/pub/history/military/a-weu/document File: 1366defc.baa Document 1366 19th May 1993 United Nations operations - interaction with WEU ________ REPORT(1) submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee(2) by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur ______ TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on United Nations operations - interaction with WEU DRAFT RESOLUTION on United Nations operations - interaction with WEU DRAFT ORDER on United Nations operations - interaction with WEU EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur I. Introduction II. The realities of the new world order III. United Nations operational organisation - an overview (a) The Charter (b) A holding action (c) Characteristics (d) Peace-keeping and peace-making IV. Composition and organisation of UN operations (a) Composition (b) Chain of command (i) Command in the field (ii) Administration V. Command and control of UN operations: theory and practice (a) The Military Staff Committee (b) Finance (c) Functions of a UN Military planning cell VI. Nordic UN Stand-by Forces and Nordic UN Co-operation (a) Background and basic structure (b) The Nordic UN Stand-by Forces (c) Recruiting and training (d) Nordic military UN peace-keeping co-operation (e) Considerations and factors in connection with a UN peace-keeping mission - the Nordic experience - The decision-making process in UN Headquarters in New York VII. The way ahead: a role for WEU? ===================== Preface ======= Your Rapporteur has been extremely fortunate in preparing the present report to receive much kind help and assistance from all the authorities consulted and she would like to take this opportunity publicly to thank all concerned for their co- operation. Arrangements for visits to the United Nations in Geneva and New York were co-ordinated respectively by Ambassador Boddens- Hosang and Ambassador Biegman, Permanent Representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Mr. Anders Bjoerck, the Swedish Defence Minister, kindly authorised a visit to the Swedish UN Training Centre at Almnaes. Your Rapporteur was invited to take part in a Conference sponsored by the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Isla, on "Options for United States participation in United Nations sanctioned military operations". The Conference participants included experts from every continent and provided an excellent opportunity to explore the intricacies of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace" and the often conflicting attitudes of the countries represented, not least the United States. Of special help in Newport in framing the ideas expressed in the following chapters were Mr. Bo Huldt, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Mr. Jack McNeil, General Counsel in the Pentagon and Rear Admiral Frank Rosenius from the Swedish Ministry of Defence. A particular problem discussed throughout has been traditional US reluctance to become involved in UN operations per se (arguing that as the UN is so ill-equipped to take action, the United States itself must act - a "chicken and egg" way of reasoning) and an general refusal to allow US forces to serve under other than US command (except for the UN Sinai mission). However now in Somalia with the withdrawal of the bulk of US forces the remaining 4 000 Americans are coming under the command of the Turkish General, Cevik Bir. Another aspect which became obvious as the fact-finding missions progressed was a tendency displayed by a number of alliance countries to want to "re-invent the wheel" where the UN is concerned and to dismiss the experience of others. Very few of our countries are able to match the Nordic nations as a whole for their dedicated commitment to the UN. Which is why a chapter of the report is devoted to the Nordic experience in some detail in the hope that the example will be of benefit to others. WEU countries should consider recruiting volunteers specifically for UN operations (for example by proposing two-year contracts at the end of the normal period of national service). All WEU member states are currently participating in a wide variety of UN operations, in one way or another. Some countries are making contributions which are proportionally much greater than what might be expected (in financial terms and with regard to population size), another is in the process of reconsidering its own constitutional position. ________________________ In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following: 15th February 1993 - United Nations, Geneva H.E. Ambassador Boddens-Hosang, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands; H.E. Ambassador Di Lorenzo Badia, Permanent Representative of Italy (representing the WEU Presidency); H.E. Ambassador Larssen, Permanent Representative of Denmark (representing the EC Presidency); H.E. Ambassador Ahtisaari, Permanent Representative of Finland, Chairman of the Working Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina; H.E. Ambassador Berasategui, Permanent Representative of Argentina, Chairman of the CSBM Working Group; Colonel Graham Messervy-Whiting (United Kingdom), Military Adviser to Lord Owen; Mr. Fouinat (France), Head of Yugoslavia Desk, UNHCR; Mr. von Blumenthal (Germany), UNHCR; Mr. Ritz, UN Working Group on Minorities. 15th February 1993 - International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Mr. F. Bellon (Switzerland), Head of ICRC operations in former Yugoslavia. 30th March 1993 - United Nations, New York H.E. Ambassador Biegman, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands; H.E. Ambassador Vieri Traxler, Permanent Representative of Italy; H.E. Ambassador Bent Haakonsen, Permanent Representative of Denmark; H.E. Ambassador Sir David Hannay, KCMG, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom; Mr. Herve Ladsous, Deputy Permanent Representative of France; Mr. Inderfurth, Senior Counsellor to H.E. Ambassador Albright, Peace-keeping Operations, United States Mission to the United Nations; Mr. Riza (Pakistan), Deputy to Mr. Kofi Annan, OSG Peacekeeping Operations; Colonel Heikki Purola (Finland), Deputy Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Mr. Derek Boothby (United Kingdom), Office of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. 31st March to 2nd April 1993 - Newport, Rhode Island United States Naval War College Conference on "Options for United States participation in United Nations sanctioned military operations": Dr. Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Undersecretary- General of the United Nations for Peace-keeping Operations; Dr. Inis Claude, University of Virginia; Dr. Bo Huldt, Director, International Institute of Strategic Studies; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald, GCB, former First Sea Lord of the United Kingdom; Mr. Julien LeBourgeois, State Department Policy Department; Mr. Marc Palevitz, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, International Security Affairs, Global Affairs; Vice Admiral Henry Mustin, USN (Ret), Fellow, Centre for Naval Analyses; Dr. Gwyn Prins, Cambridge University; Commander Ian Bartholomew, RN, Cambridge University; Rear Admiral Frank Bowman, Joint Staff, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs; Major Brennan, US Army Staff, Chief, Strategic Plans and Policy Division); Major General John Lorber, US Air Staff, Director of Plans; Major General Indar Rikhye (India), US Institute for Peace, Former Peace-keeping Force Military Commander; Rear Admiral William Wright IV, USN, Navy Staff, Director, Political, Military and Current Plans; Brigadier General Thomas Wilkerson, USMC, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Director of Plans; Dr. Robert Staley, University of Colorado. 7th April 1993 - SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Stockholm Mr. Ove Svensson (Sweden), Deputy Director; Dr. Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia); Dr. Thomas Stock (Germany); Ms Evamaria Loose-Weintraub (Germany); Ms Elisabeth Skoens (Sweden); Mr. Chris Ulrich (United States); Mr. Richard Nystroem (Sweden). 8th April 1993 -tockholm Ministry of Defence Mr. Michael Sahlin, Undersecretary of State; Rear Admiral Frank Rosenius; Mr. Jan Hyllander, UN desk officer. UN Training Centre, Almnaes Lt. Col. Wadensjoe, Commanding Officer; Major Jershed, Training Officer. Colonel Adolf Ludin, Swiss Military Attache. 21st April 1993 - Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rome H.E. Ambassador Fabio Migliorini, Permanent Representative of Italy to WEU. The committee as a whole received evidence from the following: 11th and 12th March 1993 - Rome (Cecchignola) Seminar on "New defence models": Mr. Salvo Ando, Italian Minister of Defence, Co-Chairman-in- office of the WEU Council; Dr. Willem Van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU; Ambassador Amedeo De Franchis, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO; Mr. Hans Haekerrup, Danish Minister of Defence; Mr. Relus Ter Beek, Netherlands Minister of Defence; Mr. Joaquim Fernando Nogueira, Portuguese Minister of Defence; Mr. Julian Garcia Vargas, Spanish Minister of Defence; Mr. Jorg Schoenbohm, German State Secretary of Defence; Mr. Stathopoulos, Greek Deputy Secretary of Defence; Ambassador Richard Duque, Representative of the French Minister of Defence and French Permanent Representative to WEU; Lt. Gen. Joseph Charlier, Representative of the Belgian Minister of Defence; Lt. Gen. Svang Rasmussen, Representative of the Norwegian Minister of Defence; Mr. David Gould, Representative of the British Minister of Defence; Lt. Gen. Domenico Corcione, Italian Chief of Defence Staff; Mr. Michael Legge, Assistant Secretary-General of NATO. The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, officials and senior officers who gave evidence for the preparation of this report. The opinions expressed, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. ====================== Draft Recommendation ==================== on United Nations operations - interaction with WEU The Assembly, Determined to uphold the authority of the United Nations Organisation and to support moves to make it much more effective; Welcoming therefore the UN Secretary-General's intention to improve the working of the United Nations and in general supporting the ideas expressed in "An Agenda for Peace"; Strongly supporting the establishment of a UN military planning staff together with a 24 hour situation centre, appropriate training, logistics, transport, communications and intelligence-gathering facilities to enable the UN to play its proper role in command of its own operations; Pleased that increased links are now evident between Western European Union and the United Nations and that the presidency of the WEU Council has taken a series of initiatives to that end; Convinced that the example shown by those nations which have traditionally supported the UN could serve us in good stead for the future conduct of UN operations, and congratulating those governments which have made forces available for UN, NATO and WEU operations, and the men and women who serve in those forces, often in difficult, trying and frustrating circumstances, at sea, on land and in the air; Believing that WEU's experience of operations both during the Gulf conflict and now concerning the former Yugoslavia is worth sharing with the UN and that there are many parallels between the two organisations which may be used to mutual benefit; Considering that the question of whether or not WEU may be declared a regional organisation under the terms of the UN Charter should be fully debated and that in general WEU should take action in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty only under the aegis of a UN mandate; Recognising that sanctions can be an alternative to war and believing that when such sanctions have been approved by the United Nations they must be enforced, calling therefore on the Council of Ministers and national administrations to publish the evidence available to them of significant breaches of sanctions; Seeking support in national parliaments to ensure that defence budgets are restructured to take account of the need to participate in UN operations, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL Include the subject of participation by member countries in UN operations promptly and regularly on its agenda and on that of the Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee, the planning cell, the Secretariat-General and its various working groups and keep the Assembly informed; Study the possible participation in UN operations by WEU per se, with appropriate WEU co-ordination; In parallel with the Assembly, make a thorough examination of the pros and cons of declaring WEU a regional organisation within the meaning of the UN Charter and reaffirm WEU's acceptance of the principle of possible action in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty under the aegis and in support of the UN; Establish a working relationship with the UN Secretary- General using both the WEU Chairman-in-Office's good offices and those of the WEU Secretary-General and his staff and instruct the planning cell to offer advice for the UN Secretary-General's Military Adviser in New York, especially with a view to facilitating the creation of a similar planning cell for the UN; Direct the WEU planning cell to examine ways in which WEU governments might support the UN in terms of: - logistic co-operation and procurement; - transport pooling; - communication arrangements; - intelligence gathering; - command and control for operations; - the formulation of rules of engagement; - training co-ordination. ====================== Draft Resolution ================ on United Nations operations - interaction with WEU The Assembly, INVITES the parliaments of member, associate and observer countries to support the United Nations and the general ideas expressed in the "Agenda for Peace". ======================= Draft Order =========== on United Nations operations - interaction with WEU The Assembly, REQUESTS its President to invite the United Nations Secretary-General to address the next plenary session of the WEU Assembly. ======================== Explanatory Memorandum ====================== (submitted by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur) I. Introduction ================ Since the end of the second world war, the world has experienced some 400 further conflicts, less global in character, but which nevertheless have resulted in a total of some 16 million deaths. Only a comparatively small number of these conflicts have had any particular impact on our western nations, but now, with the "ending of the cold war" our perception is changing. Firstly, such conflict appears less and less tolerable. Secondly, such conflict is now on our doorstep in Europe. One of the main effects of the end of East-West confrontation is the new freedom of manoeuvre now available for the Security Council of the United Nations together with the revitalisation of the organisation. The Security Council's success of late has led many to believe that at long last the Security Council might be going to play the role envisaged by those who drafted the UN's Charter. In fact in the last four years the UN has become involved in numerous and varied peace-keeping operations: Cambodia, Angola, Kurdistan, Mozambique, Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, etc. - thirteen operations in total, as many as tackled in the preceding forty years. With what results? Security Council resolutions flaunted in the former Yugoslavia. The Khmer Rouge back in power in part of Cambodia and making a laughing stock of the UN. Certain military operations run in reality by the United States in the name of the United Nations with no real control from the Security Council. Civil wars and massacres continue in Liberia, the Sudan, Tajikistan and elsewhere, with the UN unable to intervene. The right of interference, hastily defined, conflicts with the traditional sovereignty of states. Peace-keeping operations in Croatia, Somalia, Cambodia and elsewhere risk running into the sand. Is it the "new world order" which actually justifies such actions? Just as we are witnessing a large increase in peace-keeping operations we are also posing questions regarding the legal basis for such operations as well as on the political and military aims and the fitting of the means to these ends. Such considerations have prompted the Defence Committee to examine the whole range of UN operations with the aim of discovering how they are organised and carried out, how they are financed and constrained and, above all, how Western European Union should endeavour to support appropriate action under the UN mandate. The aim therefore of the present report is to acquaint colleagues with the range of issues arising from the UN's vocation: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;"1. II. The realities of the new world order ========================================= As asserted above, the current interest in "peace-keeping" results from the end of East-West confrontation. In fact at the inception of the United Nations, the Charter established principles for a system to protect world peace and security. The international community, and in particular the five permanent members of the Security Council acting in concert, would recall to order any country which was not respecting the "rules of the international game". In cases of necessity the use of troops acting under the UN's authority was envisaged. It was the cold war which paralysed the efficient working of such a system. The power of veto was used on some 279 occasions against draft resolutions in the Security Council. With only a very few exceptions (Korea 1950-53 and the Congo 1960-64) operations under the aegis of the United Nations were explicitly conducted with the consent of all parties and a consensus not to use force. The de facto solution meant that many of the original principles of the UN Charter (respect for the sovereignty of states, the right of intervention, the rights of minorities, the inviolability of frontiers, the use of force to maintain peace) went by the by. The current freeing of the Security Council has brought all these questions under the spotlight as we ponder the nature of the "new world order". In conceptual terms it is necessary to consider the notion of the "new world order" from a specific angle: the basis in international law for military intervention in order to maintain or restore peace. The "prime contractor" is obviously the United Nations itself but the UN must be seen in context which from a European angle means the relationship with the European organisations: CSCE, NATO, the Twelve and WEU. In passing it is worth pointing out that not all the states exhibit the same enthusiasm for the United Nations as an organisation. The most reserved such attitude has been demonstrated on a number of occasions by the United States which has had a peculiar (in all senses of the word) stance which is not necessarily shared by the majority of its partners. Rather, what your Rapporteur believes is now required, and will seek to demonstrate, is that the UN should be given adequate structures and funds to accomplish the types of mission originally envisaged nearly 50 years ago and for which there is an increasingly urgent need today, with our "new world order". It was President Bush who defined this "new world order" in a speech before Congress on 19th September 1990. His vision was idealistic, in global terms, less militaristic than economic in its expression. The aims, peace, security, democracy and the rule of law, would be achieved by using the Euro-Atlantic institutions (CSCE, NATO and the EC) as well as those with a world-wide base (the UN, IMF, GATT, the World Bank), thus implicating politico-economic means above all. Seen from the single Superpower the vision was decidedly imperial: there would be two types of operation for the future: US operations with the agreement of the UN or UN operations with the agreement of the US. The present proliferation of conflicts would rather indicate that we are now in a new world "disorder". We should be looking now for a more democratic world such as that envisaged by the idealists who drafted the UN Charter and longed for by those nations who are newly-escaped from the yoke of totalitarian communism. What we are finding is often somewhat removed from that seeming utopia. In Africa and Eastern Europe after the end of empire there is still much difficulty in achieving democracy. Nationalist passions, xenophobia and demagogy all lie in wait for the unwary. The Paris Charter of November 1990 with its solemn agreement by the Europeans to respect frontiers, human rights and those of religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities, should serve as the example to follow. This image of a democratic community of nations, living in peace and harmony, also evokes the reactivation of the UN, made possible by the unfreezing of the Security Council. The UN however remains fundamentally an inter-state organisation and is in no way a supranational authority as the precursor of a sort of world government. In particular this means that the UN can act only when member states (and especially the United States) decide on such action. In cases of flagrant aggression, the UN Charter provides for the Security Council to vote resolutions authorising the use of military force to defend the victim. Such was the case in Korea (1950-53) and for Kuwait (1990-91). In many ways these may be seen as "international police operations". One of the bases of the security system stemming from the second world war is the sovereignty of states and the ensuing non-interference. According to Article 2.7 of the United Nations Charter, "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state". The principle of non-interference is due to the experience and supposed wisdom of nations. As a safeguard of sovereignty, it expresses the firm rejection of so many armed interventions, particularly in Balkan Europe or Latin America, by the strong against the weak. The sovereignty of a nation is the first condition of its freedom. It was probably the genocide in Cambodia, when a government systematically exterminated part of its own population, that led to the absolute principle of non-interference being questioned. In 1988, the United Nations General Assembly accepted the principle of humanitarian interventions by non-governmental organisations under the aegis of the United Nations and, if necessary, with the support of armed forces, since assistance to victims must not be hindered either by the state affected or by neighbouring states. Humanitarian operations to protect the Iraqi Kurds stem from this new guideline. What has been called "a right to interfere" is rather "a duty to intervene" or "a duty to assist" allowing, outside any inter- state conflict, a reaction to serious, systematic violations of human rights or the rights of minorities committed by or with the complicity of a government. It is plain that there is a risk of conflict between two equally respectable principles: state sovereignty and right to assist. Mr. Boutros-Ghali has denied the right to interfere because this rather unfortunate expression contradicts one of the essential principles of the Charter, which is precisely non- interference in the internal affairs of states. However, he has admitted that a decision might be taken in special circumstances for emotional reasons, thus paving the way for new jurisprudence. The international community will therefore have to draw up new jurisprudence. It will be a matter of measure and balance and it will be difficult to avoid contradictions. The present proliferation of conflicts underlines the weaknesses of action by the United Nations: - Operations require the agreement of a majority in the Security Council and the approval of the five permanent members. However, the Council has often been paralysed and this might happen again. Moreover, is not the privileged role that the five great victorious powers gave themselves in 1945 excessive? Other states should be given the same prerogatives, to better reflect different world regions. - Interventions are liable to be selective in the light of the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council. - There can be no peace-making if the parties concerned do not wish to stop the fighting. Failing this, at best, the intervention of United Nations forces can but freeze an existing situation. At worst, it accustoms minds to accepting the results of aggression. - In the absence of a political solution, United Nations interventions are liable to drag on. United Nations observers and military forces have been in Kashmir since 1949, in Jerusalem since 1948 and in Cyprus since 1964. The perpetuation of large-scale operations would permanently jeopardise the organisation's finances and credibility. - Security Council resolutions, which are laborious political compromises, rarely provide a clear basis for correctly defining the aims of a (military) operation. Was Kuwait freed to restore the sovereignty of a state that your Rapporteur considers not very democratic and to punish the Iraqi aggression or to shatter Iraq's military power and nuclear ambitions and ensure supplies of cheap oil? Humanitarian operations should not be a disguised form of imperialism or neo- colonialism. The creation of a world-wide system of rules of democratic conduct has become more than ever necessary with the increasing interdependence of states. The notion of interdependence is progressing here and there. The signing of the treaty on the European economic area and the opening of negotiations for the accession of Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway herald the enlargement of the area of European interdependence, the best guarantee of stability for our continent. In his ambitious "Agenda for Peace", submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on 17th June 1992, the Secretary- General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, outlined future United Nations operations: "The terms preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace- keeping are integrally related and as used in this report are defined as follows: - Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. - Peace-making is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. - Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. The present report in addition will address the critically related concept of post-conflict peace building - action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peace-making and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples. These four areas for action, taken together, and carried out with the backing of all members, offer a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter. The United Nations has extensive experience not only in these fields, but in the wider realm of work for peace in which these four fields are set. Initiatives on decolonisation, on the environment and sustainable development, on population, on the eradication of disease, on disarmament and on the growth of international law - these and many others have contributed immeasurably to the foundations for a peaceful world. The world has often been rent by conflict and plagued by massive human suffering and deprivation. Yet it would have been far more so without the continuing efforts of the United Nations. This wide experience must be taken into account in assessing the potential of the United Nations in maintaining international security not only in its traditional sense, but in the new dimensions presented by the era ahead." The role of regional organisations is explicitly set out: "... should the Security Council choose specifically to authorise a regional arrangement or organisation to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort." This is why it is necessary to examine the possibilities and means of the CSCE, NATO and WEU (see Chapter VII). In recognising, in Helsinki in 1975, the intangibility of frontiers resulting from the second world war and human rights, the CSCE allowed detente to be started. It was in the framework of the CSCE that the thirty-four European countries subscribed to an order of peace and security in Paris in 1990. In Helsinki on 10th July 1992, it declared itself to be a regional organisation within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. In accordance with the same declaration the CSCE will intervene only with the agreement of all the parties to a conflict and after the establishment of a true cease-fire. Interventions might cover a wide range of activities: - deployment of a buffer force; - assistance to the administration; - observing respect for a cease-fire, disarmament or the withdrawal of belligerents; - humanitarian assistance and protection of refugees. In fact, the CSCE has hardly any effective instruments for settling disputes and preventing crises. Only since the Stockholm meeting on 15th December 1992 has it had a permanent Secretary-General. The crisis prevention centre set up after the Paris conference in November 1990 and the high commissioner for minorities, appointed on 15th December 1992, still have to prove their effectiveness. It is not compulsory to have recourse to the court of arbitration, also set up in December 1992, and its verdicts are not binding. Its creation was endorsed by only twenty-one of the fifty-four members. So, when the United Nations Secretary-General asked it, on 31st July 1992, "if the CSCE could play a role in mediating the peace-keeping requirement in Yugoslavia, in particular managing a mechanism for supervising the heavy weapons of the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina", the CSCE was not able to propose effective action in time. It merely sent a mission to examine the situation in the detention camps and sent observers to Vojvodina, Kosovo and the Sandjak to try to prevent the conflict spreading. While this was at least a start, the organisation of the CSCE will need considerable reinforcement if it is to be effective. However, at present it lacks efficient decision- making mechanisms and the organisational structures to mount peace-keeping operations. As for the means and roles of the Atlantic Alliance, this is essentially a defensive alliance whose members have undertaken to intervene to defend their countries against attack. It organises the participation of the North American allies in the defence of Western Europe and manages the security aspect of the transatlantic relationship. However, these tasks lost much of their raison d'etre with the end of East-West confrontation. Some have therefore sought other roles for the alliance: NATO interventions outside the area covered by the Washington Treaty or making available to the United Nations or a regional organisation, NATO infrastructure, communications, headquarters and, possibly, units. In Oslo in June 1992, the North Atlantic Council decided to take action on request under the aegis of the CSCE. On 2nd September NATO offered its support to the United Nations to protect humanitarian assistance and to control heavy weapons in Bosnia. NATO AWACS aircraft are monitoring Bosnian air space. In the Adriatic, the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean is helping to impose the embargo decided by the Security Council. A headquarters drawn from NORTHAG Headquarters is co-ordinating action by troops made available to the United Nations in Bosnia. On 17th December 1992, the allies agreed to develop their co- ordination for peace-keeping and said they were prepared also to act under the aegis of the United Nations on a case-by-case basis. Until now, several allies have ensured that contributions to out-of-area operations emanated clearly from individual nations. In this way, they wish the Atlantic Alliance to retain its main defence function and remain within the territorial and juridical limits of the treaty. At the time of writing however something of a struggle is developing between those on the one hand who would like to see NATO as such acting as the authority to implement the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia and those who prefer to develop the United Nations own embryonic organisation - an organisation which is little known and appreciated. Which is why your Rapporteur now includes a chapter in the present report to provide an overview of the "status quo ante": essential reading as an aid to understanding present problems with United Nations operations. III. The United Nations operational organisation - an overview ====================================================== Like many political institutions, the United Nations has been faced, virtually throughout its existence, with a deep gulf between theory and practice, between the principles and objectives of the Charter and political realities. The effort to bridge this gulf has been the main theme of nearly fifty years of the United Nations. Nowhere has the gulf between theory and practice been so evident as in the primary function of the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter's provisions for this purpose, based primarily on the activity of the Security Council and the unanimity of its permanent members, have never been permitted to function fully. Being unable to exercise the magisterial but relatively simple powers prescribed in the Charter, the Council has had to fall back on less well- defined measures - good offices, conciliation, mediation and delegation of responsibility to the Secretary-General. Of these less well-defined measures, the form of conflict control which is now known as peace-keeping is perhaps the most original and most ambitious. Peace-keeping is a technique not mentioned, let alone described, in the Charter. In fact it is in many ways a reversal of the use of military personnel foreseen in the Charter. It has been developed for situations where there is no formal determination of aggression. Its practitioners have no enemies, are not there to win, and can use force only in self-defence. Its effectiveness depends on voluntary co- operation. It is therefore remarkable that the United Nations has turned to various forms of this technique no less than twenty-six times and that peace-keeping is widely regarded as one of the organisation's most successful innovations. (a) The Charter The first of the purposes of the United Nations listed in its Charter is "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". Concrete measures to be taken by the United Nations Security Council, the principal organ which was vested with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to achieve this purpose are set out in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Chapter VI provides that international disputes "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" can be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Security Council is expressly mandated to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment and, in addition, to recommend actual terms of a settlement. The action of the Security Council in this context is limited to making recommendations: essentially, the peaceful settlement of international disputes must be achieved by the parties themselves, acting on a voluntary basis to carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the Charter. If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists, the Council may use the broad powers given it in Chapter VII of the Charter. In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Next, it may decide, under Article 41, what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed by the members of the United Nations, including the complete or partial interruption of economic relations, communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Should the Security Council consider such measures inadequate, it may take, under Article 42, "such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to restore international peace and security". For this purpose, all members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, the necessary armed forces, assistance and facilities. Plans for the application of armed force are to be made by the Security Council with the assistance of a Military Staff Committee. The measures outlined in Articles 41 and 42 constitute the core of the system of collective security envisaged by the Charter. A basic feature of this system is the determining role assigned to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. These Powers are permanent members of the Security Council and can block any of its substantive decisions by their veto. They also control the activities of the Military Staff Committee, which is made up exclusively of their military representatives. Consequently, the United Nations collective security system, and especially its key provision concerning the use of armed force, can work only if there is full agreement and co-operation among the permanent members. (b) A holding action During most of the United Nations history this condition has not been met. The evolution of international relations after the second world war quickly brought to the fore differences which existed among the member states, and in particular the five permanent members of the Security Council, and these inevitably affected the functioning of the organisation. New conflicts arose, particularly during the process of decolonisation, and many could not be resolved by peaceful means. A way had to be found to stop hostilities and to control conflicts so that they would not develop into broader conflagrations. Out of that need, United Nations peace-keeping operations evolved as, essentially, holding actions. There was not, and still is not, any particular theory or doctrine behind them. They were born of necessity, largely improvised, a practical response to a problem requiring action. The term "peace-keeping operation" did not gain currency until much later. As the United Nations practice has evolved over the years, a peace-keeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military police and civilian personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the "enforcement action" of the United Nations under Article 42. Peace-keeping operations have been most commonly employed to supervise and help maintain cease-fires, to assist in troop withdrawals, and to provide a buffer between opposing forces. However, peace-keeping operations are flexible instruments of policy and have been adapted to a variety of uses, including helping to implement the final settlement of a conflict. Peace-keeping operations are never purely military. They have always included civilian personnel to carry out essential political or administrative functions, sometimes on a very large scale, as, for instance, in the Congo operation or in the independence process in Namibia. In both those operations, and in several others, civilian police have also played an important role. It is difficult to subsume all these various operations under any one clause of the Charter. It is clear that they fall short of the provisions of Chapter VII described above, which deal with enforcement. At the same time they go beyond purely diplomatic means or those described in Chapter VI of the Charter. As former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjoeld put it, peace-keepin might be put in a new Chapter "Six and a Half". Initially, questions were raised about the legality of the United Nations' use of military personnel in a manner not specifically provided for in the Charter. In recent years, however, something close to consensus has developed that these operations can be considered as having a basis, apart from the principle of consent, in the broad powers conferred by the Charter upon the United Nations and especially the Security Council. (c) Characteristics In practice, there has evolved a broad degree of consensus on the essential characteristics of peace-keeping operations and on the conditions that must be met if they are to succeed. The first of these essential characteristics is that peace- keeping operations are set up only with the consent of the parties to the conflict in question. Their consent is required not only for the operation's establishment but also, in broad terms, for the way in which it will carry out its mandate. The parties are also consulted about the countries which will contribute troops to the operation. It is a key principle that the operation must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host countries and must not in any way favour one party against another. This requirement of impartiality is fundamental, not only on grounds of principle but also to ensure that the operation is effective. A United Nations operation cannot take sides without becoming a part of the conflict which it has been set up to control or resolve. For their part, the parties to the conflict are expected to provide continuing support to the operation by allowing it freedom of movement and other facilities which it needs to carry out its task. This co- operation is essential. The peace-keepers have no rights of enforcement and their use of force is limited to self-defence, as a last resort. This means that if a party chooses not to co- operate, it can effectively defy a peace-keeping operation. In line with the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, peace- keeping operations have mainly been established by the Council (though two were, exceptionally authorised by the General Assembly). This means that no operation can be established without a broad consensus within the international community that it is the right thing to do. It is the Security Council's responsibility to ensure that the operation is given a mandate which is clear, accepted by the parties concerned and practicable in the situation existing on the ground. Also essential is the continuing support of the Security Council, which may be asked by the Secretary-General to intervene if one or other of the parties fails to provide the necessary support and co-operation. If the mandate is unclear or ambiguous, the operation is likely to face recurrent difficulties and its activities may become controversial with the consequent risk that it may lose the necessary support of the Security Council or the necessary agreement of one of the parties concerned. Nevertheless, there have been times when the mandate of a peace- keeping operation has not been as clear as could have been wished, e.g., when the Security Council has decided that the primary requirement of international peace and security requires the creation of an operation even if it is clear from the outset that the operation will not easily achieve the objectives given to it. The military personnel who serve in peace-keeping operations are provided by member states on a voluntary basis. Once so provided, they pass under the command of the Secretary-General in all operational matters, as the Secretary-General is responsible for the direction of the operation and is required to report thereon at regular intervals to the Security Council. Those who serve in military observer missions are almost invariably unarmed. Those who serve in peace-keeping forces are equipped with light defensive weapons but are not authorised to use force except in self-defence. This right is exercised only sparingly because of the obvious danger that if a United Nations force uses its weapons its impartiality is, however unfairly, called in question. This requirement sometimes demands exceptional restraint on the part of soldiers serving in United Nations peace-keeping forces. Exceptional after-care for the troops is necessary on return home (both medical and sometimes psychiatric) and is emphasised in the Nordic countries. Finally, it is essential that the operation should have a sound financial basis. The financing of peace-keeping has been one of its most controversial and least satisfactory aspects. All operations should now be financed as agreed by obligatory contributions levied on member states. If the member states do not pay their contributions promptly and in full, the Secretary- General lacks the financial resources needed to reimburse to the troop-contributing governments the sums due to them. This means, in effect, that those governments have to pay an unfairly high share of the cost of the operation in question, in addition to sending their soldiers to serve in unpredictable and sometimes dangerous situations. Furthermore many countries are now seconding staff to UN Headquarters in New York at their own expense. (d) Peace-keeping and peace-making Peace-keeping operations have usually been mounted only after hostilities have already broken out. However, the Charter of the United Nations aims at a system of international relations wherein the use of force as a means of foreign policy is eliminated altogether. Consequently, the Charter deals at length with the peaceful settlement of disputes. This may be achieved by various means, including multilateral diplomatic efforts within the framework of the Security Council, bilateral efforts of member states, or through the good offices of the Secretary- General. These approaches to peace-making are by no means mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the organisation has been most successful when co-ordinated efforts were undertaken at all levels. In recent years, there has been a marked increase in the demand for the Secretary-General's good offices, with a view to helping the parties to a conflict to compose their differences. In responding to these demands, the Secretary-General has usually been able to rely on a formal request of the Security Council or the General Assembly. In some cases, peace-keeping operations were established as a direct result of agreements reached through his and others' diplomatic efforts, and in some cases - West Irian and Namibia are the best examples - as part of complex arrangements for the final and, in the end, peaceful settlement of the conflict. Peace-keeping operations are intended to be provisional and thus temporary measures. They can never, alone, resolve a conflict. Their tasks are essentially two: to stop or contain hostilities and thus help create conditions in which peace- making can prosper; or to supervise the implementation of an interim or final settlement which has been negotiated by the peace makers. Ideally, peace-keeping should move in step with peace-making in a combined effort leading to the peaceful resolution of a conflict. In practice this ideal cannot always be attained. Sometimes it is less difficult to keep a cease-fire in being than to negotiate away the causes of the original conflict. In such cases it is right for the Security Council to ask itself from time to time whether the peace-keeping operation has "become part of the problem" by protecting the parties from the consequences of their negotiating stands. But it should not be assumed that longevity means that a peace-keeping operation has failed; on the contrary, longevity may be a measure of its success in preventing a recurrence of hostilities in spite of the intractability of the conflict between the parties. United Nations peace-keeping operations can be divided into broad categories: observer missions, which consist largely of officers who are almost invariably unarmed; and peace-keeping forces, which consist of lightly armed infantry units, with the necessary logistic support elements. These categories are not, however, watertight. Observer missions are sometimes reinforced by infantry and/or logistic units, usually for a specific purpose and a brief period of time. Peace-keeping forces are often assisted in their work by unarmed military observers. IV. Composition and organisation of UN operations ================================================== (a) Composition A United Nations peace-keeping operation is considered a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, established consequent to a resolution of the Security Council or, exceptionally, of the General Assembly. (b) Chain of command United Nations peace-keeping operations are normally established by the Security Council and fall under its authority. The Secretary-General is responsible to the Council for the organisation, conduct and direction of the operation, and he alone reports to the Council about it. The Secretary- General keeps the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the operation. All matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the operation are referred to the Council for its decision. The Secretary-General is assisted in this regard by the Office for Special Political Affairs. (i) Command in the field Command of the operation in the field is exercised by a Force Commander, Chief Military Observer or Chief of Staff appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The commander is responsible to the Secretary-General. The commander exercises full command authority over the operation except for disciplinary questions. The commander has full authority with respect to all assignments of members of his headquarters staff and, through the chain of command, of all members of the operation, including the deployment and movements of all contingents in it and all units assigned to it. The contingents comprising the operation are integral parts of it and take their orders exclusively from the commander. The commander has general responsibility for the good order and discipline of the operation. (ii) Administration The Field Operations Division, in general terms, is responsible for organising the civilian administrative staff to support the operation and, in close collaboration with the Office for Special Political Affairs and the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance, makes arrangements for airlift of the contingents, prepares the final budgetary proposals for the operation and presents those proposals to the General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Assembly's Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee. Additionally, it arranges for the procurement of the necessary stores for the maintenance of the operation and directs the operations of the civilian administrative staff in the field. The following chart indicates the standard chain of command for United Nations peace-keeping operations. TABLE V. Command and control of UN operations: theory and practice The UN appears now to enjoy the widely accepted authority and legitimacy needed to invigorate the Security Council's mandate to "decide what measures shall be taken...to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations). But the organisation has yet to develop the minimal structural competence needed to initiate and direct the military operations which, if the last two years are a guide, are likely to be authorised by the Security Council. In other words, the UN lacks the necessary expertise to orchestrate who does what, when, where and how - that is, to exercise command and control (C2, or more properly as will be discussed below, "C3I" - to include communications and intelligence). Since there is little doubt that the post-cold war increase in calls upon the UN's peace-keeping and enforcement functions is a trend rather than an aberration, such an organisational defect is central to the question of the future effectiveness of the UN per se. Whether the UN can, or should, exercise direct control of military forces operating under its mandate, or whether it should delegate the conduct of operations to a lead state, or to ad hoc groups of nations, or to a regional organisation, is a closely related subject, but not one that can be adequately dealt with before the fundamental issue of political control has been resolved. Any C2 system must be structured to accommodate a broad range of inter-related political and military variables. Given that, following the stalemate of the cold war, the debate as to how best to promote the goal of international peace and security is just restarting, few, if any, of these variables may be considered in any way fixed. The aim is therefore to review some of the current issues and concerns regarding the political control of UN forces and examine the pressing need to establish some form of "UN Military planning cell". The link with Western European Union's very recent experience is obvious. It is worth restating that the first purpose of the UN, as enshrined in Article 1 of its Charter, is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace...". The drafters of the UN Charter, recognising the unfortunate fact that the use of force was unlikely to be avoided in the maintenance of peace and security, made provision within Chapter VII for the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the United Nations" (Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations). As a measure authorised by an international organisation, it is vitally important that the use of the "military instrument" in what might be described as UN-sponsored peace support operations - a term which embraces four main categories of UN activity (namely peace-making, peace-building, peace-enforcement (as authorised by the Chapter VII provisions of the Charter of the United Nations) and peace-keeping) should be perceived as a means to an end: i.e. the maintenance of international peace and security. Peace-making does not imply the projection of military force in order to impose a solution but, rather, is a diplomatic process perhaps more usefully described as "peace broking". "Peace building" is defined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in an "Agenda for Peace" as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict". In an "Agenda for Peace", Boutros Boutros-Ghali defines "peace-keeping" as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well". The suggestion here is that peace-keeping may be undertaken without the consent of all parties (i.e. "peace enforcement"). A variant on the preceding definitions has been developed in the Pentagon which has applied itself assiduously of late to an examination of the "whys and wherefores" of the United Nations. The definitions read as follows: - Peace-making: process of arranging an end to disputes, and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement, which may include military peace support operations; - Peace support operations: the umbrella term encompassing peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary or non-military action taken in support of a diplomatic peace-making process; - Peace-keeping: non-combat military operations (exclusive of self defence), undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute; - Humanitarian assistance: missions conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation which might present a serious threat to life, or result in a great loss of property; - Peace-enforcement: a form of combat, armed intervention, or the threat of armed intervention, that is pursuant to an international mandate authorising the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions - the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly accepted by the international community. In an "Agenda for Peace", Boutros Boutros-Ghali sketches his personal strategy for peace, which he also characterises as comprising four areas, namely preventive diplomacy (defined in an "Agenda for Peace", page 11, as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur"), peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace building. "These four areas for action, taken together, and carried out with the backing of all members, offer a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter. The United Nations has extensive experience not only in these fields, but in the wider realm of work for peace in which these four fields are set. Initiatives on decolonisation, on the environment and sustainable development, on population, on the eradication of disease, on disarmament and on the growth of international law - these and many others have contributed immeasurably to the foundations for a peaceful world. The world has often been rent by conflict and plagued by massive human suffering and deprivation. Yet it would have been far more so without the continuing efforts of the United Nations. This wide experience must be taken into account in assessing the potential of the United Nations in maintaining international security not only in its traditional sense, but in the new dimensions presented by the era ahead." (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an "Agenda for Peace".) In order to fulfil its primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security, the UN must therefore be sufficiently in control of the military assets operating under its mandate to ensure that the employment of those forces is effectively orchestrated with the other political, social and economic instruments available to the organisation. It is sometimes forgotten that the UN's activity also comprises sub- organisations or "sister-bodies" such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), etc., and that many non-governmental organisations (e.g. the Red Cross) are engaged in peace-building moves which are increasingly conducted alongside UN peace- keeping missions. When your Rapporteur visited the Headquarters of the International Red Cross in Geneva (which is working tirelessly with others to help those suffering in the former Yugoslavia) it quickly became obvious that there has to be much more co-operation between such bodies and the UN, UNHCR, etc. It follows that, as a minimum requirement, the Security Council, acting on behalf of the General Assembly in accordance with the Charter, must be able to exercise strategic direction of all assets operating under UN mandate such that those assets achieve the political object(s) for which they were deployed. The relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council can, with some justification, be characterised as a microcosm of the relationship between the developing and developed worlds. Whilst the cold war expedient of classic UN peace-keeping avoided the use of troops from the five permanent members of the Council, the recent increase in the level and complexity of operations - which demand both increased military sophistication and, often, scale of involvement - renders it much more likely that the permanent five will become militarily engaged. There is therefore a pressing requirement for the Security Council to evolve a system of accountability to the UN as a whole. Some degree of accountability to the General Assembly would go a long way to countering third world suspicions that the permanent five, either singly or collectively, manipulate the Security Council to pursue a "first world agenda". In the absence of action being delegated to a competent regional organisation (such as the CSCE, NATO or WEU), it is entirely probable that a lead state from amongst the permanent five will be required to take the initiative in future UN operations. Such action brings with it the reasonable expectation of that state (which, in a democracy at least, relies heavily on domestic consensus) that all necessary steps will be taken to minimise casualties. Shortcomings in C2 undoubtedly increase the likelihood of sustaining casualties as a result of both enemy and friendly fire: a distressingly high proportion of allied casualties sustained during the Gulf War, where C2 structures were highly sophisticated, resulted from "blue on blue" engagements. It is reasonable therefore to assume that lead states will, in the absence of an adequate UN structure, continue to insist on the use of national C2 structures. It is worth noting that neither NATO nor WEU have declared themselves as regional organisations under Articles 52 and 53 since they believe that this could then impair the prerogative to assert collective self defence under Article 51. In fact the UN itself obviously perceives both NATO and WEU as regional bodies and, for example, has been surprised to find that they shy away even from attending a forthcoming UN seminar on the subject. The subject must be thoroughly debated by the WEU Council in conjunction with the competent authorities. Likewise the Assembly should bring such matters into the open. In parallel the corollary that WEU action must usually take place under UN auspices should be properly examined. Much depends on such a principle: whether it be that WEU activity per se could conceivably thus be hostage to individual veto in the Security Council or whether such a principle is, for example, absolutely necessary to allow an individual member such as Germany to take its place alongside WEU partners "out of area". As far as logistics go, it is obvious that very few large- scale operations could take place without active American involvement given the USA's virtual monopoly of strategic sea and air lift, and intelligence-gathering facilities (although WEU's recently-inaugurated satellite centre at Torrejon near Madrid gives the Europeans something of a potential capability sadly lacking hitherto). WEU has been more pragmatic in other ways, however, and, anticipating involvement in roles such as the delivery of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, peace-keeping and peace- making, established a Military planning cell in October 1992. The cell's initial tasks include: creating listings of forces that member nations might make available for ad hoc WEU operations; preparing specific recommendations for the command and control of such operations; considering the requirement for WEU rules of engagement (ROE); planning logistics, transport and communications; and formulating an exercise policy. To date, the cumulative experience of the UN in military enforcement operations underlines the place that national command structures play in their conduct. Operations that have been mandated under Chapter VII include Southern Rhodesia, the 1991 Gulf war and, most recently, the Somalia incursion - but, interestingly, not the Korean war. In command and control terms, however, the Korean, Rhodesian, Gulf and Somali models are broadly similar in that, regardless of mandate or colour of helmet, national command structures were utilised on each occasion. However rational this may have been in purely military terms, its inevitable result was to isolate, from both the political and military decision-making loops, the very organisation under whose authority the operation had been mandated. Javier Perez de Cuellar has been quoted as saying: "The (Gulf) war is not a classic United Nations war in the sense that there is no United Nations control of the operations, no United Nations flag, (blue) beret, or any engagement of the Military Staff Committee. What we know about the war, which I prefer to call hostilities, is what we hear from the three members of the Security Council which are involved, Britain, France and the United States - which every two or three days report to the Council after the actions have taken place. The Council, which has authorised all this, (is informed) only after the military activities have taken place." The UN's international credibility is at stake. Further harm will only be alleviated to the extent that the UN is enabled to develop, and exercise, the military competence required to direct any military assets deployed under its mandate. (a) The Military Staff Committee The above points were not, of course, lost on the framers of the UN Charter. Appreciating the need for the provision of sound military advice to the Security Council, the Charter provided outline terms of reference and membership for a Military Staff Committee (MSC), which "shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council" (Article 47 of the Charter of the United Nations). However, recognising that military command structure would vary according to the composition of the force - and, presumably, aware that the subordination of national forces to international command was too complex and thorny a question to address directly - the Charter then confines itself to directing that "Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently." (Article 47.3 of the Charter of the United Nations). There are some who argue that the MSC provides a quite adequate model on which to base the development of any future UN military staff. An early victim of the cold war, the MSC nevertheless made considerable progress in fleshing out the bones of its Charter mandate before finally succumbing to the political realities of a bi-polar world. In a report (dated 30th April 1947) to the Secretary-General, the Chairman of the MSC forwarded details of the Committee's recommendations on the "General principles governing the organisation of the armed forces made available to the Security Council by member nations of the United Nations". The principles examined included consideration of the purpose of armed forces, their composition, overall strength, contributions by member nations, employment, degree of readiness, provision of assistance and facilities, logistical support, general location, and - last but not least - strategic direction and command. In view of their relevance to the subject of C2, the general principles recommended in this last domain are reproduced in full at the end of this chapter. Frustrated perhaps by the fact that in "the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the (Security) Council chose to authorise member states to take measures on its behalf" (an "Agenda for Peace", paragraph 42), Boutros Boutros-Ghali clearly supports the resurrection of the MSC: "I recommend that the Security Council initiate negotiations in accordance with Article 43, supported by the Military Staff Committee, which may be augmented if necessary by others in accordance with Article 47, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It is my view that the role of the Military Staff Committee should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of the planning or conduct of peace-keeping operations" (an "Agenda for Peace", paragraph 43). It is equally clear, however, that this call for a return to the letter of the Charter does not excite universal enthusiasm, and particularly amongst those member states who would likely be required to provide the bulk of the forces needed to conduct any action contemplated under Chapter VII. A number of modern supporters of the MSC also subscribe to the notion of stand-by UN forces ("on call" rather than "standing"). Boutros Boutros-Ghali argues that: "the option of taking (military action to maintain or restore international peace and security) is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security. This will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby member states undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes states in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis" (an "Agenda for Peace", paragraph 43). An alternative approach, and one that is currently receiving much attention, not least in WEU, is that of "earmarked" capabilities. The earmarking of national forces is seen as the only realistic way flexibly to generate the forces required for the wide range of UN military operations now envisaged. A "standard building block" concept, with each block providing an operational capability, would enable a multinational force to be tailored to suit the requirement. The UN Office of Peace-Keeping has mandated a Stand-by Force Planning Group consisting of a team of officers from France (Chairman), the Argentine, Canada, Denmark, Ghana, Pakistan and Poland, to study past and present peace-keeping operations to determine the "building blocks" from which future peace-keeping operations might be constructed. The countries concerned have been chosen on the basis of an equitable geographic representation and in the light of peace-keeping experience. The terms of reference require the group "to develop a system of stand-by forces able to be deployed as a whole or in parts by the beginning of 1994 anywhere in the world at the Secretary- General's request within an agreed response time for United Nations duties as mandated by the Security Council". The first phase of the exercise, scheduled for completion in May 1993, is to examine the way in which a UN Stand-by Force should be created and to prepare a doctrine for its employment, together with appropriate procedures. The second phase of the initiative will involve the same team approaching each of the 65 governments currently supplying troops, facilities, capabilities or finance for current peace- keeping missions with a request that they stipulate the full range of capabilities they would be willing to supply to the UN, under what limiting conditions, with what stated lead times, etc. The study should prepare the ground for establishing a flexible range of forces which while in no way representing a UN Standing Army would be available for use with minimum delay. Nations would be asked to stipulate the lead times for putting Stand-by Forces at the UN's disposition and these would be written into the required memorandum of understanding. Such an exercise will, of course, also elicit information on the capacity of states to participate in the full range of contingencies envisaged by Chapter VII. The advantage from the viewpoint of governments is that this would allow them a commitment that is limited and conditional - thus avoiding possible political difficulties with the use of forces more formally "earmarked". The countries which have been in the forefront of providing such forces over a number of years are those from the Nordic region: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. A study on their provisions is included at Chapter VI. (b) Finance Whilst there are undoubted advantages - notably the deterrent value of readily available forces, the physical demonstration of collective will, and the opportunity to develop and exercise tactical doctrine - stand-by forces also suffer from a lack of operational flexibility and, more importantly when considering an international force that must be supported by national contributions, demand sustained financial support. It is significant that, in the covering letter to his 1947 report, the Chairman of the MSC drew "the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the question of financial expenditures which might arise in connection with the fulfilment by countries, members of the United Nations, of measures envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter, has not been reflected in the recommendations prepared". Such concerns are directly addressed in Chapter IX of an "Agenda for Peace", which makes various proposals to deal with the current high levels of unpaid contributions, and seeks to establish a peace-keeping reserve fund (at a level of $50 million), to authorise commercial borrowing, and to establish a UN peace endowment fund in order to finance the initial costs of "authorised peace-keeping operations, other conflict resolution measures and related activities" (an "Agenda for Peace", paragraph 70). To put typical current costs into perspective it is worth noting that the cost of one day of the Desert Storm operation reputedly equated to the whole of the UN's 1991 peace-keeping budget. One hopeful sign on the financial side is that the reserve fund for peace-keeping operations, agreed last December by the UN General Assembly, is now a reality. The first beneficiaries are the operations in Angola, on the frontier between Kuwait and Iraq and in El Salvador. The fund has already lent a total of some 170 million French francs to "allow certain operations to face up to a temporary lack of liquidity". (c) Functions of a UN Military planning cell The obvious conclusion is that, regardless as to whether the Charter provisions for an MSC can or indeed should be revived, the UN must, as a matter of urgency, develop an effective in- house military competence - which in turn must involve the development of a permanent UN military staff, based in New York. This is not a new idea, but it is one that merits urgent and detailed consideration by both the UN secretariat and individual member states. Your Rapporteur believes that WEU's own experience in conceiving (notably with support from its Assembly in general and its Defence Committee in particular) and creating such a planning cell should be of inestimable value in the UN context. Hence one of the specific draft recommendations included with the present report. It was obvious during your Rapporteur's fact-finding mission to the UN in New York that the authorities there would much appreciate any advice which would be forthcoming from the WEU planning cell and are particularly interested in the pragmatic approach WEU has brought to setting up our new structure. The tasks to be delegated to a military staff will depend on the extent to which the UN expects to exercise political and/or military control over armed forces operating under its mandate. At the very least such a staff, given the political aims of an operation by the Security Council, should undertake the following tasks: (a) determine the military objectives required to achieve the political aims; (b) decide the force structure required to achieve the military objectives, within the required time- scale; (c) develop appropriate command structures; (d) develop, and advise on changes to, rules of engagement. Other tasks that a UN military staff should undertake include: (a) the monitoring and recording of the status of national forces available for assignment to UN operations; (b) the co-ordination, processing and dissemination of intelligence; (c) the preparation and maintenance of contingency plans for UN military deployments; (d) the development of standard operating procedures for use in UN military operations; (e) the co-ordination of logistic, financial and administrative functions in support of UN military operations; (f) the analysis of collective UN military experience, and the development of a core training curriculum to assist member states to train national military and civil personnel in the specialised techniques unique to UN multinational military operations. As far as (e) above is concerned, it is surprising to note that, for traditional peace-keeping operations, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in charge of a peace- keeping mission reports to the Secretary-General through the Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping - whilst all logistic and administrative functions associated with the same mission are staffed through the Head of Field Operations Division (FOD), who reports to the Under Secretary-General for Management. This functional split in current UN procedures and lack of co- ordination, while hardly ideal for peace-keeping, is clearly unfit for the conduct of higher-level operations, where any lack of co-ordination between "teeth" and "tail" will invite disaster. It is obvious that the situation must be improved and that UN Headquarters should be equipped with a fully-fledged situation centre manned on a proper 24-hour watch-keeping basis and properly co-ordinated. Regarding (f) above, a Swedish Colonel in New York is in the process of developing such a core curriculum for the United Nations. As with Stand-by Forces it is the Nordic countries who are the most advanced in organising and running UN training courses, initially for themselves but now for a whole range of countries (see Chapter VI). The Norwegian Minister of Defence has recently suggested setting up a UN peace-keeping academy for the education and training of high-ranking officers and officials. The "unfreezing of history" triggered by the end of the cold war has not only created the opportunity to reappraise and re- order the "peace support" machinery of the United Nations but also, by removing many of the certainties of the "old world order", has created the particular circumstances which imply a greater need for its use. At the same time, a growing emphasis on basic human rights is calling traditional views of sovereignty into question. Thus, whilst there will surely be a continuing requirement for classic UN peace-keeping, it is clear that the UN, through the Security Council, will increasingly be drawn into situations which can only be addressed under Chapter VII of its Charter. The use of the "military instrument" by the UN is unambiguously mandated in Article 42 of the Charter. Regrettably, however, the Charter provision to establish a Military Staff Committee (MSC) "to advise...on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements (Article 47 of the Charter of the United Nations) was an early victim of the cold war (although the MSC has valiantly continued to meet, almost on a weekly basis, since the beginning). The UN, therefore, lacking in-house military competence, is currently ill-equipped to retain either political or military control of any Chapter "VI 1/2" or VII operations it may authorise. It is axiomatic that authority and accountability go hand in hand, and it is for precisely this reason that, aware of the UN's structural deficiencies, those nations or groups of nations to whom the UN delegates the conduct of operations currently insist on using their own command structures - and by so doing, are marginalising the UN's legitimacy, credibility and, ultimately, utility. If the UN is to wield the "military instrument" on behalf of the world community, it must, at the very least, exercise control of that instrument. To accomplish this the organisation must develop the necessary military competence. Resurrection of the existing MSC is not a realistic option. The creation of a "Military planning cell", authorised as a "provisional measure" under the terms of Article 40 of the Charter and tasked along the lines proposed above, would provide the UN with the minimum competence needed to exercise effective control of military operations undertaken under its auspices. As promised there follows the extract from "General principles governing the organisation of the armed forces made available to the National Security Council by member nations of the United Nations: report of the Military Staff Committee". Extract from "General principles governing the organisation of the armed forces made available to the National Security Council by member nations of the United Nations: report of the Military Staff Committee" (30th April 1947) (See paragraph 78) Chapter X - strategic direction and command of armed forces Article 36 The armed forces which member nations of the United Nations agree to make available to the Security Council shall be under the exclusive command of the respective contributing nations, except when operating under the Security Council. Article 37 When these forces are called upon for the fulfilment of measures envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter, they shall come under the control of the Security Council. Article 38 During the period these armed forces are employed by the Security Council, the Military Staff Committee shall be responsible, under the Security Council, for their strategic direction. The time and place at which the Military Staff Committee will assume or relinquish strategic direction will be designated by the Security Council. Article 39 The command of national contingents will be exercised by commanders appointed by the respective member nations. These contingents will retain their national character and will be subject at all times to the discipline and regulations in force in their own national armed forces. Article 40 The commanders of national contingents will be entitled to communicate directly with the authorities of their own country on all matters. Article 41 Text accepted by the delegations of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America: An overall commander or overall commanders of armed forces made available to the Security Council may be appointed by the latter, on the advice of the Military Staff Committee, for the period of employment of these forces by the Security Council. Text accepted by the delegations of France and the United Kingdom: A supreme commander or supreme commanders of armed forces made available to the Security Council may be appointed by the latter, on the advice of the Military Staff Committee, for the period of employment of these forces by the Security Council. Commanders-in-chief of land, sea and air forces acting under the supreme commander or commanders mentioned above may be appointed by the Security Council on the advice of the Military Staff Committee. VI. Nordic UN Stand-by Forces and Nordic UN Co-operation ========================================================= (a) Background and basic structure At the sixth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1952 it was proposed that national stand-by forces should be formed and that the services of these forces could be called upon in the event of an international crisis. Subsequent to this proposal no action was taken by the Nordic countries until the Secretary- General, Dag Hammarskjoeld, in his report to the thirteenth Geeral Assembly referred to this recommendation. In a letter dated 12th June 1959, the Secretary-General approached the nations which were participating or had participated in the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in the Middle East (UNEF I) with a petition that these member states in their national military planning should allow for possible future UN requests for peace-keeping forces. After discussions in the early sixties, the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden agreed in 1964 to a basic composition of Nordic Stand-by Forces at UN disposal. The formation of units was mainly based on appreciation's made in the 1950s and to some extent on experience gained from UNEF I. In the spring of 1968 the organisation and other relevant data of the Nordic Stand-by units at UN disposal were sent to the Secretary-General, at the request of the UN's "Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations". Lessons learnt in the 1970s in connection with the UNFICYP (Cyprus) and UNEF II missions as well as the employment of units from the Nordic Stand-by Forces at UN disposal in peace-keeping operations have led to certain structural changes in the composition of the units within the framework of the Nordic countries' national obligations as compared to the original organisation. National law and regulations specified the maximum number of units and personnel that could be at UN disposal. In addition to units accounted for within the framework of UN commitments the Nordic countries have organised temporary and smaller units for a limited contribution following a request from the UN secretariat. (b) The Nordic UN Stand-by Forces The UN stand-by units are organised, equipped, trained, and mobilised by the national military authorities concerned according to regulations issued by the governments (Ministries of Defence) of the respective countries. UN contingents, battalions or smaller units drawn from the Nordic Stand-by Forces should be able at short notice to be placed at the disposal of the UN for peace-keeping missions. Most of the units within the Nordic UN Stand-by Forces are set up in such a way that their numerical strength can be increased or reduced according to UN requests. Adjustments in the organisation can also be made from time to time as required during the course of the operation. This flexibility also allows for the organisation to be augmented by limited additional elements, should the need for this become apparent during the course of the operation. The organisation, equipment and training of the various units are continuously being modified as mentioned above. Continued studies of the use of a UN force from previous and current UN missions form the basis data for revisions. When organising national units of similar character, the Nordic countries have been co-operating in certain matters. In order to meet possible future requirements within the framework of peace-keeping and possibly relief-giving operations continuous liaison is kept up to deal with: - new experiences; - improvements in equipment; - revision of existing organisation; - procurement of estimated new requirements; - new unit establishments; - training; - states of alert; - mobilisation situation. Apart from certain regular officers and NCOs, the personnel of the units are mainly selected on a voluntary basis partly from personnel who have done their national service as conscripts and partly from enlisted men. As most applicants are already trained for some civil trade or profession it follows that the Nordic countries' yearly selection boards have an unusually high percentage of craftsmen and qualified technical personnel to choose from. As a result of this an added capability of "self- help" has been absorbed within the units. The Nordic UN Stand-by Forces are composed so that they can fulfil any demand and specific suggestion on organisation and equipment that will be found in the guidelines issued by the UN HQ New York for governments contributing troops to a certain mission. The Nordic UN battalion is approximately 500 to 800 all ranks, normally consisting of the HQ and headquarters unit plus two to five rifle companies. Within the framework of the Stand-by Forces of all the Nordic countries there are staff officers who are meant to form part of a UN HQ staff within a UN mission. Staff personnel should be able to serve in various positions and levels on the UN HQ staff. Positions that should be filled are those within, for example, operations, logistics, information, personnel, liaison, engineering and humanitarian branches. Staff personnel within the national Stand-by Forces can be on immediate call and can be posted within 24 hours. Military police teams operate either independently or together with other units from national contingents within the UN force and are trained to carry out: - traffic control; - maintenance of law and order; - accident and crime investigation; - guarding, registration and possible evacuation of refugees; - assistance to local police. Movement control personnel consist of a number of movement control officers and NCOs who plan road, rail, air and sea transports and supervise these movements within a UN area of operation. The personnel will require appropriate equipment as well as local labour in order to maintain proper terminal services. Military observers are used for various supervisory duties within the framework of a UN mission. The observers have usually had previous service with the UN or have had special training in UN observer duties. (c) Recruiting and training Recruiting and selection of personnel for Nordic UN Stand-by Forces is carried out according to national procedures. As most of the personnel are selected on a voluntary basis, campaigns are organised through the armed forces, public information services and in liaison with labour exchanges. Among the WEU nations, the Netherlands is considering a scheme for recruiting volunteers for the United Nations, proposing two-year contracts after national service. The Swedish Parliament at the end of 1992 approved a new Act concerning Armed Forces for Service Abroad. The Act is a model of simplicity and may well serve as an example. It reads as follows and entered into force on 1st January 1993: The Act concerning Armed Forces for Service Abroad The following is hereby prescribed. Section 1 At the request of the United Nations or in accordance with a decision taken by the Conference on Security and Co- operation in Europe, the Government has the right to make available armed forces for peace-keeping operations abroad. Section 2 Armed forces for peace-keeping operations abroad shall consist of personnel recruited for the purpose. This personnel shall be recruited to a force for service abroad organised under the military authorities. Section 3 A maximum of three thousand persons from the said force may serve abroad at any one time. Training for service with the UN is a supplementary form of training beyond the normal conscript, NCO and officer training. The scope and the time available vary somewhat between the Nordic countries. The aim of the training is to give the volunteer some idea of the conditions under which he will carry out his tasks. The training consists of: - general information concerning the UN organisation and peace-keeping operations; - knowledge about the climatic and topographical conditions in the area as well as the cultural and religious situation in the area; - basic knowledge concerning how a soldier carries out his tasks as a peace-keeper; - information about the conditions under which UN service is performed; - training in the function to which he is allocated in the organisation of a stand-by unit. For a limited number of officers and NCOs certain basic UN training has been organised yearly in the Nordic countries in order to facilitate international teamwork within a UN mission. The courses are for staff officers, military police personnel, logistics and movement control officers and military observers. The UN courses are organised and run by the host nation. The appropriate military authorities of the respective Nordic countries consult with each other before the course plans are confirmed and the military instructors to all UN courses are appointed. The course staff and the instructors are drawn from all Nordic countries. (d) Nordic military UN peace-keeping co-operation The peace-keeping activities of the Nordic countries are characterised by extensive mutual co-operation. At the beginning, in the 1950s, the co-operation consisted only of the organisation, equipment and dispatch of troops but nowadays it also includes Nordic officers UN training and other activities. The working body for the Nordic military UN co-operation is the Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN) which is composed of the respective military UN authorities of each Nordic country. An essential feature of the NORDSAMFN activities is the endeavour to benefit from the experience gained in peace-keeping operations and the current problems in such way that the Nordic UN units and their preparedness correspond to the needs of the United Nations at all times. Nordic military UN peace-keeping co-operation activities Twice a year Conference of the Ministers of Defence - General outlines Several times a year Conference of NORDSAMFN - Agenda for the conference of the Ministers of Defence - Courses for officers and NCOs - Experiences from present UN missions - Preparedness Annually Conference of Nordic Economic Working Committee Conference of Ad Hoc committees Transport Planning Committee The supreme body for Nordic UN co-operation is the meeting of the Ministers of Defence which is held twice a year. The Nordic Ministers of Defence have appointed a special Nordic Economic Working Committee for dealing with matters affecting the financing of UN peace-keeping activities. In addition to matters of general economic interest the committee is investigating the possibility of the reciprocal adjustment of economic benefits in connection with Nordic participation. Another problem which has been a subject of study is the guiding principles for regulating reimbursements in connection with a UN mission. When units from more than one Nordic nation take part in a new UN peace-keeping mission NORDSAMFN can, when necessary, act as the co-ordinating authority for the Nordic countries concerning the preparation of the effort, the co-ordination of transport, and general management of matters of a common nature. In this connection there will be close liaison with the Nordic economic working committee in order to lay down the general basis for calculating claims for compensation and the procedure for presenting these claims to the UN. NORDSAMFN also co-ordinates the preliminary UN peace-keeping training programme for Nordic officers and NCOs, which is shared as follows: Course Country responsible UN Military Police Course = UNMILPOC (once a year) Denmark UN Military Observer Course = UNMOC (twice a year) Finland UN Logistics Officers Course = UNLOC (every second year) Norway UN Movement Control Course = UNMOVCC (every second year) Norway UN Staff Officers Course = UNSOC (once a year) Sweden Nordic UN Seminar Alternates between (every third year) the Nordic countries Such is the current interest in these courses that many of them are now being run much more frequently. In addition the range of countries participating has increased considerably. For example, in addition to the four Nordic countries, the last UN Staff Officers Course held at Almnaes near Stockholm comprised officers of some fourteen nationalities. A number of countries (e.g., Austria, France, Poland and Switzerland) are interested in running similar schemes themselves. Ideally of course the UN iself should be organising such training, perhaps on a regional basis... NORDSAMFN plans and conducts the Nordic UN Seminar, in which persons at command level within Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defence and Defence Staffs participate. The purpose of the seminar is to deal with questions connected with UN peace-keeping operations. During the seminar there is a follow-up and analysis of the experience acquired from past and current operations in which the Nordic countries have participated or are participating. The intention is that this will lead to improved and more effective contributions to future UN undertakings. (e) Considerations and factors in connection with a UN peace-keeping mission - the Nordic experience The decision-making process in UN Headquarters in New York The time taken to assemble a force of the kind envisaged will then depend on when the countries approached submit their replies. In this connection their representatives in New York play an important role as intermediaries. If the countries approached privately have replied affirmatively they will receive an official request from the Secretary-General in the form of a note. The question of the financing of a peace-keeping operation may be brought up already in the resolution of the Security Council. As the budget for the operation can only be determined as time goes on the Secretary-General must in the initial stages of the operation make use of the special authorisation he has for obtaining the necessary funds. These funds are designed to defray the costs incurred by the troop-contributing countries on transportation to the mission area, on providing their units with equipment and material and also that portion of the pay and allowances paid to personnel which the UN has undertaken to refund. Over and above these costs funds are needed for salaries of the civilian personnel, for administrative costs in connection with the contributions as well as for materials supplied by the UN and their maintenance. Preparations for the operation are now entering the practical stage in that questions of transportation and maintenance take priority, usually against a deadline. The contacts between the UN Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries now take place also through the permanent delegations to UN and here it is of great importance as regards the professional handling of the issues involved if these delegations have military experts as regular members of their staffs. This is the case in respect of comparatively few countries, although all the Nordic countries. Even though this is not specifically stated in the resolution that has initiated the operation the Secretary-General submits a situation report as the end of each mandate period approaches. Where appropriate the report includes a recommendation that the mandate for the UN force be extended, though as a rule this has been preceded by consultations with the host country or the parties to the conflict. Before the question of a possible extension of the mandate is taken up in the Security Council the Secretary-General must also ascertain that the troop- contributing countries are willing to continue to take part in the operation. If the question of a UN peace-keeping operation is blocked in the Security Council the matter can be referred to the General Assembly in accordance with what is known as the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. This was approved by the General Assembly on 3rd November 1950 in connection with the UN initiative in Korea and was implemented on the creation of UNEF I (General Assembly Resolution 997/1956). However, for a decision of the General Assembly to be valid it must be supported by a majority of at least two-thirds (UN Charter, Article 18:2). Critics of the present system argue that more adequate pre- planning for peace-keeping should be undertaken so as to enable the organisation to respond rapidly when the situation demands it. Such critics have always minimised the enormous political difficulties that have thus far prevented any public pre- planning for peace-keeping in the United Nations Secretariat. They have also not taken sufficiently into account the reluctance of governments to make the necessary financial outlays that may be necessary, in the absence of any specific crisis, to organise an effective military staff to prepare contingency plans. VII. The way ahead: a role for WEU? ==================================== It will be obvious from the preceding chapters that much remains to be done to give the UN a specific and an efficient command structure. First of all, however, the member nations of the organisation, and especially of the Security Council, must come to the political agreement that action should be taken; they must therefore re-express their faith in the UN. The first stage in the process is the report by the UN Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations examining the Secretary-General's suggestions advanced in his "Agenda for Peace" which is expected imminently and which should bring matters to a head. As we reach the 50th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations what could be more appropriate than to invest the UN with the means to fulfil the new vocation outlined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Opinions may still be divided on exactly how much of the "Agenda for Peace" could be applied and in what time scale but it points in the right general direction. The greatest service the WEU countries might perform would be to convince our NATO partner, the United States, to give the ideas a chance to succeed. Your Rapporteur was assured by the US Delegation in New York that the new Washington administration had an open mind on the subject: there is therefore an ideal "window of opportunity" - a chance to be seized now before it is too late. The US gesture in putting their troops taking part in the UNOSOM II operation in Somalia under non-US command for the first time is perhaps an indicator and should serve as a precedent. The sine qua non on the European side of the Atlantic, at least amongst the WEU nations, is that some of us need to modify our somewhat cynical attitude to the United Nations (however justified such cynicism may have been in the past with regard, for example, to the machinations of UNESCO). The argument that the UN is not properly equipped will no longer hold water if we will not agree to provide what is needed. The thorny problem of whether or not WEU should be declared a regional organisation under the terms of the UN Charter is discussed in Chapter V and is the subject of a specific draft recommendation. Your Rapporteur raised the subject with the Secretary-General and in addition a written question has been posed to the Council concerning the necessity for WEU to be mandated by the UN for particular action. The WEU Secretary- General appears to think not, but much is riding on such considerations and the debate should now be brought into open forum. Meanwhile on the practical side attitudes are changing. Many of our delegations in New York now include a military representative to provide appropriate advice. Some 20 countries (including a number of WEU nations) are in the process of seconding officers at national expense to the United Nations to augment the present tiny military staff. With regard to "stand-by forces", while WEU countries do not generally have formal arrangements for forces earmarked especially for UN operations, most have contingency arrangements for fairly rapid deployment of some measure of force. Tied in with this is the obvious need both for adequate air and sealift to "reach the right place at the right time". Such matters are under particular consideration in WEU at present: the UN parameter should now be added as a subject for reflection and recommendation. On the ground (and at sea and in the air) many of our countries are making available large numbers of the well-trained for UN operations, with France and Britain leading in sheer numbers; Italy, Spain and the Netherlands making large contributions also and other members sending contingents "beyond the call of duty". (For example, Luxembourg has virtually 10% of its armed forces in former Yugoslavia.) Most of our countries have also contributed ships and/or aircraft to help enforce embargo action in the Adriatic. A number are presently offering personnel and equipment for the WEU operation to stiffen controls on the Danube (see the parallel report of the Defence Committee: "WEU initiatives on the Danube", Joint Rapporteurs: Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed). Training also. Some would have us believe that because an army is superbly professional and equipped for every eventuality it is necessarily apt for all the gradations of peace-keeping outlined in previous chapters. Not so, your Rapporteur argues. Peace-keeping is an acquired science, as the Nordic countries have long since realised. The United Kingdom has devised a card system for briefing the individual soldier on his own rules of engagement - what he may and may not do in a given situation. This scheme has been used to effect by British forces in Bosnia and should be extended on a UN-wide basis. What is required however is a UN centre for the exchange of ideas, plus a "data bank" where details of individual operations could be held in a sort of collective memory. Such a centre might save valuable time. At present it is the four Nordic nations who together provide a "collective memory" for the UN and a common training system. Ideally the UN itself should sponsor and run a "UN staff college" as well as specialised schools for logistics, communications, etc. Given financial as well as political problems it will be some time before the creation of a centre is possible or even probable. Meanwhile WEU, which has already mandated the Defence Representatives Group to examine ways of co-ordinating training, internally should actively seek to co- operate on training for the UN with the Nordic countries. Training co-operation on such a regional basis may well be the best solution for the foreseeable future and this European model could serve as an example for other parts of the world. "Logistics" is another area which requires particular attention. Not so much in traditional NATO terms such as "standardisation" and "interoperability", although these are obviously important, but more simply in levels of equipment and in availability. The UN is sadly lacking in any procurement capability and stories are legion of "solar topees being issued in freezing weather and arctic footwear in the desert". Even allowing for exaggeration a problem does exist. Questions such as stocking of equipment, prepositioning, transport, etc., must be tackled and maybe the embryonic WEU European Armaments Agency should be tasked with examining such considerations. Of course as in so many other realms the bottom line for all these considerations is the finance. The UN's problem in financing operations has already been mentioned. Certain countries have been very tardy in making their due contributions, although apparently the situation is now less dramatic than hitherto. The "receiving end" is also not without its problems. The UN pays troops on a flat rate system, regardless of nationality or background. Some countries are therefore very much in profit, others the reverse. Boutros Boutros-Ghali in "An Agenda for Peace" draws attention to various aspects of the financial structure of the UN and makes proposals which appear reasonable. Where WEU nations are concerned we might examine another aspect of the problem, from a budgetary angle. We are all in the process of reducing our defence budgets but your Rapporteur would recommend that rather than aim for straight reductions we should diversify and direct our defence efforts towards support for the UN. The UN as an idea receives a great deal of goodwill from the electorate which should be reflected and encouraged by parliamentarians. The UN Secretary-General has also suggested that defence budgets should be used increasingly to fund the UN, but why not seek finance from national overseas development budgets too? The UN's humanitarian effort is now often inextricably linked with peace-keeping operations and the link could therefore be emphasised nationally. Thus in practical terms rather than for semantic reasons WEU should be prepared increasingly to interact with the UN. While NATO seems at times to be seeking a role to justify a continued existence in the post-cold war world WEU has a more pragmatic approach, realising its current limitations and that it is only "the sum of its parts", in political terms. The UN is likely to appreciate practical advice to create its own organisation more from the body which has recent experience in structuring itself than from those who would merely substitute themselves for the body they were supposedly helping! Your Rapporteur's draft recommendations are therefore designed both to be not only feasible but also to appeal to our governments as being worth doing if we are to try to make sure that the UN fulfils its new vocation. 1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. de Puig (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Borderas, Brito, Chevalier, Cox (Alternate: Thompson), De Carolis, De Decker, Dees, Fernandes Marques, Ferrarini, Hardy, Irmer (Alternate: Feldmann), Jung, Kelchtermans, Leccisi (Alternate: Caccia), Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Mannino (Alternate: Paire), Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Pecchioli, Perinat, Reis Leite, Scheer, Sir Keith Speed (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston), MM. Steiner, Vazquez, Zierer, N... (Alternate: Baumel), N... (Alternate: Jacquat), N... (Alternate: Masseret). ------- For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com