/pub/history/military/a-weu/document File: 1370polc.mar Document 1370 24th May 1993 European security policy - reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council ______ REPORT (1) submitted on behalf of the Political Committee (2) by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur ______ TABLE OF CONTENTS EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. Competition and co-operation III. Sources of European insecurity (a) Russia (b) Other successor states of the former Soviet Union (c) Migration and refugees (d) Ethnic and nationalist conflicts (e) Risks originating from outside Europe IV. Objectives of a European security policy V. The future of transatlantic relations VI. The importance of arms control and verification VII. The role of nuclear weapons in European defence VIII. The Franco-German relationship and the defence of Europe IX. The institutions (a) The European Community (b) NATO (c) WEU (d) Council of Europe (e) CSCE (f) United Nations X. The future (a) Military improvements (b) Political improvements XI. Conclusions ------------------------ Draft Recommendation ==================== on European security policy - reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council The Assembly, (i) Aware that the replacement of the former threat of a massive attack by the Warsaw Pact by the risk of smaller-scale conflicts has not improved stability in Europe; (ii) Considering that in these circumstances all existing security organisations have a role to play in ensuring and preserving peace and security; (iii) Considering that Western European countries will have to assume their responsibilities in a number of security issues which are apparently less vital for their North American allies; (iv) Noting that, apart from the criteria for recognition of new states adopted by the European Council, there is an urgent need for a more detailed definition of the rights of peoples to self-determination; (v) Noting that, without close co-operation between member states of the EC in intelligence-gathering and analysis, a common European foreign and security policy cannot be alert and effective; (vi) Aware that the deep changes in Europe since the end of the cold war are influencing the respective responsibilities of both the United States and Western Europe to such a degree that the transformation of the old transatlantic bargain into a new partnership should be considered, as this could reinforce the existing close relationship and safeguard it for the future; (vii) Aware that geostrategic changes have also influenced the role of nuclear weapons in European security; (viii) Noting that the work of the WEU military planning cell is of the greatest importance in preparing any operational activity by WEU; (ix) Considering that, for the implementation of an effective European foreign and security policy, it is also vital for the EC, in conjunction with WEU, to start making contingency plans for crisis management and conflict solution; (x) Recalling the recommendations already passed on the issues of conflict prevention and peace-making in the former Yugoslavia; (xi) Considering that a European security policy implies: - assistance to Central and European states, often with no experience of democracy, to find their way to pluralist societies; - financial and economic support for states to help them move away from command economies towards market economies; - cultural, educational and financial support to help states, peoples and minorities deal with the strife unbridled by the unfreezing of historic rivalries which, until recently, have been suppressed by imposed collectivism; (xii) Considering that this policy must give priority to the following goals: - to prevent any cross-border attack by one European state on another and to work towards ensuring that this principle is accepted by all European states; - to ensure that, within states, different ethnic or religious groups tolerate each other, minority rights are respected and to ensure that, if conflict does arise in one state, neighbouring states are not drawn into the conflict; - to ensure that Europe is able to resist any covert or overt threat to its security from outside Europe and is in a position to respond to crises, aggression and arms proliferation outside Europe; - to provide a collaborative structure for western security ties with the former Soviet Union; - to encourage democratisation throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet republics and encourage the development of shared liberal democratic values; - to seek to ensure stability in Central and Eastern Europe through extensive economic co-operation and a fully-developed system of conflict resolution, peace-keeping and possibly peace-making; - to avoid the re-emergence of nationalism amongst European armies; and - to maintain a close relationship with the United States, based on a new partnership in order to pursue common economic, political and security interests, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 1. Start to examine the aspects concerning European security which should be part of a new Atlantic partnership; 2. Re-examine the role of both United States and European nuclear weapons in European security in conjunction with a parallel re-examination in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance; 3. Give priority to the establishment of contingency plans for crisis management, conflict solution and the employment of forces under WEU auspices, including decisions regarding the necessary command, control and communication arrangements; 4. Establish as a matter of exceptional urgency ways of ensuring that CSCE and WEU are in a position to prevent the conflict in the Balkans from spreading, especially to Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 5. Always inform the Assembly of issues arising from ministerial and other meetings and to do so before communicating with the European Parliament. ---------------------------------- Explanatory Memorandum ====================== (submitted by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur) I. Introduction =============== Why yet another report on European security policy? Most of the readers of this report are only too familiar with the organisations, passwords, secret competitions and failures connected with this issue. Why then discuss it again? The reason may be that there are still too many changes on the European scene which could influence thoughts on security, but it also may be because passwords can be put in a different order, which ultimately may provide the key for a solution to Europe's security problems. The present report neither claims to be exhaustive, nor boasts of providing the final solution. It will not dwell extensively on all the aspects involved, but rather focus on some of them. It may offer some ideas which could help in finding the elements for a solution. II. Competition and co-operation ================================= Ironically, the end of the cold war has brought instability rather than greater stability: the cold war may have been unfriendly but it had the virtue, in international affairs, of stability and simplicity. From the perspective of the western allies, the task was a simple, albeit expensive one, of deterring a single massive military threat from the East. American leadership of and commitment to NATO was unquestioned. NATO's overriding imperative was military. Whilst NATO, as an organisation, had a political structure and character, the political aspect of the organisation was very much secondary to the military. Consequently security was naturally perceived in narrow military terms and the non-military aspects of security policy, e.g. political, economic and social measures and contacts, respect for human rights, were barely taken into account. Within the alliance this had an extremely important consequence: the organisation was greater than the sum of its parts since an individual country's concern over a specific issue could be overcome in the light of the over-riding military imperatives. The collapse of the Soviet Union swept away this familiar landscape and introduced greater uncertainty and insecurity. Compared with the former monolithic threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, the multifaceted problems of intrastate interethnic conflict, mass migration and instability in the Middle East and in the south Mediterranean are far more intractable. The response to the security vacuum in eastern Europe has been to improvise. The last three years have seen the hectic, not always co-ordinated, creation of new security instruments and adaptation of existing institutions. Thus NATO and WEU have been reformed, the CSCE has been transformed and extended and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council has been created. Partly in response to internal developments and geostrategic changes, the EC has become an additional factor in European security. Post-Maastricht, the WEU has been given a dual identity. It will become the EC defence identity and reinforce the Atlantic Alliance by acting as the European pillar of NATO. Ideally, Europe's security institutions should have reacted to the continent's problems in concert and in doing so achieved an economical division of labour between them. In reality, it could be argued that Europe's security institutions have, at times, overlapped and competed. Although CSCE, NATO and WEU communiques constantly refer to the need for complementarity and transparency, until quite recently duplication and sometimes even secrecy have been common. For example, NATO has sought to prevent obsolescence by transferring its rationale away from the essentially military need to counter a specific military threat into the more political aspects of security. Among other things, it set up the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in December 1991 to act as a forum for security discussion and liasion between all the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Yet this new "son of NATO", although possessing a smaller membership, shares common interests with the CSCE. Similarly, in its traditional defence role NATO has faced implicit competition from WEU. It may appear peculiar that there are two western naval task forces in the Adriatic monitoring the imposition of United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, one under NATO and the other under WEU command. It may be due only to the fact that the local NATO Commander is an Italian and that, since Italy holds the chairmanship of the WEU Council, the commander of the WEU squadron is also Italian, that co-ordination between the two forces has proved successful. Since June 1992, various attempts have been made to avoid such parallelism and to improve co-ordination between Europe's security institutions. There is a well-founded hope that these improvements will be effective. A great deal of the discussion of European security has concentrated on the relative status of the various security organisations concerned with Europe - NATO, and the NACC, WEU and its link with the EC; the CSCE; and the United Nations Security Council. There has been extensive use of architectural metaphors - WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - and of the need for these various structures to be complementary, interlocking and multilayered. Additionally, the question has been raised over which institution should have the primary role in European security. Such reactions are all quite natural, as is the fact that in this time of great flux, every individual organisation is defending its own position, trying to extend its area of interest or to prove its indispensability. So much has been said and written about these issues that the need for another report may be questioned. Still, it seems useful to review the present state of affairs, since changes are taking place at such a rapid pace that the existing international organisations, unwielding by nature, cannot always react appropriately. The much-debated new strategic concept, for instance, adopted at NATO's Rome summit in November 1991, has already been overtaken in many respects, if only because of the implosion of the Soviet Union and its consequences. Moreover, it takes little account of security in the Mediterranean, which is increasingly important for Europe. Therefore it seems useful to review the security environment once again, to look at the potential threats or risks to peace both from within and without Europe and then decide how these should be met, preferably by existing security organisations. III. Sources of European insecurity ==================================== (a) Russia Perhaps more because of a long standing habit than based upon objective reasoning, many Europeans are still continuing to see Russia, the largest successor state to the former Soviet Union, as the greatest threat to their security. It should be noted, however, that since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the former monolithic politico-military machine no longer exists and that the potentially dangerous combination of capabilities and intentions has come to an end. The prospect that a weakened Russia could still threaten Western Europe is remote. Even if a government were to come to power which wished to re-establish Russia as a major military power, the weakness of the economy would make it very difficult to reconstruct its former awe-inspiring military capability. Nuclear weapons may be the one major exception to this. In the actual state of affairs, there can be very little hope that Russia will be a prosperous country in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the group of seven leading industrialised nations has provided support for President Yeltsin with a $43 billion financial aid package, explicity tied to continued economic and political reform in Russia and tacitly linked to continued Russian co-operation or foreign policy issues. However, even with this substantial aid package and, hopefully, follow-up aid programmes, it will be a long time before the country and its population will be prosperous enough to constitute a politically stable state. (b) Other successor states of the former Soviet Union There is no guarantee that the other successor states of the former Soviet Union will become liberal non-militaristic democratic regimes. None can be regarded as posing a conventional military threat to the West. Three of these states, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, still have nuclear weapons on their territory. Whilst there is some opposition in Ukraine to the idea that Russia should be the sole successor state with nuclear weapons, all three have made declarations that they intend to get rid of them and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states. It is essential that there be strong international pressure on all three states to keep to the undertakings which they have given. At the moment, negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on the application of the Start I Treaty are still in deadlock. As a consequence, unlike Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan have not yet ratified this treaty. It is therefore not just obstructing the full implementation of Start I, but also the entry into force of Start II. Ukraine has stated that it will ratify Start I only if the nuclear powers provide adequate guarantees for Ukraine's security, if it obtains sufficient financial aid to dismantle its nuclear weapons and if it is allowed to trade directly with buyers of the fissionable material contained in its nuclear warheads. During a recent visit to the United States, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Anatoly Zlenko, estimated the cost of dismantling his country's nuclear arsenal at $2.8 billion, which would also take account of all economic and ecological factors. The main drive behind Ukraine's attitude is most probably a tactic to obtain maximum assistance in the republic's conversion to a non-nuclear status. However, there is also a movement in the republic which considers the maintenance of a nuclear status as a way of keeping the West's attention and of protecting itself against Russia. Western Europe has not yet come to terms with the geopolitical position of Ukraine, which has a 700 000 strong armed force and shares borders with Romania, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Poland. Earlier fears of an overt conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in particular over the Black Sea fleet and the Crimean Peninsula, have not materialised but Ukraine's relations with Russia, its most important trading partner and principal source of oil, remain tense. Apparently, Russia takes the view that both republics are far too interdependent to be able to live without very close relations. It hopes that, in the future, such relations could be institutionalised one way or another. Recently, Ukraine's Defence Minister, General Konstantyn Morozov, accused Russia of violating an agreement among former Soviet republics on the control of nuclear weapons by keeping them under the direct control of Russia's defence ministry rather than under the joint command of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as was agreed in December 1991. He also said that Russia was using the Black Sea Fleet, stationed in the Crimea, to subvert Ukrainian independence. 3 Since the western nations are extremely hesitant about forging closer links with this republic, it has turned its attention to the Middle East and Asia. Indeed, there may be some doubt over Ukraine's capacity to develop its economy and to stablise the country's political and democratic structures if it does not succeed in establishing good relations with Russia, but Western Europe should not neglect its relations with this republic. Such neglect could easily create an uncomfortable source of instability in Eastern Europe. Together with the United States, Western Europe should continue to exert pressure on Ukraine to ratify START I and give up nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, the same pressure should be exerted on Russia to sign a treaty with Ukraine securing its borders and sovereignty. If Ukraine really has chosen the path of economic and political reform, the West should help it as generously as it is helping Russia. (c) Migration and refugees Economic collapse and ethnic conflicts resulting in civil war, massacres and repression in Central Europe, the republics of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans have already resulted in large numbers of migrants and refugees, who, understandably, have all moved westward. At the moment, the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia has already caused the displacement of more than two million people within its borders, while more than half a million took refuge in other European countries. In each of the years 1990, 1991 and 1992, more than a million people left Eastern Europe and the territory of the Soviet Union for the West. In the years to come, Central European countries will remain net exporters of labour and also transit countries through which citizens of the republics of the former Soviet Union will try to move to Western Europe. Another important source of migration towards Europe, almost exclusively inspired by economic reasons is Africa, in particular North Africa. At the moment, approximately 6 million people of North African origin are living in the member states of the EC, half of them having settled in France. In particular, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain are worried about the prospect of further waves of immigration from Africa, where economic growth is too low by far to absorb the growth rate of the population. Moreover, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the southern Mediterranean region could lead to political upheaval and give rise to massive migration to southern Europe. Many of the migrants from the East and from the South have not, or do not want to assimilate into Western European society. For different reasons, many of them prefer to keep and cultivate their cultural identity. For many, accustomed to newcomers seeking to assimilate and integrate, this multiculturalism is seen as a threat; however, because individuals or groups do not conform to the accepted norms of the host country does not place their loyalty in question. In fact, multiculturalism may in the longer term enrich the lives of all in the host country. In the present economic situation, many indigenous Europeans consider the immigrants as a threat to their jobs and a further burden on the well-developed social security system in Western Europe. Extremist political parties are exploiting these issues leading to heightened tensions. Central and Western European governments are well aware of all the problems involved, and they have recently started to adopt various measures aimed at countering both the real and the perceived threat of migration and refugees. Among these measures are legal precautions in the form of visa legislation and more restrictive asylum laws, reinforced border controls, practical measures to cope with refugees and diplomatic efforts. Most of this, however, is still being done at a bilateral level. On 7th May 1993, Germany signed a treaty with Poland to control the flood of migrants seeking asylum in Germany. The treaty includes German financial support to provide shelter for immigrants in Poland and to improve surveillance of Poland's borders. Germany is trying to negotiate a similar treaty with the Czech Republic. Separate agreements have reen signed with Bulgaria and Romania allowing refugees who agree to return to those countries to be sent back. Germany alone received 438 191 applications for asylum in 1992, compared with 256 112 in 1991 and 160 000 in the first four months of 1993. Most applicants come from ex-Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. An estimated 100 000 applicants came in through Poland in 1992. Poland hopes to reach agreements with Hungary, Ukraine and other neigbours in order to control illegal immigrants. At multilateral level, two conferences have been held on illegal immigration: the first in Berlin in October 1991 and the second in Budapest in February 1993, but neither of them was very successful. In Budapest, several non-obligatory recommendations were adopted but they had only reference value. The European states most concerned, Germany and Austria, proposed to establish a special aid fund in order to support the Central European "front-line states". This proposal was not adopted because of opposition from southern European countries, France and the UK, which argued that they were the countries which first had to confront, migrations from the Maghreb, Black Africa and the Commonwealth countries. While it is quite clear that the apparent and growing migration and refugee problems cannot be solved on a national or bilateral scale, there still is an astonishing lack of European solidarity to find a common solution. (d) Ethnic and nationalist conflicts Since in recent years, the risks arising from nationalist or ethnic conflicts have become only too familiar, they are increasingly dominating the European security discussion. The reasons for such conflicts are only too well known to warrant repetition. These conflicts do not immediately threaten other European states directly and the ensuing security problem is not one of constructing defences against a potential attack. The problem is the very different one of conflict resolution, or preferably, conflict prevention. Indeed, conflict resolution often means that a conflict has reached a stage of violence, where people have been stirred up to such a degree that reason does no longer apply. Moreover, history has shown that the intervention of external powers in armed local or regional conflicts has been the mechanism by which such conflicts have spread, and also because it appears to be very difficult not to take sides. In the new pattern of international relations which is actively taking shape, the major actors on the international scene were, and are, not prepared for conflict resolution - which is not surprising. During the cold war, conflict resolution was hardly on their agenda. When conflicts did arise, they were usually, though not always, seen as part of an East-West confrontation. The question was whether, by supporting one side in the conflict, the world position of the USSR - or the United States, as the case might be - could be weakened. The Security Council had little power in this period, and there was no other international organisation with any interest in trying to resolve conflicts. Consequently, the process of conflict resolution is at present very much a matter of trial and error. International institutions are needed which try to defuse disputes before they become armed conflicts. Conflicts which spring from local nationalist rivalries, once started, are very difficult to stop. Atrocities are committed; reports are exaggerated. These conflicts are often driven by deep hatred and perpetuated by the desire for revenge. Once large numbers of irregular forces have acquired weapons, it is very difficult to negotiate a cease-fire agreement which is effective. The new institution, under the CSCE, of a High Commissioner for Minorities is, for this reason, a valuable idea, because action can be taken before a conflict breaks out. There is a need for early warning and early action. Early warning requires more extensive intelligence-gathering and analysis of facts. It should be the duty of some international institution to prepare dossiers on possible sources of conflict of this kind. Fact-finding cannot be done properly by ten-day visits from delegations whose members often have no previous familiarity with the region. When the Carter Centre decided to try to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the first year was spent in fact-finding. Non-governmental organisations can also help to provide early warning; they also can, and do, work in the field of conflict prevention. For states other than those directly engaged, there is one overriding requirement. It is at all costs to avoid the situation so prevalent during the cold war, with one group of states supporting one side in the dispute or conflict, and another group supporting the other side. Both sides in the conflict will look for support from other states. If they obtain it, then the conflict will be prolonged; the states backing different sides will themselves get embroiled, and may supply weapons and volunteers; and there is a much greater risk that the conflict will spread. It follows that there must be an attempt to get a common approach which is agreed by all the states which consider themselves in any way involved. This may include some states which are not in Europe. For instance, Islamic states outside Europe have a clear concern with conflicts affecting Muslim groups in Europe. In conflict resolution, the role of the military is very different from its role in deterring and defence against, a major act of aggression. Military action will tend to come fairly late in the process, after attempts at resolving the dispute, mediation, and negotiating a cease-fire have failed. It is important to distinguish between military peace-keeping and military intervention. Peace-keeping traditionally has to have the agreement of both sides, and peace-keeping forces are not heavily armed. Military intervention is a last resort and many conditions would have to be fulfilled before it could be considered right. Proportionality dictates that any intervention must do more good or avert more harm than the evil done in the process. In ethnic conflicts within states, it may often be difficult to meet these conditions. To try to impose peace on two antagonists who do not want to stop fighting might require external forces stronger than the sum of the two antagonists, since outside intervention forces are quite likely to be shot at by both sides to the conflict. It is difficult to think of any historical example where outside intervention in such circumstances has been successful. An agreed system of conflict resolution may require states to take action, and possibly send military forces, into areas where they have no direct interest. Those with a narrow interpretation of the national interest may question this: even peace-keeping forces suffer casualties. A broad definition of the national interest is needed, which accepts, as part of the national interest, work towards a more peaceful world. The present position in Yugoslavia indicates that many governments already accept this. In a European framework, this should lead to a "common European interest", at a first stage defined on a case-by-case basis, but gradually to be based on a coherent and lasting set of principles. Both the EC and WEU should, in close co- operation, start to define this "common European interest" which could be a useful tool by helping to take early policy decisions in future conflicts which threaten Europe's security. Finally, it should be noted here again that substantial European support for the establishment of market economies, economic development and the establishment of democratic government structures are essential in stabilising Central and Eastern European states and societies, a vital element of conflict prevention. (e) Risks originating from outside Europe Risks may emerge from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East and the Maghreb. However, these risks are hardly of the order of magnitude that Europe used to have to face in military terms and it must guard against the impetus to find an enemy substitute. Realistically, it is difficult to imagine how the states on the southern shore of the Mediterranean could pose any serious military challenge to European states whilst a challenge from a state in the Middle East would be a matter of global rather than exclusively European concern, because of its effect on oil supplies. The most appropriate way to deal with these risks is by action on the part of the international community to introduce serious preventive measures which make this type of risk increasingly improbable. An example is the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as the result of Iraq's breaches of the non-proliferation treaty. One of the best ways of dealing with problems arising from weapons proliferation is to negotiate a world-wide ban. This has been done, first for biological weapons, and now for chemical weapons. To outlaw other weapons categories in a similar way may be considered, but the prospects are rather slim. The Treaty on Chemical Disarmament for instance, signed in Paris in January 1993 by a large number of states, was not adhered to by others such as Iraq, North Korea, Libya and many Arab countries which stated that they would refuse to do so as long as Israel is not a party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. (The members of the Arab League except for Morocco, Algeria and Kuwait have not signed for this reason.) Non-military policies can also be used to reduce threats of this kind. For example, North African states could be brought into much closer co-operation with the European Community. As it is, they send most of their exports to Europe. It should be possible to develop the kind of economic co-operation which, as in the European Community, makes the idea of a military attack highly implausible. There is a range of proposals (environmental, economic and political) to encourage co- operative action between the states which border the Mediterranean.4 As part of the arms control agenda, the transfer of destabilising conventional weapons must be taken more seriously so as to prevent any future Saddam Husseins. This must imply a more critical attitude to the arms trade. No one would deny that countries are entitled to defend themselves but it is perverse that at a time when the European states are engaged in reducing their military capabilities, under the CFE Treaty, that they should be acting to increase the military capability of states elsewhere in the world. Notwithstanding the many bold statements made by various governments on this subject during and immediately after the Gulf crisis, the results of international efforts in this field have been only very modest. In fact, not much more has been done than the establishment of a United Nations arms export register. Even in the EC, the subject of a European arms export policy seems to have been removed from the agenda. There is a strong case for trying to develop a common policy among as many supplying states as possible, and making that policy sufficiently restrictive, so that the folly of arming Iraq is not repeated elsewhere. The final category of security risks from outside Europe is the possibility of attacks, or the threat of attacks, on the sources or supply routes of commodities vital to Europe's economy, as was the case in the Gulf crisis. Obviously, the best means of protecting Europe against such events is the promotion of international order through competent bodies, in particular the United Nations. If even this cannot prevent such aggression, the only possible answer would be international action based on the largest possible consensus in the framework of the United Nations, going through the different stages as described in Chapter VII of its Charter. IV. Objectives of a European security policy ============================================= The end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Soviet empire with the re-emergence of independent states in Central, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union dedicated to democracy and market economies has produced a situation where internal European security no longer depends purely upon military power and capabilities but also upon political, economic and cultural considerations. In some respects the "one Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" already exists but it is a Europe with a clear cleavage. A pattern of increasingly close co-operation in the western half of the continent is matched by a process of disintegration in the other half. While in the western part of the continent, the idea of settling any kind of dispute by military force would be considered ridiculous, this is not the case in the other parts of Europe, where, from the Balkans to Central Asia, many have taken up arms to reinforce their arguments or to reach political objectives. Security in the west is recognised as the result of a number of factors: shared liberal democratic values, extensive economic cooperation, tamed nationalism without the suppression of patriotism and shared sovereignty without destroying the nation. Clearly, one objective of European security policy should be to extend the pattern of inter-state relations and behaviour within Western Europe and Scandinavia to Europe as a whole. As part of this wider concept, an effective European security policy must include: - assistance to Central and European states, often with no experience of democracy, to find their way to pluralist societies; - financial and economic support for states to help them move away from command economies towards market economies; - cultural, educational and financial support to help states, peoples and minorities deal with the strife unbridled by the unfreezing of historic rivalries which, until recently, have been suppressed by imposed collectivism. With these basic conditions in mind, the objectives of a European security policy will be: - to prevent any cross-border attack by one European state on another and to work towards ensuring that this principle is accepted by all European states; - to ensure that within states, different ethnic or religious groups tolerate each other, minority rights are respected and to ensure that, if conflict does arise in one state, neighbouring states are not drawn into the conflict; - to ensure that Europe is able to resist any covert or overt threat to its security from outside Europe and is in a position to respond to crises, aggression and arms proliferation outside Europe; - to provide a collaborative structure for western security ties with the former Soviet Union; - to encourage democratisation throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet republics and encourage the development of shared liberal democratic values; - to seek to ensure stability in Central and Eastern Europe through extensive economic co-operation, conflict resolution, peace-keeping and possibly peace-making; - to avoid the re-emergence of nationalism amongst European armies; and - to maintain a close relationship with the United States, based on a new partnership in order to pursue common economic, political and security interests. Clearly the institutional instruments needed to accomplish these tasks are more complex than the NATO of the cold war. Europe must guard against the risk of a return to the old style geopolitics which would see a return to a competition for national power and influence between European states which had reverted to essentially national security and defence policies. This could result from a failure of European Union as well as from the breakdown of collective defence institutions. The re-emergence of nationalism in security and defence policies could occur as a result of runaway ethnic strife in Central and Eastern Europe. To give a hypothetical example: if the German minority in Silesia were to be victimised by a xenophobic and autocratic regime in Poland, this would quickly become a bilateral problem in the absence of successful EC or collective security intercession. Europe has, therefore, a fundamental interest both in maintaining multilateral security and defence policies. V. The future of transatlantic relations ========================================= It has been rightly pointed out that the traditional transatlantic bargain on which the relationship between Western Europe and the United States was based during the cold war, has lost most of its rationale5. This transatlantic bargain meant that the United States extended its security guarantee to its West European allies in return for Western European co-operation in political, economic and security matters and recognition of United States leadership. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact are the main reasons why the transatlantic bargain lost its attractiveness. Another important reason is that, no doubt stimulated by events in Eastern Europe, the EC took important decisions towards economical and political integration, including the development of a common foreign, security and defence policy, all reflecting a growing common feeling to confirm and reinforce Europe's responsibility and identity. The virtual end of the military threat from Eastern Europe also caused a shift in interest from transatlantic military to economic relations, bringing to the surface differences of view, which until then had more or less been dissimulated. The formerly vital importance of the United States' vast nuclear and conventional arsenal has diminished. With recent arms reduction agreements for conventional arms and for tactical and strategic nuclear arms, there are prospects for a reasonable conventional balance in Europe - for those political and military die-hards who continue to think in terms of antagonistic blocs -while, in principle, British and French nuclear forces could play the role of a necessary residual deterrence. In the present turbulent state of world affairs, it would be unwise to think that Europe could dispense with transatlantic consultation and co-operation. Now and in the near future, United States military assistance appears to be essential to mount any larger scale military operation in Europe, let alone outside it. The most important reason for this is that WEU members, individually and collectively, simply do not have the vast logistical support (air and sealift), satellite data intelligence and command and control systems available to the Americans. The WEU Assembly has been prominent in suggesting how some of these deficiencies might be rectified. It has proposed the creation of a WEU pool of air transport aircraft. The Council apparently does not consider this to be an urgent matter, since according to the last annual report, it is not on the agenda of the Defence Representatives Group. Another proposal, the creation of a satellite interpretation centre, was agreed to by WEU ministers in June 1991. However, these initiatives must be seen against the background of declining defence expenditure, and under these circumstances, it would seem unlikely that WEU could develop military resources comparable to the United States in the near future. In the foreseeable future, therefore, United States involvement in European security will remain vital. On the other hand, United States Governments will come under increasing pressure to reduce military expenditure. Clearly, such policies will have an impact on United States force levels in Europe and perhaps the availability of United States military assets such as transport aircraft. It should be recalled here that the new United States administration envisages reducing the number of United States troops in Europe to 100 000 by October 1996, while the Bush administration had still planned to maintain the number of troops at 150 000. According to Pentagon documents made available in March 1993, the Clinton administration plans to reduce the United States defence budget by $88 billion by 1997. It is difficult to predict all the consequences of a reduced United States presence in Europe, but it is crystal clear that Europe cannot claim to develop its own foreign and security policy which, according to the treaty on European union, "shall include all questions related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence", if it is not prepared to draw the financial consequences from these basic decisions. The inevitable conclusion is that Europe will have to pay for a greater share of its security. The common strategic resources needed to complement such a policy will not be available overnight. They can only be the result of a long planning process. The stage is now reached at which there is uncertainty over the future commitments of allies in different kinds of conflicts. This is no reason to be surprised or even ashamed. After all, the Atlantic Alliance was created to cope with a completely different situation in Europe. After more than forty years of a close political and military relationship, European and North American allies should be able to discusss their long- term relationship without any false shame. Only in an atmosphere of close consultation, which includes all possible future developments, will it be possible to avoid misunderstandings on both sides of the Atlantic. It would be wrong for Europe to suggest that NATO is no longer relevant in the years to come, and Europe should at all costs avoid arousing feelings of indifference or hostility in North America towards its historic political and strategic relations with Europe. It would be wsong for the United States to pretend that nothing has changed in its political and military relations with Europe. While there can be no doubt that the United States is still fully committed to the obligations of the Washington Treaty, recent events have made it clear that beyond the NATO territory, there is a zone where they may prefer not to intervene but to leave action to the Europeans. On the other hand, it would be naive to suggest that the recent changes in Europe do not require a more thorough adaptation of transatlantic relations. This is well illustrated by the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia. The Europeans originally took the lead in dealing with this presumably because the United States took the view that there was no vital national interest at stake and that it was purely a European problem. There is no reason to believe that the United States took this view because it wishes to see the public failure of the recently decided European foreign and security policy. Apparently, in both the United States and Europe, there is widespread indignation over the continuation of a civil war on European soil, where atrocities are being committed and human rights being trampled at a scale unknown in Europe since the Second World War. At the same time, both are reluctant to send ground troops into a savage war, which nobody dare predict when and how it will end. The United States and Western Europe are now accusing each other of not taking the lead, not doing enough or not proposing the right action. The same kind of debate may occur again in future similar conflicts. The positions now adopted by the United States and Western Europe in European security affairs are unsustainable in the long run because they are inherently under tension and trade- offs will have to be made. The United States wants to reduce its burdens but at the same time maintain and influence leadership. Western Europe wants more equal partnership with the United States. These tensions will have to be resolved, and all efforts to cover them up will be useless because they are too obvious not to come to the surface again. It is advocated here that Western Europe and the United States thoroughly revise their old bargain and replace it by a new partnership, knowing that they continue to share important and far-reaching common economic, political and security interests and that in the new international relations neither can achieve its important objectives acting alone. In the framework of this new partnership, Western Europe and the United States should negotiate an agreement defining roles and responsibilities towards each other and toward the rest of the world, and leading to changes in the institutional relationship which reflect these new definitions and also providing mechanisms to implement the new policies to achieve common objectives. The transatlantic partners know each other too well to continue playing their newly-favoured game of hide-and-seek with their real intentions and pulling rabbits out of their hats every now and then when the other party seems to have found a clever move. Without this proposed new partnership, the existing transatlantic alliance is bound to deteriorate, neither ally will succeed in attaining its objective and European security might well be the victim. VI. The importance of arms control and verification ==================================================== The recently-established framework of arms control and verification agreements in Europe has created so much military transparency that it would not be possible, now, for any European state to build up, in secret, a major aggressive military capability. Four agreements or treaties have come into force which between them provide a formidable array of measures of verification and inspection: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; the concluding act of the negotiation on personnel strength of these armed forces; the Open Skies Treaty accompanied by the CSCE declaration on that treaty and the Vienna document of 1992 on confidence- and security-building measures. Together, these documents are ensuring a continuous and regular process of inspection and verification and there will be even more in the future. If any of the participating states were to consider building or rebuilding a major aggressive military capability, it could not do so without triggering a procedure of early warning. Among other things, it would have to refuse inspections and withdraw from the relevant treaties at an early stage og rearmament. This would appear to rule out any possibility of surprise attack. The next step concerning this particular threat or risk - that is, the re-emergence of some major aggressive expansionist power - is to maintain the impetus provided by these treaties or agreements in the new CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, established at the July 1992 Helsinki summit. The provisions already have to be fully implemented. One of the first functions of the new CSCE security forum will be to harmonise the relevant provisions of the CFE Treaty, which concern only NATO and the former Warsaw Pact states, with the provisions of the Vienna document which concern all CSCE members. A good deal more can still be done in improving military transparency in Europe. The habit of military secrecy dies hard. The Helsinki conference set out, for the security forum, a programme for immediate action. It includes a number of further proposals for increased transparency. It suggests, for example, the annual discussion of military budgets with detailed production plans for different weapon systems. At this exchange, states could say whether they found the forward plans of any other state particularly threatening. The programme for immediate action does not, however, include any specific suggestions for further disarmament. VII. The role of nuclear weapons in European defence ===================================================== Increasingly, nuclear weapons are seen, not as solutions to certain security problems, but as serious problems in themselves. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the exposure of Iraq's nuclear ambitions have highlighted the need to give the highest priority to further measures to prevent the spread of such weapons. The nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT and IAEA should be further strengthened to stop further proliferation and the export of nuclear technology. An important factor will be the actions of the existing nuclear weapon states themselves. It will be of little use urging other countries to forego nuclear weapons if the existing nuclear weapon states are maintaining or increasing their nuclear firepower. The United States and Russia have embarked on massive reductions of the number of nuclear warheads. This impetus must be maintained and hopefully adopted by the other nuclear weapons states. Nuclear weapons are still an important part of official allied thinking as witnessed by the final communique of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in autumn 1991 in Taormina, stating that "nuclear weapons will continue for the foreseeable future to fulfill their essential role in the alliance's overall strategy, since conventional forces alone cannot ensure war prevention". On the other hand, it decided on a substantial reduction and restructuring of the alliance sub- strategic nuclear forces which is in progress. This cannot be seen as the last possible adaptation to new circumstances especially since future threats to Europe are likely to be quite different from those which had to be faced during the cold war. Clearly the relevance of nuclear weapons to the security of Europe has greatly diminished and the residual purpose of these weapons may simply and solely be to deter their use by others6. Indeed, a critical re-examination of the role of nuclear weapons in Europe is needed. On the one hand, there should be continuing consultation on the future of transatlantic security guarantees, including the various possible extended transatlantic nuclear deterrence options in the Atlantic Alliance and its Nuclear Planning Group. On the other hand, an intra-European debate is needed over the role, and the future role, of European nuclear weapons. These debates should be initiated in WEU among both nuclear and non- nuclear member states. Needless to say, both debates should take place in parallel and with the greatest possible degree of transparency. VIII. The Franco-German relationship and the defence of Europe =============================================================== Since May 1992, Franco-German military co-operation has assumed a potentially more European dimension: France and Germany decided at their La Rochelle meeting to create a military corps with a European vocation which other WEU countries were invited to join. This Eurocorps was meant to contribute to giving the European Union its own military capacity and show the will of the participating countries to shoulder their responsibilities concerning security and the preservation of peace in the framework of the European Union. At the same time, the Eurocorps was intentioned to contribute to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. The Eurocorps can be used for the common defence of the NATO and WEU allies, for humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-enforcing missions. The headquarters of the Eurocorps are being established in Strasbourg and the estimated 35 000-40 000 strong full corps should be operational in October 1995. Belgium and Spain are considering joining the corps and Belgian liaison officers have been posted to the Strasbourg headquarters since March 1993. The Franco-German initiative has been severely criticised by both the United Kingdom and the United States. They feared that the Atlantic Alliance might be weakened if Germany were to withdraw some of its units from NATO, which, as some said, was illegitimate. Finally, on 21st January 1993, an agreement was signed between France, Germany and SACEUR, detailing relations between the Eurocorps and NATO. While, formerly, French forces could have been placed under NATO's operational control in a crisis situation, it was now agreed that French units of the Eurocorps could be under NATO's operational command. This means that there would be more freedom to use these forces, not only for the Supreme Allied Commander, but also for lower levels in the integrated command structure. There is a wider definition of the missions, and the type and duration of the obligations are defined in less detail in advance. However, this can be done only under three preliminary conditions: - there must be a preliminary agreement with France and Germany; - the corps must be engaged for a preliminary defined mission according to a plan which has been approved by the French authorities; - the corps must be engaged as such. As it is, the agreement leaves many questions unanswered. For instance, what will happen if the Eurocorps were asked to participate in peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations of NATO in the framework of the CSCE. It is also unclear if these rules would apply to other French units which are not part of the Eurocorps. Moreover, the relation between the Eurocorps and WEU is far less clear and, as of today, no agreement is yet in sight. Certainly, France is changing its commitments regarding security in Europe and apparently the doctrine of the defence of the "sanctuaire national" is being adapted to a changed security environment in Europe. Altogether, France is clearly working towards a new security concept which pays tribute to European ambitions while at the same time taking into account the importance of maintaining narrow transatlantic relations which are being revised in a positive sense. As the French Defence Minister, Alain Juppe, recently said:7 "Europe as such must be included in the necessary renovation of the alliance ... even if the link with the United States is, and remains, more necessary than ever." or otherwise: "While it is legitimate for France to be concerned with promoting European defence, it is nevertheless essential for it to include its contribution in the transatlantic framework." If France is gradually making progress in adapting to a new situation, in Germany, an acrimonious debate is still continuing over the question of whether the constitution allows it to send troops to participate in operations outside the NATO area. Of the two articles in the constitution now under debate, one, Article 87a, says that Germany establishes armed forces for defensive purposes, while the other, Article 24, expressly permits Germany to join a system of mutual collective security. According to the opinion of a large majority of legal experts, there is no constitutional impediment to German participation in United Nations or NATO military operations outside the NATO area, but the position of the CDU/CSU as the largest partner in the coalition government has not been strong enough to overcome the reluctance of both the coalition Free Democrats and the opposition Social Democrats. On the other hand, it became clear that the consequences of this constitutional debate had an increasingly negative influence on the authority of Germany in the international community, which is faced with growing United Nations demands for peace-keeping, humanitarian and other operations in conflict zones. On the 13th January 1993, the coalition government reached an agreement which allowed for future engagement of German troops outside the NATO area, alongside troops from other states, even without a mandate from the UN Security Council. The agreement thus covered the sending of "blue helmets" to participate in peace-keeping operations under Security Council decisions or in the framework of CSCE, and participation in peace-enforcing measures under the aegis of the United Nations. It also covered the participation of troops in operations of collective defence or peace-enforcement operations, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, with other states or in the context of alliances and other regional agreements, in particular NATO, WEU and CSCE. Possible German participation in the abovementioned operations would need approval in the national parliament: in the first two cases mentioned by a simple majority, in the third case by a two-third majority. At the same time, it was agreed that the government would propose a formal change of the constitution. When, however, the Chancellor Kohl proposed that German airmen, who make up one-third of NATO's AWACS reconnaissance aircraft crews, should participate in the operations to enforce a no-fly zone in former Yugoslavia, the Free Democrats took the question to the Federal Constitutional Court, which allowed German airmen to join the operations in former Yugoslavia, mainly reasoning that Germany's self-imposed restrictions on its military role would "endanger the trust for Germany within NATO alliance". Since the Court's ruling only applies to this individual case, it does not provide a final ruling on the still pending constitutional question, which, if not resolved in accordance with the coalitions January agreement, would cause serious problems for the credibility of a future European security and defence policy. It is known that in the foreseeable future, WEU or NATO operations, with military involvement, to maintaining or to restore peace and security in Europe or to protect its vital interests, will most likely take place outside the area covered by the Treaty of Washington. If Germany, Europe's most powerful economic force with the biggest population, were to take part in the decision-making on security and defence policy without participating in the possibly resulting military operations, it would create anomalies which might not be accepted by the other EC member states and thus lead to serious problems in European policy making. Moreover, what would be the use of a Eurocorps, if its German component would be condemned to play not more than a rather ceremonial role? In that case, all the French efforts to be more co-operative within the NATO framework would not be matched by the expected German flexibility on out-of-area operations and they may question if all the extra efforts needed to build this multinational corps were to any advantage. IX. The institutions ===================== Fundamental developments within Europe since 1987 have resulted in gradual changes in the European security architecture. These changes already include a gradual and prudent tendency towards both a Europeanisation and pan- Europeanisation of the European security structure and an increasing linkage between the military and non-military dimension of security policy. This move is, however, slow and gradual when compared with the fundamental and far-reaching changes in the European security situation. Developments within the different existing organisations will be examined succinctly in the following paragraphs: (a) The European Community Especially since 1988, the European Community has played a considerable part in the developing European security situation through its support for economic and political reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. The European agreements which were concluded with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the negotiations on association and other agreements with the other countries in the region further increase the influence of the community. The extent to which the Community agrees to strengthen contacts with these countries depends on their fulfilling several stabilising conditions. The association agreements and the prospect of possible membership of the EC also give these states a wider political incentive and have a stabilising influence. Western Europe, together with North America and Japan, has a specific responsibility to help these countries in this difficult task, which will take many years to accomplish. Much has been done already, but everyone is aware that it is not nearly enough. Important EC programmes for the transfer of much-needed knowhow to these countries are "Phare" for Central European countries and "Tacis" for the former Soviet Union republics, which together supply about 70% of the West's technical aid to that region. There has been criticism of its efficiency, but that was not only the EC's fault. Moreover, the criticism was acknowledged and improvements are now under consideration. At the same time, the EC is concluding different kinds of trade and association agreements with many central and eastern European countries. It is known that Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic, which are seeking EC membership, would like to have a date set for this objective to be attained. They have also complained that the EC, notwithstanding the existence of agreements, has been far too hesitant to allow them access to the EC market. It is also noted that EC member states are very slow in ratifying the European agreements, which offer trade liberalisation to the abovementioned countries. Of the 12 member states, only Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom have ratified. In response to this criticism, the European Commission has now proposed a new package of measures to accelerate the political and economic integration of these six countries into the EC, which will be discussed in Copenhagen at the June 1993 EC summit. This package includes improved, across-the-board market access for east European products, faster dismantling of EC tarifs, more commission-led lending to finance infrastructure and a commitment to eventual membership. It is especially encouraging to see that according to the Commission's proposal "improved market access is the most effective way of encouraging economic growth and the transition to market economies". This opinion clearly diverges from arguments put forward by EC member states that increased imports from Eastern Europe would cause lasting damage to EC members, which are going through a period of recession. It should be noted that in 1992 Eastern Europe accounted for just over 3% of total EC imports, while the EC itself accounted for more than half the total trade of Eastern Europe. The EC has managed to develop substantially the non-military dimension of security policy which is bound to play an even more important role. However, the crisis in Yugoslavia showed that the influence of the European Community is still too limited as it cannot back its security policy, confined to non-military aspects, with military means. Nevertheless, the crisis in Yugoslavia also indicated a positive development in the EC's nascent security policy. The EC has developed criteria which are applied for the recognition of new states: the acceptance of the rule of law and the principles of democracy, guarantees of the rights of minorities and ethnic groups, respect for each other's frontiers and observance of existing commitments to disarmament and regional security. These principles, which are aimed at stabilising the European security situation, oblige the republics or people concerned to adapt their position, if necessary. Apart from that, it established - in parallel with the peace conference on ex-Yugoslavia - an Arbitration Committee under the chairmanship of Robert Badinter which has provided a number of opinions which can contribute to the prevention of conflicts. One of these opinions, concerns the right of peoples to self determination as is vaguely defined in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, the Charter did not provide a definition of the word "peoples", nor did it lay down rules as to how this right is to be exercised. The committee appeared to link the rights of minorities to the rights of peoples. As a consequence, the notion of "people" is no longer homogeneous and should not be seen as encompassing the whole population of any state. Within one state, various ethnic, religious or linguistic communities may exist. According to the committee's opinion number 2, each of these communities would have the right to see its identity recognised and to benefit "from all the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognised in international law, including, where appropriate, the right to choose their national identity". Rights of minorities can therefore be respected without this having to result in a break-up of an existing state. This could lead to a distinction between "nationality" and "citizenship" similar to what is provided in the Treaty on European Union. Furthermore, the Arbitration Committee attached great importance to the principle of respect for frontiers existing at the moment of independence, and recalled in its opinion number 2 that, whatever the circumstances, "the right to self- determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers". On the other hand, according to the committee, states may modify their frontiers by mutual agreement. Even though its member states had only just signed the Treaty on European Union with its provisions for a common foreign and security policy, the EC was the first external power to become involved in the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, assuming its new responsibilities. Furthermore, the Community employed new instruments in its security policy. The Twelve mediated in the conflict and initiated a peace conference in The Hague, they negotiated to achieve cease-fires, and sent observers to the disputed area to monitor the cease-fire agreements. Admittedly, all EC efforts have had little success, but, almost certainly, others would not have done better. It is hoped, however, that some lessons will have been learned, one of them being that taking half measures in no way helps to solve a crisis. This first experience in practical common foreign policy also made it clear that the EC should start making contingency plans for crisis management and solutions for possible conflict in Europe. (b) NATO Within the Atlantic Alliance, there have been moves to recognise that the European allies will have to play an increasingly important role in the security and defence of Europe. First of all, the important declaration on peace and co-operation and the new strategic concept issued at the NATO summit in Rome in November 1991 emphasised the importance of strengthening the European pillar and increasing the role of the EC and WEU in defence and security matters. The Rome declaration asserts that "the development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. ...Recognising that it is for the European allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that ... we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the alliance. ...We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance ...". Notwithstanding incidental benevolent comments, it is, however, not at all clear to what extent the United States and some European NATO countries will allow this European pillar to become more than an appendix to NATO and to gain some degree of independence. As regards military structures, some recent developments are indeed providing evidence of a trend towards multinationalisation and even Europeanisation of the alliance's armed forces. An allied rapid reaction corps (ARRC) with its headquarters in Bielefeld under British command is being established. This ARRC will consist of forces from different European NATO member states and NATO can decide to put parts of this corps under WEU command. There is also the new Franco-German Eurocorps, for which SACEUR has recently concluded an operational agreement with France and Germany. According to this agreement, the Eurocorps will come under NATO operational command for the implementation of agreed SACEUR plans. In an alliance framework, the Eurocorps will be available for humanitarian peace-keeping and peace- making operations. On the other hand, it will also be available for WEU operations, but this has not yet been formaliqed. However, this Europeanisation of the Atlantic Alliance is not yet visible in NATO's European military command structure. While Europeans provide 80% of the alliance's conventional forces, United States officers are still at the head of the only two major commands and of one of the three major subordinate commands. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is also American. The decision of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo on 4th June 1992 that it be "prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peace-keeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE" should be seen as a positive step towards pan-Europeanisation of the alliance's security structure. This implies that the alliance might also intervene outside the traditional NATO area. It requires, however, that the CSCE asks NATO to do so and that no NATO member state is opposed to such action. The need to establish relations with Central and Eastern European countries and to help them to stabilise their security led to the creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in December 1991, which includes the 16 NATO countries, the former Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet republics plus Albania, making a total of 38. In the first year of its existence, NACC dealt with such problems as the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the Baltic states, the division of CFE reductions among the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union and the issue of nuclear weapons and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in some of these republics. At its December 1992 meeting in Brussels, NACC agreed to prepare for joint peace-keeping missions in Europe. Co- operation in this field would include joint sessions on planning of peace-keeping missions, joint participation in peace-keeping training and consideration of possible joint peace-keeping exeraises. It was stressed that all peace-keeping operations would be under the aegis of the United Nations or CSCE. At the same meeting, a work plan for dialogue, partnership and co-operation in 1993 was agreed to, which would concentrate on such subjects as democratic management of defence budgets, civil/military interface within Ministries of Defence and the conversion of defence industries. It is clear that NACC with its limited scope and budget can make only a modest contribution to help solve the many problems being faced by Central and Eastern European countries. As regards conversion of the defence industries for instance, it can organise colloquies, studies, exchange or assemble information and in general play a role as a clearing house, but there is no money to do more and, evidently, NACC is not the most appropriate forum for tackling major industrial and economic problems. For Central European countries seeking EC membership, NACC cannot do enough, but it provides at least a chance for other republics further East to learn more about such things as the organisation and control of armed forces in a democratic society. It also shows that the West is seriously interested in stability and peace in parts of Europe further East. NACC should therefore continue its activities, concentrating on the solution of those issues for which it is best equipped. In recent years, there have also been efforts to strengthen the political role of the alliance, also by emphasising more than before the linkage between the military and non-military dimensions of security. The outcome of these attempts to date, however, also clearly shows the limitations of the alliance. In the present framework, it would not be logical to try to stretch NATO in a political role beyond the limits of its original vocation as a security organisation in the classical sense. Finally, NATO should continue to refrain from enlargement, even if time and again suggestions to extend its membership are made by Central and Eastern European states. Recently, NATO confirmed that the subject of enlargement was not on the agenda. The reason most frequently put forward is that it does not want to create a new common border between the alliance and the territory of the former Soviet Union, which would imply that Central Europe would again find itself in a position of "buffer zone". It also wishes to prevent, at any price, that Russia and the other former Soviet republics might become suspicious of a new alliancu being created against them. Another more fundamental argument might be that such enlargement would be inconsistent with its earlier endorsement of the development of a European security and defence identity. The future European Union, if developed according to the principles laid down in the Maastrict Treaty, will provide the most complete security structure imagined, including all economic, political and defence aspects, which are vital for the stability, peace and prosperity of a state. The greatest ambition of at least all Central european states is to be admitted as a member of this union. The European Community, now being transformed into a European Union, has from the beginning been conceived as a dynamic structure with the development of an integrated peaceful and prosperous Europe as its main objective. It would be erroneous to present accession to the Washington Treaty, which was created with the limited political-military objective to maintain a status quo in Europe by preventing the Soviet Union to extend its influence over Western Europe as a viable alternative for the future security of Central and Eastern European countries. Enlargement of NATO would seem to run counter to the objective to develop Europe's responsibility for its own security and defence. (c) WEU As the Europeanisation of the western security structure was considered essential, both NATO and the European Community saw WEU as a useful organisation for achieving this goal and for asserting their competence in security and defence. In this context, it seemed as if WEU was more an object than a subject in the discussions about the future European security architecture. After NATO's Rome declaration and the Maastricht summit, however, important developments brought WEU to the front of the stage. Some of these, such as the enlargement of WEU and relations between the EC and WEU, have been discussed in earlier Assembly reports. It is recalled here that the declaration of the countries, which are members of WEU and the European Union on "The role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance", which was issued together with the Treaty on European Union at the Maastricht summit in December 1991, to some extent clarified the position of WEU. The declared objectives were to build up WEU as the defence component of the European Union and to develop WEU as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It was also accepted that WEU's operational role would be strengthened. Indeed, as long as WEU has no military organisation, and some member states remain reluctant to use this organisation as an active and independent actor in Europe, its operational role can be only very limited. Some progress was made when in the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992, it was stated: "WEU member states declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU. Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions." It seems, however, that since this bold statement, relatively little has been done for its implementation, as in the second part of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council to the Assembly it is dryly stated: "The (Special Working) Group also turned its attention to the politico-military aspects of designating and setting up military units answerable to WEU. At the Council's request, it considered problems associated with implementing proposals made in the Franco-German memorandum on the creation of a European corps." Apparently, the Council is not so much in a hurry to implement this part of the Petersberg declaration as it was regarding enlargement. While no official arrangement has yet been made on such units answerable to WEU, the United Kingdom's Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rikfind, provided a clear indication when he said: "In principle, all the United Kingdom's conventional armed forces are available for military operations conducted under the auspices of Western European Union. Military units for WEU operations would be drawn on a case-by-case basis from forces with national and NATO roles - in the latter case, after consultation with our NATO allies. ... of course, any new commitments for our armed forces must become publicly known. The new arrangements involving Western European Union do not imply additional commitments: they simply suggest that in certain circumstances it may be more appropriate for WEU, rather than NATO, to sponsor certain operations. That would largely depend on whether the United States and Canada were likely to be involved in a specific matter, so that is the sort of circumstance which we envisage as potentially arising." 8 Meanwhile, an agreement has been concluded between France, Germany and SACEUR, regarding the Eurocorps, which for the time being, seems to be of greater interest for NATO than for WEU. As regards these military units answerable to WEU, the same annual report mentions that the Defence Representatives Group "examined ways and means by which units could be assigned to WEU in times of crisis. It also considered the choice of headquarters and the organisation of headquarters staff. At the same time, the group gave consideration to WEU's structure in times of crisis." It is hoped that these numerous examinations and considerations will, in the foreseeable future, lead to conclusions, decisions and implementations, in order to ensure that a following crisis in Europe will not again develop into an armed conflict because of Europe's hesitation and lack of preparation. On the other hand, it is encouraging to see that a proposal for co-operation between air and naval forces of WEU member states, initially formulated by France, Italy and Spain, with the aim of developing it with the participation of all member states, has given birth to a "European pre-planned air/maritime force ready to carry out missions which might be assigned to it by WEU." According to the Petersberg declaration, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for: - the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, respectively; - humanitarian and rescue tasks; - peace-keeping tasks; - tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. The Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf crisis and the crisis in former Yugoslavia have been occasions for successful WEU maritime operations for mine-sweeping and embargo enforcement, respectively. Moreover, WEU is providing both material and personal assistance to the Danube states of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, in enforcing the United Nations embargo against Serbia/ Montenegro. The Council's decision at Petersberg on 19th June 1991 to establish a military planning cell was an important step forward. This planning cell, which, after a preparatory phase, started its activities on 1st April 1993 under Major-General Caltabiano as its first director, is in particular responsible for: - preparing contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices; - preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected; - keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations. Rightly, General Caltabiano has said that the interaction of the planning cell with other security organisations such as NATO, CSCE and the United Nations is essential for its military efficiency and vital to avoid duplication. Again, transparency and complementarity are key words in this process. It has been observed time and again that a European defence organisation without a proper integrated command structure is not likely to be effective. The military planning cell should therefore come forward with realistic proposals which would enable WEU to act if needed. Such proposals should naturally take into account the command structures existing in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and try to avert any unnecessary duplication. In future security crises in Europe and elsewhere, WEU can be a viable alternative if NATO is not willing or able to act, but not necessarily excluding NATO co-ordination and even collaboration. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that a future European Union foreign and security policy towards its eastern and southern borders will be different from the United States' policy. The crisis in ex-Yugoslavia has provided a modest example of the divergent views among western allies which has certainly not contributed to their readiness to act. One important issue to be addressed in the future is a definition of WEU's geographical area of interest. Recent operations in the Gulf and in the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia are certainly providing clues. The self-discipline shown as regards multiple violent conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union is also a clear indication, but there is still an important grey zone just beyond the area of the central European consultation partners where WEU's interests need to be spelled out in more detail. (d) Council of Europe Although the Council of Europe is rarely mentioned in discussions on security in Europe, the importance of its activities should not be underestimated. After the accession of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland, and recently of Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia, the applications for membership by Albania, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and the Slovak Republic are now being examined. In fact, if a country is admitted to the Council of Europe, it has passed a first important test as regards the democratic legitimacy of its institutions, respect for human rights and the rule of law, which no country with ambitions to participate in further European integration can afford to ignore. The Council of Europe has now established activities to help new member states, applicant states and states on the territory of the former Soviet Union, which do not meet the geographic requirements for membership, with projects in the fields of legal co-operation, human rights and media. A recent new development in this framework was the establishment of a task force in Tirana, which provides the Albanian authorities with legal advice on the reforms of the institutions and legal systems with the Council of Europe's standards. (e) CSCE Since the successful conclusion of the Follow-up Conference of Vienna in January 1989 and especially since the end of the East-West conflict, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has been able to assume a new role where it finally can be used as an instrument to genuinely strengthen relations between all European countries. The new start was formalised by the Charter of Paris for a new Europe which was accepted by all CSCE countries during the November 1990 Paris summit. The Charter of Paris, the Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, Helsinki Summit and other high level CSCE meetings have gradually provided this body with an extremely elaborate set of structures, institutions, mechanisms and procedures which leave very little room for further detailing. There is a Confllict Prevention Centre in Vienna, which has the aim of reducing the risk of conflict by promoting openness and transparency in military matters, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, a Secretariat in Prague, while recently a Secretary General was nominated. Furthermore, a High Commissioner on National Minorities has been appointed, who provides "early warning" and, as appropriate, "early action" at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues with a potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area affecting peace, stability, or relations between participating states. Finally, at the Stockholm Council meeting, CSCE ministers adopted the text of a Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, providing for general conciliation and for arbitration on the basis of agreements, ad-hoc or in advance, based on reciprocal declarations, which was signed by 29 of the 51 states participating in the Stockholm meeting. The convention will go into effect when it has been ratified by 12 states. Altogether, it seems that theoretically CSCE has a full range of options to take action in any situation where peace and security in Europe are threatened. Still, in recent years and months it has been relatively ineffective, a reproach which in all fairness, can be made to most international organisations in the security field. In the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, the CSCE was used as a legitimising factor for action taken by other organisations, as was the case when the EC sent observers to Yugoslavia with the support of the CSCE. This crisis has made it clear that the CSCE and the Conflict Prevention Centre are not yet able to intervene efficiently. The large number of member states, its intergovernmental character and the lack of an executive branch of its own undermine the possibilities of the CSCE. There was also an apparent lack of political will of participating states and of parties involved in conflicts to recognise CSCE's authority. It is clear that CSCE would be more effective if it had the full support of other organisations like NATO and WEU, as they pledged in July 1992. The most realistic option for CSCE would be to operate actively in the field of conflict prevention and early warning. There can be no question that in this respect, monitoring and fact-finding missions have an important role to play. Unfortunately, such missions often struggle with shortages in personnel and funding. These and many other problems in the practical and organisational field have prevented CSCE to operate effectively. The Committee of Senior Officials is now examining a restructuring which should enable CSCE to concentrate on its political and operational tasks. The first results of this review should be endorsed by the next Council meeting in Rome this year, while the operation should be finalised at the Budapest Review Conference in late 1994. It should be recognised that the large number of states involved in the CSCE is at the same time an advantage and a handicap. However, through its competences mainly in the non- military dimension of security, the CSCE remains a valuable organisation, whose influence may increase further if the CSCE were declared a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Participating states should, therefore, continue and intensify their efforts to make this, the largest regional organisation in the area of security, a success. (f) The United Nations With a high-profile presence, both political and military, in a number of serious conflicts in the world, the importance of the United Nations has grown, not only as the international organisation which can legitimise and decide on action, including even the use of violence against aggressors in a conflict, but also as the organisation which can send peace- keeping forces of its own. It is too early to tell what will be the consequences of these activities for the future of the United Nations. Apparently, there are limits to its effectiveness and credibility which have come to the surface in ex-Yugoslavia and Cambodia. It does, however, seem likely that the bodies mainly concerned with the early stages of attempts at conflict resolution will be the CSCE or the UN, or possibly the European Community or Union; NATO or WEU, or both, will be concerned at a later stage, with regard to the provision of military forces. X. The future ============== Apart from the other problems discussed earlier in the present report, important questions regarding the potential improvement to Europe's possible security policy need to be addressed here. The first is how Europe should solve the consequences of a declining US military presence. The second is, how political co-ordination could be improved in order to accelerate reactions to crises and to make any actions taken more effective. Finally, how should Europe provide assistance to the nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. (a) Military improvements A way of coping with the US drawdown from Europe and declining continental military resources would be to move towards further integration between, and role specialisation with, Europe's armed forces. This poses both practical and political difficulties. Smaller European states are moving towards the abandonment of certain defence capacities, the maintenance of which they could justify during the cold war. In contrast, the two most important European states in military terms, the United Kingdom and France, both appear determined to hold on to as many capabilities as possible, despite reducing the overall size of their armed forces. Role specialisation has already occured to a certain extent in the NATO Rapid Reaction Force. Germany for example, has assumed the major share of the air component, while the United Kingdom plays the leading role on land. However, arguably, role specialisation will have to be extended well beyond this if overall European military effectiveness is to be enhanced or maintained with reduced manpower and defence expenditure. In terms of integration, multinationalism has already advanced in NATO with the formation of multinational corps and multinational divisions. In practice, however, multinational integration below divisional level has proved problematic, even in NATO armies which share common doctrine and common communication methods. Throughout the cold war, military deployments were heavily concentrated on the Central European confrontation. This involved a large concentration of personnel and weapons, both tactical and nuclear, to repel an invasion from the East. Since the end of the cold war, the scale of deployment is being substantially reduced on both sides. In future, the forces required will be those which are adapted to the various requirements of conflict resolution. These must be able to respond speedily to a request for action. Western European countries have been developing such rapid reaction forces - national contingents, the Franco-German corps, and NATO's rapid reaction corps - and these together with NATO's experience of multinational planning, logistics and training should provide for conflict resolution. The aim of European states should be to concentrate on the provision of armed forces suitable for this function, preferably for use under the auspicies of the United Nations or CSCE with Security Council approval. (b) Political improvements WEU to open the possibility of undertaking peace-keeping operations and, by NATO and WEU, of providing support for such operations, marked the beginning of attempts to improve co-ordination between security institutions. On the other hand, the presence of one NATO and one WEU naval task force to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic was seen by many as an unfortunate consequence of competition between two security organisations. Although co-ordination between the two forces has been successful, it would appear unlikely that such parallism will re-occur. In November 1992, NATO and WEU adopted a Document on Co-operation which sets out mechanisms for mutual information and representation of one body at the meetings of the other, as well as guidelines for co-operation in planning. The chances for co-ordination between the two organisations have been greatly improved by the transfer of WEU's Secretariat General to Brussels in the beginning of 1993. A welcome trend in European security architecture is its rationsalisation. Meeting in Bonn in December 1992, the defence ministers of the 13 member states of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), established in 1976 to harmonise operational requirements and standardise defence procurement practices, formally agreed to incorporate IEPG into WEU with immediate effect. However, the practical details of this merger will not be formalised until the forthcoming June 1993 WEU Council. One of the objectives of this decision was, as the IEPG National Armaments Directors have stated in their report to the Ministers that WEU, based on an international treaty and having its own legal personality "could provide a more solid and visible framework for European armaments co-operation thus opening new possibilities for its development, including the eventual establishment of a European armaments agency, if nations so choose". In addition, at the November 1992 WEU Council, it was agreed that the WEU would address the possible transfer of certain Eurogroup activities in spring 1993. The WEU Defence Representatives Group (DRG) is now evaluating the activities of Eurogroup with a view to preparing joint WEU positions prior to the establishment of a joint WEU/Eurogroup working group. The question is if the rationalisation of European security institutions could be taken much further at this juncture. Some have made a case, for example, for a merger between the NACC and CSCE which do indeed cover some common ground. It seems, however, far too early to seriously consider this merger, not only because of a considerable difference in membership, with NAC covering 38 and CSCE covering 52 states, but also because NACC really has a different orientation and purpose. In the workplan adopted by NACC on 10th December 1992, only the section on political and security related matters has similarities with the field of activities of CSCE. It would be preferable to leave both institutions to come to grips with their main objectives and to reach a stage of great effectiveness, which may indeed contribute to peace and security in Europe. In a more distant future with the expected and hoped-for extension of a network of bilateral and multilateral relations, NACC may automatically become superfluous since many of the issues mentioned in the workplan would then be addressed in specialised organisations and instituttions while other issues would have lost their topicality. The CSCE could then address all the political aspects of pan-european security policy, while possible military action would be left to NATO and WEU under the aegis of CSCE as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. While WEU could provide the military forces and oversee a particular peace-keeping operation, NATO could furnish planning, communications and logistical support. Although such a division of labour seems unlikely to occur in the near future, the declining US military presence in Europe may reduce the importance of NATO as a military instrument and consequently enhance the military value of WEU. A further improvement could be to redistribute resources between the various security institutions. Whereas NATO possesses thousands of central staff, it appears anomalous that the CSCE and WEU have very limited resources. For example, the CSCE secretariat was forced to depend on office furniture donated by the Swedish government because it did not have sufficient funds to pay for its own. It cannot be denied that the funding of a conflict prevention mechanism now being established in CSCE, would be far cheaper than the cost of peace-keeping, peace-enforcing or military intervention. The funding of peace monitors and fact-finding missions is comparatively cheap compared to the cost of military intervention. Another possible and relatively cost effective initiative would be to ensure that representatives of Central and Eastern European countries or former Soviet republics can all attend the meetings of security institutions for which they have been invited, because of their membership or for other reasons. At the moment, many of these states, perhaps those that need the most assistance, are unable to send their representatives to CSCE or NACC meetings due to a shortage of funds. Similarly, the citizens of many eastern European countries are quite unaware of the rights that their political masters have agreed to uphold by signature of the Helsinki Final Act. Greater investment in propaganda on behalf of the CSCE may be a good investment. All countries of Central Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union are demanding to have access to the West's expertise as well as capital to manage the economic and political reformation from command economies to pluralistic democracies. This requires a new international organisation to assist the reform effort in the East. There are three reasons for this: (i) The problems in developing democracy and the market economy in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union will take many years, perhaps, decades to accomplish; (ii) The West's strategic interests are deeply engaged in the outcome of the struggles for democracy in these nations; (iii) The western technical assistance which is indispensable in the building of democratic and market institutions and practices is at present totally inadequate given the dimensions of the problem. The proposed organisation has already been given the name the Organisation for European Democratic Development, the OEDD, by Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill. Its essential mission would be to generate and manage Western technical assistance, financed by Western governments, to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It would have its home back in Brussels in order to co- ordinate its activities with the European Community, although most of its work would be on eastern territory. Western nations would pay for experts of this organisation which would also develop its own permanent staff. Its divisions could include: privatisation, banking practices, delivering municipal services, building democratic legislatures, democratic legal systems including criminal justice and commercial law, agriculture, food distribution, energy, health, education, etc.. This would involve thousands of Western technical experts living, teaching and learning in the nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; not three-day visits but months and years in the territory; not unco-ordinated efforts by individuals in Western nations but a highly co-ordinated and long term inter- governmental efforts. The North Americans and the Japanese should be equal partners with the Europeans in this effort. The complexity of European security goes beyond the existing security institutions to a more profound question of policy direction and political will. It could be argued that in many ways Europe's new security structure is an empty vessel. Institutions have been revised and mechanisms elaborated but the will to utilise these new regimes often seems lacking. It should be remembered that meetings of the various security institutions are often attended by the same ministers and diplomats. However far the co-ordination and effectiveness of the security structure can be improved, the system cannot achieve success in halting, for example, ethnic conflict if the political will to act is lacking. Of course, this is to suggest that solutions to such conflicts exist. At worst, all that may be done is to isolate a particular conflict from neighbouring countries and leave it to be fought out to the point of exhaustion. On the other hand, a more forthright attitude to intervention, both military and political, may prevent the disaster comparable to the violent implosion of former Yugoslavia. XI. Conclusions ================ With all the changes still taking place on the European scene, it is too early for a final, fully detailed concept of European security policy, but, by and large, more elements are coming to the surface which will have to be taken into consideration when establishing this policy. One early and also inevitable conclusion of the report is that in the present circumstances, the overall political and economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe and other neighbouring regions is far too unstable to do away with any of the long existing or recently established organisations concerned with security in Europe. On the other hand, the fact that these different organisations continue to exist does not entitle them to enter into competition, since that would only do harm to the attainment of their common objective of preserving peace and security. Another conclusion, causing little surprise, is that a continued close relationship between North America and Europe is indispensable for European security. It should not be denied, however, that in recent years this relationship has been subject to mutual criticism caused by different views and judgements. This concerned not only economic issues, but also security issues as was, and still is, demonstrated in the crisis in former Yugoslavia. In general, it is becoming increasingly clear that the positions adopted by both the United States and Western Europe in security affairs are unsustainable in the long run because they are inherently under tension. Neither party should be ashamed to admit this, since external factors have changed completely. There is a need to revise the old transatlantic bargain and replace it by a new partnership which takes account of continued important common economic, political and security interests and objectives, which neither ally can achieve by acting alone. There are many lessons to be learned from the Yugoslavia conflict. One of them is that in today's Europe with its numerous existing, and potential, nationalist and ethnic conflicts, a common foreign policy cannot be conducted without stringent procedures for the recognition of new states. Indeed, the European Council has adopted criteria for this recognition, but this may not be sufficient if there will not be a more detailed definition of the rights of peoples to self- determination. The possibility should be considered of establishing prototype agreements to be concluded between a nationality, the state of residence and the state - if existing - with which it has a nationalist or ethnic affinity. It is vital that minorities are respected and agreements implemented. For the implementation of an effective European foreign and security policy, it is also vital for the EC, in conjunction with WEU, to start making contingency plans for crisis management and conflict solution. No foreign and security policy is possible without intelligence gathering and analysis of facts. It is far too early for the EC to develop capabilities in this field, but there should at least be a mechanism for the member states to keep each other better informed through consultation and information. Such a mechanism could prevent what happened early in the crisis in former Yugoslavia, when each member state had a different opinion on the seriousness of the imminent crisis, based on different information and analysis. In this framework, the EC and WEU should also start to establish a lasting set of principles in order to define the "common European interests" which could lead to common action. Europe cannot pretend that with the revolutionary changes in the geostrategic situation, the role of nuclear weapons has not been subject to change. There should be continuing consultation on the future of transatlantic security guarantees. At the same time, an intra- European debate is needed over the role, and the future role, of European nuclear weapons. These debates should take place in parallel and with the greatest possible transparency. The WEU Council's decision to move the Secretariat-General to Brussels and to establish a military planning cell have demonstrated the Council's determination to create the conditions for WEU to be developed into an operational organisation, co-operating with other organisations, playing its own specific role in Europe's security policy. In the near future, the Council will have to show the political will necessary to implement the consequences of its earlier decisons. ---------------------- 1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Eisma), Agnelli, Alegre, Andreotti, Benvenuti, Bowden, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabra, Feldmann, Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Marshall), MM. Kittelmann, de Lipkowski, Maroni, Moya, Mueller, d'Ornano, Pecriaux, de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Roseta, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soell, Ward, Wintgens. 3. Financial Times, 5th May 1993. 4. See the report on security in the Mediterranean, submitted by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee. 5. For the many different aspects of United States-European relations, see Nannette Gantz and John Roper ed: Towards a new partnerhip. United States-European relations in the post-cold war era - WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris 1993. 6. For a stimulating discussion on this subject see Roberto Zadra, "European integration and nuclear deterrence after the cold war", WEU Institute for Security Studies, November 1992. 7. Address of 26th April 1993. 8. Answer to oral question by Mr. Marshall, House of Commons, 20th April 1993. ------- For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com