operation with NATO and United States national authorities. Some duplication: e.g. no real need for NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic to relieve Stanavformed - WEU could have helped. - Command and control: good. - Rules of engagement: clear and simple. - Need for: (a) better cost-sharing arrangement; (b) all WEU countries to participate in one way or another. Above all, however, it was obvious that the embargo was certainly not being applied as it had been during the Gulf crisis, which is where the Council's opinion on the need for a further United Nations Security Council resolution for embargo enforcement becomes germane. As a result of the study-visit, the Chairman of the Defence Committee recommended a strengthening of the embargo and its rigorous application and this call was echoed by the WEU Council meeting at the end of the London Conference on Yugoslavia on Friday 28th August. The Council also considered the options for action agreed by the Ad Hoc Group which had met in Rome on 24th August. The communiques issued after the two meetings read as follows: "Communique issued after the meeting of the WEU ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia (Rome, 24th August 1992) The WEU ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, composed of senior officials of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence, met in Rome on 24th August to study the report drawn up by the contingency planning group set up at the previous meeting to prepare options for decisions by the Council of Ministers. The latter is to meet in London on 28th August next and will be attended by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence. This will be the first concrete action taken following the conference on Yugoslavia. The operational hypotheses worked out and discussed in the ad hoc Group relate to the problem of humanitarian convoys in the context of Security Council Resolution 770 and the question of monitoring heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The speed and efficiency with which the contingency planning group managed to work out options considered appropriate by all the partners reflect the solidarity in WEU, the determination to take joint action and the attention each one accords to the need to facilitate the granting of speedy assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One should view in the same spirit the timeliness with which all partners indicated that they were prepared to make practical contributions. At the meeting of the Ministerial Council, it is planned to adopt final decisions on the contributions of the various member countries intended to facilitate the achievement of the aims of the United Nations and to instruct the Italian presidency to present to the United Nations Secretary-General the result of the planning work accomplished and the means made available by the member countries in order to allow the implementation of the measures envisaged in relation to the various problems." "Communique issued after the meeting of the extraordinary Council of Ministers (London, 28th August 1992) 1. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU member states met in London on 28th August 1992 following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia. They expressed their firm conviction that the principles agreed at that conference should provide the foundations for progress towards a peaceful and just resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they reaffirmed the urgent necessity for the parties involved to cease the fighting and the use of force immediately and strictly respect the agreed cease-fires. They strongly urged all parties involved in the conflict to adhere to the principles through positive actions and to contribute effectively to the implementation of specific decisions also adopted by the London conference. 2. Ministers noted and endorsed the contributions which WEU and its member states were already making and were prepared to make to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia: Delivery of humanitarian assistance The delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina constitutes one of the most immediate requirements for establishing civilised conditions promoting a political solution. Ministers approved the planning carried out by WEU experts covering the protection of humanitarian convoys by military escorts. They welcomed the willingness of the United Nations Secretary-General to recommend to the Security Council that UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina be enhanced to provide such escorts, and expressed the view that humanitarian operations and associated protective support should be organised by the United Nations. They underlined the collective will of the member states of WEU to contribute to such operations by military, logistic, financial and other means and decided to keep the United Nations informed from today of the details of such contributions. The Nine also decided to offer collectively today through the presidency to the United Nations the results of WEU's planning. They asked the Ad Hoc Group and Contingency Planning Group to elaborate further the necessary planning. Supervision of heavy weapons Ministers underlined the importance of the supervision of heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the overall peace process and for alleviating the suffering of the population. The ministers welcomed the conference's decision that all mortars and heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be subject to international supervision and, as a first step, notified to the United Nations within 96 hours, as a prelude to their disengagement from the conflict. WEU member states are willing to contribute to carrying out supervision operations under the overall responsibility of the United Nations and in co- ordination with the CSCE and other organisations. Ministers took note of the planning undertaken by WEU experts and decided to make it available through the Italian presidency to the United Nations Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and the Secretary-General of NATO. Strengthening the embargo Ministers noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia. They welcomed the conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states to contribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible. Member states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. They also support the call by the London conference to the Security Council to consider further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. They also decided that the Ad Hoc Group should continue its work in this field. 3. Ministers decided that the Italian presidency would continue to ensure a full exchange of information and the necessary co- ordination with the other organisations involved (United Nations, EC, NATO and CSCE)." (iv) 3rd September: urgent meeting of the Standing Committee The President of the Assembly called an urgent meeting of the Standing Committee on 3rd September to debate developments. As Rapporteur for the Defence Committee, your Rapporteur was asked to present a report on "WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia" and also to formulate and present appropriate draft recommendations. Against the background of the study-visit to the Adriatic the following recommendations were adopted (comments in brackets): "The Assembly, (i) Acting through an urgent meeting of its Standing Committee; (First time ever the Standing Committee had met: extraordinary procedure, underlining the special urgency.) (ii) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511, 512 and 519 which have all sought to prompt specific WEU action to help resolve the Yugoslav crisis; (As the Yugoslav crisis has unfolded the Assembly has suggested a series of actions to the Council: some of these ideas have been examined seriously, others ignored. The Council should re-examine all the Assembly's ideas, many of which are now even more appropriate than when originally suggested.) (iii) Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713, 757, 770 and 771; (713 and 757 are United Nations Resolutions setting up the present embargo on Serbia and Montenegro; 770 authorises the use of force to permit access by humanitarian convoys; 771 institutes the notion of war crimes which will be tried by a special court (c.f. Mr. Feldmann's amendment to Assembly Recommendation 519 in June 1992.) (iv) Welcoming the progress made as a result of the London Conference but saddened that in spite of many attempts, in varying bodies, to find a political solution to the crisis, the suffering of the peoples concerned is intensifying to a devastating degree, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia where Dubrovnik is still being shelled nightly; (The London Conference was the last in a series of attempts to find a political solution to the crisis. In spite of all the words and pious expressions of intent, real people are still dying every day. The media is concentrating on Bosnia (Sarajevo) but conflict is still intense around Dubrovnik, Mosta... (WEU ships and aircraft watch nightly bombardment of Dubrovnik - powerless to intervene.).) (v) Regretting that the United Nations embargo on Serbia and Montenegro is not being applied effectively, except at sea; (The only concerted action to apply the United Nations embargo is at sea. The WEU/NATO surveillance operation is effective in that no merchant ship entering or leaving a Montenegro port is unchallenged. To date: c. 1 700 challenges c. 17 violations c. 12 suspicious ships Although the embargo is not yet a blockade, the information gathered on embargo-breaking is very important and would prove invaluable in applying a Gulf-type operation.) (vi) Congratulating the Italian presidency of WEU for its initiatives in convening an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting in London on 28th August, as requested on behalf of the Assembly by its President, and approving the communique issued which offers the United Nations assistance in delivering humanitarian aid, in the supervision of heavy weapons and in strengthening the embargo; (Congratulations to the President of the Assembly for requesting an emergency meeting of the Council of Ministers. Congratulations to the Italian Presidency for responding. Approval of the WEU ministerial communique which offers assistance to the United Nations under three headings: 1. Delivering humanitarian aid - the provision of military escorts for humanitarian convoys. WEU states would contribute "military, logistic, financial and other means". WEU's planning to be made available to the United Nations (as after Metz planning meeting in October 1991 with regard to Croatia and Slovenia). 2. Supervision of heavy weapons WEU states willing to help carry out supervision operations under the overall responsibility of the United Nations and in co-ordination with the CSCE and "other organisations", WEU planning to be made available to the United Nations, CSCE and NATO. (Note: 1 and 2 refer to operations where WEU forces would be under direct United Nations command.) 3. Strengthening the embargo. WEU willingness to help strengthen the embargo, both at sea and on land, especially offering expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube, riparian states. WEU planning to continue in the Ad Hoc Group. (Note: WEU forces here are under WEU opcon (operational control).) (vii) Pleased that a majority of WEU countries are contributing forces for Operation "Sharp Vigilance" and are prepared to make forces available to support United Nations efforts in Bosnia- Herzegovina, but also hoping for a more equitable cost-sharing agreement between member countries; (Hitherto, WEU nations contributing forces are: - Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom - naval forces; - Italy, Germany, France and the Netherlands - maritime air patrol; - France and the United Kingdom - AWACS (national command). (Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom also contributing to NATO forces.) At present there is no specific cost-sharing agreement on a WEU basis: unfair for burden to fall on only some countries who contribute forces. Ideally costs should be shared on the normal WEU basis.) (viii) Welcoming the North Atlantic Council's decision to make NATO's logistical infrastructure available to co-operate in WEU action in the framework of United Nations Security Council directives and also welcoming offers by the United States; (The North Atlantic Council is reported to have offered logistical support for operations - important for WEU to use the organic link with NATO in the modified Brussels Treaty.) URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 1. Seek immediate United Nations approval to impose a complete and total land, air and sea blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, the cessation of all financial, economic and other international assistance and the exclusion of Serbia and Montenegro from all international organisations until such time as they comply completely with all United Nations resolutions and the decisions of the London Conference; (A blockade on Serbia and Montenegro is necessary, both on land and at sea to support the embargo. Strict parallel with the embargo versus Iraq. Action in the United Nations needed now, to convince Serbia that the London agreement must be respected in order to avoid potential isolation.) 2. Respond favourably to Romanian requests for help in policing the border with Serbia and help to establish similar arrangements with other neighbouring countries in the region; (Romania has already made a demarche with WEU, EC, etc., asking for help in policing its border with Serbia. EC has responded proposing a number of observers. Opportunity here for WEU nations, which might not be willing to send forces to Bosnia, to take part in enforcing the embargo. Direct offers by WEU should also be made to Bulgaria and Hungary.) 3. Insist that Greece give the necessary assurances of total compliance with the United Nations embargo before continuing the present negotiations for WEU membership; (Greece appeared ambiguous on applying the embargo: - in spite of a Greek warship in the Stanavformed and a Greek maritime patrol aircraft searching for ships violating the embargo it is known for certain that at least one Greek merchant ship visited a Montenegrin port recently; - trucks were reportedly plying across the Greek border with very little control on cargo or final destination. Greece should be above suspicion as a NATO member and applicant for WEU. The Council should seek assurances before continuing the present membership negotiations.) 4. Offer to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to keep WEU forces available to the United Nations under European command and operational control in order to maintain cohesion and to carry out Resolution 770 effectively, and in close co- ordination with the United Nations; (The Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council has announced that WEU forces for Bosnia will be made available to the United Nations and used as the United Nations sees fit. WEU forces are likely to be dispersed piecemeal therefore. Recent events have shown that some United Nations commanders lack the experience necessary in such a situation... It would surely be better to try and maintain European cohesion and complementarity by operating our forces as a whole, under WEU command, with the United Nations as an umbrella organisation.) 5. Ensure that the WEU military planning cell is fully operational when established on 1st October 1992 in order to play a specific role in the present crisis; (The WEU military planning cell was to be established from 1st October. Eventually it will be in the same building in Brussels as the Secretary-General. It has a role to play now and should be operational as soon as possible: maybe in Rome, co-located with the WEU military experts group?) 6. Institute a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters and appropriate commands and also with the relevant United States authorities to help promote efficient and cost-effective co-operation and to avoid duplication of effort; (The modified Brussels Treaty contains an article, Article IV which provides for an organic link with NATO. This link must be invoked and a formal liaison established between WEU and NATO - even to the extent of forming joint planning groups. Liaison with United States forces also should be formalised and upgraded (e.g. United States offers to WEU in Adriatic). Duplication of effort is not common sense, is costly and does nothing for the reputation of any organisation.) 7. Prepare, in conjunction with other bodies, the future military requirements which may become necessary should Serbia not respect the London engagements and, in particular, study the need to: (The aim of this recommendation is to ensure that WEU is ready to lend further support to the United Nations, if necessary, should Serbia not respect the engagements made at the London Conference.) (a) develop the alternative options for action considered on 28th August; (Ministers were presented with a series of options on 28th August. They chose the most basic and probably the least effective: 5 000 extra troops at the United Nations's disposal. Option two would have involved 11 500-13 000 troops under WEU command to carry out specific tasks in support of United Nations humanitarian operations. Such an option would imply a higher level of equipment, air cover also and probably greater efficiency and concentration of effort by WEU forces as well as enhanced morale.) (b) plan appropriate anti-submarine and mine-hunting operations in the Adriatic; (At present there is little threat of mining or submarine operations from what is left of the "Yugoslav" Navy, but they have a definite capability and we should be prepared.) (c) ensure air superiority in the area of operations and if necessary an air exclusion zone; (d) take steps to ensure sufficient air protection for WEU forces made available to the United Nations; (Air cover and therefore air superiority will be vital in support of land operations in Bosnia: we should not tackle the task without air cover (which could be easily provided in area from land or sea platforms). Maybe also an air exclusion zone over Bosnian airspace would be the best solution, as presently over Southern Iraq.) (e) confine all naval assets based in Kotor and Bar; (The easiest way to neutralise "Yugoslav" naval assets is probably to confine them to port - which should be possible with the very minimum of allied naval co-operation.) (f) develop electronic counter-measures (ECM) to best effect and, more specifically, jam and neutralise military communications as well as fire control systems; (Not enough apparent consideration has been given to electronic counter-measures which could be used to jam military communications and the fire control systems, for example, of hostile missiles, artillery, etc.) (g) provide military hospital facilities in the region for the treatment of the wounded, both service and civilian, and organise facilities for refugees; (There is a growing need for hospital facilities in the former Yugoslavia. All our countries could help with such a purely humanitarian task, even if they cannot provide military forces, per se. Mobile military hospitals could be established in Bosnia, Croatia, even in neighbouring countries. Some possess large hospital ships, or ships which might be used temporarily to house refugees many of whom will need special help before winter arrives.) 8. Invite non-member nations to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU assets; (Some countries, Canada and Czechoslovakia (in spite of problems at home) have offered support to WEU in the past. Any such offers should be encouraged to ensure a truly multinational and international approach. Those countries with aspirations to join WEU or become associate members should be urged to identify with and actively support WEU action.) 9. Examine action to be taken, including military action, not only to stop present fighting but also to prevent present conflicts spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia and, in conjunction with the CSCE, consider the timely deployment of protective forces." (The greatest danger now is that present conflicts may spread to other parts of the former Yugoslavia. The CSCE has decided to send long-term missions to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. WEU should monitor developments and be ready, in conjunction with the CSCE, to support the timely deployment of protective forces.) Reactions to Recommendation 525 The major reaction, to recommendation 3, came initially from the Greek authorities in the form of letters addressed to the President of the Assembly, to the Chairman of the Defence Committee and also to your Rapporteur. The letter to the Chairman of the Defence Committee contained a number of assurances of Greek compliance with the embargo. It is not known whether the Greek Government gave specific assurances also to the WEU Council: enquiries are continuing. It would have been useful to discuss this particular point with Greek parliamentarians and your Rapporteur would urge that the subject be raised during the next plenary session. In the light of the Greek reaction your Rapporteur put the following Written Question to the Council on 14th September 1992: "Written Question 304 With reference to the selective embargo on Serbia and Montenegro decided in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757, to ask the Council: (a) to list all those vessels challenged by WEU and other forces in the Adriatic and which are known to have called at Montenegrin harbours, giving details of their port of registry, provenance and declared destination and, where possible, also the cargo carried; (b) to report what action has been taken to alert the United Nations authorities to any apparent breach of the embargo at sea; (c) to inform the Assembly of approaches made to WEU by Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania concerning the application of the embargo on the various relevant land boundaries and the response given." The Council's replies to Recommendation 519 and Recommendation 525 were sent to the Assembly on 16th October 1992. They read as follows: "Reply of the Council to Recommendation 519 1. Meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers adopted a declaration on the Yugoslav crisis in which ministers expressed the determination of their states "to abide fully by the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 and to implement comprehensively the sanctions which it contains. In this connection, they noted that the United Nations Security Council has decided to consider immediately, whenever necessary, further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Security Council, based inter alia on Part VII of the United Nations Charter." Furthermore, "Ministers declared that WEU is prepared, within the bounds of its possibilities, to contribute towards effective implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They charged an ad hoc group composed of representatives from foreign affairs and defence ministries to examine WEU's possibilities to contribute to the implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions." In accordance with decisions taken at the WEU Ministerial meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, the ad hoc Group on the former Yugoslavia met in London at the WEU Secretariat-General on 26th June 1992 to examine ways of contributing to the implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and further steps the Security Council might take to achieve a peaceful solution. Subsequently, two groups of military experts met in Rome to consider requirements for possible naval measures in support of the United Nations embargo and other sanctions, as well as possible WEU contributions in support of United Nations humanitarian efforts in Sarajevo. On 3rd July 1992, both groups reported back to a session of the ad hoc Group. On 10th July 1992, in the margins of the CSCE Helsinki summit, an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers was held on the situation in Yugoslavia. WEU ministers, having taken note of the report of the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, decided to implement the operations of monitoring at sea, as proposed by the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia at its Rome meeting of 3rd July. Furthermore, ministers adopted a decision on WEU humanitarian aid efforts on the basis of the recommendations of the ad hoc group. The implementation of the operation of monitoring at sea started immediately after the extroardinary WEU Council of Ministers in Helsinki. They are conducted in close co- ordination with NATO forces. The foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states met in London on 28th August 1992 following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia. They expressed their "firm conviction" that "the principles agreed at that conference should provide the foundations for progress towards a peaceful and just resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they reaffirmed the urgent necessity for the parties involved to cease the fighting and the use of force immediately and strictly respect the agreed ceasefires. They strongly urged all parties involved in the conflict to adhere to the principles through positive actions and to contribute effectively to the implementation of specific decisions also adopted by the London conference". On 28th August 1992, ministers noted and endorsed the contributions which WEU and its member states were already making and were prepared to make to the United Nations efforts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia, in the following fields: delivery of humanitarian assistance, supervision of heavy weapons and strenthening the embargo. As regards the strengthening of the embargo, ministers noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be "an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia". They welcomed the conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states "to contribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible". Member states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. Ministers also supported the call by the London conference to the Security Council to consider further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. Furthermore, ministers decided that the ad hoc group should continue its work in this field. The texts of the communiques of the extraordinary meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia were officially transmitted to the Assembly. Whenever appropriate, the Assembly will continue to be regularly informed on the implementation of the relevant ministerial decisions. Developments in the Yugoslav crisis will remain on the agenda of the Council and its working groups. 2. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request in the second paragraph of the recommendation. It wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that - in their strong condemnation of the unacceptable policies of ethnic cleansing and forced expulsions in former Yugoslavia - senior members of governments of individual WEU member states have deemed it appropriate to speak in favour of international sanctions for the perpetrators of war crimes in the context of the conflict in former Yugoslavia." "Reply of the Council to Recommendation 525 1. Meeting in London on 28th August 1992 following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be "an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia". They welcomed the conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states "to contribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible". Ministers also supported the call by the London conference to the Security Council to consider further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. Furthermore, ministers decided that the ad hoc group should continue its work in this field. 2. At that same meeting, ministers agreed that member states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. As such requests would be of a civilian nature, they would not, however, concern WEU as such. They could be better handled in other frameworks, such as the EC or the CSCE. 3. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 525. 4. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 4 of Recommendation 525. It recalls that on 28th August 1992, WEU ministers approved the planning carried out by WEU experts covering the protection of humanitarian convoys by military escorts. They welcomed the willingness of the United Nations Secretary-General to recommend to the Security Council that UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina be enhanced to provide such escorts, and expressed the view that humanitarian operations and associated protective support should be organised by the United Nations. They underlined the collective will of the member states of WEU to contribute to such operations by military, logistic, financial and other means and decided to keep the United Nations informed from that day of the details of such contributions. The Nine also decided to offer collectively, through the presidency, to the United Nations the results of WEU's planning. They asked the ad hoc Group and Contingency Planning Group to elaborate further the necessary planning. 5. At present, the Council does not foresee a "specific role in the present crisis" in the former Yugoslavia for the WEU planning cell. 6. In its reply to the Assembly's suggestion for instituting "a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters and appropriate commands and also with the relevant United States authorities to help promote effecient and cost-effective co-operation and to avoid duplication of effort", the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to paragraph 3 of the communique of the WEU extraordinary Council of Ministers of 28th August 1992. Paragraph 3 reads: "Ministers decided that the Italian presidency would continue to ensure a full exchange of information and the necessary co-ordination with the other organisations involved (United Nations, EC, NATO and CSCE)." 7. Measures and options such as those listed in paragraph 7 of Recommendation 525, could be prepared by WEU and other bodies, if and when deemed necessary. 8. In principle, invitations to non-member states "to co- operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU assets" can be extended by the Council on a case-by-case basis. 9. The Council is fully aware of the risk of the present conflict in the former Yugoslavia spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia. In the opinion of the Council, any "examination of action to be taken, including military action", as well as "the timely deployment of protective forces" is best undertaken in the larger framework of the United Nations." Aid to Danube riparian states In the Council's answers to both Recommendations 519 and 525 it is stressed that "They (Ministers) agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be "an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia"". But the Council included a further comment in its reply to Recommendation 525 "As such requests would be of a civilian nature, they would not, however, concern WEU as such. They could be better handled in other frameworks, such as the EC or the CSCE". Why should this be? The Assembly's Standing Committee had urged the Council to "respond favourably to Romanian requests for help in policing the border with Serbia" (much of which is coincident with the Danube) "and help to establish similar arrangements with other neighbouring countries in the region". Was it this demarche by Romania which had given the Council second thoughts? Stranger still is the Council's reply to Written Question 304 (communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1992): "Reply of the Council to Written Question 304 1. The Council regrets that it cannot comply with the request made in paragraph (a) of Written Question 304, as the relevant data is classified. However, the Council would like to take the opportunity to inform the Assembly that, as of 15th September 1992, WEU and NATO forces in the Adriatic had challenged 2161 vessels in implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. Of these, 32 were suspected of violating the embargo. 2. The WEU Presidency is keeping the competent United Nations authorities informed about the progress of operation sharp vigilance. 3. As of 15th September 1992, there had been no official approaches to the WEU Council "by Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania concerning the application of the embargo on the various land boundaries"." To begin with, the Council says that the information on the ships suspected of breaking the embargo in the Adriatic is classified. Surely it is in the interests of all who wish to see the embargo properly applied that details of probable violations are published? In addition, your Rapporteur finds it somewhat strange that lists which were hitherto unclassified should now prove so difficult to consult. Has the classification been applied by WEU or by NATO or by the United Nations? And for what reason? In addition, the Council goes on to say that Romania had not made an official approach concerning the application of the embargo... The next study-visit by the Chairman of the Defence Committee and your Rapporteur was therefore to Romania (from 11th to 15th October 1992). Romanian efforts to apply the embargo The various Danube conventions dating mainly from the 1920s established a certain measure of freedom of navigation on the Danube which has the status of an international waterway. The situation regarding transit is somewhat similar to that on the high seas and the faithful reader will remember from what precedes that the WEU Council was of the opinion that a further United Nations Security Council resolution was necessary before the embargo might be applied any more stringently in the Adriatic. Some of our member countries, however, and others have told Romania and Bulgaria that they should give United Nations Resolution 757 precedence over the Danube Convention: in other words expecting the Romanians to enforce the present embargo on the Danube to a greater extent than we ourselves are prepared to do in the Adriatic. The Romanian Foreign Office has sought clarification from the United Nations itself, but at the time of writing no definite answer had been received. Fortunately, the CSCE's Committee of Senior Officials has stepped into the fray and meeting on 18th September had this to announce: "Sanctions monitoring The Committee of Senior Officials notes with satisfaction the steps taken by the international community to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions. However, practical problems are being encountered by the neighbouring states in the enforcement of these sanctions, particularly transit traffic. In order to assist the neighbouring states in overcoming these special problems, the CSO urges all participating states to take necessary measures to ensure strict compliance with the sanctions in this respect. The CSO takes note of the decisions of the London Conference on the former Yugoslavia concerning the implementation of sanctions and endorses the establishment of sanctions assistance missions in all states neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro. The London Conference has invited the EC and the CSCE to co-ordinate these activities. The governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania have invited experts to provide advice on ways of overcoming difficulties in the application of the sanctions. Officials from the EC presidency and other CSCE states have participated in preliminary fact-finding missions to these countries. The CSO welcomes the intention of participating states to organise similar fact-finding missions to the other neighbouring states. The CSO decides to endorse the plan drawn up by the United Kingdom/European Community in close co-ordination with the United States of America and other CSCE participating states. This plan calls for the establishment initially in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania as early as possible of sanctions assistance missions to assist the governments of these states in the implementation of sanctions. The status of these missions will be defined in Memoranda of Understanding agreed with the host governments as soon as possible. Similar sanctions assistance missions will be established in countries neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro that may also be experiencing problems in implementation of sanctions." CSCE sanctions monitoring On the Danube, the Defence Committee Delegation discussed the embargo with the United States customs officers who are already co-operating with Romanian customs officials under CSCE auspices. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur feels that the Romanians should have received a reply to their demarche which was addressed to WEU in preference to any other organisation (NATO, NACC, etc.), especially in view of the Council's apparent offer to Danube riparian states as well as in the context of the newly-formed (19th June) Forum for Consultation with Central European states. This being said, the WEU Council has been instrumental in trying to ensure that a number of the Assembly's recommendations are implemented without delay. From Recommendation 525 the Council has: - urged a stronger embargo (thus far without success); - sought air cover for United Nations operations likely to involve WEU forces (United Nations Resolution 781 goes some way to creating a "no fly zone" but not as far as one would wish). Direct contact is now in place between WEU and the United States authorities to explore other air defence possibilities; - sought to keep WEU forces under a European Commander within the aegis of the United Nations. General Morillon (France) will now have British, Canadian and Spanish forces under his command as well as French plus a number of units from Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal. These forces are being deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina for humanitarian reasons. They are likely to be extremely vulnerable unless their rules of engagement allow a strong response to any aggression. Depending on the way the situation evolves, the Council should be ready to propose additional measures to the United Nations if necessary. V. Conclusion Given the continuing developments in the Yugoslav crisis, the recommendations formulated by your Rapporteur today may well be overtaken by events tomorrow. Which is why the present recommendations will probably have to be updated before being debated in plenary session in the first week of December. Of course, we may hope for a breakthrough in the talks which continue in Geneva under the aegis of Lord Owen and Mr. Vance but we have been disappointed so many times now by the intransigence of one or other party engaged in this war or by the lies told in order to obtain yet more time to kill and maim. It is obvious that WEU, like the United Nations or NATO is only the sum of its parts - in other words, our governments will only decide to participate in any given action on largely national criteria, in spite of moves towards a common European foreign and security policy at Maastricht. None of our organisations is supranational and all have special viewpoints on what may or may not be achieved. The United Nations, in spite of a series of appropriately partisan Security Council resolutions, still seems to wish to remain "non-aligned" in the present crisis and has demonstrated the serious disadvantages of such an attitude which has been bred through countless blue beret peace-keeping operations. Such operations have tended, however, to include very little military action per se, such as that experienced by the Western European nations in recent years. NATO has been largely paralysed, partly because of its changing but still embryonic organisation for the post-Cold War era, partly because traditional attitudes (such as a tendency to over-react in numerical terms) have been slow to change, but primarily because of a lack of specific leadership: the United States has been largely "otherwise engaged" throughout the Yugoslav crisis. Will the situation change after the United States presidential election? In fact the operations being conducted in former Yugoslavia are much less reminiscent of the vast set battle long-cherished by NATO and Warsaw Pact planners than they are of, say, Chad or Djibouti, where French forces have become expert at trying to keep the various warring factions apart. It is probably no coincidence therefore that French forces make up the largest contingent currently taking part in United Nations operations. In the present set of draft recommendations, the Rapporteur is seeking to develop those which he formulated for the Standing Committee and which were adopted as Recommendation 525. (i) The set of recommendations recalled are: - 506 (on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis); - 512 (on operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis); - 519 (on the application of United Nations Resolution 757); - 525 (on WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia). All sought to prompt the WEU Council and member countries to help solve the Yugoslav crisis. (ii) All relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions are endorsed: - 713 (Arms embargo, peacekeeping force); - 757 (Application of the embargo); - 770 (Humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Herzegovina); - 771 (Detention camps in former Yugoslavia); - 781 (Ban on military flights in Bosnia-Herzegovina). (iii) It appears that a political solution to the crisis is as distant, if not even further away, than previously. What is imminent is the onset of winter - a thin layer of snow was already present in parts of Romania just across the border from Serbia when your Rapporteur visited the area in mid-October. The implications are obvious. (iv) There has been a tendency to sit back of late and think that the search for a solution in the former Yugoslavia may be left to others. Your Rapporteur believes that there is now room for a specific initiative by WEU in co-operation with the principal organisations, but particularly in the Forum for Consultation with the Central European states, some of which as "neighbours", are the most immediately affected. (v) As a result of Recommendation 525, it appeared that the WEU Council was adamant in pushing for reinforcement of the present embargo. Unfortunately the idea was not followed through and as a result the fighting continues unabated. It is now evident, for example, that large amounts of fuel are reaching Serbia: the price of a litre of petrol has reportedly dropped from 3.50 DM to 1 DM over the past two weeks. The embargo needs reinforcing, even to the extent of preventing transit through "third party" states or on the Danube. (vi) Through their actions thus far both the Council and the Italian presidency of WEU have maintained the initiative of action on the European side and ensured an unprecedented liaison with the United Nations, CSCE and NATO. The implications for WEU are considerable: the relationship established now will help determine the role to be played in the future. (vii) All WEU member states are contributing in one way or another. Certain nations, such as Italy, are bearing an unfair proportion of the costs and therefore your Rapporteur suggests that a supplementary budget be formulated to take account of present operations. In addition, the Council must determine a budget to enable the planning cell to function correctly. (viii) Most military experts believe that an air defence capability is essential to help protect ground forces. The United Nations resolution on a "no fly zone" (781) does not go far enough to remove the threat of air action against troops present for humanitarian purposes. With a series of air bases across the Adriatic in Italy and even considering recent proposals on aero-naval co-operation WEU would be well-placed to provide efficient air cover. Even more effective would be bilateral co-operation between WEU and the United States in zone - if the necessary political decisions were forthcoming. (ix) Your Rapporteur saw for himself at the end of August the excellent arrangements made to co-ordinate naval and maritime air activities in the Adriatic area. There is no escaping the fact however that some duplication is taking place. The ideal and most cost-effective solution would be to pool resources in as many domains as possible to form composite WEU/NATO forces. (x) Much has been made of current actions "under the WEU flag". What flag? The time has come to identify WEU forces as such when taking part in WEU operations. The Assembly has been instrumental in choosing a logo for itself which might well be adopted for use by the different component parts of WEU - even to the extent of putting a special emblem on all military forces - ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel. The staff of the planning cell should be the first recipients of such a badge. Your Rapporteur trusts that the individual recommendations in the operative text, given the background arguments advanced above, are self-evident. We cannot stop trying to help solve the Yugoslav crisis - our new operational organisation must be developed as a tool to be used to that end as well as for more traditional roles. 1. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions. 2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld- Schlaman, Mr. de Puig (Alternate: Moya) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Brito, Cariglia, Chevalier (Alternate: Sarens), Cox, De Decker, Dees, Durand, Fernandes Marques, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Fourre, Hardy, Irmer, Jung, Kelchtermans, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Marten, Lord Newall (Alternate: Thompson), MM. Pecchioli, Perinat (Alternate: Cuco), Reis Leite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Vazquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer. 3. WEU: the operational organisation, Document 1307, 13th May 1992, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith. 4. European security - reserve forces and national service, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker. 5. Document 1139, 9th May 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson. 6. Document 1332, 23rd October 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. Lopez Henares. 7. The application of United Nations Resolution 757, Document 1319, 2nd June 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer. ------- For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com