/pub/history/military/a-weu/documents File: 1389polc.soe Document 1389 8th November 1993 Political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU ______ REPORT (1) submitted on behalf of the Political Committee (2) by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur ______ TABLE OF CONTENTS ================= DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. Correspondence between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of Western European Union III. The new challenges facing the United Nations and their consequences IV. The modified Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations V. Thoughts on ways and means of enhancing political relations between the United Nations and Western European Union VI. Conclusions APPENDIX Extract from the Agenda for Peace by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali ----------- Draft Recommendation ==================== on political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU The Assembly, (i) Considering that, with the end of the cold war, the East- West confrontation has been replaced by a series of different conflicts of a new type that have broken out in several areas of the world; (ii) Considering that it is now crucial to determine whether the United Nations can henceforth become the essential instrument for ensuring the prevention and settlement of conflicts and safeguarding peace in the world; (iii) Recalling that the year 1995, which will be the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations, will be of particular importance for the prospect of reforming the organisation; (iv) Recalling the importance of the United Nations and the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council for disarmament and non-proliferation with particular regard to the extension of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1995; (v) Welcoming the success achieved so far by the opening of the register of conventional arms kept by the United Nations enabling better supervision of exports of armaments at world level; (vi) Noting the considerable increase in requests to the United Nations in the last five years for peace-keeping operations; (vii) Noting that it lacks adequate financial, organisational, technical, military and political means for the effective conduct of these operations; (viii) Concerned at the alarming financial position of the United Nations, due to the late payment of contributions by the majority of the member countries; (ix) Noting, on the one hand, the desire of the United Nations to seek greater co-operation with "regional arrangements or agencies" in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter and, on the other hand, the exchange of letters between the Secretary- General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of WEU in this respect; (x) Noting, however, that, contrary to the United Nations, WEU is subjected to parliamentary supervision and, consequently, should consult its Assembly prior to any exchange of views with the United Nations; (xi) Recalling that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are based on the right of legitimate self- defence guaranteed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and not on the provisions of Chapter VIII of that Charter; (xii) Consequently, convinced that WEU is an independent organisation, whose decisions are not subject to Security Council authorisation; (xiii) Convinced, nevertheless, that the fundamental political interest of WEU is to strengthen the vocation of the United Nations in playing the role of primordial instrument for maintaining peace in the world and to submit its activities to the views expressed by the United Nations; (xiv) Recalling the Petersberg Declaration, according to which WEU affirmed that it was prepared to support "the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis- management measures, including peace-keeping activities, of the United Nations Security Council"; (xv) Recalling also that the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the maintenance of peace in ex-Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina are addressed to "states, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements"; (xvi) Consequently, dismayed that WEU does not consider it has been called upon to take coercive action on the pretext that the United Nations has made a specific request only to NATO; (xvii) Emphasising that any constructive evolution in relations between WEU and the United Nations depends on solving the problems that may arise from the fact that WEU represents the start of a progressive integration of Europe in defence and security matters, whereas the United Nations and its Security Council are based exclusively on the principle of the sovereignty of member states; (xviii) Noting, further, that the United Nations is intervening increasingly in the internal affairs of member states, whereas the Charter does not provide sufficient legal bases for doing so; (xix) Convinced that WEU and the bodies concerned with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union must co-operate and further co-ordinate their activities in preventive diplomacy and crisis-management and, possibly, place their means at the disposal of other regional organisations, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 1. Work out forthwith a new platform of European security interests on the basis of an assessment of the new threats and risks in the world and their consequences; 2. Define WEU's vocation in relation to the United Nations and the specific areas in which it can offer its assistance to the United Nations while retaining its independence; 3. Without waiting for the United Nations to make a specific request to WEU: - establish contact with the bodies concerned with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union in order to reach agreement on the areas of joint activity and the sharing of responsibilities in peace-keeping, with particular regard to preventive diplomacy and the consolidation of peace at the end of hostilities; - co-ordinate with NATO ways and means of sharing peace- keeping responsibilities between the two organisations; - instruct its planning cell to have a report prepared by experts on the requirements and time necessary for implementing coercive measures in former Yugoslavia with particular regard to available resources and necessary personnel; - instruct the Torrejon satellite centre to present a report on the capabilities and experience it can offer for peace-keeping, particularly in establishing facts, monitoring and early warning; - inform the Assembly of the results of these studies. 4. Make proposals for reforming the United Nations and its Security Council with a view to strengthening its effectiveness in peace-keeping and improving WEU's participation in the decision-making process in the United Nations; 5. Give a new mandate to the representatives of the member countries of WEU at the United Nations headquarters in New York to hold regular consultations in order to co-ordinate their positions, particularly in the committees and working groups of the United Nations whose activities come within the framework of the responsibilities of WEU. ----------- Explanatory Memorandum ====================== (submitted by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur) I. Introduction ================ Since Western European Union has been developed into an operational organisation carrying out - in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions - its first military operations and contingency planning in the framework of the conflicts at the Gulf and in former Yugoslavia, the problem of interaction with the United Nations has become evident. The Assembly's Defence Committee has already examined the operational aspects of the problem on the basis of the report submitted by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman in June 1993 (3). For the necessary basic information on the international post-cold war realities, with the dramatic increase in regional conflicts and trouble spots in several world regions, and for a description of the various organisational and operational challenges the United Nations is now facing, your Rapporteur refers to the relevant chapters of that report. What is still needed is an assessment of the consequences of the new world situation for the future political role of the United Nations and its Security Council, for the implementation of the United Nations Charter and for political relations between the United Nations and other organisations with the aim of maintaining which is international peace and security within which Western European Union is assumed to assume an enhanced role. The character of the United Nations' future activities in security matters and of its relations with WEU cannot be without consequences for the development of WEU itself which is based on the ideals proclaimed in the United Nations Charter in general and on the right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the provision of Article 51 of the Charter in particular. This might also have an impact on WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the defence component of the future European political union, and a fortiori on its efforts to define a common European security and defence policy. In order to cover the whole range of political areas in which either the United Nations or Western European Union or both might be challenged, an analysis of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and of the modified Brussels Treaty will be unavoidable. However, it is not the purpose of this report to present legal expertise to be used as a basis for argument in the case of different interpretations of the respective responsibilities and roles of the two organisations. On the contrary, the purpose of this report is to analyse the conditions under which the United Nations and Western European Union assume their responsibilities and to identify possible areas of co-operation. Such a task also requires an assessment of the new character of conflicts in which the United Nations is at present involved and, in particular, an analysis of the direction in which United Nations itself has developed and is developing. II. Correspondence between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of Western European Union ====================================================== Such an assessment is the more urgent since the United Nations has, for the first time, actually approached Western European Union to ask it to strengthen its efforts in maintaining international peace and security and to improve co- ordination with the United Nations. Following a statement by the United Nations Security Council issued on 28th January 1993, in which it took note with appreciation of the Secretary-General's report entitled "Agenda for peace" and in particular the views presented in paragraphs 63, 64 and 65 (4) of this report, "concerning co- operation with regional arrangements and organisations", the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council, sent the following letter, dated 1st April 1993, to the Secretary- General of Western European Union: "The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of Western European Union and has the honour to transmit a copy of the statement made by the President of the Security Council, on behalf of the Council, in connection with its consideration of the item entitled "An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace- keeping" (S/25184). The statement reads, inter alia, as follows: The Security Council ... invites within the framework of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, regional arrangements and organisations to study, on a priority basis, the following: - "ways and means to strengthen their functions to maintain international peace and security within their areas of competence, paying due regard to the characteristics of their respective regions. Taking into account the matters of which the Security Council has been seized and in accordance with the United Nations Charter, they might consider, in particular, preventive diplomacy including fact-finding, confidence- building, good offices and peace-building and, where appropriate, peace-keeping; - ways and means to further improve co-ordination of their efforts with those of the United Nations. Being aware of the variety of mandate, scope and composition of the regional arrangements and organsations, the Council stresses that the forms of interaction of these arrangements and organisations with the United Nations should be flexible and adequate to each specific situation. These may include, in particular, exchange of information and consultations, with a view to enhancing the United Nations capability including monitoring and early- warning, with the Secretary-General or, where appropriate, his Special Representative, participating as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, secondment of officials to the United Nations Secretariat, making timely and specific requests for United Nations involvment, and readiness to provide necessary resources. The Security Council requests the Secretary-General: - to transmit this statement to those regional arrangements and organisations which have received a standing invitation to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly as observers, and to other regional arrangements and organisations, with a view to promoting the aforementioned studies and encouraging the replies to the United Nations; - to submit as soon as possible and preferably by the end of April 1993 to the Security Council a report concerning the replies from the regional arrangements and organisations." The Secretary-General would be grateful if the replies requested by the Security Council could be communicated to him by Monday, 26th April 1993." Identical letters were sent to those intergovernmental organisations that have received a standing invitation to participate in the sessions and the work of the United Nations General Assembly as observers, among those the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Council of Europe and the European Community; the text was also transmitted to "other regional arrangements and organisations" in Africa, North and South America, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Middle East. In Europe, the following organisations (apart from WEU) received it: Black Sea Economic Co-operation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the Nordic Council of Ministers and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As at 14th July 1993, nine organisations out of fifty two having received such letters had replied, including the European Community (on 20th April 1993), the CSCE (on 11th June 1993), NATO (on 12th May 1993) and WEU (on 25th June 1993). The text of WEU's reply has already been communicated to members of the Assembly in a separate document (5) but, because of the importance of the matter, it seems useful to reproduce the full text hereafter: Reply by the WEU Secretary-General dated 25th June 1993 to the letter of the United Nations Secretary-General of 1st April 1993 "I thank you for your letter of 1st April in which you transmitted to me the note S/25184 of the President of the Security Council. WEU attaches great importance to enhancing the role of the United Nations and its Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. I welcome therefore this opportunity to indicate how WEU envisages future co-operation with the United Nations in the fields mentioned in your letter. My reply is without prejudice to the question of whether WEU is a regional arrangement or agency as referred to in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. In their declaration agreed at Maastricht on 10th December 1991, the member states of Western European Union committed themselves to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Since then, WEU has concentrated its efforts on giving concrete expression to this dual vocation notably by developing its operational role. In their Petersberg Declaration of 19th June 1992, Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU defined the three types of missions for which military units acting under WEU authority could be employed, namely: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. The WEU Planning Cell was created to conduct the necessary planning for these missions, inter alia. It is in the context of WEU's operational role that WEU member states, at the Petersberg meeting, declared their readiness to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with WEU procedures, the effective implementation of conflict prevention and crisis management measures including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE and United Nations Security Council. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions. I wish to recall the various activities which WEU has undertaken, or is presently conducting, which are relevant to the subjects mentioned in your letter. During the conflict between Iran and Iraq in 1987-88, WEU ships conducted mine-clearing operations in the Gulf to ensure the unhindered movement of international maritime traffic in this area. Secondly, in the context of the measures taken by the international community following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, ships of WEU member states conducted mine-clearing and embargo enforcement operations in the Gulf. All these measures were undertaken in the framework of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. WEU is also contributing in various ways to the search for a resolution of the conflic in former Yugoslavia. Since July 1992, ships and aircraft of WEU member states have been conducting first embargo monitoring, and subsequently embargo enforcement, operations in the Adriatic. Now, following the decision taken by the joint session of the Council of Western European Union and the North Atlantic Council held on 8th June, combined WEU/NATO operations are underway in the Adriatic to ensure the strict implementation of United Nations Councils resolutions, in particular 820. WEU member states are also assisting Bulagaria, Hungary and Romania in enforcing sanctions and the embargo on the Danube. Furthermore, WEU has conducted contingency planning on a number of aspects relating to the situation in former Yugoslavia, notably regarding the possible creation of the safe haven around Sarajevo. The results of this planning were transmitted to the United Nations earlier this year. WEU Ministers, at their meeting in Rome on 19th May last, have now requested a study be made on the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to safe areas and on the possible rotation of UNPROFOR contingents from the WEU member states. In response to your letter and in the context of WEU's enhanced role as outlined above, it therefore seems important to increase contacts and exchanges of information between the United Nations and WEU. The mission of the United Nations in New York of the country holding the Presidency of WEU will act as a point of contact for the United Nations and will be responsible for the introduction of WEU contributions to the United Nations. In addition, WEU is ready to discuss with you ways to develop appropriate contacts and exchanges of information between the Secretariat-General and Planning Cell and relevant United Nations Secretariat bodies." As far as your Rapporteur is aware, Western European Union is to date the only organisation to have stated explicitely that its reply is "without prejudice to the question of whether WEU is a regional arrangement or agency as referred to in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter". In contrast to that, the CSCE confirmed in its reply that at the Helsinki summit in July 1992, it has declared its understanding that the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. The Political Committee and Defence Committee's joint meeting with the Permanent Council and the Secretary-General of WEU on 5th October 1993 provided an opportunity to throw some light on the considerations that led the Council to draft in such terms the answer the WEU Secretary-General sent to the United Nations. However, the committee first had to learn from the Secretary-General of WEU: - that regarding the coercive measures that would possibly be taken to ensure the security of the populations in Bosnia- Herzegovina for which WEU had prepared the contingency plans, WEU did not consider it had been approached since the United Nations had made a specific request only to NATO and - that there was no co-ordination between the member countries of WEU in the case of Somalia. Furthermore, the Secretary-General confirmed that the Council was unanimous in considering that WEU was not a regional organisation in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations but a collective defence organisation and that, consequently, certain member countries had even contemplated not answering the letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations at all. The committee was also informed that at the present time there were no plans for appointing a liaison officer to the United Nations and that there had been no co- ordination with NATO or the European Community before sending WEU's answer to the letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations. III. The new challenges facing the United Nations and their consequences =========================================================== A number of other questions were still outstanding and in particular what was really behind WEU's wish to strengthen the role of the United Nations in international security and peace- keeping and how did WEU intend to increase contacts and exchanges of information with the United Nations as indicated in its letter of 25th June 1993. Before examining in detail the contents and significance of the United Nations approach to regional organisations it is important to realise that, with the end of the cold war requests for United Nations peace-keeping operations have increased dramatically. Since 1988, fifteen new peace-keeping operations have been initiated compared with thirteen such operations over the previous forty years. Of the operations now involving the United Nations, nine started no earlier than 1991, including: - UNIKOM (United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission) since June 1991. Its mission is to monitor the Khor Ab Dullah (water way) and a demilitarised zone (extending 10 kms into Iraq and 5 kms into Kuwait), to deter violations of the boundary through its presence and surveillance of the demilitarised zone, to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one state or the other. Since 5th February 1993, UNIKOM has also had the power to prevent physically, and if necessary redress violations of the border or the demilitarised zone. UNIKOM has an authorised strength of three hundred military observers provided by more than thirty-four countries, plus two hundred other military personnel and some one hundreds and eighty-six local civilian staff. WEU member countries involved with military personnel are France, United Kingdom, Italy, Greece (as a future member) Norway (as an associate member) and Denmark (as observer). - UNAVEM II (United Nations Angola Verification Mission II) since 1991. Its original mandate was to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban forces, the maintenance of the cease-fire and elections. However, the crisis that developed after the elections thrust UNAVEM II into a central mediating role. The deteriorating security situation has further limited the ability of the United Nations to facilitate negotiations between the government and UNITA. Since January 1993, fighting has intensified between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces. Despite all efforts to achieve a cease-fire, the civil war in Angola developed to an extent that the United Nations Secretary- General described it as the most murderous conflict in the world with more than a thousand people dying every day as a consequence of the fighting (6). - The United Nations Security Council, by adopting Resolutions 864 on 15th September 1993, therefore decided for the first time to impose sanctions on a rebel organisation (UNITA) and not on a sovereign state. Originally, UNAVEM II's authorised strength was three hundred and fifty military observers and ninety police observers together with some eighty- seven international and a hundred and fifty-five local civilian staff (not counting electoral observers). WEU member countries were involved with military personnel from the Netherlands, Spain and Norway (as an associate member). Bearing in mind the dramatic deterioration of the situation in the country, it is especially peculiar that the United Nations Security Council agreed to reduce the strength of UNAVEM II to seventy-eight military and thirty police observers. - Since July 1991, ONUSAL (United Nations Mission in El Salvador) has been established with the mandate to monitor the cease-fire agreements between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional) and to reform and reduce the armed forces, create a new police force, reform the judicial and electoral system and verify human rights. Its mandate also includes economic and social issues. WEU member countries involved with military and police observers are France, Italy, Spain and Norway (as an associate member). - MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara) was established in September 1991 with the mandate to monitor the cease-fire between Morocco and the Polisario and the confinement of each party's troops to designated areas, to facilitate exchanges of prisoners of war and to organise and monitor a referendum for the self- determination of the people of the Western Sahara. For the some three hundred and twenty-eight military observers and military support personnel in the area, the following WEU member countries are involved: Belgium, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Greece (as a future member). - One of the most difficult tasks is to be fulfilled by UNPROFOR I (United Nations Protection Forces in former Yugoslavia) established in March 1992 and UNPROFOR II established at the end of June 1992. The problem of resolving the conflicts after the break-up of Yugoslavia, in particular in Bosnia Herzegovina, was already the subject of Recommendation 541 adopted by the WEU Assembly on 16th June 1993 on a report (7), submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur. It will be the subject of a report to be submitted by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Defence Committee at the forthcoming session of the Assembly. Depending on the actual development of the situation in the area, the Political Committee will eventually present a further special report on this particular subject. The involvement of several organisations such as the United Nations, the CSCE, the European Community, NATO and WEU in the efforts to terminate hostilities in former Yugoslavia provide a concrete example of the problems involved in organising their various political and military activities in such a complex situation. This became particularly evident when a dispute arose recently between Britain and France on the one hand and the United States on the other after President Clinton said he would send United States peace-keeping troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina only if the operation was under the control of NATO, not the United Nations. Furthermore, Mr. Woerner, NATO Secretary-General, said in Brussels on 10th September 1993, that "NATO cannot be regarded as an instrument or as a military subcontractor to the United Nations. Both must maintain the possibility to act indeendently." UNPROFOR, based on a United Nations Security Council decision was to be an interim arrangement for creating the conditions of peace and security for negotiating an overall settlement of the crisis. Its mandate was enlarged several times to include support for efforts to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and to protect convoys of released civilian detainees, as well as monitoring certain areas in Croatia. UNPROFOR includes military, police and civilian components of some twenty-three thousands personnel from more than thirty-five countries. The following WEU member countries are contributing personnel: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Norway (as an associate member) and Denmark (as an observer country). UNPROFOR M (United Nations Protection Force in the Republic of Macedonia) offers the first example of the deployment of military forces of some thousand men including an American unit in the framework of a preventive diplomacy measure. At the request of the Macedonian President, Mr. Gligorov, the United Nations Security Council authorised this deployment to monitor the frontiers of Macedonia with Albania, Serbia and Montenegro. UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia), preceded by UNAMIC (United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia), was established in March 1992 to ensure maintenance of the cease-fire, to organise the demobilisation of the factions' armed forces, to arrange free and fair elections, to create a neutral political environment for those elections, to oversee human rights observances, to repatriate those displaced by war and to start the rehabilitation of the country. For these purposes UNTAC has about twenty two thousands military and civilian personnel, to which the following WEU member countries contribute: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway (as an associate member). A particular complicated situation has developed following the intervention of the United Nations in Somalia on the basis of UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) set up in April 1992. From the very beginning, major differences arose on the definition of the mission to be carried out in a country which has been deprived of a central government since January 1991 and where fighting between opposing warloads has resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands millions of refugees, and catastrophic famine in the country. The first mandate of UNOSOM was concentrated on national reconciliation and humanitarian assistance. But following continuous fighting between the rival militias, the next option was to pursue country-wide action by a group of member states authorised by the Security Council to ensure that the current violence against the international relief effort was brought to an end. Following an offer by the United States to organise and lead such an operation, and bearing in mind that the United Nations Secretariat did not have the ability to command and control an enforcement operation of the magnitude required. The Security Council authorised by its Resolution 794 the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia", acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) spearheaded by the United States, was deployed in Mogadishu, including military units from twenty-one countries including the following WEU member countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Turkey (as an associate member). In parallel, UNOSOM remains fully responsible for the political aspects and humanitarian assistance to Somalia. It is composed of military personnel from seventeen countries including units from Belgium and Norway. The heavy losses several United Nations units suffered in carrying out their duties in Somalia, in particular those of Pakistan, Italy, Nigeria, the United States and others, and the sofar failure of allied operations to restore security and peace in the country has led to serious differences between the participants in the operation. Doubts have also been voiced regarding the ability of the United Nations to bring this operation to a successfull conclusion. It should therefore be recalled that in Recommendation 544 (8) on the situation in Somalia on a report submitted by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Political Committee, the Assembly reminded the Council that any action in which forces of several of its members are involved conforms with Articles V and VIII, paragraph 3 of the modified Brussels Treaty and asked for an urgent WEU Council meeting on the matter. The Council's answer on this matter is not at all satisfactory. The total absence of political and logistic co-ordination between the member countries of WEU which is characteristic of the operations in Somalia, where the United Nations is faced with difficulties of such gravity that they may lead to the failure of the whole operation, leaves little hope that the WEU Council will show the political determination to shoulder its responsibilities under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty. Finally, UNOMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique) created in December 1992, is mandated to verify the cease-fire between the government and the RENAMO rebels after fourteen years of devastating civil war, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; to verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and provide security in the transport corridors. Furthermore, UNOMOZ's electoral division is to monitor and verify all aspects and stages of the electoral process which is to be organised in October 1994. About seven thousands or eigth thousands military and civilian personnel members are involved in the process including units from the following WEU member countries: Italy, Portugal and Spain, whereas Italy, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Germany are members of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission which is to guarantee the implementation of the general peace agreement. Among the other activities of the United Nations, one must not overlook the information missions conducted in Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh where the role of the United Nations is mainly to back up CSCE efforts to manage this crisis. Moreover, after fighting started in Abkhazia, the United Nations Security Council decided on 24th August 1993 to create a United Nations Observation Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Finally, the action started by the United Nations to re- establish democracy in Haiti shows that the United Nations is increasingly called upon to intervene in the internal affairs of states and that it is difficult to fulfil such tasks even in close collaboration with the Organisation of American States (OAS). To ensure the implementation of the New York agreement for returning President Aristide to Haiti, the United Nations had decided to organise in that country a peace-keeping mission known as MINUHA, mobilising about 1 300 men with a view to modernising the Haitian army and creating a new police force. A serious obstacle was raised to the implementation of this undertaking, when armed demonstrations managed to prevent the debarcation of American and Canadian forces of the United Nations at Port au Prince. It is difficult to assess the risk that the increased number of United Nations peace-keeping missions will lead to operations which will never be determined. The number of armed forces serving under the United Nations flag has been increased dramatically: in 1987, 9 666 United Nations troops and military observers were deployed in different regions of the world, compared with 75 738 on 31st May 1993 (9). (In an article published in Der Spiegel on 16th August 1993, the United Nations Secretary-General reported 85 000 soldiers under the United Nations flag). Most of them are serving in former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Lebanon and Somalia. Freed from being paralysed by the global East-West conflicts, the United Nations has emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of various regional conflicts and for the preservation of peace, as its Secretary- General describes it in his report "Agenda for peace" which he presented to the United Nations Security Council in June 1992. But assuming its new and enhanced responsibilities, the United Nations is confronted with various new problems and difficulties of a very different type. The multiplication of burdens has led the United Nations to ask for the support of relevant regional organisation in order to decentralise its various tasks and responsibilities. There is first the question of creating a United Nations armed force on a permanent basis in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter (10). This is strongly advocated by the Secretary-General in his "Agenda for peace". But in view of the rather limited response sofar from member states which are reluctent to transfer the control of their armed forces to the United Nations, the Secretary-General now seems to favour extending the existing practice of assigning armed forces and civil experts under bilateral agreements with the largest possible number of member countries. As the Secretary-General explained to your Rapporteur during his visit to the United Nations Headquarters in New York, the formation of proper United Nations armed forces would require new bureaucratic and command structures involving higher expenditure. The United Nations therefore had to rely on the help of member countries in this area too. The bilateral agreements on assigning peace-keeping forces to the United Nations are normally concluded by verbal notes without reference to the United Nations Charter. According to the present practice of United Nations peace-keeping operations, the United Nations takes the decisions on missions and employment of the troops. The whole internal composition of the units however remains the responsibility of the relevant member state. The present staff of the Secretary-General is quite insufficient for coping with this task of commanding and controling the increased number of peace-keeping operations. The peace-keeping department is therefore planning a large increase in staff from the present thirty-five to about ninety. Furthermore, the department is asking for additional experts from member countries who should be seconded to the United Nations for a certain period free of charge. The organisational situation within the Secretariat-General is not facilitated by the fact that the responsibilities of the peace-keeping department vis-a-vis the other departments, in particular the political and humanitarian departments, have not yet been spelled out in detail. Furthermore, any staff increases run counter to the efforts of the Secretary-General to tighten his organisation and come up against the policy of real zero-growth followed by certain member countries. Furthermore, the United Nations lacks experience in commanding and controlling operations and does not have the requisite intelligence means. What it needs in particular is information about the political situation in certain countries, the powers of different political groups and individuals and relations between them. Offers from intelligence services of certain countries to provide some information are difficult to accept because of the difficulty of protecting classified information and because such information is possibly given only in a selective way. At the later stage, consideration might be given to how it might be possible to improve the monitoring and early warning activity of the United Nations by offering information obtained by the WEU Space Observation Centre in Torrejon. The conditions and ways of providing such information and the actual requirements of the United Nations might affect the effective communication of information. At present, your Rapporteur has the impression from his talks in New York that the United Nations is interested in information, practically in the framework of preventive diplomacy and early warning. Regarding early warning, the "Agenda for peace" mentions in particular "environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease. There is a need ... to strengthen arrangements in such manner that information from those sources can be synthesised with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be taken by the United Nations to alleviate it. ... Regional arrangements and organisations have an important role in early warning." It does not seem that the United Nations is prepared to develop its own intelligence service for the moment. However, the question of recruiting United Nations experts for satellite imagery interpretation capable of interpreting raw data or exploiting interpreted imagery from the WEU Satellite Centre is worthy of consideration. In this respect, mention should be made of the longstanding activities of the United Nations in elaborating legal conditions to prevent or limit the military use of outer space, beginning with the Outerspace Treaty of 1967 and the agreement governing the activities of states on the moon and other celestial bodies prohibiting inter alia the use of the moon and other celestial bodies for military purposes. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space set up in 1959 is the focal point of United Nations action in this field. In considering the military uses of outer space, the United Nations Assembly expressed grave concern at the extension of an arms race into outer space and urged all states, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the goal of preventing such an arms race. Considering those efforts in a framework of peace-keeping in a broader sense, Western European Union, which is on the way to assuming a leading European role in space matters, should add this item to the agenda of how to develop its relations with the United Nations in this area. Another important area for maintaining international peace and security in which the United Nations recently has considerably increased its efforts is disarmament and control of armaments transfer. Global and regional approaches in these matters need to be harmonised. What will be the respective role of the United Nations and other international organisations in preparation of the conference due in 1995 that will decide on the extension of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? What will be the responsibility of the five nuclear powers which are permanent members of the Security Council in this respect? How will they reach a common position? How will NATO and Western European Union in which some of the nuclear powers are members reach a common position? The nuclear test conducted by China on 5th October 1993 again raises the question of extending the moratorium on nuclear tests by the other nuclear powers and also the even more fundamental question of whether the planned negotiations to conclude a treaty banning all nuclear tests still had any real chance of success. The problem of the use of chemical weapons has been settled by the signing of the chemical weapons convention (CWC), but since members of the Arab League and a number of Middle Eastern and Far Eastern countries did not sign, a regional problem in the matter remains. In the United Nations much importance is attached to preventing the proliferation of ballistic missile technology; however, the elaboration of United Nations guidelines in this area is difficult because of differences between the positions of industrial and developing countries. This is a major obstacle for the world-wide extension of the missile technology control regime. It seems however that the United Nations is well satisfied with the success sofar in establishing the United Nations register of conventional arms for collecting data on international arms transfers. It is pleased with the response to calls for all member states to provide annual data on their imports and exports of armaments. According to United Nations sources, sofar seventy-three member countries have responded to the request to provide information on their arms exports and imports covering 95% of weapons exports and 70% of imports. All major arms suppliers have replied. Some countries, such as the United States, are naming in their replies the countries to which they export weaponry. An expert group of the United Nations set up to work out the follow up activities of the register, will begin its work next year. There is no doubt that the creation of the register should give new impetus to European efforts to achieve a common and harmonised arms export policy. The United Nations is interested in stimulating efforts in conversion where it lacks appropriate means but where European countries could provide valuable assistance. A fundamental and growing problem for the United Nations is that a continuing financial crisis is paralysing its ability to carry out it rapidly-expanding activities. Since 1956, peace- keeping has been financed outside the regular budget through a separate assessment for each operation. The current special assessment formula for peace-keeping divides member states into four categories. The economically least-developed states pay 10% of their assessment rate for the regular budget and the economically less-developed states pay 20%. The industrialised countries pay the same assessment rate as for the regular budget. The five permament members of the Security Council pay the remainder, or approximately 22% over and above their regular assessment rates. In 1992, this meant that the permanent members paid 56% of the entire peace-keeping assessment. (11) Member countries assigning armed forces for United Nations peace-keeping operations normally bear first and foremost their own expenses and are reimbursed by the United Nations. But this is possible only if all the member countries have paid their regular assessment. This is far from so, however. According to an assessment published in Der Spiegel on 16th August 1993, for peace-keeping operations, in July 1993, the United States owed the United Nations (in $ million) 318.6, Japan 99.1, Germany 78.2, Russia 417.9, France 42.5, Great Britain 1.1, Italy 49.7; Ukraine 58.7 and Brasil 10.7. In the meantime, on 6th October 1992, the United States paid about half its debt to the United Nations, i.e. $284 million to the regular budget and $188 million for financing peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-Generaltly stated that only 62 of the 184 member coun tries had paid their regular assessment in full for the year 1993, which would normally be paid on 1st January, and the states owed the organisation $1.7 billion (12). The only weapon against non- payment is Article 19 which provides that such a member state may lose its vote in the general Assembly under certain conditions, but sofar this Article has not deterred late payments. On the other hand, the United Nations is from time to time obliged to defend itself against reproaches of financial mismanagement, waste of money or even corruption (13). These are undoubtedly very serious problems which will have a strong influence on all questions related to the future role of the United Nations in a new world order. A number of proposals to improve the financial position of the United Nations are under discussion and your Rapporteur will revert to this problem at a later stage. But first a major political problem is to be assessed relating to the changing nature of activities in which the United Nations is increasingly involved and for which it is seeking the help of those organisations it considers as regional or agencies in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter. United Nations activities have developed in two different directions: first they cover far more responsibilities in regard to human rights monitoring, refugee assistance and repatriation, the conduct of the elections and referenda, civil administration, public information programmes, humanitarian assistance and economic and social development. In playing a growing role in the internal problems of countries, the United Nations is treading on uncertain legal grounds. Such activities are not covered by Chapter VI of the Charter dealing with the peaceful settlement of disputes, because they are totally different. If the United Nations wishes to use armed forces, police or other civilian experts for carrying out the type of assistance just mentioned, it needs the consensus of all the authorities concerned. The United Nations Charter is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members (Article 2, paragraph 1). It provides a legal basis only for purely interstate relations and for the settlement of conflicts between sovereign states. If a peaceful settlement of an interstate dispute has been reached and the United Nations is requested to monitor such an agreement with peace-keeping troops Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter provides no legal basis for the deployment of such forces. The traditional peace-keeping forces have therefore been formed outside the Charter and need the consensus of all the countries in which they are to be deployed. Whereas the coalition war against Iraq, similar to the war in Korea, might be considered as a classic application of collective self-defence, conducted by an allied coalition approved by the Security Council, matters became more complicated when the United Nations intervenes in civil wars in cases they consider to be a threat to international peace and security allowing enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. In doing this, for instance in Somalia, the United Nations is departing from the principle of Article 2, paragraph 7, which confirms that: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter." This broader interpretation of the Charter has several consequences: it makes it even more difficult to establish clear differences between peace-keeping operations requiring a consensus between the relevant parties and those of coercion which are particularly delicate when they are for humanitarian purposes. In some of these cases such enforcement action for humanitarian objectives has endangered the activities of the humanitarian organisations themselves. It appears that the system of means provided by the United Nations Charter for maintaining peace and security, in particular in Chapters VI and VII, contains deficiencies which already existed in the past but which become more serious the more the United Nations extends its competence in maintaining international peace and security and becomes the central world instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts in the world. Conversely, another important aspect could offset deficiencies in the Charter: this is the degree of confidence the United Nations and its Security Council might have achieved since the end of the cold war by demonstrating its ability to play its role as a leading watchdog of international peace and security. Both considerations might have an influence on the position and role of regional organisations in the framework of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and on the role Western European Union can play in this context. IV. The modified Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations ========================================= The question of future relations between the United Nations and Western European Union is not just a legal question of whether WEU is to be considered as part of the regional arrangements or agencies in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. However, this question, which is one for long drawn-out disputes between legal experts, is not just academic. The answer has important political consequences. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter on regional arrangements begins with Article 52, the first three paragraphs of which are as follows: "1. Nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 2. The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council. 3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council." There was never a definition of what regional arrangements or agencies meant, and a proposed definition by the Egyptian Delegation during the conference in San Francisco was rejected. In the absence of such a legal definition, the United Nations Secretary-General interprets these words in the broadest possible way, when he states in his "Agenda for peace": "The charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus allowing useful flexibility for undertakings by a group of states to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action which also could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such associations or entities could include treaty- based organisations, whether created before or after the founding of the United Nations, regional organisations for mutual security and defence, organisations for general regional development of for co-operation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern." For the United Nations Secretary-General, a collective defence organisation such as WEU belongs therefore to this category of organisation. The first consequence of such an interpretation follows from Article 53 of the Charter which stipulates in paragraph 1 that: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council, ..." (The only exception applies to measures against former enemy states). The second consequence is the obligation in Article 54 of the United Nations Charter, according to which: "The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security." The dependence of regional arrangements or agencies on the United Nations in all cases of enforcement actions relating to the maintenance of peace and security is finally completed by the provisions of Article 103 of the Charter stipulating that: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present charter shall prevail." Notwithstanding the non-existence of legal criteria defining the character of regional arrangements and agencies, there seems to be no major dispute over the fact that the objectives of such organisations are first and foremost the settlement of disputes between members (14). Furthermore, one cannot disregard the political intentions of the contracting parties of a treaty establishing a regional organisation, when deciding that the regional organisation they create is to be governed by the provisions of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Apart from the required conformity of the relevant organisation with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Article 52), Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali mentioned some years ago as a further condition the explicit desire of the organisation to be recognised as such by the United Nations (15). If one considers the modified Brussels Treaty and the history of its origins, the result is ambiguous. The precursor of the Brussels Treaty, i.e. the treaty of alliance and mutual assistance between Great Britain and France signed in Dunkirk on 4th March 1947, confirmed in its preamble the resolve of the parties "to co-operate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations in preserving peace and resisting aggression, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in particular with Articles 49, 51, 52, 53 and 107 thereof." Thus a clear reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter was expressed. Neither the Brussels Treaty of 1948 nor the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 took up such references. The preambles of both treaties refer more generally to the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and to the will of contracting parties "to afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and resisting any policy of aggression." The cornerstone of the Treaty now became Article V (former IV), stipulating: "If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power. Thus the right of individual and collective self-defence in a case of an armed attack from outside, became the main objective of the treaty. These rights are explicitly guaranteed by Article 51 of the charter which has its place outside the framework of Chapter VIII of the charter and are specified as follows: "Article 51 Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of seld-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." In order to fulfil the provisions of the charter, Article VI of the modified Brussels Treaty (former Article V) confirms that: "All measures taken as a result of the preceding article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." If it is thus evident that the character of the Western European Union makes it a system of collective self-defence outside the framework of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter one should not overlook the fact that the modified Brussels Treaty also contains elements and provisions dealing with the settlement of disputes among members (Article 10) and internal matters as the control of armaments and the level of forces within the union. All these factors have characteristics similar to those of regional organisations covered by Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. But since the treaty is based first and foremost on the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the charter according to some legal experts Western European Union is not subject to obligation of Article 53 and 54 of the charter (16). This question assumes particular importance when assessing possible measures decided by Western European Union on the basis of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty according to which: "At the request of any of the high contracting parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat arise ..." It should be recalled that the French text of the article uses the words "se concerter" which allows the possibility of reaching common positions and decisions. According to the legal opinion in the United Nations Secretariat-General, WEU should be considered both as an organisation for collective self-defence and as a regional organisation in the sense of Chapter VIII of the charter. Consequently, it could not act without the authorisation of the Security Council in cases outside the right of self-defence defined by Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. Various measures might be taken under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty. They may be through the co-ordination between armed forces as during the Gulf crisis, but they may also agree economic sanctions and embargoes and their co-ordination or elaborate military contingency planning as in the Balkan crisis. In all these cases, WEU had a political interest in acting in accordance with the United Nations (17). But such a political interest is not quite the same as a legal obligation. The definition of enforcement action in the sense of Article 53 of the charter might be interpreted differently by the United Nations and the regional organisation concerned. If WEU consultations of any kind in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty were felt to depend on United Nations Security Council authorisation, this could discourage member countries from invoking this article and consequently reduce the range of possible proposals. Furthermore, other United Nations member countries and in particular members of the Security Council which are not members in Western European Union might be tempted to influence consultations in WEU. Consultations in the framework of the Article VIII, paragaph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty should be considered to be carried out in WEU's overall self-defence framework. WEU should always seek to co-ordinate its considerations and activities in this respect with the United Nations while at the same time safeguarding its full autonomy of decision. There is therefore no reason for WEU to undertake any initiative in the United Nations which might be viewed as a wish to be considered as a regional arrangement or agency in the sense of Chapter VIII of the charter. But there are further reasons to avoid such an approach: Article 53 of the Charter gives the Security Council "where appropriate", the right to make use of regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. Its is yet too early to assess the full consequences should the Security Council one day wish to take such a decision with regard to Western European Union. Certainly, two member states of Western European Union are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with a veto right. But what would happen if both these members, on the basis of a prior consensus reached in WEU, agreed in the Security Council to the use of the European Corps or other European multinational forces "answerable to WEU" being deployed in United Nations enforcement actions, and that one or several other WEU member states did not agree? Of course, the Petersberg Declaration (18) states that "Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions." But if WEU is governed by Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, difficulties of harmonising United Nations obligations with interests of WEU members cannot be excluded. Furthermore, nothing in the modified Brussels Treaty obliges WEU representatives in the Security Council to defend the interests or decisions of WEU member countries in the framework of the United Nations. Even the Maastricht Treaty has only incomplete provisions regarding the obligations of the permanent Security Council members vis-a-vis other members of the Political Union. Article J. 5 of the Treaty provides that: "Member states which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter." This provision is a clear indication that permament members of the United Nations Security Council who are members of WEU and the future political union can encounter a conflict of interest between their United Nations responsibilities and those of relevant European organisations. The United Nations is based on the notion of sovereignty of members whereas WEU's task is "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe" particularly in security and defence matters. The political will to enhance the role of the United Nations and its Security Council expressed in the letter from the WEU Secretary-General to the United Nations Secretary- General (19) should therefore duly take into account the different starting points of both organisations. Another problem to be resolved as Western European Union moves towards basing its future co-operation with the United Nations on the United Nations Charter, is how parliamentary control based on Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty will be able to find its place in the framework of an increasing WEU commitment to the United Nations which does not include any parliamentary structure. There is no doubt that careful examination of the whole system of the modified Brussels Treaty leads to the conclusion that WEU cannot be considered as a regional arrangement or agency in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. But the relationship between Western European Union and the United Nations should be seen as a dynamic process, which might lead to better structured and more constructive co- operation between them than has sofar been achieved. V. Thoughts on ways and means of enhancing political relations between the United Nations and Western European Union =============================================================== The last meeting with the WEU Permanent Council in Brussels confirmed the impression gained from the very start of hostilities in former Yugoslavia. Apart from working out contingency plans and relatively modest participation in measures to monitor sanctions imposed by the United Nations on Serbia and Montenegro, no decisive political will can be discerned in the WEU Council that might induce it to take initiatives whereby it would shoulder its political responsibilities and impose WEU concepts. Quite the contrary, WEU is still counting too much on the existence and activities of other organisations, particularly the European Community, the CSCE, NATO and the United Nations, taking refuge behind the fact that it has not been called upon. The lack of enthusiasm among most of the member states to consult with each other on the course to be followed in the Somalian problem, for example, reveals that WEU has still not come to grips with the full range of its responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty and particularly Article VIII. In these conditions, what value can be attached to the Council's answer to Recommendation 542 to the effect that: "WEU co-ordination of the contributions and actions of its member states which have been called on by the United Nations to participate in peace-keeping operations is one of the major topics which the WEU Council, both at ministerial and permanent representative level, has placed on the agenda for political consultation..." and, a fortiori, the affirmation by the WEU Secretary-General in his communication on "WEU's security role in post-cold war Europe" distributed in Brussels: "Given the difficulties now encountered by the United Nations in the execution of its missions and the risks of its decision- making mechanisms being blocked, the future European Union must be in a position to intervene on its own account; both within its own continental area and anywhere else where its vital interests or its nationals are under grave threat"? Your rapporteur can but advocate the Council rallying to the opinion expressed by one of its representatives at the meeting in Brussels, an opinion that he shares in full: political determination and drive are necessary for implementing co- operation in peace-keeping. In this respect, WEU should play a greater role on the international scene, including in prolonged and preventive diplomacy. To this end, it must show collective awareness which implies the existence of a WEU defence identity. WEU cannot be content to handle leftovers from the activities undertaken by other organisations. Particularly, since examples of actual United Nations peace- keeping operations and of other United Nations activities in maintaining peace and security in the world listed in Chapter III above show that WEU member countries or WEU as an organisation are involved in the United Nations activities in an even more intensive manner than described by the letter which the Secretary-General of WEU sent to the United Nations Secretary-General on 25th June 1993. But despite the different declarations and communiques issued by the WEU Council since the end of the cold war, including those of Maastricht, Petersberg and Rome, WEU has so far failed to make a new comprehensive assessment of the changed European security situation which is the essential basis for any concrete decisions which might have to be made in the next future. The very useful effort by the United Nations Secretary- General, to describe the new security challenge for the United Nations and the consequences to be drawn in his "Agenda for peace" has not yet found an equivalent in the framework of Western European Union. However, such an effort is more than necessary. For instance, a new Platform on European security interests could be drawn up which could be presented as a major European contribution to the NATO summit which is to be held at the beginning of 1994. This new platform should define the new types of threats in the world and their consequences for armaments co-operation, training and intelligence. It should also include the items mentioned in the letter of the United Nations Secretary-General, i.e. preventive diplomacy, good offices, peace-building and peace-keeping. In this respect, WEU should work out a joint concept concerning ways and means of closer co-operation and co- ordination with the European Community and the common foreign and security policy in the area of preventive diplomacy, including means available for imposing conditions in the framework of the policy to be followed in foreign trade and the granting of credits. Such a joint concept should also include the establishment of conditions whereby European institutions might possibly place their means and infrastructures at the disposal of other regional organisations. An important part of such a task should be devoted to the future role of the United Nations and its co-operation with Western European Union and NATO, in particular with regard to armed forces assigned to the United Nations. This would be also a suitable opportunity for harmonising in agreement with the United Nations, the different terms used in the relevant areas. At the moment for instance "peace-making" in the sense used by the United Nations, means action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means, whereas the Petersberg Declaration uses the term in connection with tasks of combat forces for terminating hostilities. In this respect, WEU should make better use of the results of the work of the NACC ad-hoc group on co-operation and peace- keeping presented at the meeting of the North Atlantic Co- operation Council in Athens on 11th June 1993 (20). NACC not only has the advantage of having worked out terminology for the various options in these matters corresponding broadly to that used in the framework of the United Nations, it has also worked out and started a wide-ranging programme of work extending well beyond what is known about the activities of the WEU Forum of Consultation in these matters. It has to be noted that WEU is lagging well behind in an area that corresponds perfectly to its responsibilities, its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty and the ambitious intentions it voiced in the Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations. Conversely, it should be recognised that the tangible, civil, assistance WEU afforded to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in order to strengthen means at the disposal of those countries to enforce, on the Danube, respect for the embargo on Serbia is a good example of WEU's operational co-operation with its consultation partners. This effort calls for many economic sacrifices by the abovementioned countries and some have asked your rapporteur whether patrol boats cannot also be present in the Serb part of the Danube. During your Rapporteur's meeting with the United Nations Secretary-General, the latter underlined that after the cold war the world is only starting to learn new experiences and new terminologies in the area of maintaining peace and security. After 1945, about a decade was needed before everyone understood and accepted the system of confronting pact systems. The learning process regarding a new kind of collective security would need almost as long. An important matter for a new platform would of course be to redefine the possibilities and limits of the modified Brussels Treaty in the new security environment with special regard to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty. Nor should WEU hesitate to voice its views on the future development of the United Nations. The principle that only states can become members of the United Nations and its Security Council will create increasing difficulties as the importance of the United Nations Security Council increases and as European integration progresses. This is a particularly acute problem, because any revision of the charter is a delicate undertaking, but it has to be studied. In practice, WEU should seek for more opportunities to harmonise positions in the different committees and working groups at the United Nations Headquarters dealing with matters within the purview of WEU. To the best of your Rapporteur's knowledge, there has so far been only one meeting of representatives of WEU member countries in New York in order to discuss confidence-building measures in outerspace. On the contrary, there are regular meetings of mission representatives of the Twelve, and there is even a special United Nations mission of the European Community. NATO has now seconded a liaison officer to the United Nations. There are many reasons why missions of WEU countries should also meet in New York in order to co-ordinate their positions. In the special committee on peace-keeping operations created by the United Nations General Assembly, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain are full members, and Belgium, Luxemburg, Portugal, Norway and Turkey are observers. This is a very important committee, in which WEU should act with one voice as far as possible. The same should be done in the framework of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organisation which devotes its activities in particular to co-operation between the United Nations and regional organisations in maintenance of international peace and security. But the most urgent question to which all interested member states and organisations should give priority is the steadily worsening financial situation of the United Nations, in particular with regard to peace-keeping missions. The United Nations Secretary-General said in New York, that everybody agreed that the United Nations should be responsible for stopping violence and killing in the world because nobody else would be able or ready to assume this task. During the cold war, most countries spent vast sums of money to finance their defence and armaments. Furthermore, industrial countries delivered huge quantities of armaments to the third world. These burdens now have to be removed. This should not be too difficult since the contributions of each country are not excessive. It is obvious that the financial aspect and the question of sharing the financial burdens in peace-keeping activities should also be discussed in WEU and in our national parliaments. Several proposals, including taxes on arms exports, creation of independent funds, etc., have been put forward. All these proposals should be examined carefully, including the study by the Stimson Centre in Washington which seems worthy of special attention, including the proposal to establish a two-year budget especially reserved for peace-keeping which would be revised each year jointly with the ordinary budget of the United Nations. According to this study, a special fund should be created for establishing peace which would constitute a collection centre for the contributions to be paid. But the crucial condition for improving the situation is whether there is enough confidence in the ability of the United Nations to assume its role of central instrument for preventing and resolving conflicts and preserving peace in the world. VI. Conclusions ================ The debates and speeches during the present session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that opened in New York in September 1993 have revealed important divergencies between Americans, Russians and Europeans regarding the future role and functions of the United Nations, particularly in peace-keeping and regarding the conditions for the participation of member countries in such operations. The United States, apparently influenced by the failure of the Somalia operation, has redefined in a more restrictive manner the guidelines for its participation in United Nations actions, interpreting very closely the charter of the organisation, reserving the possibility of acting unilaterally in the event of a threat to its vital interests and asking for any peace-keeping operation in Bosnia to be conducted under NATO command. This position seems to be shared to a large extent by the United Kingdom. On the other hand, France and Germany seem to lay greater stress on the need to strengthen the role of the United Nations and the control exercised by the Security Council. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has put forward something of a Russian Monroe doctrine (21)claiming for Russia the exclusive right to intervene within the frontiers of the former Soviet Union in order to attempt to quell national conflicts. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that certain public statements made recently by the United Nations Secretary- General might be interpreted as signs of resignation, particularly with regard to the aptitude of the United Nations to impose peace. In an interview granted to Le Monde on 19th October 1993, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted that the United Nations could intervene only with the agreement of the belligerents. If they did not want peace, it could not be forced upon them. Any weakening of the role of the United Nations as the principal instrument for legitimising the settlement of conflicts and safeguarding peace in the world would dangerously affect the credibility of the United Nations itself and would also weaken the credibility of initiatives taken by organisations with the necessary infrastructures such as WEU and NATO in their endeavours to become serious actors in peace- keeping, provided they receive an appropriate mandate from the United Nations to this end. The two organisations and their member countries therefore share a heavy responsibility since it is their task to achieve the joint goal of working out and implementing appropriate arrangements for ensuring the maintenance of peace wherever it may be threatened. ----------- APPENDIX Boutros Boutros-Ghali An Agenda for Peace Extract VII. Co-operation with regional arrangements and organisations ... 63. In the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the absence of a universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occasion work at cross- purposes with the sense of solidarity required for the effectiveness of the world organisation. But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII. 64. It is not the purpose of the present report to set forth any formal pattern of relationship between regional organisations and the United Nations, or to call for any specific division of labour. What is clear, however, is that regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilised in serving the functions covered in this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peace-making and post-conflict peace-building. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and co-operation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs. 65. Regional arrangements and agencies have not in recent decades been considered in this light, even when originally designed in part for a role in maintaining or restoring peace within their regions of the world. Today a new sense exists that they have contributions to make. Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it. Regional organisations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would encourage states outside the region to act supportively. And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorise a regional arrangement or organisation to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort. Carried forward in the spirit of the Charter, and as envisioned in Chapter VIII, the approach outlined here could strengthen a general sense that democratisation is being encouraged at all levels in the task of maintaining international peace and security, it being essential to continue to recognise that the primary responsibility will continue to reside in the Security Council. -------------------------------- (1)1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. (2) 2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg (Alternate: Marshall), Mr. Roseta (Vice- Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Agnelli (Alternate: Ferrarini), Alegre, Andreotti, Benvenuti, Bowden, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabra, Feldmann, Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Godman), MM. Kittelmann, de Lipkowski, Polli, Mueller, Pecriaux, de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soell, Vincon, Ward, Wintgens, Zapaero. (3) 1. United Nations operations - interaction with WEU, Document 1366, 19th May 1993. (4) 2. See Appendix. (5) 3. Document A/WEU/DG [93] 22, 19th August 1993. (6) 4. Le Monde, 16th and 17th September 1993. (7) 5. Document 1379, 16th June 1993. (8) 6. Document 1377. (9) 7. Source: Enid C.B. Schoettle, Europa Archiv, No. 16, 1993, page 453. (10) 8. Article 43, paragraph 1 stipulates: "All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accord with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, ..., necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security". (11) 9. Enid C.B. Schoettle, Financing Peace-keeping, March 1993. (12) 10. Le Monde, 19th October 1993. (13) 11. NZZ, 18th August 1993. (14) 12. Ruediger Wolfrum: Handbuch Vereinte Nationen, Muenchen (Beck) 1991. (15) 13. Boutros-Ghali, "Regionisme et Nations Unies", Revue egyptienne de droit international, 1968, page 10. (16) 14. Ruediger Wolfrum, Handbuch Vereinte Nationen, Muenchen, 1991, page 677. (17) 15. For instance, the Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council informed the United Natns Secretary-General of the measures envisaged by WEU after Iraq invaded Kuwait; the WEU Secretariat also gave the United Nations details of its contingency planning regarding former Yugoslavia. (18) 16. Document 1322, 19th June 1992. (19) 17. See paragraph 11 above. (20) 18. Report published in the NATO Review, No. 4, August 1993, Volume 41, page 30. (21) 19. Le Monde, 1st October 1993. ------- A French version of this report may be obtained upon request. 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