a.weu/documents File: 1338defc.ded Document 1338 5th November 1992 European security - reserve forces and national service ______ REPORT (1) submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee (2) by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur ______ TABLE OF CONTENTS DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on European security - reserve forces and national service EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. National service in France, Belgium and the Netherlands (i) France (ii) Belgium (iii) The Netherlands III. NATO's new force structures and the reserves IV. Current reforms (i) Belgium (ii) Canada (iii) France (iv) Germany (v) The Netherlands (vi) Portugal (vii) Spain (viii) Turkey (ix) United Kingdom (x) United States V. The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (the CIOR) (i) NATO relationship (ii) Activities (iii) Organisation (iv) Commissions (v) National Reserve Forces Committee (vi) The CIOMR VI. Conclusion APPENDICES I. The CIOR's country-by-country survey of reserve forces II. National service in countries of the WEU and the North Atlantic Alliance ----------------------- Draft Recommendation on European security - reserve forces and national service The Assembly, Recognising that adequate standing forces must still be maintained to preserve the requirement for defence incumbent in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the more binding modified Brussels Treaty; Conscious that with the ending of East-West conflict in Europe there is a reduced need for sizeable standing and largely conscript armies and that instead, smaller, flexible, mobile and more professional forces are required; Bearing in mind, however, the imperative of maintaining a capability for home defence in Europe which might be increasingly entrusted to reserve forces; Recognising the devotion to duty of the Atlantic Alliance's reserve forces and mindful of the sacrifices made by those who serve in the reserves; Underlining the important liaison role played by reserve forces in linking the armed forces with the civilian population, which strengthens public spiritedness and promotes better understanding in our nations of defence problems; Considering the current debate in many member countries on the relative advantages of conscription vis a vis all-volunteer and professional forces, although aware that the latter are proportionally more costly; Witnessing the general reductions in the length of national service in the majority of member countries, or its abolition, and wishing to highlight the obvious effect on the availability of properly-trained reservists; Determined to promote full and frank debate in WEU on the subject of national service and reserve forces in member countries; Convinced that more coherent arrangements for assuring a cost-effective European security system should be possible, given greater co-operation and consultation between member states, both within WEU and together with the other nations of the Atlantic Alliance and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council; Knowing that the Central European states would welcome the opportunity to discuss matters such as national service and reserve forces; Supporting the efforts of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) to stimulate informed discussion among its members on a wide variety of issues, and hoping that the CIOR will soon include all Atlantic Alliance nations, at least as observers, and liaise with the Central European nations which are full members of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council; Recalling Recommendation 469 adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989; Believing that multinational units such as the Franco-German Brigade serve as a channel for the enthusiasm of those who wish to place their national service in a European context and that the idea of attributing reserve forces for the European Corps provides a further opportunity for integration; Considering the increasingly strong calls by the armed forces for modern, varied technologies enabling them to provide further training, particularly for the volunteers who are required to serve for a long enough period, which will be useful for their subsequent employment as civilians; Asserting that the arrangements for organising and mobilising reserve forces in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland may serve as a future model for both the Western European and especially the Central European states, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL Take every opportunity to ensure that the debate on reserve forces and national service in any member country benefits from a common fund of experience and requirements and include discussion on the subject on the agenda of the next WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting; Stimulate informed debate in member countries on revised roles for reserve forces as well as on reductions in and possible restructuring of national service; Provide a forum for discussion of such matters among member states and also with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and interested Central European states; Strongly encourage WEU countries without volunteer reserve forces to consider the example of those which already possess such an asset which is indispensable for countries abolishing national service and to provide proper equipment and training for the reserves; Explore the idea of creating a European "national guard" for territorial defence, using the reserve forces of WEU member states; Reconsider the Assembly's previous recommendation to "take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult" (Recommendation 469); Give priority to training volunteers who would be asked to form reserve forces whose training would be continued for long enough after their return to civilian life for them to be, if necessary, a useful complement to regular military personnel; Decide to give a symbol of European identity to all forces - ships, aircraft, vehicles and regular and reserve personnel - taking part in WEU operations; Establish and develop a liaison with the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR); Ask the WEU Institute for Security Studies to make a thorough examination of national service and the structure of reserve forces in member states and of the possibilities for co- operation; Invite WEU parliamentarians to participate in discussions on these topics. ------------------------- Explanatory Memorandum (submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur) I. Introduction The Defence Committee has long been interested in the role of the reserve forces and has included regular reference to such forces in its reports. However, the last report dedicated entirely to the subject was reserve forces (Rapporteur: Mr. Delorme) adopted by the Assembly in June 1976 (3). The recommendation makes very interesting reading: "The Assembly, (i) Considering that improved organisation, recruitment and training of reserve forces would allow: (a) a considerable strengthening of the deterrent potential of the field forces of the European armies; (b) European defence to be based to a substantial extent on recourse to the widest possible mobilisation of the people's energies in the event of attack; (ii) Considering that the defence of Europe must not be based solely on nuclear deterrence and a modern and effective field force but must also be ensured by a people's deterrent, expressing the will of the peoples of Europe to remain responsible for their own destinies; (iii) Aware of the importance of the role which reserves can play in strengthening the links between the Eurpoean peoples and their armies, particularly in keeping public opinion better informed about the importance of defence problems; (iv) Underlining the financial advantages of forming large-scale reserves, as opposed to an equivalent active force, when the proportion of national budgets devoted to defence tends to remain constant or even diminish and when personnel costs linked iwth the maintenance of active forces are continuously increasing to the ponit of sometimes jeopardising the implementation of certain equipment programmes; (v) Considering it necessary to harmonise the concepts which govern the organisation of reserves in Europe, in the framework of a common strategy for all the Western European states, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 1. (a) Together with the member states of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU, specify the type of tasks entrusted to the various components of the European defence system: nuclear forces, combat forces, internal defence forces; (b) consequently define requirements in respect of internal defence forces and combat forces with a view to harmonising the concepts of European states in this field; 2. To this end, set up a group of experts consisting of senior defence officials to study measures likely to develop the contribution by reserves to the internal defence of European territory and inter alia consider the possibility of: (a) increasing the number of reservists who could be called up for internal defence, particularly where there is no system of conscription; (b) producing special equipment for reserves for internal defence forces, combining power, simplicity and robustness, and ensuring that it is made available immediately in the event of mobilisation; (c) improving training of reserve officers responsible for commanding the units forming internal defence forces, such trianing to include on the one hand periods of training in active units and on the other hand periods of training together with reservists in the ranks; (d) adapting compulsory military service, where this exists, to the requirements of internal defence and consequently provide for a short but intensive period of active service followed by a number of training periods at regular intervals; (e) organising internal defence forces on a territorial basis by assigning the necessary number of national servicemen and the essential reservists, according to their place of residence; (f) paying reservists undergoing periods of training at an appropriate rate; 3. (a) Study measures likely to increase the availability and effectiveness of reserves for combat forces and inter alia seek means of improving the training of such reserves and the speed and efficiency of their mobilisation; (b) Pay particular attention to the question of the time required for the mobilisation and immediate use of reserve units in the field forces; 4. Consider setting up a European defence college where those responsible for Europe's defence and reserve officers would discuss their experiences and endeavour to define joint principles which might govern the use of reserves in Europe.", and much of the detail is extraordinarily germane even today. An appendix gave details of the balance of forces between the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance and defined the characteristics of land forces in peacetime and their possible strengthening in wartime and the study also gave a forecast of the future shape of war - "attack with or without warning, lightening or long-drawn-out, conventional or nuclear". The situation has of course changed dramatically from that of 16 years ago and the absence of a clear military threat against western interests in Europe has largely undermined hte original requirement for considerable numbers of trained reserves. Even the mobilisation of some 230 000 United States reservists for the Gulf conflict in 1990/91 (only a comparatively small percentage left United States soil and the majority filled billets at home vacated by active personnel) is not considered a sufficient reason for retaining the same sizeable reserves for the future. In the United States, as in the United Kingdom and in Canada, the regular forces are all-volunteer and in general do not produce a great deal of manpower for the reserves in practical terms - the bulk of the reserves are themselves voluntary also. Virtually all other members of the Atlantic Alliance, barring Iceland and Luxembourg, rely on forming their trained reserves by giving their conscripts a reserve commitment at the end of national service. What happens therefore if that period of national service is reduced to the point where no effective training is possible or indeed the national service is abolished? The aim of the present report is therefore twofold: to give an account of the present reserve forces maintained by WEU countries and also to examine the effect on the reserves of reducing or abolishing national service. If at the same time our nations may be incited to debate the matter and even take complementary decisions on future force structures instead of acting always unilaterally then the Assembly's efforts will not have been in vain. II. National service in France, Belgium and the Netherlands Of course national service in most of our countries has fulfilled a number of political and social purposes as well as providing the cheapest way of maintaining large numbers to reinforce the regular army. To examine a number of cases: (i) France France's commitment to maintaining national service for the future, although at a comparatively reduced level, has been restated on a number of occasions, with the last formal restatement of principle occurring in the Prime Minister's speech to the Colloquy on "The new strategic debate" on 1st October. Mr. Beregovoy was adamant that conscription formed part of the natural structure of national life and was unlikely to be abolished in the immediate future. The length of national service in France has been reduced, however, from 12 to 10 months and no national servicemen were allowed to serve as such in either the Gulf conflict or nowadays in the former Yugoslavia: all must sign on for a three-year contract of "long service" if they wish to volunteer for active duty. Another particular complication of national service in France is that nearly one in four of the eligible male population escapes his obligation for one reason or another. On the other hand, it is also possible to do one's national service working for a different ministry than the Defence Ministry: perhaps on a co-operative venture overseas or in a Prefecture or even with the fire brigade (the "sapeurs pompiers"). The latest idea is to spend time helping the socially deprived - an experience which could be of mutual benefit to all concerned. Although the French Government has a particular attachment to the maintenance of conscription, it is in the process of not only modifying the length of national service (now 10 months instead of 12), but also adapting to new conditions: "Conscription is at the heart of our defence options. Our attachment to it is not rooted only in the two century old link - and quite different from the mere financing of the armed forces through taxation -that the nation has managed to maintain with its army thanks to military service. Objective considerations still militate in favour of retaining a large place for conscription in the organisation of our armed forces. The usefulness of military service has been proved This is testified by the participation of national servicemen in several external operations, in particular in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. France's ability to deploy a significant part of its units outside its territory and the development of peace-keeping operations and humanitarian actions are thus based on an essential contribution by conscripts, particularly branches such as emergency medical treatment, logistics, interpretation, etc. Conscription accounts for about 50% of troop levels The foreseeable trend of troop levels in the years ahead should not modify this proportion. Dropping conscription and building up an entirely professional army could only be at the cost of reducing the size of forces. This would no longer allow them to carry out the tasks that our country wishes to assign to them and would reduce the relatively weight of our defence system in Europe. Conscription ensures the diversity and standard of the human resources of our armed forces If we deprive ourselves of this contribution, there would be serious difficulties in recruitment which, in the lower ranks, might draw only those without a place in the economic system. The budgetary aspect can clearly not be concealed The maintenance of an army of conscripts is the only way compatible with the effort to stabilise financial resources earmarked for defence purposes. Apart from the doctrinal considerations underlying our choice, the army has a deep- rooted, lasting need for conscripts, otherwise it will have to pay a very high price for many essential executive and support tasks, and recruit, at market rates, all the specialists it vitally needs in very many sectors, ranging from unusual languages through medicine to electronics. Furthermore, while military service remains overwhelmingly the main form of national service since it accounts for 95% of those called up, the essential role played by the various civil forms in operating public services should not be forgotten: service in the police force, co-operation service, technical assistance in overseas departments and territories and the new civil security service created by the law of 4th January 1992. However, perpetuating conscription in our defence system means two conditions have to be met - equality and universality - as the basis of its acceptance by public opinion. From this point of view, the demographic trend and the adaptation of medical selection standards have allowed the rate of exemption to be reduced to a historically low level of about 18%. This tendency should be extended by a steady effort to terminate inequality between certain forms of national service. Obviously, conscription cannot remain outside the far- reaching changes affecting all the components of our defence. It must also be adapted to become fully integrated in the new organisation that the government is planning. By reducing the period of military service to ten months, the law of 4th January 1992 makes this adaptation and extends it through an ambitious renovation of conditions for carrying out military service, particularly in the army. Thus, the reform of the system of training (abolition of the period of classes, direct incorporation in working units) and adoption of the new concept of differentiated operational availability (a system whereby units immediately available coexist with deferred availability units thanks to the possibility of calling up some national servicemen two months after their demobilisation) guarantee a new place and role for conscription in the country's defence policy." This does not mean that the debate on a professional army is non-existant, quite the contrary in fact and it will probably not be very long before the debate is out in the open again. There is a definite effect on the reserve forces as a result of the shortening of national service: the reserves are given 1/6 less training than previously and this is bound to have a consequence particularly for "high-tech" posts. The cost of training is rising as equipment is subjected to a greater turn- around in use. Some consultation has taken place with the United Kingdom on the formation of voluntary reserves. The French Ministry of Defence has recently announced sweeping changes in the arrangements for constituting reserve forces. Many of these ideas coincide with your Rapporteur's own suggestions and merit further study within WEU and NATO: "Current developments that have led us to carry out major reforms in the armed forces will inevitably have repercussions on our reserve forces. It was therefore essential to draw up a plan to modernise and make reserve forces coherent with the options agreed for active personnel. This plan, the broad lines of which were presented recently by the Secretary of State, is to replace the present system, based on mass recruitment, by a strict organisation corresponding to the operational requirements of the armed forces and of the gendarmerie and adapted to both crisis and war situations. Guidelines Four main guidelines will be followed in implementing this plan, known as 'Reserves 2000': - constructing a general framework within which each service can set up and run its own reserve system adapted to its operational needs, no longer just for wartime but also - and this is a fundamental innovation - for times of crisis. Thus, voluntary reservists might be called up in time of crisis in the light of the needs of the armed forces; - concentrating the efforts of the armed forces and gendarmerie on the 500 000 reservists they effectively need and no longer on the 4 000 000 reservists forming the present mobilisation potential; - ensuring careful administration of these reservists, calling up and training voluntary reserve officers on a more regular basis and guaranteeing them assignments that correspond to their know-how; - making volunteers 'loyal' by giving them a contractual framework to ensure a better follow-up of their training and career in the reserve. The Reserves 2000 plan will be based on three categories of reservists: - those immediately available who might be called up for a period of two to three years after the end of their military service and who will thus already have received instruction and training; - volunteers who would have to provide the major part of reserve officers and non-commissioned officers. As the central element of this reform, volunteers would be given contracts enabling their training and careers to be followed up on a personalised basis; - specialists, i.e. personnel exercising professions in civilian life that are directly transferrable to the armed forces (interpreters, doctors, etc.). They might be recalled when needed in the event of crisis or war. This plan is thus aimed at promoting the notion of voluntary service and concentrating the resources of our armed forces on forming, managing and training reservists according to their needs in time of crisis or war and to those needs only. The Reserves 2000 plan, which will require legislative changes and new regulations, will be implemented progressively through shrewder staff management and an increased effort by the armed forces in favour of their reserves." Your Rapporteur believes that a fine line remains between the length of training received by the average national serviceman and the same man's performance then as a reservist. With the general shortening of lengths of national service in the majority of our countries (see table at Appendix II) sometimes for particular political or economic ends rather than out of concern for efficiency, it is more and more difficult to understand why certain nations do not abolish conscription altogether rather than reduce ad absurdem. That being said, your Rapporteur cannot agree that a decision to abolish conscription with a consequent effect not only on the size of a country's forces but also on the size of its reserves should be taken either lightly or unilaterally. (ii) Belgium The Belgian Defence Minister's recent decision to end conscription by 1994 foreshadows a dramatic reduction in the size of the country's armed forces overall and means that most equipment programmes will have to be re-evaluated. This decision makes Belgium the first country in continental Europe to abandon conscription (although probably not the last). An end to conscription will involve demobilising more than 30 000 billets for conscripts. National service is presently scheduled to end after 1993. Conscripts called up that year will serve for eight months in Belgium or only six months in Germany. Attempts have been made in parliament to set up a special commission to examine the implications inherent in the decision but so far have not met with any success. (iii) The Netherlands In the Netherlands, however, a special consultative commission (the "Dienstplicht" Commission) has been hard at work, weighing up the pros and cons of the professional versus a conscript army. For the present the commission has concluded that national service in the Netherlands should not be abolished but be shortened and made more agreeable. Abolishing military service purely and simply would have the effect of vastly reducing the Dutch army's operational ability, especially of its land forces, as well as its eventual recourse to mobilisable reserves. The commission also pointed out that - independently of problems at constitutional level - passing to a career army entailed great cost. The commission considered that a "radical reform" of military service was needed. It especially pleaded in favour of a flexible length of service, of nine, 12 or 15 months, depending on the function (conscripts within this last category could, for example, be posted to humanitarian missions or "peace-keeping"). The report also comes down in favour of an improvement in the material conditions granted to conscripts (compensation, help in finding work, university enrolment, etc.). III. NATO's new force structures and the reserves Given the alterations in NATO philosophy with the end of the cold war, one might be forgiven for wondering just what reserve forces would be required for within the NATO area. Fortunately, your Rapporteur has had the benefit of expert advice. Writing in the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers' newsletter, Colonel Leon Stenuit of NATO's International Military Staff, has this to say about NATO's new force structures and the reserves: "The new NATO force structure calls for three categories of forces, namely Main Defence Forces, Reaction Forces and Augmentation Forces. Main Defence Forces (MDF) will form the major portion of the force structure and will generally be maintained at lower readiness. However, some MDFs will be kept at high readiness for early defensive operations in a crisis. Reaction Forces (RF) must be capable, versatile, highly mobile and will be maintained at high degrees of readiness with employment options covering all regions of the alliance. They will be divided into Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). They need air, land and maritime components. Augmentation Forces (AF) will provide appropriate strategic and operational reserves not necessarily tied to specific regions. They will be maintained at varying degrees of readiness and will be used where appropriate to reinforce the RFs and the local MDFs. The structure of these forces must be flexible enough to be adapted to the size of the crisis and other factors such as geography and climate. Thus, it may be said that the NATO authorities will have the opportunity to select units from a large menu, depending on the circumstances. This new NATO force structure clearly calls for a greater reliance on force build-up capabilities through reinforcement, reserve mobilisation and reconstitution. The obvious increased importance of reservists will confront all alliance nations with the challenge to develop or improve their reserve organisation. The options chosen will most probably vary from one nation to another, however the common objective must be effectiveness. As the bulk of the forces will rely on reservists, reserve officers will now need to be educated and regularly trained and updated in order to be capable of assuming a larger spectrum of responsibilities. Even high technology equipment and weapon systems will be operated or used by reservists. One can envisage that fighter squadrons could be augmented by reserve pilots, or even as we see already now in the United States, that reserve squadrons could be activated. The same is also valid for ground and naval units equipped with modern and sophisticated equipment. Of course, there is a limit. For example, the time is over when you could simply store or even mothball modern aircraft, and reserve fighter pilots need to fly almost as much as regular pilots. The key issue for the organisation of the forces will be to identify which functions need to be maintained in peacetime in order to allow not only for a timely build-up but also for a continuity training programme that includes the training of reservists and the "maintenance" of equipment (in the broad sense). The question to define if a unit needs to be on "active" or "reserve" status in peacetime is not necessarily dependent upon the timing in which it needs to be ready. Some nations have already developed structures and training programmes that allow for units primarily manned by reservists to be maintained at high readiness. Other nations are in the process of developing similar systems. The percentage of active personnel required will essentially depend upon the type of weapon system and mission. It can be expected that some units will be exclusively manned by reservists, whilst others will only rely on reservists to reach full combat strength or even have no reservists at all. It is well understood that technology and training are essential but not the only matters for consideration during this period of fundamental change in the force structure. Over the years of peace that are hopefully in front of us, the forces will need to maintain their motivation and the required level of expertise in order to be capable when required to assume their tasks. The necessary recall of reservists from civilian life for regular training exercises will be very challenging not only for employers and economic activities in general but also for the armed forces, the reservists and in particular for the reserve officers. The following are a few topics that will need consideration in most NATO countries: - practical arrangements between the ministries of defence and the civilian employers in order to avoid reservists and their employers being professionally and financially penalised; - selective recall of personnel in crisis, which avoid disturbing unnecessarily economic activities; - motivation of reservists through valuable training opportunities; - public support through well-adapted information programmes. These are only a few ideas but it is essential that this fundamental transformation of NATO's force structure be successful. Besides the budgetary benefits that may be expected by governments, the opportunity should not be missed to establish efficient and practical plans to allow capable reserve units to support NATO's strategy.". Of course the restructuring of NATO is not yet fully complete and is bound to have a further effect on the eventual shape of the reserves in years to come. IV. Current reforms For the present, almost every country of the Atlantic Alliance is in the process of modifying the structure of its forces, to a greater or a lesser degree. Current reforms which affect both national service and the reserves are based on the following "snapshot": (i) Belgium In relation to its size Belgium has traditionally had one of the highest ratios of reserve forces of any country of the alliance. The Belgian army can count on 192 000 reservists who can be mobilised. There were traditional tasks to be accomplished: - to complement active units and bring them to full defence strength; - to form two reserve brigades one of which is assigned to the 1st Belgian Corps; - to form the regiments for home defence and also to form a number of specialised units, notably engineering and logistical units. The air force, with a peacetime strength of 17 300, could be augmented with 40 500 reservists if necessary upon mobilisation. The reservists would be required to bring the active air force to full combat strength and have a particular role for airfield defence. For the navy, 12 400 reservists would be available to join a peacetime strength of 4 400. Some billets exist at sea but the majority of reservists would be used for port defence or to take part in the naval control of shipping organisation. Traditionally, a system of conscription provided the opportunity to train a large number of reservists. In common with most countries of the alliance, national service in Belgium was being restructured and it had been planned to reduce from 10 months in Germany and 12 months in Belgium to eight months in Germany and 10 months in Belgium with effect from this year, and to eight months everywhere from the beginning of 1993. International developments and the threat following the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe, the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany and the prospect of the withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Union from Central Europe led the Belgian Government to decide, in July 1992, on a complete restructuring of its armed forces. The future structure takes account of the following principles: - maintenance of three forces (army, air force and navy); - reorganisation of armed forces round a smaller number of units with high technology equipment and capable of deployment at short notice and in various contexts; - reduction in the number of regular servicemen from 48 000 to 40 000; - accentuating the inter-force and inter-army aspects of future operations in the organisation and working of headquarters and lines of command; - retaining only a small reserve; - abolishing military service as from 1994. At the present stage in current studies, the new structures of the regular army have not been defined well enough to be able to express an opinion on the future shape of the reserve. With the termination of national service, it is obvious that the reserve concept will have to be completely revised. (ii) Canada Canada is one of the four NATO nations with voluntary military service and no conscription. The armed forces perform tasks in Canada and Europe, as well as in several places in the world in the context of the United Nations (nearly 3 500 Canadians are presently serving in various United Nations operations). The armed forces total 84 000 active forces, 27 500 primary reserves and about the same number of supplementary reserves. These two categories of reserves, the primary and the supplementary, provide the bulk of Canada's citzen-soldiers. The latter category, the supplementary reserve, is a pool of trained personnel who are available in the event of an emergency. The primary reserve consists of volunteers, officers and non- commissioned members who have agreed to perform duties for the military service of their choice. This choice can be the militia, which is the traditional name for the army reserve, the naval reserve, the air reserve or the communication reserve. The members of these four elements generally train one or two nights a week, one or two weekends a month and often participate in summer training which lasts on average two weeks. The militia is the largest element of the primary reserve. It has approximately 20 000 personnel, spread over the vast country in more than 100 cities and towns. The total number of units is 131 of which 99 are combat arms units (infantry, artillery or armour) and 32 are support units (e.g. medical, engineers, military police). Traditionally the militia had its drill-halls in the town centres and the military activity was part of the community's daily life. Since the second world war, this tradition has faded away and the militia has often moved to barracks out of town. The move has not been without consequence for civil-military relations and attempts have now to be made to interest the public at large both in their armed forces in general and the reserves in particular. The Canadian Government's ambition is to increase the reserve forces to some 35 000, a major part of which will wear the militia's uniform. The planned increase implies that a major recruiting campaign over an extended period will be necessary while at the same time special attention should be given to bringing the forces closer to the people. The naval reserve's role is to enhance the war capability of maritime command (the navy) and to complement the navy in ongoing peacetime tasks and activities. The missions of the naval reserve include maritime coastal defence, mine counter- measures, naval control of merchant shipping and the provision of personnel to integrate into regular force ships and shore- based units. The naval reserve is composed of 23 divisions or units across the country, comprising about 4 200 personnel. A modernisation programme for the naval reserve has started. Twelve maritime coastal defence vessels for the naval reserve have been ordered and will come into service during the 1990s. These vessels will be used for training of the naval reserve in coastal, inshore and harbour surveillance as well as in mine counter-measures. Modernising the equipment for diving teams of naval reserves is another example. The smallest element in the reserves system is the air reserve. The air force, which in Canada is called air command, controls the air reserve. It comprises 1 450 personnel in two wings, three squadrons and augmentation flights at each airbase across the country. Its wartime missions include augmentation of the regular force and providing a manpower base for mobilisation. In peacetime, the air reserve is tasked with United Nations peace-keeping missions, search and rescue, light transport and maritime surveillance. Another small element is the communication reserve, comprising some 1 700 specialised personnel, organised in six regiments, 12 squadrons and three troops, all located across Canada. The communication reserves augment regular force units if required, they participate in peace-keeping missions, support civil emergency authorities with their special equipment and participate in military exercises where their particular expertise can be used. Following the September 1991 defence policy announcement, Canada's reserves are to increase by approximately 25% while the regular forces will see their numbers decrease by some 9%. Consistent with the September 1991 decision, economies will be affected in several areas: - reduction of the regular force from 84 000 to 76 000; - civilian staff reductions from 33 000 to 32 000; - closure of the two Canadian forces bases in Germany by 1995; - cancellation of commitment to maintain a 1 000-man task force in Europe. Some savings are expected to be achieved by slowing the rate of growth in the reserves in the near term. However, the targets for the ultimate size and composition of the reserves have not changed. The Department of Defence remains committed to the implementation of the total force concept. The integration of the regulars and reserves into a total force remains one of the fundamentals of the new Canadian defence policy. The reserve component of the Canadian forces is being required to play a more substantive role within the total force in the defence and security of the nation. The process has evolved over the past few years when significant efforts were devoted to making the total force a reality. Positive accomplishments were achieved on a variety of key issues impacting not only on the general effectiveness of the reserves but also on the perception of their value to the overall defence commitments. A strategic plan for the reserves has been formulated. The plan reaffirms the aim of the reserves "to have an effective reserve component, within a viable total force, which enables the Canadian forces to carry out its assigned defence and security responsibilities in peacetime and emergencies or in war". The plan then defines the reservist as a citizen who trains on a part-time basis, or occasionally full-time, possessing strengths and limitations that are different from those of his or her regular force counterpart. An analysis made of the characteristics required by the reserve component in order to be effective within the total force concluded that the reserve component must be the following: - a reflection of and have the support of the Canadian society at large; - highly motivated and have competent leadership; - individually and collectively trained to standards required to be operationally ready; - structured to facilitate command, control, administration, and training in peacetime and possessing the capacity for expansion and sustainment when deployed in emergencies and war; - supported by full-time personnel assisting with administration, training and operational requirements; - funded to recruit, train, and retrain sufficient personnel to support its required role with the total force; - properly equipped to meet training and operational requirements; - protected through voluntary or legislated employers' support in civilian jobs while absent for training, emergencies, or war; - given mutual respect, confidence, and support among all members of the total force from both regular and reserve components. Canada is therefore well advanced in formulating structures for a changed security and defence scenario. This determination to tackle a series of very difficult decisions was stressed by the Canadian Associate Minister of National Defence, The Honourable Mary Collins, MP, both when the Defence Committee visited Canada in July 1990 and again when the Chairman of the committee, Sir Dudley Smith, MP, met her during the NAA session held in Banff, Alberta, in May this year. (iii) France In total almost 680 000 people are involved in the "military" side of defence. Just over 300 000 are professional military, just under 250 000 are conscripts and about 130 000 are civilians. Although 680 000 is no small force, it would not be enough in time of real crisis. In that case, half a million reservists would be needed to bring the peacetime armed forces to wartime strength. At present, over 500 000 reservists are involved and they would man 52% of the army, 27% of the navy, 42% of the air force, 59% of the Gendarmerie and 65% of the armed forces medical service. These figures are a convincing indicator that the effective performance of the armed forces depends to a high degree on reservists. Hence it is obvious that the active duty time of the conscripts - recently decreased from 12 to 10 months - must be fully devoted to preparing the citizen-soldiers for their reservist missions. (See also Chapter II(i)) (iv) Germany The Bundeswehr is a conscript army, i.e. approximately 50% of its personnel are servicemen required to complete 12 months of service at present or 15 months or even 18 months at an earlier stage under the Compulsory Military Service Act. As a consequence of compulsory military service, about six million reservists have undergone military training since the build-up of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the Bundeswehr at any given time has more reservists available than are actually required for growth to full wartime strength of more than 1.3 million men. For peacetime purposes, the Compulsory Military Service Act provides that servicemen having completed their basic miltiary service can be earmarked for mobilisation as reservists until the age of 32 (enlisted men), the age of 45 (NCOs) or 60 (officers). With these parameters, the armed forces do not face any difficulties in maintaining a mobilisable reserve of 900 000 men. The reservists available beyond that potential are generally also subject to control under the Military Service Act and can be called up as reserves until the age of 60 in times of war. The new reservist concept will have to establish its priorities: (i) introduction of a volunteer reserve component similar to the reserves of the United States armed forces or the United Kingdom Territorial Army; (ii) short reserve duty exercise terms of five days maximum, with the weekends being avoided as far as possible; (iii) individual determination of reserve duty exercise terms instead of exercises at company or battalion level that are common practice, in particular in the army; (iv) recall units based in the regional vicinity, which has become more difficult due to the reduction of the armed forces in an expanded German territory since unification; (v) attractive social benefits in order to improve the acceptance of service in the reserve. Because only a minor proportion of the six million reservists trained in the Bundeswehr so far could be earmarked for assignment in the reserve corps of the armed forces and that active duty slots are available only to a limited extent, the possibility of voluntary activity beyond the scope described so far, has been created for reservists. The Federation of Reservists of the Bundeswehr was assigned the mission by parliament and the Ministry of Defence to promote reservists in their military development on a voluntary basis, to keep them informed about security policy as regards the armed forces, and to provide support and assistance to them. Moreover, the Federation, in co-operation with its dedicated reservists, pursues public relations activities in the interest of the armed forces. The Federation has more than 100 000 members - including former reservists - indicating that the reservists of the Bundeswehr are a social group acting as an intermediary between the armed forces and the civilian population. (v) The Netherlands In time of peace about 0.80% of the total Dutch population participates in the preparation of the national and inter-allied defence. the armed forces total 100 000 military women and men in time of peace, of which 45 000 (male) are conscripts. The navy's total is 16 450 men and women of which 1 500 are conscripts; the army has 63 000 men under arms, of which 40 000 are conscripts; and the air force total is 16 000 of which 3 400 are conscripts. the Royal Military Constabulary totals some 3 500 of which 10% are conscripts. The number of women in the Dutch armed forces is still relatively small: 3 500 volunteer women serve the colours. In addition, a total of 23 000 civilians are involved in the activities of the defence ministry and the armed forces. In time of crisis not less than 175 000 reservists are available to bring the armed forces to full defence strength. At complete mobilisation, 2% of the Dutch population would be involved in active defence. (vi) Portugal The Portuguese armed forces number approximately 70 000 men. In round figures the army totals about 42 000 of which 35 000 are conscripts; the navy has 15 000 men, including 2 800 marines and some 5 000 conscripts and the air force totals 13 000 of which 5 000 are conscripts. The pool of conscripts is large in Portugal. Although annual intakes between 40 000 and 50 000 were normal for many years, such high numbers could be reduced in the future. Whereas in other European countries, Germany for example, the force structure shrinks as a consequence of the demographic reality - the reduction of available young manpower - the reason for the Portuguese decision is political and related to the reorganisation of the armed forces. Portugal has enough manpower in its conscript potential and a demographic decline affecting military requirements will not start before 1999. The regulars in the total armed forces number 23 500 although, to complete the financial picture of the regulars, some 11 500 men should be added. The first group is on active duty, the second has left active military life and is kept in reserve. This category of "regular-reserve" receives full pay during their reserve period. The system obliges officers to leave the active service at a relatively young age: lieutenant colonels and below at 56 and colonels at 57. The real retirement age for officers is 65 and this implies that they remain on the paylist - with full pay - until that age. The same applies to NCOs, although sergeants for example remain on active duty until the age of 57 and the sergeant-major category until 60. Their reserve period is therefore somewhat shorter. The regular reserves are only a small group in the total of Portuguese reservists. The majority come from the many thousands of conscripts who have served in the Portuguese forces. They are soldiers, sergeants and lieutenants with a lower age limit of 22 years. Hence Portuguese reservists vary between the ages of 22 and 65. The conscripts receive a basic training of six weeks. The subsequent training of NCOs lasts another week and for young reserve officers seven weeks. In broad terms, the army musters some 1 000 junior officers and 2 000 conscripted non- commissioned officers. The navy and air force each have approximately 200 conscripted junior officers. The imminent reduction of national service to four months implies considerable reorganisation for the reserves. (vii) Spain At the end of 1990, the government published a strategic plan for the armed forces. The two main objectives in this plan were to increase the capabilities of the forces in order to contribute effectively to the allied defence (as defined in the co-ordination agreements with NATO) and to accomplish other national commitments. Safeguarding the stability in North Africa, especially in the Maghreb area, is regarded as a basic national commitment which of course also has the traditional European and Atlantic dimension. The total strength planned for the "Armed Forces 2000" is 270 000, comprising 40 000 cadres (officers and NCOs) and 230 000 troops. Of this full combat strength only approximately 50% will constitute a force-in-being in peacetime, the other half belonging to the mobilisable contingent which will only be activated in time of crisis. This represents a fundamental change in the Spanish structure. Until the 1990s, the existence of forces-in-being had been the basis of their power and credibility. In that concept, only a relatively small mobilisable strength would be needed to complement the peacetime strength of the force and to replace casualties in a prolonged battle. Under the new policy, emphasis will be placed upon training the conscripts for duty as reservists in mobilisable units which will be generated only in time of need. Essential elements in the new force structure are its voluntary nature and adequate use of conscripts. The plans are based on a strong increase in the number of volunteers. At the beginning of the 1990s, the armed forces consist of 33% volunteers, career officers and non-commissioned as well as men signing a contract ofr several years of speicalised active duty. The remaining 67% of the force are conscripts who serve 12 months. The ideal situation which the staff planners have drafted foresees a land force which consists of 50% volunteers. The period for contract volunteers should be expanded from three to eight years. In the meantime, conscription has come under pressure. Mandatory military service has a very long tradition in Spain dating back to 1469. With the improvement of the international situation, the voices in favour of abolishing national service are heard more and more and pleas for a full professional force are loud and clear. Government and parliament, however, on one hand, regard keeping the forces rooted in the people by means of conscription as too important to give up, and on the other hand, understand that sufficient volunteers would neither become available nor could be sufficiently paid. So national service remains, though in 1991 it was decided to shorten it from 12 to nine months, to be implemented gradually over a period of about one year. (viii) Turkey The armed forces are an integral part of the Turkish population. The size of the Turkish forces is second to none in Europe. Within NATO only the United States has larger forces. The peacetime strength of the Turkish armed forces (1991 figures) is over 620 000, to which in time of crisis almost 900 000 well-trained mobilisable reserves can be added, bringing the full authorised strength for wartime to just over 1.5 million. However, in time of need several more million men could be added to this total; men who are still within the legal age- limits of military service and have received military training in the past. In the event of mobilisation the Turkish Army can rely on two categories of reservists: former regular personnel and former conscripts. In the first category are officers and non- commissioned officers who have left the service at an early age and who are still eligible for reserve duty. Some 1 800 officers and 7 700 NCOs form this gorup. Of the conscript category, almost 30 000 reserve third lieutenants belong to the mobilisable army and almost 645 000 soldiers and sergeants. The mobilisable reserves are meant primarily to bring units which are under strength in time of peace to full time strength and additionally to generate mobilisable units. All personnel and material preparations for this generation process are made on a regional scale. Spread over the country are 20 recruiting offices which are regional centres for a dense network of registration offices. Each community has such an office and each reservist is obliged by law to keep his local office up-to-date until his final discharge. The Turkish General Staff provides the guidelines by which the regional recruitment centres and the military regional establishments can co-ordinate their preparations. In principle a Turkish reservist has a military obligation of 20 years, from his 20th until his 41st year. However, in practice the State does not require the whole period. The full mobilisation strength of some 1.5 million men, which for obvious reasons of efficiency will be composed of those with the most recent training, requires only the actual availability of the most recent six-year groups. (ix) United Kingdom In time of war or crisis, the Territorial Army (TA) would provide significant manpower to support the regular army. At present it contributes over half of the infantry, logistic and medical support of the front line army, and undertakes important home defence tasks. The Royal Naval Reserve provides additional trained manpower for mine counter-measures, naval control of shipping and medical support; the Royal Naval Auxiliary Service provides many of the personnel essential for the defence of ports and anchorages in time of tension or war. Finally, the Royal Marines and the Royal Air Force also rely upon their reserves as an integral part of their overall operational capability. Even so, the differences between the regular and reserve forces have to be acknowledged. The latter do not substitute for the former, but rather complement them. The key role and crucial value of the reserves was graphically demonstrated and re-emphasised during the Gulf conflict; A total 1 774 reservists, consisting of both individual and volunteer reserves, served in support of the war in the Gulf. Of the 887 volunteer reservists, 19 were from the Royal Naval Reserve, 552 from the Territorial Army, 252 from the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and 34 from the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. In addition, some 100 Royal Marine Reserves served in Turkey and Northern Iraq in support of the United Nations. The way forward for United Kingdom reserve forces is summarised in the 1992 Statement on the Defence Estimates: "Reserves in the 1990s 1. The tradition of civil commitment to national defence in times of emergency has deep historical roots in the British Isles, from Anglo-Saxon and Celtic times to the more recent Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers. This tradition is upheld by members of the present reserve forces, both volunteer reservists and ex-regulars. Today, reservists operate alongside their regular service colleagues as an integral part of the armed forces, whether as members of formed volunteer reserve units or as individuals applying their military skills and experience within the regular forces in times of tension and war. 2. The volunteer reserves have been a central component of our armed forces since the early years of this century and undertook a major role in both world wars. In recent decades they have made a substantial contribution to our defence: Royal Marines Reserve (RMR) and Territorial Army infantry and support forces for the defence of the United Kingdom and the European mainland; the Royal Naval Rescue (RNR) and the Royal Naval Auxiliary Service (RNXS) in areas such as mine countermeasures and the control of shipping; and the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force (R Aux AF) in fields such as intelligence, ground defence, air movement, aeromedical evacuation, public relations and maritime headquarters support. Over the years the reserves have successfully adapted to new commitments and patterns of warfare and the need to become expert in a wide range of skills and specialisms. Members of the reserve forces, most finding time for the reserves while doing full-time jobs, have met the challenge of an ever-increasing requirement for professionalism and dedication. Those qualities were clearly in evidence during Operation Granby, when some 2 000 ex-regular and volunteer reservists were called out or undertook short-term regular engagements in the Gulf and elsewhere. This included TA soldiers serving with "teeth" arms and others providing support elsewhere. 3. The reserves will continue to play an important role. With reduced readiness requirements and increased warning times, a study has been made of the balance between regular and reserve forces, with the aim of providing for a more efficient and cost-effective use of reserves in the mid- 1990s and beyond. Detailed consideration is being given to the study's wide-ranging recommendations, which include new liabilities for reserve service and changes to reserve forces legislation. A Defence Open Government Document (OGD), "The future of Britain's reserve forces", was published in March and has invited responses to key elements of the study's recommendations. Meanwhile, initial work on the restructuring of the volunteer reserves has proceeded. On 10th December 1991 the then Secretary of State announced firm plans for the TA, including a forecast reduction in strength from 74 000 to 63 500 in the longer term. Some 20 000 volunteers join - and a similar number leave - each year and, as far as possible, the reductions will be made through natural wastage: no active volunteer who remains suitably qualified for TA service will be forced to leave. TA units will undertake important roles in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, most notably in the combat support areas, and in the defence of the United Kingdom, including roles previously undertaken by the regular army. A key feature of the new organisation will be flexibility, with units not committed to the ARRC having more of a general reserve role. 4. TA units will continue to be distributed widely across the United Kingdom, taking account of the need for strong links with local communities to sustain public understanding and support. The advice and assistance of the 14 Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations (TAVRAs) in preparing future force structures in the regions and maintaining these links will continue to be important to the government. The existence of the reserve forces depends not only on the dedication of the reservists themselves but also on the support of families and employers, the latter represented through the work of the National Employers Liaison Committee. 5. The TA will also benefit from equipment enhancements for its new role. These will include the Scimitar family of tracked combat reconnaissance vehicles for the medium reconnaissance regiment assigned to the ARRC; 155mm FH70 howitzers and the Starstreak Air Defence Missile for the Royal Artillery; the Ptarmigan communication system for some Royal Signal units; the Gazelle helicopter for Army Air Corps Squadrons and DROPS for transport units. 6. For the smaller RNR and RNXS, reorganisation has already begun, with a reduction in the former from about 5 900 to 4 700, and in the latter from 2 850 to 2 700 by April. 7. The planned changes for the RAFVR and the R Aux AF are comparatively small. A review of units is likely to confirm their existence, though in some cases a change of role will be necessary. We are investigating the feasibility of employing auxiliairies in mission planning for the Nimrod MPA. We intend to retain the six R Aux AF field squadrons for the area defence of airfields and are aiming to increase the number of R Aux AF defence flights for the perimeter defence of other vital installations. 8. These changes, and in particular those for the TA and the RNR, have involved some difficult decisions on the future of units which have served the United Kingdom with distinction. The government sought the views of all interested parties, before proceeding with plans for reorganisation. Consideration is being given to retaining old regimental affiliations or unit identities where that would be of benefit to the units concerned. 9. In order to sustain the enthusiasm and dedication of reservists in the face of change it has been essential to remove uncertainties by consulting, and by drawing up and implementing our plans as quickly as possible. We will continue over a longer period to make improvements in the structure and organisation of the reserves, particularly in the light of changed readiness requirements and extended warning times. Work on improvements to the procedure for selective call-out of reservists is already well advanced, and we are addressing the scope for greater flexibility in the call-out of reservists within the manpower structure for 1995 and beyond. In sum, the government remains committed to capable and effective reserve forces, ready to take their place alongside their regular colleagues as an effective fighting force." (x) United States The United States has had by far the largest number of fully- trained reservists of any major power. With some 560 000 in the National Guard, 1 222 600 in the army, navy, marines and air force reserves, 28 700 in the standby reserve and 178 700 on the retired reserve, the United States must hold the record for the best-trained and best-equipped reserve force to compleemnt its all-professional army, navy, marines and air force. The Defence Committee was privileged to visit a number of units in various parts of the United States in the second half of July 1990 and was greatly impressed by the enthusiasm and prowess of those we met, many of whom were to be called up for active duty only a month later. In 1973, a fundamental change in the American military personnel policy took place. In that year conscription was abandoned. The system which had provided the armed forces throughout the Second World War and the years since with hundreds of thousands of young men had come to an end as a result of the Vietnam war. The United States now relies entirely upon volunteers for both regular service and reserve duty. In order to make the most effective use of available resources, the Department of Defence developed the "Total Force Policy", whose objective is "a balanced mix of active and reserve forces that fully utilises all available assets, while ensuring that maximum military capaiblity is achieved at the minimum realistic cost". The Total Force Policy has now been in existence for almost 20 years and has been a major success. Active forces and reserve units have participated together, complementing each other, in exercises and in live actions. A significant equipment modernisation programme for the reserve forces has been in existence since 1980, making reserve units compatible with the active units. This has been a tremendous boost for the readiness and morale of national guard and reserve personnel. The Total Force Policy and its implementation made it possible for the United States Government to place greater dependence on the reserve forces. The United States with a population of over 250 million has about two million regular forces and just over 1.6 million active reserve forces for its many security tasks, both in the United States and abroad. Regulars and reservists perform these tasks together as members of the total force. In fact, in the past decade the number of active force missions to be carried out by guard or reserve units has increased; The extensive and expensive equipment modernisation programme for the reserve forces, which was carried out in the 1980s, provided them with the essential tools for these missions. At the basis of this programme were policy decisions aimed at stopping the competition for badly-needed modern equipment between regular and reserve forces. The general goal was "to equip all active, guard and reserve units to full wartime requirements...Units, that fight first shall be equipped first, regardless of component.". Five of the seven reserve components have only federal missions. The other two, the army national guard and the air national guard, also have a responsibility towards the state to which it belongs. The special position of the guard stems from the militia clause of the Constitution. Based on this clause the different states are responsible for the appointment of officers and the training of the militia. The army and air national guard units therefore carry the name of their state, such as Texas Army National Guard or California Air National Guard. The federal Congress, however, has the power to provide for organising, arming and disciplining the guard. In peacetime, the national guard of each state is responsible to the State Governor but can be called up for federal duty in case of national emergency. Through the National Guard Bureau in the federal Defence Department - the Pentagon - the services provide guidance in matters of administration, organisation and operational readiness. This channel also makes possible the implementation of federal control on the level of exercises and training of the national guard as guard units are required to meet the same standards as their active duty counterparts. The heart of the national guard and reserve components are the Selected Reserve Units. The largest reduction in the United States military force structure since the second world war will be carried out between 1992 and 1997. How and where the cuts will be made has still to be decided but the overall goal is a 25% reduction in five years time. The diminuation of forces includes a massive reduction of the United States forces in Europe. Another area of change will concern forces for deployment. In the 1980s, some 40 000 reservists were deployed annually from the United States for exercises in Europe. In general, deployments will decrease and the importance of computer exercises will increase in the future. The mix between active and reserve forces will certainly change, due to the changing requirements. The Reserve Officers Association (ROA) of the United States is concerned about the future as it sees "unwarranted negative signals regarding the prospects for the guard and reserve" and "proposals to reduce the reserve forces that are budget rather than strategy or cost- effectiveness driven...that are simply fair-share across-the- board reductions". ROA points to the fact that "the ability to attain high levels of readiness in the reserve components is not aonly theoretically possible but is now a proven fact". A major ROA study aimed at influencing policy decision-makers was issued in August 1991, taking into account the experience of the Gulf war. In summary it states: - The Total Force Policy provides a cost-effective, combat capable force that makes the best use of resources in the face of severe budget constraints. - The Total Force Policy has been successfully tested in both minor and major contingencies throughout the past decade. - Well-trained and well-equipped reservists have demonstrated that they can perform as professionals equal in skill and dedication to their active duty counterparts. - The use of reserve components of the total force in contingency operat)ons brings a vital citizen involvement and consensus to these conflicts. - Therefore, the Total Force Policy should be reaffirmed and sufficient resources should be allocated to increase the proportion of the nation's military capability in the reserve components and to ensure their effectiveness. It remains to be seen whether or not budgetary considerations will prevent the implementation of the Total Force Policy. When your Rapporteur met the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs from the Pentagon, Mr. Stephen Duncan, in Breda in August the mood could perhaps be qualified as "cautious optimism tempered with a fair dose of realism". V. The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (the CIOR) In the preparation of the present report, your Rapporteur has been fortunate to receive a great deal of information courtesy of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers and was a guest at their 1992 Summer Congress held in Breda in the Netherlands. Breda provided a particular opportunity to discuss the evolution of European security and the CIOR deserves every congratulation for its efforts to inform its members of the latest developments. Just what is the CIOR apart from being an organisation which pre-dates NATO? CIOR, the abbreviated title of the organisation, is derived from the full name in French, "Confederation Interalliee des Officiers de Reserve". CIOR is a non-political, non- governmental, non-profit organisation dedicated to co-operation between the national reserve officers associations of NATO countries and to strengthening the basic solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. CIOR's principal objectives are: - to contribute to the strengthening of the deterrent and defence capabilities of NATO and its signatory countries; - to support the policies of NATO and to assist in the achievement of its objectives; - to maintain close contact with all NATO military authorities and commands; - to establish and develop international contacts between reserve officers in order to improve mutual knowledge and understanding; - to maintain, through the individual country associations, close liaison with appropriate national defence organisations; - to develop uniformity in the duties, rights, training and mobilisation of reserve officers within NATO while respecting national differences and traditions. (i) NATO relationship The relationship between CIOR and NATO, which through the years has been intensive, was formalised in 1976. NATO's highest military authority, the Military Committee (MC) then approved document MC 248 which regulates the co-operation on military matters between NATO and CIOR. A permanent representative of CIOR to the Military Committee was then established in the International Military Staff (IMS). At the political level, the Defence Information Liaison Officer in the NATO Information Directorate has, on behalf of the Secretary-General, responsiblity for formal contact between NATO and CIOR and for providing political advice. In accordance with a MC 248 recommendation, a Reserve Affairs Adviser was appointed at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). His principle duties include liaison with CIOR for Allied Command Europe. NATO and SHAPE support educational and information activities for reserve officers. All 20 courses at the NATO School at Oberammergau are open to reserve officers. Every two years a one week NATO reserve officers course is given at the NATO Defence College in Rome. Annually, one information seminar is held for young reserve officers at NATO and SHAPE. Additionally, a young reserve officers' workshop is held in conjunction with the CIOR summer congress. Once every two years NATO and SHAPE host a seminar for experienced reserve officers, and, in alternating years, one for editors of reserve officer magazines. (ii) Activities In order to accomplish its objectives, CIOR meets on an annual basis alternating the location among member countries. These congresses, lasting five days, are held in July or August. Here current issues affecting NATO and its reserve forces are discussed. Additionally there is communication and interaction between reserve officers of the alliance. During the time of the congress, a military competition consisting of military orienteering, marksmanship (rifle, pistol and sub- machine gun), obstacle course, utility swimming and First Aid is conducted. As mentioned already, also a workshop for young reserve officers is held during the summer congress. The host country association is entirely responsible for planning and administering all the details of the congress. The mid-winter conference for the Executive Committee and Commissions is held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, usually during the first week of February to further discuss issues, interact with NATO Headquarters and finalise summer congress activities. (iii) Organisation The national reserve officers associations form the heart of CIOR, but remain completely independent in national operations. They elect from their members delegates to CIOR and the head of each delegation is a Vice-President of CIOR. The CIOR International President and Secretary-General serve for two years and are members of the same national association. The Executive Committee, the highest authority in the confederation, is composed of the President, Secretary-General, Vice-Presidents and up to four other delegates from each national association. Vice-Presidents cast a single vote for their entire delegation. The Executive Committee is CIOR's policy body and decides which country will assume the presidency, where congresses will be held, what projects will be assumed by the various commissions and the final actions to be taken on these projects. The financial status of CIOR is maintained by assessments of annual dues from its component national associations based on the membership of each association and on subsidies, gifts and legacies. (iv) Commissions Six permanent commissions work on behalf of the Executive Committee (EC). Guidance is provided directly from the President. The EC also can appoint special commissions for ad hoc tasks. Each national delegation is required to appoint at least one member to each commission. All commissions have a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and a Secretary. These offices are held for a period of two years with a possible re-election for two more years. - Commission 1: Status of the reserve officer, mobilisation, education, training and exchanges Studies and suggests ways NATO defence can be improved through the use of member reserve forces. - Commission 2: Defence issues and attitudes Exchanges information about member nations' attitudes, events and trends affecting NATO. Studies disinformation related to NATO and its reserves. - Commission 3: Public relations and information Exchanges information on public awareness of NATO, its defence and its reserves. Recommends press and information policy and helps to promote NATO in member nations. Supports the EC in general policy and planning areas. - Commission 4: Legal affairs Studies legal matters affecting NATO, its defence, and its reserves. Assists the EC in maintaining and changing the CIOR by-laws as desired. - Commission 5: Civil defence and emergency planning Exchange of information on disaster preparation and emergency procedures in member nations. Includes command and control, preparation, planning and training. - Commission 6: Military competitions Directs and monitors the conduct of the CIOR military competitions. (v) National Reserve Forces Committee A sound and effective relationship between national reserve officers associations and the national authorities responsible for matters concerning reserve forces in general and reserve officers in particular, is an obvious asset for both parties. Internationally such a relationship exists between CIOR and the National Reserve Forces Committee (NRFC), which is composed of the Chiefs of Reserves of the NATO nations. Although fully independent, the two organisations have established a system for close co-operation and exchange of information. It has its greatest visibility during the two annual CIOR events - the summer congress and the midwinter meeting - as the NRFC holds its meetings also twice a year and in conjunction with those of CIOR. The chairmanship of NRFC rotates once every two years. Here too the NRFC has opted for synchronisation with CIOR, as it has decided that the Chairman NRFC will be of the same nationality as CIOR's President. The NRFC studies and discusses reserve forces issues of mutual concern and through its Chairman exchanges results and views with CIOR's Executive Committee. (vi) The CIOMR CIOMR, the "Confederation Interalliee des Officiers Medicaux de Reserve", was established in Brussels in 1947 as the official organisation of medical officers in the reserve forces. Originally founded by Belgium, France and the Netherlands, the "Confederation" now includes all CIOR member countries. Its objectives are to: - establish close professional relations with the medical doctors and services of the reserve forces within the alliance; - study and discuss issues of importance to the medical reserve officer to include medico-military training; - promote an effective collaboration with the medical services of the active forces; - generate maximum support in the study of medical problems affecting the morale of the troops. CIOR and CIOMR are associated organisations. CIOMR holds its sessions at the same time and place as the CIOR summer congress and mid-winter conference but prepares a separate agenda for the discussion of medical matters. The main drawback to the activities of the CIOR and CIOMR over the years has been that not all member countries of NATO have taken part. Now, however, after intensive lobbying, Spain has been invited to join the Confederation and your Rapporteur hopes that a way will soon be found for the remaining countries of the alliance to be at least observers. The above remark explains why some detail is missing from the country-by-country survey which follows at Appendix I and which was kindly made available by the CIOR. Colleagues who seek further information on the reserves are advised to consult "NATO's reserve forces" by Colonel Sjouke De Jong, published by Brassey's as No. 6 in the Atlantic Commentaries in 1992. VI. Conclusion In formulating the draft recommendation on European security - reserve forces and national service, your Rapporteur has been very conscious that the report is being presented at a critical but propitious time. "Critical" because what is being decided now by our nations will affect the shape of Europe's ability to defend itself and its interests for the foreseeable future; "propitious" because much of the debate on reserve forces and on national service is now current in our countries or is about to begin. It is therefore to be hoped that the WEU Council will respond positively to a very constructive set of recommendations. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to give a few words of amplification for each preliminary draft recommendation in turn: "1. Take every opportunity to ensure that the debate on reserve forces and national service in any member country benefits from a common fund of experience and requirements and include discussion on the subject on the agenda of the next WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting;" The impression of the moment, rightly or wrongly, is that much of the debate in any of our countries is being conducted in isolation from the debate in neighbouring countries. Of course, particular circumstances apply to individual countries, but surely the priority must be to examine the requirement for the various forces on a collective basis before moving to purely national considerations. Likewise the fund of experience of some nations who have already had to cope with difficult decisions should be pooled for the benefit of all. One of the best places to begin is by putting the subject on the agenda of the next meeting of the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee. "2. Stimulate informed debate in member countries on revised roles for reserve forces as well as on reductions in and possible restructuring of national service;" A logical progression from recommendation 1. "3. Provide a forum for discussion of such matters among member states and also with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and interested Central European states;" Ideally your Rapporteur would like to see a WEU initiative, preferably sponsored by the presidency, to create such a forum for discussion perhaps beginning with a colloquy to sound out interested parties. The Defence Committee's pioneering study-visits to Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as prompting the current specific interest of all those countries in WEU, reminded us of the relevance for territorial defence of the arrangements for organising and mobilising reserve forces practised by the hitherto "neutral" countries. These examples are now also being studied by many of the Central European states with whom the Defence Committee has also had contact. "4. Strongly encourage WEU countries without volunteer reserve forces to consider the example of those which already possess such an asset;" The recommendation is of course referring to the United Kingdom primarily (within WEU) because of Britain's experience over some 30 years in recruiting and utilising a large volunteer reserve force. France is already conducting a study but the example, both of the United Kingdom but also of Canada and the United States, is very relevant for others of our member nations. "5. Explore the idea of creating a "national guard" on a European scale for territorial defence;" The comparison here is particularly with arrangements for territorial defence in the United States where the national guard plays a major role. This idea is linked with the premise that "smaller, flexible, mobile and more professional forces" are increasingly required for possible operations outside traditional areas, but that "home defence" in Europe should not be neglected (coupled with the need to preserve the requirement for defence incumbent in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty with its more binding commitments. Therefore your Rapporteur submits the idea that a "European national guard" composed mainly of reservists could be part of the solution for the future. "6. Reconsider the Assembly's previous recommendation to take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult (Recommendation 469);" This recommendation was originally formulated in May 1989 by Sir Keith Speed in a report for the Defence Committee entitled "State of European security - intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north". As with so many of the Assembly's recommendations, the idea was ahead of its time, but one particular development since then serves to prove its worth. Visiting the Franco-German Brigade at Boeblingen the Defence Committee was much impressed by the obvious enthusiasm of both French and German national servicemen, given the opportunity to serve in a multinational and especiall European context. The principle will apply also as the Eurocorps is expanded with other WEU countries participating. As well as allowing national servicemen to put their European idealism into practice your Rapporteur believes that the idea should be extended to reserve forces where the Eurocorps and similar multinational developments provide further opportunity for integration. "7. Decide to give a symbol of European identity to all forces - ships, aircraft, vehicles and regular and reserve personnel - taking part in WEU operations;" The idea behind this recommendation is developed in a forthcoming report for the Defence Committee on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis (Rapporteur: Mr. Marten). It is reiterated here mainly because of the "reserve" dimension but also because your Rapporteur believes the Council should be made aware of the deeply-held political conviction that the European identity has "to be seen to be believed". "8. Establish and develop a liaison with the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR);" Through your Rapporteur, the WEU Assembly has already established a link with the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) and the wealth of detail contained in the present report bears witness to that link. The Secretary- General has also addressed the CIOR which, with its vast international membership, has a potential for reflection and influence in the twin domains of security and defence going far beyond the immediate domain of reserve forces. Our countries are represented on the National Reserve Forces Committee which has a regular working relationship with the CIOR and where the Council might consider some gentle WEU "caucussing"... "9. Ask the WEU Institute for Security Studies to make a thorough examination of national service and the structure of reserve forces in member states and of the possibilities for co-operation;" Through its growing network of international contacts, both official and unofficial, the Institute is well-placed to conduct such an examination, the results of which would form a very useful basis for discussion, for instance at the colloquy proposed as part of recommendation 3 above. "10. Invite WEU parliamentarians to participate in discussions on these topics." This final recommendation is included as a reminder to the Council that the parliaments of WEU member countries include a wealth of knowledge and experience appropriate to the discussion of the subject in hand. Indeed a number of parliamentarians, like your Rapporteur, and parliamentary officials are themselves reservists and are therefore particularly competent to express a purely objective viewpoint. ________________________________ 1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. de Puig (Alternate: Moya) (Vice- Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Brito, Cariglia, Chevalier (Alternate: Sarens), Cox, De Decker, Dees, Durand, Fernandes Marques, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Fourre, Hardy, Irmer, Jung, Kelchtermans, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Marten, Lord Newall (Alternate: Thompson), MM. Pecchioli, Perinat (Alternate: Cuco), Reis Leite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Vazquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer. 3. Document 707. ------- For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com