/pub/history/military/a-weu/documents File: 1395defc.rus Document 1395 9th November 1993 Lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict ------- REPORT (1) submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee (2) by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur ------- TABLE OF CONTENTS ================= DRAFT RECOMMENDATION EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. Action taken by the EC III. The EC's policy in the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the position of Germany and Greece IV. The United States' attitude V. Minority rights in Europe and the recognition of new states (a) Guidelines for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (b) The Badinter arbitration committee (c) The Balladur plan (d) Conclusion VI. Inviolability of borders VII. Sanctions VIII. Peace-keeping or peace-making (a) State of affairs in preparing for the peace-keeping roles of NATO and WEU (b) NATO and WEU operations in former Yugoslavia (c) The future of peace-keeping in former Yugoslavia (d) Peace-keeping in Europe and other possible areas of conflict (i) Nagorno-Karabakh (ii) Georgia (iii) Tajikistan (iv) Moldova (v) Other regional disputes (vi) Central Europe (e) What are the chances? (i) Peace-keeping in the independent republics of the former Soviet Union (ii) Peace-keeping in the nine Central European states (f) Conclusions IX. What about peace-making? APPENDIX Assembly Document A/WEU/DG (93) 21 of 19th August 1993: letters from H.E. Mr. Dimitris Macris, Greek Ambassador to France, to Sir Dudley Smith, President of the WEU Assembly, and information on Greece's position regarding the United Nations Security Council sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro ------- Draft Recommendation ==================== on lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict The Assembly, Noting that all the efforts of the international community to solve the conflict in former Yugoslavia have failed; Noting that the conflict in former Yugoslavia has shown clearly that in future there will be no possibility for EC member states to act independently in matters concerning peace and stability on the European continent; Convinced that Europe will have to develop an independent capability to act in defence of its own specific security interests, while recognising the continuing vital contribution of the United States to European defence; Considering that the EC, having realised that it had to give up its original mistaken objective of keeping former Yugoslavia together in a federative structure, has not yet managed to identify a clear political strategy towards the Balkans; Noting that similarly international organisations such as NATO, the CSCE, the United Nations and even powerful countries like the United States have been unable to identify a clear and effective political strategy towards the Balkans; Noting that a peace agreement coming to grips with all conflicts in the region is the only viable way to deal with the dissolution of former Yugoslavia; Noting that in conflict prevention apart from diplomatic and economic action, consideration must also be given to the possibility of preventive military presence through the deployment of peace-keeping forces; Considering that the seemingly hurried restructuring of armed forces in WEU member states in recent years may have to be reviewed in the light of Europe's inability to provide forces for long-term peace-keeping operations in its area of responsibility; Recognising at the same time that political will is naturally the first requirement for any operation involving military forces; Noting that any peace agreement for the region must include rigorous provision for arms control, the reduction of armed forces and adequate enforcement provisions; Considering that the EC's regrettable difficulty in identifying its aims clearly has caused much fatal hesitation and many changes in its policy towards the conflict in former Yugoslavia; Noting that foreign and security policy are of little avail if they are not complemented by a defence policy; Noting with satisfaction the creation of the Eurocorps and stressing the need for a European rapid action force; Noting that, within Europe, recognition of new states requires a new approach which includes due appraisal of its security and the nature of the collective commitment to its integrity; Noting that recognition of a new state cannot be an end in itself and that the new state's ability to meet the criteria for recognition and the responsibilities resulting from this recognition must consequently be examined in depth; Noting that the problems created by large movements of refugees clearly show that it is in the interests of European countries to have an agreed reception policy and, more important, to find a means of averting the conflicts which cause such movements, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 1. Consider the establishment of a European rapid action force to which the member countries of WEU should make commitments including greater integration of training and equipment; 2. Implement the chapter of the Maastricht Treaty concerned with the joint foreign and security policy of the European Union as soon as possible, determine the role of WEU and set out terms for better integration of the foreign and defence policies of Europe; 3. Further develop the military contingency planning capability of the WEU Planning Cell, while at the same time including the widening of its intelligence access and powers of initiation; 4. Clearly identify threats to Europe's security and suggest preventive action at diplomatic, economic and military levels in part to provide practical assistance to the transition process in new democracies in order to avoid a reversion to past policies; 5. Emphasise to Greece the interest of its recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the period prior to its accession to WEU; 6. Re-examine the respective tasks and roles of the United States and its European allies in the maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures to ensure that under no circumstances will it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack of appropriate preparation, co-operation and co-ordination; 7. Provide the UNPROFOR command with the ways and means it is seeking to ensure compliance with all the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council; 8. Suggest to the appropriate authorities that they should intensify low-level flights over Bosnia, particularly Sarajevo, as an effective deterrent to the repeated shelling of the civilian population, which results in daily slaughter. ------- Explanatory Memorandum ====================== (submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur) I. Introduction ------------ The savage war in former Yugoslavia has profoundly shaken many convictions about peace and security in post-cold war Europe. A conflict in the centre of Europe with hundreds of thousands killed, both military and civilians, and even larger numbers tortured, persecuted and expelled from their houses and lands, an important part of the existing habitat and economic infrastructure devasted and the majority of the region's cultural heritage deliberately destroyed seemed unthinkable. Yet it happened. None of the serious efforts made by the CSCE, the European Community, or the United Nations, has been effective enough to prevent the bloodshed and devastation which, after more than two years of fighting, have become commonplace in the daily news reports. Could a war and all its consequences have been prevented? Has the international community, and in particular the European Community, failed to take the appropriate action? Many questions have been asked and just as many proposals have been made by politicians and political commentators. If in the present report the crisis in former Yugoslavia is again subject to discussion, the main objective is not to point out who was at fault. Indeed, fatal mistakes and misjudgments have been made and many of those who are, or were, involved in mediation efforts or negotiations are the first to recognise this. Why did Europe make it clear that it would abstain from the use of force? Was there a fundamental reason to stick to the principle of respecting existing borders, even if these had been internal borders within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? Why were sanctions and other decisions meant to curb aggression or violence not enforced at an earlier stage? One purpose of this report is to do some soul-searching which might help to establish a framework for policies and procedures which might prevent future similar crises. It may also help to further dispel some of the illusions about a new world order and the altruistic co-operation of all civilised nations in maintaining such an order. II. Action taken by the EC ---------------------- One feature of the war in former Yugoslavia is widespread violence and atrocity. Mass media have diffused images of unparalled savagery into the living-rooms of hundreds of millions of Western Europeans, many of whom had spent their holidays on the beaches of the very country where all this is happening. No wonder, therefore, that in both public and parliamentary debates in all Western European countries there was an almost general appeal for governments to "do something" in order to stop the killing. In fact the governments did something, in particular through the EC. Cease-fire agreements were brokered, EC observers were sent to the area of conflict, a peace conference was established, the conflicting parties were almost dragged to the negotiation table, and economic and arms embargoes were imposed. At a later stage, the United Nations was called upon, which not only resulted in an endless number of United Nations Security Council resolutions but also in the peace-keeping forces being sent to Croatia, humanitarian aid being facilitated in Bosnia- Herzegovina, the presence of a monitoring force in Macedonia and the enforcement of sanctions imposed. It should also be noted that the EC managed to hammer out a common European policy which may have been the best one possible at that moment. However, it clearly had the flaws of a consensus policy and make-shift solutions which had been prepared not long before and after thorough examination of all the issues involved. This policy has not solved the conflict nor has it prevented the killing, but until now it has contained the conflict within the borders of former Yugoslavia. The different parties apparently had such a remarkable stamina in mutual butchery that none of the classic peaceful means enumerated in Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter has been enough to stop the conflict. Can one reproach the EC - which was mentally not prepared to face the display of violence and savagery which came to the surface at an early stage - of not having made provision for rapid military action, which then might still have nipped the conflict in the bud, leaving room for negotiations between different parties on an equal footing? The specific issue of the use of force or the credible threat to do so will be discussed later in the present report. What were the most obvious shortcomings in the EC's efforts to draft and implement a common policy? The EC could have prepared itself better for a possible conflict in Yugoslavia. Nobody can reasonably argue that in the EC's member states there was a lack of information about political developments in Yugoslavia. During the cold war, Yugoslavia was generally considered to be the most open of all European communist states. The end of the cold war did not suddenly cut off this steady flow of information, but rather increased the possibilities of assessing the situation. Neighbouring countries, including in particular Hungary which was increasingly worried about the position of the Hungarian minority in the Republic of Serbia, actively informed EC member states about what could happen in Yugoslavia. It seems, however, that many have turned a blind eye to some of the developments after Tito's death and their possible consequences and especially the rise of nationalism, in which many leading Serb intellectuals and former dissidents have played an important role. Among them are well-known people like Mihajlo Markovic, Dobrica Cosic, Matija Beckovic and Vojislav Seselj, to name just a few. As early as 1987, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences prepared a memorandum, outlining a "national programme" which made a paranoid case for Serbian nationalism based on historic "injustices" done to Serbs, especially to those living in Kosovo. It is only logical that their nationalist thinking finally gave birth to official party policy as contained in a document which was made public by the Serbian socialist party on 15th July 1991 stating that: "the regions in Croatia with a Serbian majority must establish an autonomous region of Yugoslavia", and that "arguments are no longer sufficient to defend the interests of the Serbian people ... Serbia needs a real military force, highly motivated". Concerning the Albanians, it was said that "according to international criteria, separatist aspirations of ethnic minorities cannot be tolerated". Since Milosevic came to power in Serbia in 1987, Serbia's government has conducted a consistent nationalist policy including the violation of the autonomous status of both Kosovo and Vojvodina and political repression of minorities. Apparently there has been a lack of anticipation and forward planning, if not in national foreign ministries, then certainly in the European political co-operation framework. Until the middle of 1991, when both Slovenia's and Croatia's secession were accomplished facts, the EC had been supporting federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic's policy of national conciliation and economic recovery. It has been argued that all the energy of Europe's diplomatic chancelleries was concentrated on the approaching collapse of the Soviet Union and on the Gulf war and its aftermath. This is a point in case, but still it is astonishing that so little attention was paid to the indications which foreboded the first major armed conflict on European territory since the second world war. If, understandably, the EC has the ambition to play a role as the most influential and powerful moderator on the European political scene, it will have to create the conditions to enable it to do so. A prerequisite is more intensive co-operation in exchanging intelligence between all members. At the same time, the EC must analyse and define its strategic interests. Only then will it be able to establish the principles and guidelines which should be the basis of a consistent foreign and security policy, with member states committed to its implementation with all necessary means at their disposal. Another apparent handicap in the EC's nascent foreign and security policy procedures is the collective decision-making machinery in the European Council, where consensus is considered vital for a common strategy. It appears to be difficult to decide on a common security policy if there is no authority within the EC or elsewhere, which leads the way. Especially in security matters, most, if not all, EC countries were used to waiting for the United States to tell them what to do. The crisis in Yugoslavia introduced an ambiguous situation in that on the one hand the EC was eager to demonstrate its ability to handle a security crisis in Europe, while on the other hand it was looking over its shoulder to see what the United States would say or do, more or less subconsciously expecting that Big Brother would rush in if things really turned nasty. The EC quickly learned, however, that the United States is no longer prepared to exert its leadership if it believes there is no threat to its own national interests. Should this lead to the conclusion that the EC needs a new leader, a primus inter pares, who tells the other members what to do if Europe's security is threatened? Not necessarily, but if the EC wishes to be able to react rapidly and adequately under such circumstances, it may have to consider procedures where member states wishing to act should be allowed to do so under the aegis of the EC, if there is sufficient support among the member states. This would mean that foreign and security policy decisions could not be blocked by one single or perhaps two member states. On the other hand, it should be clear that no member state could be forced to participate in EC foreign policy action or to provide military forces for such action without first reaching agreement on the matters concerned. While it is possible to imagine such opt-out procedures during the early stages of building a European foreign and security policy, there can be no question of them in situations covered by the modified Brussels Treaty with the compulsory obligation of Article V. The crisis in former Yugoslavia has made it clear that situations in which a single member state of the EC or WEU is prepared to act in order to solve a conflict in Europe outside the territory of the EC must be excluded. EC and WEU member states are far too interdependent to claim that they can or will act without the others. Much has been said about the lack of forces and the possibility of co-ordinating military operations. These problems of a practical nature can be solved provided there is a political will, the first requirement for any operation involving the use of military force with all the inherent risks. It should be noted in this framework that in NATO, there is a growing consensus over the need for a close link between NATO and the European defence identity, in particular WEU. The ideas put forward include the suggestion discussed by NATO's defence ministers at their recent meeting at Travemuende on 21st October 1993 that, in the event of a specifically European operation by WEU, NATO should place its technical and logistical assets at WEU's disposal. The major lesson of the conflict in former Ygoslavia is that the EC has reached a point of no return in the development of a common foreign and security policy. Member states are aware that they have a common responsibility for peace and stability in Europe. They will have to act accordingly. III. The EC's policy in the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the position of Germany and Greece With the actual decision-making process in the EC, any European foreign and security policy has to take into account the attitudes and opinions of each member state. It is well known that this does not always facilitate the establishment of a very energetic policy. In particular Germany and Greece (surprised to find themselves together!) are often accused of having stood in the way of a reasonable and balanced EC policy in former Yugoslavia. Are these accusations justified? It would seem useful to have a closer look at the attitude of each country. First Germany. As is known, the EC has been reluctant to recognise the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia too soon and many have pointed a finger at Germany for forcing the EC into early recognition. Today, however, there are few experts who would assert that Germany's attitude on this issue caused war in former Yugoslavia. There were several arguments in favour of early recognition. First of all, it should be observed that the EC's hesitation to recognise the newly-independent republics had an increasingly adverse effect on efforts to restore peace, since it only reinforced the Serb leadership's expectation that the international community would accept a Greater Serbia policy of force under the guise of preserving the Yugoslavian state as a community of nations and peoples. Indeed, in the autumn of 1991, with war raging in Croatia, it became clear to most EC members that Serbia was using the peace negotiations as a shield to continue the war and that recognition of the new republics could be a means of legitimately halting aggression. Opponents of the early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia argued that it would deprive Lord Carrington of the leverage to find an overall political solution. In fact, Lord Carrington had no leverage at all since the international community repeatedly affirmed that it would not consider military intervention in order to contain Serbian aggression against Croatia. As a consequence, Lord Carrington had no means of bringing pressure to bear on the non-Serbian parties to reach an agreement with Serbia on granting regional autonomy to Serbs in Croatia. It was the German Government that persuaded Croatia to change its constitution in this respect. It should be noted therefore that Germany has positively tried to help promote the best possible solution through active diplomacy. Germany has also been accused of letting other EC member states send land forces to former Yugoslavia for peace-keeping and humanitarian aid, tasks which Germany itself could not perform for different reasons. Here too, Western Europeans should show some indulgence. Recent history was a first valid reason for not sending German land forces as peace-keepers in a conflict between Serbs and Croats. It is also very hard to object to other constitutional impediments to the involvement of German armed forces in military operations in former Yugoslavia. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that after the second world war the allied countries took pains to re-educate and transform the population of Germany to become a peace-loving, if not pacifist, people. The same countries should not be surprised at the success of their efforts. Of course, there may be good reason to adapt Germany's attitude to the entirely different situation in the world today, but this can be safely left to the Germans to decide, knowing that they are concerned with the position of their country in Europe and its image in the world. The position of Greece has been and still is a more complicated factor in the formulation of a European policy towards former Yugoslavia and its now independent republics. First, Greece has from the beginning taken a negative view regarding recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Greece has used its veto to block the EC's recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent state, notwithstanding the fact that in January 1992 a committee of legal experts under the chairmanship of Mr. Badinter concluded that Macedonia met all the conditions for recognition by the EC. The reasons for Greece's attitude are almost too well-known to be repeated here, but in essence, Greece has expressed fears that a new independent Republic of Macedonia may become a threat to peace in that region, alleging that in its constitution of 17th November 1991 there are references to the possibility of changing existing borders and intervening in the internal affairs of neighbouring states on the pretext of issues concerning the status and the rights of alleged minorities. Moreover, Greece asserts that it has a monopoly on the name of Macedonia which, it argues, "has been Greek for 3 000 years". Neither had Macedonia the right to adopt the Star of Vergina as its coat of arms because it is a Greek symbol which was found on Philip of Macedon's tomb near Salomila. In April 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution which cleared the way for the admission of Macedonia, to be referred to provisionally as the "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", to the United Nations. The questions of both the name and the flag of the new state were left to be settled under the auspices of the international mediators in the Balkans, then Cyrus R. Vance and Lord Owen. Second, Greece has never been able entirely to dispel charges of connivance in violations of the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro. After the last June 1993 session of the Assembly of WEU, the Greek Ambassador to France, H. E. Mr. Dimitris Macris, wrote to the President of the Assembly to inform him of Greece's position regarding the United Nations Security Council sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (see Appendix I). Since then, however, new charges have been made, as mentioned in Chapter V on sanctions. The return to power of Pasok, under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, after the last parliamentary elections in Greece may have serious implications for the situation in the Balkans. In April 1993, Andreas Papandreou, then still the Pasok opposition leader, publicly declared that the embargo was an injustice done to one party in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, saying "Greece must not betray Serbia, its long-time friend." (3) He was elected on a nationalist programme promising resistance to the "Turkish threat", envisaging Greece allied with Serbia against Turkey. He also assured his compatriots of an "even tougher" policy towards the FYROM. On 15th October, Prime Minister Papandreou announced that Greece would pull out of the United Nations-sponsored negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over its name. With Greece due to assume the rotating EC presidency on 1st January 1994, this does not augur very well for a European Balkan policy. What must be done? An important part of the agitation and rhetoric of Greek politicians over Macedonia serves their personal and domestic political objectives. Strong nationalist attitudes still pay off well in Greek politics. But the rhetoric may not always be well understood abroad and it may even worry other member states of the EC if it is accompanied by action running counter to European interests. Greece has its own specific and justified security interests in the region to which the other EC member states should pay due attention. However, a reasonable examination and debate of these interests may be hindered if Greece continues to confuse priorities in its domestic and foreign policy. It must know that being a member of a security alliance includes both rights and obligations. For more than forty years, NATO has been able to shelter Greece from the possible threat of the Warsaw Pact. There is no reason to even think that it would not be prepared to protect Greece against new post-cold war threats. As is known, a protocol of accession to WEU was signed with Greece on 20th November 1992. There is no doubt that Greek accession to WEU fits into the logic of decisions taken in Maastricht in 1991 as regards the development of a European common foreign and security policy and of a genuine European security and defence identity. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty obliges member states to afford "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power ... if any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe". As said earlier in a report on the enlargement of WEU (4), Greek membership should enhance the mutual coherence and security which is the objective of the WEU alliance and not be a source of additional risks. The accession protocol with Greece should therefore not be ratified before Greece has satisfactorily solved its existing dispute with FYROM. IV. The United States' attitude --------------------------- It is no doubt a significant feature of the conflict in former Yugoslavia that the United States did not participate in any diplomatic effort to find a solution to the conflict during the early phase lasting up to April 1992, when war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the first time since the second world war, the United States did not take the lead in handling a European security crisis. Why did that happen and should it be interpreted as a changing of the guard, with the EC taking over from the United States? Before rushing into easy conclusions, certain specific developments should be taken into consideration. Two connected reasons for United States reluctance to act were that it was thought that even though a break-up of Yugoslavia could have repercussions on political stability in Central and Eastern Europe, no American interest was directly at stake. On the other hand, according to the Americans, the European Community was apparently best placed to conduct negotiations preventing a dissolution of the Yugoslavian federation. It should also be noted that United States diplomacy was fully involved in the Gulf crisis and its aftermath, in the Middle East peace conference and in arms reduction negotiations with an increasingly unstable Soviet Union, each of these matters being considered issues of far greater importance. The 1992 presidential election campaign was approaching rapidly and it was clear that according to an overwhelming majority of the United States electorate, the Bush administration had paid far too much attention to foreign policy and too little attention to internal matters and the ever- increasing budget deficit. Involvement in any foreign policy adventure without a guaranteed chance of success was therefore excluded. Moreover, while the political leadership saw little chance for successful mediation, the military were by no means eager to send troops into what is generally considered to be the notoriously hazardous Yugoslav environment. Lastly, the United States administration was aware of the EC's desire to demonstrate its ability in solving a European security problem. Although at times a persistent nostalgia for world leadership can be discerned, the United States administration supports the idea of greater integration for Europe, which could be a reliable partner in building and maintaining peace and in defending common interests. As for the United States administration's political opinion on what should be done, there was no doubt that it agreed with the United Kingdom and France that Yugoslavia's territorial integrity should be maintained insofar as possible. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was considered to be a dangerous precedent for the whole region, where many other nationalist conflicts or crises were surfacing. However, when a break-up of Yugoslavia appeared inevitable in the autumn of 1991, with heavy fighting quickly spreading over parts of Croatia, the United States agreed to the imposition of sanctions. Yet, throughout 1992, when the whole political scene was absorbed by the presidential election campaign, it avoided any direct involvement. Only after President Clinton's inauguration did the United States offer to become "actively and directly engaged" in peace efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It made a series of proposals and nominated Reginald Bartholomew as a special envoy to the international peace talks on former Yugoslavia. As already known, the results of this direct engagement have not led to a significant breakthrough in the peace process. Notwithstanding much criticism of the EC's inability to solve the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the United States has agreed to the Western European approach that a peace plan cannot be implemented before it has been accepted by all parties. In September 1993, President Clinton, the United States Secretary of State, the national security advisor and the United States permanent representative to the United Nations explained their view of United States foreign policy. The President's message was that the United States would use its unique position "to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies". He also said that "the United States plans to remain engaged and to lead". Altogether, however, the view presented was not very clear and left many doubts about the scope of United States determination to get involved in crises. A new definition of United States national interests in the post cold war era has not yet been established and recent events in Somalia and Haiti seem to confirm the suggestion of a political commentator (5) that a new kind of containment policy is being developed, in which the United States only intervenes in crises that are containable, manageable, cheap and close-ended, except in the event of mortal threats to American security. After the Washington agreement on the joint action plan for containing the war in Bosnia, the United States Secretary of State said that "Beyond the Congress and outside the (Washington) Beltway" he felt "real support from the American people" for the government's policy. He was aware that some critics said that the United States had not lived up to its responsibility, but went on to say that: "In this kind of situation, a humanitarian crisis a long way from home, in the middle of another continent, I think that our actions here are proportionate to what our responsibilites are. We can't do it all. We have to measure our ability to act in the interests of the United States, but to save our power for those situations which threaten our deepest national interest, at the same time doing all we can where there's humanitarian concern." (6) These guidelines were confirmed in the Secretary of State address on 20th September 1993, meant to clarify the new administration's approach to world affairs, when he stated: "The central purpose of our foreign policy is to ensure the security of our nation and to ensure its economic prosperity as well, and to promote democratic values. The United States must maintain its military strength and reinvigorate its economy so we can retain the option to act alone when that is best for us." Later he added that: "We should not ignore the value of working with other nations." (7) The message given here is clear. Europe should shoulder its own responsibilities and be prepared to take care of its own security interests if they do not coincide with those of the United States. There is a strong feeling that the United States leadership is interested mainly in maintaining good relations and a strategic partnership with Russia, while leaving it to Europe to solve problems in Central and Eastern Europe. This minimalist approach would seem to be neither in the interest of Western Europe nor that of the United States. What is needed is co- ordination, if not close co-operation, between the United States and Western Europe in helping Central and Eastern European countries, including Russia and Ukraine, to develop their economies and democratic institutions as the best guarantee against conflicts and insecurity. In his recent address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton enumerated four important conditions for United Nations peace-keeping operations, stating that the United Nations should assess peace-keeping proposals carefully to determine if there is a genuine threat to international peace, what the objectives would be, at what point the peace-keepers would be removed and what the cost would be. Earlier, the United States permanent representative to the United Nations had stated that the United States would insist on answers to fundamental questions before undertaking new obligations in a United Nations peace-keeping operation. Among these questions would be the following: - Does the proposed peace-keeping mission have clear objectives and can its scope be clearly defined? - Is a cease-fire in place and have the parties agreed to a United Nations presence? - Are the financial and human resources available to accomplish the mission? - Can an "end point" to United Nations participation be identified? (8) After clashes between United States peace-keeping soldiers and followers of the Somali warlord, General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, causing the death of 12 United States soldiers, President Clinton stated that he wanted to bring home all American forces before 31st March 1994. The President made it clear that it was not the United States' job to rebuild Somalia's society or even to create a political process that would allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace". (9) In Haiti on 11th October, a crowd of several hundred armed demonstrators managed to prevent the disembarkment of a small contingent of United States soldiers who had come to Port-au- Prince to join a United Nations assistance mission sent to help in the re-establishment of democracy on the island. Events in Somalia and also in Haiti have made it clear that even the United States is going to be ever more reluctant to commit troops for peace-making, or even peace-keeping, in regional and local conflicts when there are no guarantees of success and when there is not a direct and more or less self- evident threat to vital national interests. The Clinton administration has until now favoured a multilateral approach to world affairs. This means that American power is being placed at the service of the world community on the grounds that the United Nations will use it only for purposes approved by broad international consensus and in conformity with international law. This attitude can only be welcomed. At the same time, however, there is still some ambiguity in the implementation of this policy. While the United States is willing to work in the framework of the United Nations and other multilateral organisations, it does so only on the assumption that it can play the leading role, both politically and militarily, and thus it wishes to have the command of any military operation in which its troops are involved. This means that it always asks its partners to occupy a position which it would not be prepared to occupy itself. Another ambiguity which has only recently become more evident is that it still has the natural and instinctive habit of a superpower, inclined to tackle problems with a show of military force, while it backs off as soon as it encounters serious resistance, for fear of criticism at home in case of casualties. This can lead to a paradoxical situation where United States soldiers are not sent on a mission to create a secure environment for the population in a conflict, but rather to have a secure situation created for themselves. On the other hand, it should be admitted that, for understandable reasons, the United States has not yet defined accurately the full range of its national interests in the post- cold war world, which makes it difficult always to take the right decision about where and when to intervene and also to foresee the consequences of such intervention. In these circumstances, what should be Europe's attitude? As regards the reappraisal of the United States foreign policy it must be patient, maybe even indulgent. Europe is not in a position to dictate to the United States what its vital national interests should be, nor is anybody else in the world. On the other hand, Europe cannot wait to identify its own vital and strategic interests until the United States has made up its mind. It must act now and prepare for a future where, on the European continent, it will most probably have to defend on its own certain vital and strategic interests which it may no longer share with the United States and which it therefore will have to handle under the benevolent eye, but without the active participation of, the United States. V. Minority rights in Europe and the recognition of new states ----------------------------------------------------------- Although it is generally admitted that minority rights are presumably the most explosive issue in post-cold war Europe, it is extremely difficult to find an adequate general solution acceptable to all the parties concerned. The conflict in former Yugoslavia has clearly revealed what can happen if minorities and majorities do not know where to draw the line. It has also shown that the EC had no ready response to the question of what to do when an ethnic, religious or other minority does not accept living in a state ruled by a different majority but claims the right to self-determination, including the adjustment of existing frontiers - goals that it is prepared to seek by the use of force. It appears that since the beginning of the conflict, Western Europe has desperately tried to respect the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, as later specified and confirmed in the 1990 Charter of Paris in order to prevent the collapse of a system of values and lofty principles. This system not only confirmed the status quo in Europe as it emerged from the cold war, it should also, in the opinion of the EC, guarantee peace and security in Europe for the future. In the following paragraphs, a succinct review will first be given of Western European activities in the issues of minorities and the recognition of new states. The review will be followed by concluding remarks with an indication of the possible road to take. (a) Guidelines for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union When the EC member states gradually came to the conclusion that they had to accept the collapse of former Yugoslavia, they developed, not without difficulty, a common position concerning recognition of the republics of former Yugoslavia. The EC's foreign ministers, meeting in Brussels on 16th December 1991, agreed on a compromise consisting of the following elements: - on 23rd December 1991, Yugoslav republics wishing to be recognised should make this known to the EC foreign ministers, indicating their willingness to meet the conditions set out in the EC's "Guidelines for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union"; - following their requests, the Badinter Arbitration Committee should verify if these states indeed meet the conditions enumerated in the above guidelines; - based on the Badinter Arbitration Committee's advice, the Twelve would take a decision on recognition on 15th January 1992. In the "Guidelines for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union", the Twelve mentioned the following conditions for recognition: "- respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights; - guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE; - respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; - acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; - commitment to settle by agreement, including, where appropriate, by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes." Among other things, they also declared: "The European Community and its member states will not recognise entities which are the result of aggression. They would take account of the effects of recognition on neighbouring states." (b) The Badinter Arbitration Committee When, on 27th August 1991, the Community and its member states in an extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers convened a peace conference on Yugoslavia, it also created an Arbitration Committee, chaired by Mr. Robert Badinter. This arbitration committee produced a number of opinions, at the request both of Lord Carrington, President of the Peace Conference and of the EC Council of Ministers, to which reference was made under A. in this chapter. It also produced two opinions at the request of the Serbian Republic, which used the conference as an intermediary. These Serbian requests concerned the right of the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to self-determination and the delimitation of internal borders. The right of peoples to self-determination is vaguely defined in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, the Charter did not provide a definition of the word "peoples", nor did it lay down rules as to how this right is to be exercised. The Arbitration Committee appeared to link the rights of minorities to the rights of peoples. As a consequence, the notion of "people" is no longer homogeneous and should not be seen as encompassing the whole population of any state. Within one state, various ethnic, religious or linguistic communities may exist. According to the committee's opinion number 2, each of these communities would have the right to see its identity recognised and to benefit "from all the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognised in international law, including, where appropriate, the right to choose their national identity". The Committee also noted that Article 1 of the two 1966 International Convenants on Human Rights establishes that "the principle of the right to self-determination serves to safeguard human rights", signifying that "by virtue of this right, each human entity might indicate his or her belonging to the community (...) of his or her choice." The Committee then suggested that the states concerned might accord to Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, if they so desired, the nationality of their choice. These persons, declaring themselves Serbs, could retain certain civil and political rights in the territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, without thereby questioning the sovereignty of the state. Rights of minorities can therefore be respected without this having to result in a break-up of an existing state. This could lead to a distinction between "nationality" and "citizenship" similar to what is set out in the Treaty on European Union. Furthermore, the Arbitration Committee attached great importance to the principle of respect for frontiers existing at the moment of independence and recalled in its opinion number 2 that, whatever the circumstances, "the right to self- determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers". On the other hand, according to the committee, states may modify their frontiers by mutual agreement. This conclusion of the committee does not leave much room for a flexible policy. What should be done if a minority refuses to remain in the state of its citizenship if this state, while according it full minority rights, refuses to change its frontiers by mutual agreement? Can such a minority be denied its right to self-determination if it wishes to be part of a neighbouring state? Can this minority be condemned to remain in the state of its citizenship because of the principle of inviolability of frontiers? Would mass migration be the only solution if no mutual agreement to change frontiers can be reached between the two neighbouring states? (c) The Balladur plan Conscious of the acuteness of the problem of minorities in Europe and of the difficulties of the international community, including the EC, to implement the principles to which it had committed itself, the French Government, at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen on 22nd June 1993, presented a pact on stability in Europe, also called the Balladur plan. France argues that this would offer the Central and Eastern European countries wishing to move closer to the EC a framework in which they could, between themselves and on a pragmatic basis, settle those problems which are considered to be potential sources of instability. The ultimate goal would be the signing of a pact embracing all the bilateral agreements thereby concluded. It is proposed that the preparatory conference for the pact will do more than solemnly confirm the inviolability of borders in Europe. It should also prepare the signing of agreements of good neighbourliness which are based in particular on the respect of minority rights in cases where violation of those rights could lead to international entanglements. As regards the rights of minorities, the proposal argues that existing texts on this subject have gradually developed from individual rights of people belonging to minorities towards recognition of their collective character and their close links with security problems. The CSCE High Commissioner should be asked to prepare a report on the collective rights of minorities. Following this, the preparatory conference for the pact should ask the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to conclude mutual agreements which, on a case-by-case basis, contain solutions for their minority problems. Preventive procedures should be established in order to avoid violation of minority rights resulting in security problems. The role and power of the CSCE High Commissioner should be re- evaluated and he might be given a more active role as a mediator. The preparatory conference should also examine possible accompanying measures to promote stability. It could, in particular: - examine the possibility the WEU to admit as associate members, signatory states of a European pact whose accession to the European Union is envisaged and developing military co- operation with them, in particular in the field of peace- keeping; - promote military co-operation between Central and Eastern Europe, the twelve, NATO and WEU; - propose concrete measures to reinforce CSCE institutions. Apart from countries from Northern, Central and Eastern Europe, the list of participating countries should also include the United States, Canada, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltic states. At the European summit meeting in Copenhagen, it was decided to integrate the Balladur proposal, now called the European stability pact, into joint action in common foreign and security policy. On 4th October 1993, a high-level working group presented an interim report to the EC foreign ministers in which problems relating to the application of the basic principles of the pact, in particular, respect of existing borders and of minority rights, were examined. The interim report also contained the first results of an information procedure in the countries interested in the pact. Ministers then decided to adopt a timeframe for action, in particular as regards informal consultations with the countries interested, priority being given to those countries which are candidates for the European Union via the European agreements. The full text of the modified proposals for a European stability pact was not yet available at the time of drafting this report, but it has been established that no violation will be allowed of the principle of respect for existing borders. The pact will furthermore have a political rather than a legal character, although the underlying bilateral agreements should have a legal character. Security guarantees will not be included in the pact and no sanctions are envisaged. In general, the pact should be another element of a European framework of preventive diplomacy. At the special summit meeting in Brussels on 29th October, it was decided that within the framework of the gradual development of a common foreign and security policy, one of the priorities for common action should be to promote stability, reinforce the democratic process and develop regional co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it was stated that a stability pact, intended to solve the problem of minorities and to reinforce the inviolability of frontiers, would be an essential part of this common action. A summit meeting organised by the Council of Europe in Vienna on 8th October has, however, again shown how difficult it is for European states to speak with one voice when rights of national minorities are concerned. In their final communique, the heads of state and government, "aware that the protection of national minorities is an essential element of stability and democratic security" in Europe, invite European states to establish conditions allowing the people concerned "to develop their culture, while preserving their religion, traditions and customs". On the other hand, there was no agreement to establish a definition of the notion of "national minorities", in particular because of French and British resistance. No mention was made of collective rights of minorities, an essential issue for many citizens in Central and Eastern Europe, but at the same time an issue on which the opinions of various governments in Western Europe still largely diverge. Because of these differences of view, the summit meeting called for the drafting of a protocol to complete the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This task, however, is limited to the cultural field, in that it is envisaged to protect "individual rights" (which corresponds to the French and British views) "particularly for persons belonging to national minorities" (which corresponds to German, Austrian and Hungarian concerns). Furthermore, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers asked to draft a framework convention defining principles which member states should respect to guarantee the protection of "national minorities". This convention should not be compulsory, nor should it allow for the development of jurisprudence. (d) Conclusion Understandably, the conflict in former Yugoslavia has produced haunting fears of further similar conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. It must therefore be a top priority of the EC's nascent common foreign and security policy to develop a distinct and unambiguous position as regards the issues of self- determination, minority rights and the inviolability or not of borders. In doing so, it should be realised that the unimpaired application of each of these principles may be incompatible. Furthermore, it may be too idealistic to assume that minorities and nations which, under communist rule, have suffered political suppression and cultural oppression will be prepared to accept the EC's reasoning regarding European citizenship and the relative unimportance of national borders in a unifying Europe. Western European states indeed have taken many years to settle their borders and start the process of unification moving under far more favourable conditions of government. Since the beginning of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the EC has been obliged to do some intensive back-pedalling on the application of principles which it had enunciated in the beginning, partly or perhaps even mainly because it lacked the political will to enforce application of these principles with military means. There is justified doubt over the question whether it will be prepared to do so in the future. It would, therefore, make sense to take a more flexible stance towards the application of such principles. The establishment of a European Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, as proposed by Robert Badinter (10), could create the necessary conditions for dealing with disputes on minority rights and frontiers in a more conciliatory atmosphere than through armed force and United Nations Security Council resolutions. At the same time, the establishment of a European stability pact - of which only the outline is known at the moment - could oblige Central and Eastern European states to consider minority problems in a larger framework of European security than, as is now often the case, in a purely national perspective. A system where directly tangible economic advantages would be granted to those nations to conclude comprehensive agreements on good neighbourliness could be a strong incentive for civilised and conciliatory behaviour. It should, however, be noted that any European stability pact should take Russian interests into account. Even if Russia does not belong to the the group of countries having the intention of joining the EC, it cannot be excluded from a European agreement which envisages a solution to minority problems. VI. Inviolability of borders ------------------------ Since the initial phase of the conflict, the EC has insisted on the principle that borders could not be changed by force. In a declaration adopted at the opening of The Hague peace conference on 7th September 1991, it was stated that internal borders could not be changed by force. Meeting in Bonn on 19th November 1991, the WEU Council of Ministers "recalled and confirmed the repeated statements by EC foreign ministers that under no circumstances will territorial changes brought about by force be recognised". It seems difficult to speak more boldly! As quoted in Chapter V, one of the conditions for the recognition of new states in Europe, as agreed by EC foreign ministers on 16th December 1991, was acceptance of the inviolability of frontiers which could be changed only through peaceful means and by common agreement. After a meeting with Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in Luxembourg (11), the EC said in a statement that the Vance- Owen plan had "no feasible alternative" and "remained the centrepiece of EC strategy". On 19th June 1992, the WEU Council "recalled that territorial gains or changes brought about by violence are unacceptable and will not be recognised by the international community". At the London conference on 26th-27th August 1992, it was again repeated that a political settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia was to include respect for the integrity of present frontiers unless changed by mutual agreement. The Vance-Owen plan, as presented on 2nd January 1993 at the Geneva peace conference, which provided for a reorganisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 provinces, was considered by many as a major infringement of the principle of inviolability of frontiers, because it tacitly endorsed territorial gains obtained by force. As already known, the rejection by Bosnian Serbs of the Vance- Owen plan in May 1993 later resulted in acceptance by the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and Spain of a joint action plan for Bosnia which "temporarily", it was said, accepted territorial gains made by force. The plan called for the creation of six "safe areas" (12) for Muslim civilians on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the use of United States air power to protect United Nations peace-keepers in those areas. It was made clear, however, that the United States would not come to the rescue of the safe areas themselves, should they be attacked by Serbs, nor would they contribute troops to the peace-keeping effort on the ground. It was said that the primary goal was no longer to roll back territorial gains, but "to contain and stabilise the situation and to put the brakes on the killing". (13) On the other hand, many agreed with the United States Republican Senator, Bob Dole, who said that the plan amounted to "writing off Bosnia as a state by ratifying the status quo on the ground". Immediately after the adoption of the joint action plan, both the United States and European governments tried to neutralise criticism that they had in fact accepted territorial gains obtained by force. In Washington, the White House said that the plan showed that the West was "refusing to accept territorial gains in Bosnia (obtained) by aggression. (14) In London, the Foreign Ministry stated: "We do our utmost to get the Bosnian Serbs to roll back their occupation", and "We do not accept that aggression be rewarded". (15) The French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, denied that the action plan was in any way a de facto recognition of Serbian conquests, saying "Our aim is clear: to obtain withdrawal from areas which have been occupied by force and to implement the Vance-Owen plan". (16) No sooner had the action plan been adopted after weeks of diplomatic negotiations than the western allies, sadly enough, again demonstrated their main weakness: lack of resolve. Meeting in Brussels on 25th and 26th May 1993, they could not reach a consensus on how the plan would be carried out, how many troops would be required to protect the safe areas and which countries would contribute the additional forces. Of course, difficult questions were involved such as how to co-ordinate ground protection with air protection, how to fit that in with the enforcement of a no-fly zone and which command arrangements should be established. Many EC and NATO member states complained about not having been consulted on the plan, others hesitated about sending more troops. The United States President had ruled out the deployment of United States ground forces and rules of engagement had yet to be established, requiring a change in the rules governing the use of force by United States peace-keeping troops. All Ministers agreed that no plans could be drawn up before a United Nations Security Council resolution was passed defining the safe area proposal. (17) Again, precious time was lost because of western reluctance and hesitation to act decisively. And still, Thorvald Stoltenberg stated that the option of using military force to end the conflict had not been abandoned by the international community, though other means to achieve peace would first be pursued. Les Aspin, the United States Defence Minister, was quoted as having stated after the Brussels meeting: "Working together is a new element, the Serbs cannot any longer rely on divisions between Russians, Europeans and Americans meaning no action." (18) One wonders whether this was meant to be a serious statement. Needless to say, fresh Serbian forces were sent into the battle for Gorazde, one of the "safe areas", while Sarajevo was heavily shelled, causing suspension of the humanitarian airlift and the continuation attacks on aid convoys. (19) Following the uncertainty over the implementation of the joint action plan, the EC Commissioner for external political relations, Hans van den Broek, insisted that EC leaders should urgently meet to discuss concrete steps, including military action. He also criticised the joint action plan which he considered incompatible with the implementation of the Vance- Owen plan and lacking any chance to be effective in the short or even long term. (20) The United Kingdom Prime Minister, John Major, however, left little doubt over allied intentions when he said the next day that the allied powers were willing to tighten sanctions and increase diplomatic pressure, but were not prepared to fight a full-scale war. He said "people are not prepared to put 200 000 troops in Bosnia to force them (the Serbs) back by armed force, but we will maintain diplomatic pressure and we will not accept the land gains by force". (21) This is an acute reminder of the strong diplomatic pressure which allowed Hitler to invade parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1938 and 1939. At a Franco-German summit on 2nd June 1993, both President Mitterrand and the Chancellor Helmut Kohl again insisted that a settlement must "guarantee the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina". (22) Meeting in Athens on 10th June 1993 in the North Atlantic Council, NATO's foreign ministers supported "the establishment of safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the protection of the civilian population as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 824 and 836". It then offered NATO's "protective airpower in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate, if it so requests" and asked NATO's military authorities "to proceed rapidly with detailed planning for the air support". Again, ministers confirmed that "The establishment of safe areas is a temporary measure leading towards a negotiated settlement based on the principles of the Vance-Owen plan which guarantee the full sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina". Not until 30th June 1993 did the NATO Permanent Council in Brussels receive a detailed report from the Chairman of the Military Committee on the planning for air support, including rules of engagement. It was decided to send the plans to the capitals of NATO's member states for approval. Some elements of the plans were to be examined by the United Nations. After approval of the plans by the 16 member states, on 9th July 1993 the NATO Permanent Council authorised SACEUR to start the procedure for deployment of member states' fighter aircraft to implement the decision on air support for UNPROFOR in its protection mandate for the six safe areas. It should be noted that at that time, the 7 500 troops required for implementing the safe areas plan on the ground, and for whom the air support was being planned, were not yet available. Finally, on 9th August 1993, the North Atlantic Council approved the operational options for air strikes in Bosnia- Herzegovina, but it immediately made it clear that the air strikes foreseen were "limited to the support of humanitarian relief, and must not be interpreted as a decision to intervene militarily in the conflict". A first NATO air support exercise in a safe area was carried out on 18th August. Still, NATO's decision was immediately followed by an exchange of statements between the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia- Herzegovina and the United States which did not contribute to the credibility of earlier threats. Only a few days later, on 20th August 1993, a compromise peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina was presented by Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, leaving the Muslim-led Bosnian government with about 30% of the territory, the Bosnian Serbs with 52% or more and the Croats with 17% or more, in fact dividing the republic into three different ethnic states. One cannot deny that whatever European governments say, an immeasurable discrepancy can be noted between their theory and their practice. Even if the maintenance of existing borders were to remain a fundamental goal, other options including the change of borders through peaceful negotiations and mutual agreement must be kept open and may have to be pursued actively in order to prevent conflict. At the same time, it should be noted that most of the minority problems, with the possible exception of those in Macedonia and Kosovo, cannot be solved by changing borders. In all other cases, border changes with the aim of creating ethnically pure states would have to be accompanied by mass migrations. On the other hand, a change of borders in Kosovo would have immediate consequences for relations between Albania and FYROM and raise tension in all neighbouring countries. If borders are to be changed within Europe, there must be accompanying security guarantees from their godfathers. The example of Bosnia- Herzegovina, where a new state was recognised, after which it was neither protected nor allowed to defend itself with appropriate means should never be repeated. Often, any proposal for changing borders is dismissed with the argument that such changes would open a Pandora's box in the whole of Europe. Is not Pandora's box already wide open with the international community's de facto acceptance of changing borders by force and ethnic cleansing? The current policy is inconsistent. Territorial changes may have to be accepted and perhaps actively pursued if that can help to prevent an armed conflict, but the new territorial relations should always be backed by an agreed security framework with satisfactory security guarantees. The recent history of the Saar shows clearly that territories can change country by peaceful means. VII. Sanctions --------- Sanctions as envisaged in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter will in future no doubt remain one of the main peaceful instruments for carrying into effect Security Council decisions. On the other hand, sanctions will have little effect if there are no measures to enforce them. In the Yugoslav crisis, sanctions were imposed at a very early stage, beginning with an arms embargo in September 1991, followed by trade sanctions and an oil embargo later that year. However, it was only in July 1992 that the first measures were taken to police the sanctions by means of a combined WEU-NATO air and sea operation in the Adriatic and even at that stage it had no authority to stop vessels suspected of breaking sanctions. A fully-effective system for controling and enforcing the embargo on the Danube came into effect only in June 1993, almost two years after the imposition of sanctions. Only then was a memorandum of understanding signed between WEU and Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary allowing WEU to establish a co-ordination and support centre in Calafat (Romania) and control centres in Mohacs (Hungary) and Ruse (Bulgaria), while a total of about 300 policemen and customs officers and 12 patrol boats were sent in to provide assistance in the embargo enforcement. Notwithstanding the extraordinary delays in the embargo enforcement, there can be little doubt that the economy of Serbia-Montenegro has been seriously affected by the embargo. In 1992, there was a 56% decline in real wages. Gross national product is forecast to drop by about 30% in 1993 to around $8 billion. According to official figures, the monthly inflation rate reached 205.4% in May. Still, not even all EC members are determined to implement the sanctions. Greece has never been able to dispel charges that it violated the embargo and there are many incidents giving proof of its mischievious behaviour. On 8th December 1992, EC Foreign Ministers criticised Greece for allowing Greek companies to violate United Nations sanctions by shipping oil to Serbia, while at the same time withholding oil from Macedonia, officially called FYROM. Greece later resumed oil supplies to FYROM, but in September 1993, it was said that Greece had threatened to cut off all oil supplies to FYROM unless half the supply, or more than 80 000 tons monthly, was sent to Serbia. (23) Also, FYROM cannot claim to have a clean record concerning the embargo either. According to UNPROFOR, which monitors the border between FYROM and Serbia, about 4000 trucks, including those carrying oil products, construction materials and spare parts for heavy machinery, made the crossing in both directions every week. (24) Only very recently, in October 1993, it was reported that the government of FYROM, encouraged by the United States, had finally decided to apply in practice the United Nations Security Council Resolution 820 on the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. (25) It is said that freight transport between the two states has come to a standstill except for lorries with authorisation from the United Nations sanctions committee. Even tanker lorries are now systematically being stopped and sent back. The government claims that the sanctions cost the Macedonian economy more than $1.2 billion in 1992 and $1.8 billion in 1993. Some financial compensation may be provided. The EC had promised 100 million ecus in December 1992, but actual payment of this sum was delayed. The economic loss for FYROM caused by the embargo enforcement during the last three months of 1993 is estimated at $1.8 billion, a sum which might be compensated by the United States or by the postponement of the country's external debt. It is suggested in Skopje that the United States could send more troops to FYROM to reinforce the 325 United States troops already deployed in that country, while the air force base of Krivovalek has been put at the disposal of the United States. Other neighbouring countries are trying to implement the embargo by all the means at their disposal, but they are all complaining of heavy economic losses for which no compensation has been provided. Greece claims a loss of over $2.5 billion, Hungary a loss of over $500 million and Romania and Bulgaria have given figures of between $1 and 3 billion. Recently, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ljuben Berov, addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, estimated the economic loss to his country caused by the United Nations embargos against Iraq and against Serbia and Montenegro at more than $6 billion. He said that, until then, Bulgaria had received no compensation whatever "except pats on the back by way of consolation". The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia claims a decline of 50% in its GNP, which has not been compensated. (26) Even if some of these figures may be rough estimates and exaggerated, it cannot be denied that economies which are involved in a painful process of change towards a market- oriented economy do not have enough reserves to face additional problems. A reasonable system may have to be worked out for the international community to compensate countries which are hit most severely by an embargo against an important neighbouring trade partner, as happened during the Gulf war. Another important problem connected with sanctions is that it is the population of the country envisaged that suffers the most. Of course, the reasoning behind the imposition of sanctions is that a population, disgruntled by food shortages, rampant inflation, unemployment and other devastating effects, will revolt against its leaders and choose a new government which should change the country's policy. The trouble here is that sanctions are always imposed upon nations with an autocratic government which has a firm grip on the population and where a real opposition does not exist. The second world war has shown that even more severe measures, such as the bombing of cities, does not make such regimes change course. In conclusion, it should be said that sanctions remain an essential instrument as backing for diplomatic arguments. But it is also vital for them to be enforced from the very beginning and for possible negative consequences for neighbouring countries to be taken into account. Compensatory measures may have to be considered. VIII. Peace-keeping or peace-making ----------------------------- After the events of 1989, when security relations in Europe started to change, the member states of both NATO and WEU understood that they had to adapt their strategic concept and armed forces. Action was taken, and after thorough preparation, a NATO summit was held in Rome in December 1991 where a transformed NATO was presented to the world. Indeed, it is only two years ago, on 7th-8th November 1991, that the heads of state and government of NATO's member states agreed in Rome on the alliance's new strategic concept, yet it now seems ages ago. At that time, the Soviet Union still existed, but rightly the Rome declaration stated that "the threat of a simultaneous full-scale attack on all NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and no longer provides the focus for allied strategy". On the other hand, it was stated that Soviet conventional and nuclear capabilities had to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe were to be preserved. In conclusion, it was therefore said that: "Even in a non-adversarial and co-operative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential still constitute the most significant factor of which the alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe." This was a good reason to maintain NATO's nuclear and conventional forces, be it in slightly reduced size, in order to guarantee and protect the territorial integrity of the member states. But new threats and risks were emerging, even if their importance and magnitude were not yet clearly visible, and the Rome declaration referred to them as follows: "On the other hand, there is a greater risk of different crises arising, which could develop quickly and would require a rapid response, but they are likely to be of a lesser magnitude." The risk of a "different crisis" had already materialised in former Yugoslavia. Indeed, it was still of a "lesser magnitude", but it was developing quickly and required a rapid response. On 27th October 1991, the Croatian Foreign Minister, Ivonimir Separovic, wrote a letter to EC foreign ministers informing them that since the beginning of July 5 000 people had been killed in Croatia. At that time, the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that more than 280 000 people had left their homes during the period of fighting. Both figures have been dwarfed by what has happened since. In the Rome declaration, apart from the alliance's task "to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state", one of the other three fundamental security tasks was formulated as follows: "To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force." Apparently, it was thought that NATO could play an eminent role as a coherent and effective political organisation, when, regarding the management of crises and conflict prevention, it was stated that: "In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members." and further that: "The success of alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the alliance's political authorities choosing and co-ordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field." With a touch of realism, ministers recognised that NATO might not be able to do this alone. They therefore added: "The potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play." In the chapter "Missions of alliance military forces", the classic role of armed forces was confirmed: "The primary role of alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged." "In peace" it followed on "the role of allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved." Finally, it was established that: "Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions." Few people would have then dared to predict that within one year this phrase was going to play an all-important role in debates among allies over the possible role of military forces in former Yugoslavia. One could argue that, in Rome, NATO had not yet completely transformed itself into the perfect security organisation for the coming decades, but that would be unfair. Developments are following in too-rapid succession to expect more than what was achieved in Rome after thorough and serious preparations. Even so, the Rome declaration provides a fairly complete catalogue of tasks and missions of the alliance and its military forces, which should have allowed it to act effectively when it became clear that the crisis in Yugoslavia was turning into a savage war. Certainly, no satisfactory solution has yet been found to the question whether NATO as such could operate out-of-area, but it should be noted that this did not prevent militarily successful operations in the Gulf war, where a number of NATO member states co-operated with others to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invaders. Even if it was not a NATO operation, NATO assets, NATO procedures and NATO experience contributed to its success. Meeting in Oslo on 4th June 1992, the North Atlantic Council made it known that it was prepared "to support, on a case-by- case basis in accordance with (its) own procedures, peace- keeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise". Later, on 19th June 1992 (the crisis in Yugoslavia had meanwhile resulted in over 100 000 people killed and 2 500 000 refugees) the WEU Council issued the Petersberg declaration which included new decisions on the strengthening of WEU's operational role. Here, WEU member states declared that they were "prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU." Furthermore, it was stated that: "Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: - humanitarian and rescue tasks; - peace-keeping tasks; - tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace- making. Meeting on the occasion of the Helsinki CSCE summit on 8th- 10th July 1992, foreign ministers of both NATO and WEU decided that their troops would, on a case-by-case basis, be available for peace-keeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE. Later, at their ministerial North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels on 17th December 1992, ministers decided to further strengthen alliance co-ordination in peace-keeping and to develop practical measures to enhance the alliance's contribution in this area. Ministers declared that they were ready "to share experiences in peace-keeping with (their) co- operation partners and other CSCE participating states, and to join them as required in supporting CSCE peace-keeping operations". They also confirmed the preparedness of the alliance to "support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peace-keeping operations under the authority of the United Nations Security Council". In the statement issued at the meeting of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) on 18th December 1992, it was said that the countries participating in NACC would "exchange experience and expertise on peace-keeping and related matters" and that they would "continue (their) consultations leading to co-operation on this subject in conformity with the work plan". (a) State of affairs in preparing for the peace-keeping roles of NATO and WEU Even if a framework of good intentions and availability has been created in the North Atlantic Council's political decisions and statements, officials at NATO headquarters note that the Alliance does not yet have a detailed set of principles and policies for peace-keeping. One issue at stake is the implications for defence planning and security, if the same assets may be used for different purposes. These are certainly subjects which should be addressed at the forthcoming NATO summit meeting in January 1994. It is clear, however, that NATO's primary role will remain the security of its members. If NATO is to assume peace-keeping roles, it does not intend to be at the beck and call of the whole world, nor will it act on its own responsibility. On the other hand, NATO rightly argues that it has unique capabilities to offer for peace-keeping, such as an airborne early warning system, command, control and communications, multinational forces, interoperability, well-trained troops with more than half of its member states having extensive peace-keeping experience, a unique scale and degree of readiness and planning capability. On 18th December 1992, the NACC decided to establish an ad-hoc group on co-operation in peace-keeping with the aim of developing a common understanding of the political principles of and the tools for peace-keeping, and to share experience and thereby develop common practical approaches and co-operation in support of peace-keeping under the responsibility of the United Nations or the CSCE. The ad-hoc group drafted principles which were agreed by the permanent North Atlantic Council and its co-operation partners on 15th March 1993. This document, notwithstanding NATO's own assertion that it is still lacking detailed principles and policies for peace-keeping, contains what is ostensibly an almost exhaustive compilation of definitions, general principles, criteria and operational principles, guidelines, measures and elements. As regards co-operation to prepare for possible CSCE peace- keeping operations, a total of 41 nations have now subscribed to this initiative, including all the NACC member states as well as Sweden, Finland and Austria. Representatives from both the CSCE and the United Nations have been invited. At this stage, an operational planning group does not yet exist, but there is an ambitious co-operation programme, including such issues as training, logistics, national planning and also technical and doctrinal questions. According to WEU's Secretary-General, the operational organisation of WEU is still in a preliminary phase. An inventory of forces answerable to WEU is now being prepared. These forces are mainly to be deployed for humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks. The Defence Representatives Group is preparing general rules and procedural guidelines for relations between these forces and WEU. Meanwhile, WEU takes the view that the involvement of the United States in Europe's security is vitally important. Therefore, in any situation where Europe's security is under threat, the preliminary question should be whether the United States is prepared to be involved in operations to counter the threat. If the United States agrees to be involved, a NATO operation can take place. If on the other hand the United States does not want to be involved, then WEU and the EC can act on their own. Depending on the requirements for the operation, WEU could then be self-reliant or play the leading role. There is a growing consensus that in such circumstances, NATO should make resources and assets available to WEU, such as the NATO AWACS and other infrastructure, a matter that was again discussed recently by NATO's Defence Ministers at Travemuende on 20th-21st Octber 1993. As the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, said, there is a growing feeling that Europeans will have to learn to take the main responsibility for handling problems which they can no longer expect Americans to solve for them. In that case, it would be only logical that NATO should be ready to help Europe, also if it is deploying a WEU force to handle a regional crisis, by lending its assets which are lacking in WEU's operational organisation, such as real-time intelligence, integrated command and control and airlift. Meanwhile, WEU should give serious consideration to how it can become self-reliant in some respects, such as airlift and satellite reconnaissance. (b) NATO and WEU operations in former Yugoslavia With the abovementioned statements in mind, it is interesting if not revealing to note what NATO and WEU are actually doing to promote or keep peace in former Yugoslavia. Actual activities are the following: (i) Implementing decisions taken by Foreign Ministers in Helsinki on 10th July 1992: both a NATO and a WEU naval force are enforcing compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning the United Nations economic embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and the arms embargo against all the republics of former Yugoslavia. For this operation, detailed co-ordination arrangements have been worked out between NATO and WEU military officials, including co-ordination of areas of responsibility, methods of operation, communications, air surveillance, support and oil supply. (ii) In a joint action with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, WEU is enforcing the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro on the Danube. (iii) UNPROFOR is using elements from NATO's NORTHAG command for its operational headquarters in Kiseljalc. (iv) Following a North Atlantic Council decision of 8th April 1992, NATO is enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina as imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 816. (v) On 9th August 1993, the North Atlantic Council approved the "operational options for air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina", enabling air support for humanitarian relief. Why did NATO not do more? At NATO headquarters, a number of arguments are being put forward which have prevented the deployment of peace-keeping forces. The first argument is that a massive operation with NATO deploying ground troops for peace-keeping is considered by many as a major test of NATO's capability as a security organisation. Any failure to pass this test, so it is said, would mean the end of NATO. As a consequence, great caution is being taken in the making the most thorough preparations, including painstaking negotiations over the mandate for such an operation and the duration of the commitment, all needed to establish a proper planning programme. Further it is said that a clear political objective, which is a main condition for any military operation to be successful, is still lacking. No clarity has yet been obtained over who will be responsible for the cost of a massive peace-keeping operation, which NATO is estimating at $8.25 billion a year. The United Nations, it is said at NATO, should allow its member states to consider their contribution to such operations as payment in kind. There are also indications that some of NATO's member states have problems in providing troops for the simple reason that, with so many different United Nations operations going on, they do not have enough resources in troops. Some member states even feel that they may have to revise their armed forces restructuring programme if United Nations peace-keeping is to require continuous large scale commitments. Following a request from NATO's Permanent Council on 15th September 1993, the organisation's military authorities have started preliminary contingency planning for possible implementation by NATO of the military aspects of a United Nations peace-keeping plan which would come into force if the different parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina sign a peace agreement and the United Nations turns to NATO for support for the plan's implementation. The planning envisages a force of 50 000 men, half of whom should be provided by the United States. It should be noted that many important issues still have to be settled. The military believe that the political objectives and rules of engagement must be established clearly before the start of any intervention. Some NATO members such as France, the United Kingdom and Canada, would prefer to see major United Nations involvement in the command and control of any peace-keeping mission, while the United States is in favour of a NATO command, dominated by the United States military, in any peace-keeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most, if not all, member states want to send troops for only a limited period. Finally, it is observed that it has been extremely difficult to reach a consensus among NATO's member states on all the different issues relating to a peace-keeping operation as now envisaged, although this is essential for any NATO operation on the territory of former Yugoslavia. WEU, it should be recognised, has not done much more than NATO, but the embargo enforcing operations in the Adriatic and on the Danube are successful. Asked why WEU did not do more, the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, pointed out that WEU's operational organisation is only in its infancy and that there were no resources to do much more. He noted that WEU has now become one of the players in security matters, but the United Nations has taken the lead, providing legitimacy for all operations. The United Nations has now asked NATO to provide peace-keeping forces in the event of a peace agreement between the parties to the conflict in Bosnia- Herzegovina implementing the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. In that framework, WEU may be asked to participate in the rotation of forces in the long term. WEU is now drawing up a plan to solve the practical problems for the EC's administration of Mostar. The WEU Planning Cell is examining the possibility of establishing a WEU police force in Mostar and the re- establishment of public, in particular medical, services in the city. (c) The future of peace-keeping in former Yugoslavia Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg, when visiting NATO on 22nd September 1993, said that the peace-keeping operation in Bosnia- Herzegovina should be accomplished by a credible force, more powerful than the lightly armed United Nations peace-keeping force deployed in Bosnia for a humanitarian mission. NATO's Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner, has made it clear that NATO will not and cannot enforce a peace plan if the United States does not participate in te peace-keeping forces. He believes that the United States administration is still willing to provide troops for an operation under NATO command, but on the other hand, he thinks that after the casualties among United States forces in Somalia and the failed effort to land United States peace-keepers in Haiti, the administration might have trouble in securing the agreement of the United States Congress and Senate. Indeed, after the rejection by the Bosnian parliament, at the end September 1993, of the last Owen Stoltenberg peace plan, the chances for a peace-keeping force seem rather remote. In fact, one political commentator was most probably right when he bluntly said that the Bosnian Parliament's rejection of the peace plan was greeted with thinly-disguised relief in Europe as well as in the United States. The most recent pirouette in Europe's ballet of hesitations over military operations in former Yugoslavia was again illustrative of a general attitude of long standing. On 25th October 1993, President Francois Mitterrand stated on French television: "A major demonstration must be made...In November a humanitarian path will have to be forced towards Sarajevo". At the EC's summit meeting in Brussels on 29th October 1993, however, President Mitterrand told the heads of government that he had not been understood correctly and that the question was not one of using force in this operation. Later that day, the summit meeting decided to use all appropriate means for ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance and not, as proposed by France, "all the means available for ensuring" which would have included the United Nations authorisation to use force and NATO's offer for aerial protection of the UNPROFOR. (27) As matters now stand, many have started to consider former Yugoslavia as a specific case where none of the CSCE principles, nor of its conflict prevention procedures, nor the United Nations Charter's procedures set out in Chapter VI and VII can be successful and where all allied American and European ideas and proposals for peace-keeping and peace-making are doomed to fail. They think it is a hornet's nest where a military operation to keep peace or enforce a peace agreement could easily deteriorate into combat operations with inevitable casualties. Not one organisation or country has been able to provide a solution or bring the conflicting parties to reason. Those who have not tried yet are afraid of losing their credibility once they become involved. These could be reasons why western governments have tacitly abandoned Yugoslavia to itself, decided to let the conflict follow its natural course while hoping that a stage of pure fatigue will be reached when the only real option left for all parties will be to stumble or drag themselves to the negotiation table where Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg will hold their hands to sign the ultimate peace plan. What remains in former Yugoslavia? If Western Europe and the United States have almost given up hope of keeping or securing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there still remains Croatia, Kosovo, Sandjak and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In Croatia, the situation is volatile. The United Nations peace-keeping force is not implementing its official mandate which is to keep both sides behind their previous confrontation line, secure the cease-fire agreement and put Serbian heavy arms in storage. Recently, the Commander-in-Chief of UNPROFOR warned that Serbs and Croats are again on the brink of war. In Kosovo, the civil, human and national rights of two million Albanians who form 92% of the Kosovo population, have been abrogated by Serbia in 1989. Under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, Kosovo had wide powers of self-rule as an autonomous province of the republic of Serbia. Local Albanians were given control over most aspects of public life. This all came to an end when President Milosevic of Serbia revoked Kosovo's autonomy, dissolved the regional parliament and made the region an integral part of Serbia. Martial law has now been imposed. Education in the Albanian language has been suspended. More than half of the Albanians have been summarily dismissed from their jobs and nearly 300 000 Albanians have been forced to flee Kosovo. Serbian military units surround most of Kosovo's major cities and towns with their artillery guns ready to target. Serbian paramilitary forces are harassing and intimidating the Albanian population under the inspiring leadership of Zeljko Raznjatovic, also called Arkan, wanted for murder and other crimes by several Western European countries. In a report, released by Amnesty International on 12th October, it is said that tension is still growing in Kosovo where a dangerous mixture of ethnic tension, rage and years of abuse in silence is fermenting. (28) It has been suggested that the Serbs should start to discuss limited restoration of autonomy for Kosovo, but the Albanians are no longer interested in such a solution. They are demanding an independent Kosovo. It is generally believed that the dispute over Kosovo can easily turn into a war, maybe even with the active participation of Albanians living in neighbouring countries such as Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Some suggest that even Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria, Greece and perhaps Turkey may become involved in the fighting. One has to hope that this will not happen, but it cannot be excluded completely. Nevertheless, the situation is sufficiently threatening to require immediate and decisive action by the international community with Europe in the lead. It has been argued that nothing can be done in Kosovo, because it is an internal dispute on Serbian territory, which would preclude foreign intervention. It should be noted, however, that the actual situation in Kosovo fully justifies international action in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter since it is unequivocally a dispute "the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security", as mentioned in Article 33 of the Charter. Application of all different actions enumerated in the abovementioned Chapters of the United Nations Charter, including the deployment of peace-keeping forces, would therefore be fully legitimate. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the situation is not much better. It has declared its independence and has been admitted as a member of the United Nations, but its official name, challenged by Greece, is still being negotiated with Greece in talks sponsored by the United Nations. The new Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, has however announced that Greece will pull out of these talks. On 12th October 1993, Belgium officially recognised FYROM as a sovereign and independent state. The Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs immediately issued a protest, stating that the "Greek partners in the EC should seriously consider Athens' views" on the "Macedonian question" and should respect "the principle of solidarity" in the EC. With a total population of just over 2 million, FYROM has a number of minorities, the most important of which are the approximately 400 000 Albanians living in the area adjacent to Kosovo and Albania, 90 000 Turks and 50 000 Serbs. In particular, the Albanians, who are participating in the present government, may cause problems in the future. They have been proposing the creation of an autonomous Albanian region and also the federalisation of FYROM. At the moment, within the framework of UNPROFOR, a Nordic battalion and a United States contingent of 315 troops are deployed along the Macedonian-Serbian border in order to prevent the armed conflict in former Yugoslavia spilling over into FYROM. (d) Peace-keeping in Europe and other possible areas of conflict. While there is little prospect of extending peace-keeping operations in former Yugoslavia, rightly or wrongly, might there be other disputes or armed conflicts in Europe where the western alliance, whether in the NATO or WEU framework, would be prepared to intervene militarily at an early stage under the authority of the United Nations or the CSCE in order to keep or enforce peace while such action was still possible with an appropriate display of force and without the risk of heavy casualties? An increasing number of ministerial and other meetings in all existing security organisations are being devoted to the many different aspects of peace-keeping. This creates the impression that huge forces are being prepared for operations in all the regions in Europe and in other continents where conflicts are raging or where fragile cease-fires or peace agreements have to be monitored. Is that really true? Let us first look more closely at the catalogue of other areas of conflict and hotbeds of tension in Europe or at Europe's border which are, or recently were, on special offer for peace- keeping and peace-making. A valuable catalogue can be found in the statements issued at the meetings of the North Atlantic Co- operation Council (NACC) which keeps an annotated record of conflicts in its member states. The last NACC statement issued in Athens on 11th June 1993 mentions the following conflicts where arms had been or were being used and where, theoretically, the deployment of peace- keeping forces may be required. (i) Nagorno-Karabakh NACC stated that the CSCE conference in Minsk offers the best chance for a lasting solution, it supports United Nations Security Council Resolution 822 and calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of all occupying forces from recently-occupied districts of Azerbaijan. At the moment, there is little hope that the conflict will be solved soon and fighting continues. In a declaration in Paris on 15th October 1993, the Prime Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh, Robert Kotcharian, declared that his country would continue to fight for its rights until it obtained satisfaction on all the issues involved. Russian hardliners are backing the Armenians in their fight for control of Nagorno-Karabakh and independent witnesses have reported Russian logistical support, but there is little evidence of any direct Russian involvement. On the other hand, Russia is worried about possible fundamentalist influence in mainly Muslim Azerbaijan. The armed forces of Azerbaijan have been soundly defeated and the current talks are the best chance for peace. The new Azeri government appears to be ready to relinquish Nagorno-Karabakh in all but name, but much depends on Armenian acceptance of the need to withdraw from other parts of Azerbaijan. (ii) Georgia NACC appealed to the parties concerned to respect an effective cease-fire in the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic of Georgia and refrain from all actions which could complicate a constructive dialogue and the achievement of a durable settlement. It also believed that it was important to pursue a full settlement of Georgian-Ossetian relations in the zone of conflict of Georgia. What has happened since that statement was issued? In September 1993, Abkhaz forces backed by Russian troops and volunteers from the North Caucasus, all in possession of large quantities of modern and sophisticated military equipment, launched a surprise attack on Sukhumi, the last remaining Georgian stronghold in Abkhazia, violating a Russian-brokered cease-fire agreement signed on 28th July last. On 4th October, the Abkhaz Defence Minister announced that all remaining pockets of Georgian resistance had been liquidated, and that Abkhaz troops were in complete control of the region. There were reports of ethnic cleansing and of more than one hundred thousand refugees. Meanwhile, troops loyal to Zviad Gamsakhurdia, President Shevardnadze's rival and predecessor, occupied a number of strategic towns in the west of Georgia, and were continuing with their offensive. Mr. Gamsakhurdia has declared that Georgia will be cleansed of Eduard Shevardnadze's supporters, adding that he would resume his "lawful presidency" by "all possible means". (29) Until recently, Russian assistance to the Abkhazians was matched by an absence of support for Georgia. With an economy which has almost ground to a complete standstill and moving towards dismemberment, Georgia is indeed close to collapse as a functioning state. The Georgian army has virtually disintegrated and can no longer fight on its own. Under these circumstances, on 18th October 1993 Eduard Shevardnadze made an urgent appeal to the governments of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to send the necessary military contingents to guarantee the normal function of vital arteries from the Black Sea to Tbilisi. Since then, covert Russian military assistance has turned the tide and it is reported that rebel forces are now retreating. (30) The Russian assistance, although publicly denied in Moscow, came only after Mr. Shevardnadze had decided that Georgia should join the Commonwealth of Independent states. In two other troubled areas on Georgian territory, there is still no guarantee of lasting peace. South Ossetia, an autonomous region, after repeated outbursts of violence during 1991, declared its independence on 21st December of that same year, and confirmed an earlier resolution on unification with Russia. Fighting continued and President Shevardnadze accused Russia of exacerbating the situation by helping the South Ossetians with troops and equipment. Meanwhile, the speaker of the Russian parliament accused Georgia of the "genocide of the South Ossetian people". According to a cease-fire agreement concluded in June 1992, Russia would withdraw its military units from the region while a monitoring committee would oversee the peace. In the autonomous region of Adjaria, a comparative peace has been observed although it is distrustful of the central Georgian government. The lack of a common border with Russia, however, offers few prospects for a successful independence movement. It is argued that Georgia is of minimal strategic importance to the West and Russia can be left to deal with security problems in that region. The only way to stop the continuing violence would be to introduce buffer forces from outside. Both politically and militarily, these can only be Russian forces. The United States, supported by Germany, indeed excludes any such action other than that taken by the Russians. The official view of the Russian government on how the conflict should be solved is unclear and contradictory statements are being issued. (31) All this is happening in a country where the President is a former Soviet foreign minister, well respected in the West as the co-architect of glasnost and of a number of important arms control agreements. Moreover, Georgia is a member state of the United Nations, CSCE and NACC. There is no clarity over its CIS membership. Where else are western alliance troops going to intervene for the sake of peace and democracy if not in Georgia? (iii) Tajikistan NACC urged the parties involved in the continuing political and armed confrontation to settle their differences through dialogue and work together for the peaceful and democratic development in their country. It supported the efforts of the international community in this regard. Last year, a power struggle developed into an all-out civil war which left at least 20 000 people killed and more than half a million forced to flee their homes. The real figures are not known and some suggested that between 30 000 and 50 000 were killed. The present government, headed by Imoli Rakhmonov, considered to be a hard-line communist, has annihilated the opposition. With the West's tacit agreement, Russia is maintaining an armed force of more then 20 000 in support of the present government and with the primary mission of keeping fighters, weapons and drugs from entering Afghanistan. Fighting at Tajikistan's southern border is reported almost daily. Both Russia and the West claim that the present situation is preferable to what they see as the alternative; a government under the influence of radical Islamic elements from abroad. Still, the conflict in Tajikistan is not between different ethnic groups, nor between communism and Islamic fundamentalism, but rather a struggle for political power between different clans. (iv) Moldova NACC welcomed the stabilisation of the situation in the left bank Dniestr region of Moldova following the agreement reached on 21st July 1992. A permanent settlement was considered essential. It supported the early and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Moldova in the context of appropriate bilateral agreements without additional linkage to other issues. Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians have been the main supporters of the proclamation of the Trans Dniestr republic, followed by a military campaign to take control of their republic. On 21st July 1992, a peace agreement was signed, giving the Trans Dniestr region special status and the right to self- determination should Moldova unite with Romania. Russian, Moldovan and Trans Dniestr peace-keeping troops began enforcing a cease-fire and talks began on the withdrawal of Russian forces already in the region. In both Moldova and Romania, there is concern over the continuing presence in Moldova of the Russian 14th Army under Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebedev, who considers it his main job to support the Trans Dniestr republic against Moldova. This is the more worrying since the General has openly declared "Theoretically we are under the orders of the commander-in-chief of ground forces in Moscow. In practice, we take decisions here." (32) It should be noted that in future, the existence of an officially independent republic of Trans Dniestr would immediately be challenged by Ukraine. Despite the volatile situation in Moldova, it is extremely unlikely, if not completely excluded, that NATO or WEU peace- keeping forces will be sent to that region, when Russian forces are doing the job which they deem necessary in their own or their country's interest. (v) Other regional disputes The NACC catalogue further mentions the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states, which has since almost been accomplished and the need to conclude, without delay, the appropriate bilateral agreements in each case. Finally, it welcomes all practical steps leading to the solution of existing differences between Russia and Ukraine including those related to the Black Sea fleet and nuclear issues. It is widely recognised that both states have a common interest in solving their differences through negotiations, even if recently-concluded agreements were in the air again after a few days, as has been the case before. Still, relations between Russia and Ukraine have not been stablilised. Apart from the many economic disputes, there are disputes over the Black Sea fleet and strategic nuclear weapons. Repeatedly, summit talks between Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk and Russia's President Boris Yeltsin resulted in a settlement over the status of the Black Sea fleet which appeared to be void within days. Agreements in Dagomys in June 1992 to split the fleet, in Yalta in August 1992 to place the fleet under the joint command of both presidents and in Moscow in June 1993 to split the fleet on a 50-50 basis, with joint use of Sevastopol were never implemented. At a recent summit meeting in Massandra on 3rd September, it was decided that Ukraine would give up its entitlement to half the 300 vessel fleet in exchange for which Russia would write off Ukraine's debts to it for oil, gas and electricity, estimated at $2.5 billion. A joint Ukrainian-Russian Commission has been set up for more detailed discussion, but there is little chance of the Massandra agreement being implemented after the Ukrainian government was heavily criticised over the compromise. Behind the dispute over the Black Sea fleet is the most explosive problem of control of Sevastopol, its Crimean headquarters and the Crimea itself which, with its majority Russian population, was given to Ukraine in 1954. With its 176 strategic missiles and 1 656 nuclear weapons, Ukraine is the third largest nuclear power in the world. President Kravchuk has obliged his country to accede to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and to become a non- nuclear power according to the 1992 Lisbon protocol, but Ukraine has not yet ratified or implemented these agreements. Ukraine is now trying to use its nuclear weapons as bargaining chips to obtain economic aid and security guarantees from the West. It is claiming $2.5 billion for dismantling its nuclear weapons. In October 1993, President Kravchuk declared that Ukraine should keep its 46 modern SS-24 missiles as a means of pressure. (33) This concludes the list of hotspots mentioned by NACC. What is left? (vi) Central Europe In Central Europe, important Polish and Hungarian minorities live in neighbouring countries. Poland has succeeded in concluding agreements on good neighbourliness and co-operation with Belarus and Ukraine, where there are 600 000 and 500 000 Poles living respectively. It is negotiating an agreement with Lithuania, where there are 350 000 Poles. Apparently, negotiations are not easy but there are good reasons to be optimistic. All in all, there is little reason to consider Poland as a country where peace-keeping forces will have to be deployed. Hungary is facing a more complicated situation. The 3 million ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary in neighbouring countries form the largest single minority in Central Europe. The Hungarian government has advocated substantial local autonomy for these Hungarians. In 1992, the Hungarian Defence Minister, Lajos Fur, declared in an interview that his country's security policies took into account Hungarians living outside its borders. Since then, Prime Minister, Jozsef Antall, has taken pains not to further deteriorate relations with neighbouring countries and, in general, the situation is now more positive. Most worrying is the position of the 350 000 Hungarians still living in Vojvodina, a formerly autonomous region in Serbia, which was deprived of this statute in 1989. The Hungarian government considers the presence in Vojvodina of paramilitary Serbian forces without proper political control to be a risk for the Hungarian minority. The adoption of the common action plan in Washington is a matter of concern for Hungary, which could only conclude that the international community has accepted Milosevic's policy of ethnic cleansing and changing borders by force. The Serbian government has said that, since the beginning of the conflict, 300 000 Serbian refugees from Bosnia and Croatia have settled in Vojvodina, thus increasing the Serbian part of the population from 60% to 80%. There are many signs of growing discrimination against Hungarians in Vojvodina. Many are dismissed from their job, the use of the Hungarian language in courts has been restricted and on 1st July last a law on higher education was passed by the Serbian parliament according to which secondary teacher training for Hungarian teachers was eliminated. This, together with a climate of growing intimidation may lead to a silent and non- violent but determined process of ethnic cleansing, causing Hungarians to leave Vojvodina for lack of reliable future prospects. The Hungarian Government has drawn these developments to the attention of the international community without obtaining any positive response. In Hungary, it is thought that the lack of response from the international community might lead other countries with Hungarian minorities to follow the Serbian example. More than 500 000 ethnic Hungarians live in the Republic of Slovakia, where they represent about 11% of the population, concentrated mostly in a region along Slovakia's southern border. During the most difficult phase of the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over the Gabcikovo dam on the Danube, it was feared that there might be negative repercussions on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, but since then both countries agreed on 5th April 1993 to take this dispute to the international court of justice in The Hague, following mediation by the European Commission. They also agreed to hold regular meetings at the level of Prime Ministers on other bilateral issues, including the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The Hungarian minority of 1.7 million living in Romania has been a continuing source of tension between the two neighbouring countries since the downfall of communism. Last September, however, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Gezra Jeszenszky, paid an official visit to Romania, meeting his Romanian counterpart Teodor Melescanu in order to prepare a bilateral treaty including the issues of minority treatment and stability of borders. Romania's imminent membership of the Council of Europe, achieved on 28th September 1993, and Mr. Melescanu's pragmatic vision have played an important role in the improvement of relations between the two countries and a satisfactory solution of the main outstanding questions is expected. After fierce debates in parliament, the bilateral treaty between Hungary and Ukraine has been ratified. In this treaty, both countries have agreed to respect each other's territorial integrity, confirming that they have no territorial claims. They have also committed themselves to ensure that minority rights will be respected and that their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities are preserved. (e) What are the chances? What must be the conclusion of this succinct review of possible conflicts and candidate regions or countries, where peace-keeping forces may have to be deployed? (i) Peace-keeping in the independent republics of the former Soviet Union Almost without exception, these republics are facing instability, ethnic strife or other forms of internal conflict. Even if protests were made when some time ago Russia claimed exclusive rights for peace-making in the states which formerly belonged to the Soviet Union, neither the United States, nor any Western European or even Central European country would even think of intervening in one of these countries in order to keep, restore or enforce peace. In his recent address to the United Nations General Assembly, the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, asked for endorsement and funding for Russian intervention in former Soviet republics. Among other things, he said: "Conscious of its particular responsibility for maintaining peace, Russia has made peace-keeping and the protection of human rights, particularly those of national minorities, key priorities of its foreign policy, first of all in the territory of the former Soviet Union." (34) Russia, for many reasons, is extremely sensitive over any possibility of outside involvement in the security affairs of former Soviet republics. In their reaction to this proposal, American officials declared that the Clinton administration in no way conceded special Russian rights on that country's borders. This may be true, but on the other hand, recent documents and statements by United States administration officials demonstrate that, in practice, the United States will be extremely reluctant to intervene actively on the territory of the former Soviet Union. As regards peace-keeping on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the following points have been stressed: - The United States does not seek to intercede in or formally mediate conflicts in the former Soviet Union. It is ready to help diplomatically if all parties to a conflict so wish. - The United States will not act on its own, but concentrate on co-operation in international organisations like the United Nations and CSCE. - The United States has no intention of becoming involved in conflicts within the Russian Federation, nor of intervening in domestic Russian politics. - The United States will not make aid conditional upon its judgment of Russia's policy and behaviour towards other newly independent states. (35) (ii) Peace-keeping in the nine Central European states It is highly unlikely that any peace-keeping operation will have to be concluded on their territory. Each of them is a member of CSCE and NACC. This in itself is not a guarantee that they will not embark on the use of force to solve disputes. On the other hand, most of them are now members of the Council of Europe which feels very strongly about democracy, the right of minorities and, in general, about the rule of law. None of these states would like to be expelled from the Council of Europe because of misbehaviour and it is, therefore, clearly understood that they will do everything to be considered as civilised and well-respected nations. States which are not members have applied for membership and they will no doubt do everything possible to meet the Council of Europe's conditions. Moreover, all these states hope to be admitted sooner or later to the EC with which some have and others will conclude association agreements. In this framework, they have already become partners in WEU's Forum of Consultation. (f) Conclusion As demonstrated in this chapter, since the end of the cold war and increasingly so after the beginning of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, extensive debates over peace-keeping and peace-enforcing have started in all international organisations dealing with peace and security. Many summits of heads of state and government, ministerial meetings and countless meetings of officials are devoted to this subject. Documents full of definitions, principles, criteria and guidelines have been drafted and agreed to. Whenever a specific action is considered, many more meetings are devoted to drafting political objectives, mandates and rules of engagement. Of course, it would be irresponsible to deploy armed forces in peace-keeping operations without thorough preparation and common agreement on all these essential elements. But increasingly, one cannot avoid the impression that these endless preparations and negotiations, leading to postponement and cancellation of operations, are part of an ingenious web of tergiversations allowing in particular Western European governments to avoid tackling the basic question: are Western European democracies prepared to commit their armed forces to peace-keeping operations if there is a genuine risk of them being drawn into combat with the likelihood of casualties? If governments think that Europe's democracies cannot sustain casualties in their armed forces when not operating in defence of national or allied territory or in defence of their vital economic interests, they should consider the consequences and draw their conclusions. One consequence may be that no peace-keeping operation with the participation of Western European forces will be possible without the deployment of a massive superiority in troops and equipment. Another consequence may be that any successful terrorist or combat action against such peace-keeping forces causing a significant number of casualties, or even the credible threat of such action, can cause the withdrawal of peace-keepers and cancellation of the whole operation. In practice, this could lead to a situation where large parts of the world will be abandoned to their fate. The classic argument for armed forces mainly consisting of conscripts has always been that this largely contributes to the creation of a national consensus on all matters concerning national defence or the defence of a nation's vital interests. If, as many are claiming, defence of national or allied territory is replaced by peace-keeping in regions outside the national or allied territory as the main activity of armed forces, the basic reason for conscription is not just losing its value, it is also becoming an obstacle to allowing armed forces to perform their new tasks. Western European governments may have to abandon their conscript armed forces and concentrate on the creation of entirely professional armies, which are better prepared to be deployed and do the jobs for which they have been hired and well trained. Some governments have already reached this decision, others will have to follow. Opponents of professionalisation often argue that such armed forces are not cheaper, they are perhaps even more expensive. But what is the use of large budgets for maintaining conscript armed forces if they are no use for priority tasks set out in all recent strategic concepts? If Western European states are not ready to take the necessary decisions in order to have armed forces at their disposal, constituting a credible threat or deterrence to anyone considering the use of armed force to obtain political objectives, they will have to lower their voices and take a more moderate stand in European and world security affairs than their ambitions, as set out in the Maastrict Treaty, might suggest. They may still be able to defend their own territory, but they will have to abandon the idea of wielding influence in those parts of Europe where violence and the aggressive use of force are still considered to be part of a nation's legitimate instruments of action. At the same time, and irrespective of their views on the use of armed forces, Western European nations must pay far more attention to the stabilisation of newly-democratic European states. Democratic elections and the establishment of a free- market economy are not enough. The stability of a state also depends on the existence of democratically-organised political parties, trade unions, employers' federations and the rich pattern of various organisations and associations constituting the system of checks and balances which is essential for the survival of modern Western democracies. This complicated system can be developed only gradually, but in the long run it is the best guarantee of protection against extremism, nationalist adventures and chaos. IX. What about peace-making? ------------------------ If proper peace-keeping operations are causing so much discussion and hesitation, what then are the prospects for peace-making? Almost from the start of the armed conflict in former Yugoslavia, there has been an on-going debate over the question whether there was a need for peace-making, which has been defined as "armed intervention in a state, even against the wishes of the government of that state, to prevent widespread death or suffering amongst the population". In theory, the United Nations Charter provides for armed intervention if "all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means have failed". Quite clearly, such armed intervention can be authorised only by the international authority with the right to do so, the United Nations Security Council. Any armed intervention aimed at peace-making, however, must meet a number of conditions. First, there must be a political objective. This can range from the objective to stop the killing or ethnic cleansing to the restoration of pre-existing borders or even democratic institutions. It should be noticed that armed intervention cannot be terminated before the political objective has been achieved. Political objectives, therefore, must be well-defined and specific so that there can be no misunderstanding over the question of when and whether the objective has been achieved. As a consequence, vaguely-defined reasons for armed intervention, which have been put forward during the conflict in former Yugoslavia, such as "to put pressure" on one or more parties in the conflict, or "to show the resolve of the governments" are fundamentally wrong. It should be added that in this conflict the EC has shown an embarrassing lack of strategic political objectives. Humanitarian intervention to stop the killing is relatively useless if no satisfactory solutions can be offered for the fundamental problems of self-determination, minority rights and the changing of borders. On these, sometimes conflicting, issues the EC apparently has not yet made up its mind. Second, there must be a reasonable prospect of success. Here, political leaders will have to rely upon the advice of the military, who must be able to tell them what troops and equipment are required for the military operation to be successful. Their advice must include estimates of collateral civilian casualties, collateral damage of civilian installations and of casualties among their own troops. The inevitable question must be addressed: whether the political constituency is prepared to sustain the possible considerable loss of human lives and the financial consequences. Third, the intervention must do more good or avert more evil than the damage wrought in the process of intervening. Finally, the interest at stake must be sufficiently important to justify armed intervention with all its possible consequences. This is a crucial question. Notwithstanding public outcry, moral indignation in itself does not seem to be a sufficiently sound reason for peace-making. Altogether, it will not be easy to imagine any peace-making operation which meets this concise list of conditions. Recent experience in Somalia and Haiti can but confirm this view. The United Nations Secretary General, presenting his own conclusions at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council, said that he does not believe the United Nations to be capable at present of peace-enforcement operations. The United Nations role, he said, was to maintain, not to impose, peace. (36) ------- APPENDIX Letters from H.E. Mr. Dimitris Macris, Greek Ambassador to France, to Sir Dudley Smith, President of the WEU Assembly, and information on Greece's position regarding United Nations Security Council sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro ------- Letters from Mr. Macris, Greek Ambassador to France, to Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly Paris, 14th July 1993 Dear President, Further to our conversation today, I enclose information on Greece's position regarding the United Nations Security Council sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. I also enclose an annex to this memorandum relating to penal procedures engaged against ships under Greek flag or belonging to Greeks accused of having broken the embargo as well as foreign vessels which have been monitored by the appropriate Greek authorities. I take this opportunity to draw your attention to the efforts of the Greek Government in its unswerving policy towards respect of the embargo and special cases of violation of the embargo and the sanctions taken. Yours sincerely, Dimitris MACRIS Ambassador Sir Dudley SMITH President of the WEU Assembly Paris, 20th July 1993 ...... Further to my letter of 14th July 1993 and apart from the matters already mentioned, I wish to call your attention to the fact that, in the meantime, two further cases have been referred to the Piraeus Court: those of the ships M/S Khrustanly, flying the Ukrainian flag and chartered by a Dutch company, and M/S Cloud, belonging to Maltese interests and flying the Maltese flag. They were stopped and searched in Italy and Croatia respectively. In both cases, the aim of the inquiry is to determine whether or not those involved were individual or legal entities subject to Greek jurisdiction. Furthermore, seven lorry drivers were recently taken to court for having attempted to break the embargo: one of these cases was reported by United Nations observers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, another by the German authorities and five by the Greek customs. Finally, the most important fact is that Greece has accepted the proposal by the sanctions co-ordinator to introduce a system of pre-shipment verification of the end destination of cargoes of oil and oil derivatives. This system has been in force since yesterday. For cargoes in transit whose destination is the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the only action will be to notify the SAM post in Skopje so that it may carry out verifications on the spot. Appropriate arrangements have already been made to ensure the maximum effectiveness of this measure. Inter alia, the number of entry points between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been reduced from four to two. ...... Dimitris MACRIS Ambassador Sir Dudley SMITH, President of the WEU Assembly Greece and United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro In a series of recently-published articles in the international press, Greece has again been accused of violating the embargo imposed on Serbia and Montenegro. It is therefore essential to examine the facts more closely. A. The facts Since 1st June 1992, Greece has complied with United Nations Security Council Resolution 752 of 30th May 1992. In the framework of measures aimed at restoring peace in the region, this resolution imposed a series of sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. Almost immediately, articles appeared in the international press describing Greece as the weak link in the operation and affirming that it was violating the embargo in order, on the one hand, to minimise its financial losses due to a decline in trade and, on the other hand, to reduce political damage to traditional Greek-Serb friendship. This is untrue. On many occasions, Prime Minister Constantin Mitsotakis asked in his speeches what proof there was for these affirmations levelled at the Greek Government. Nevertheless, in order to meet such defamatory allegations, the Greek Government decided, on 21st August 1992, to stop all exports of oil products across its northern frontier with former Yugoslavia. At the time, but not for long, this decision was very well received by the international press and Greece's European partners. Indirectly, proof of the effectiveness of this decision was given by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Denko Maleski, who, in a letter addressed to the United Nations, the EEC and other international organisations, asked that measures be taken to lift the oil embargo on his country immediately. As from 22nd September 1992, Greece therefore decided to accept the application of EEC ad hoc regulation 2656/92 temporarily lifting the oil embargo. This led to a further wave of accusations that the embargo was being violated. This time, however, Greece was seen to be guilty ... of conforming with EEC decisions! In a recent declaration (24th June 1993), the Greek Government spokesman, Mr. Vassilis Magginas, stressed that: "Those who criticise us cannot claim to be right in both ways. The Greek Government has scrupulously applied the sanctions imposed on Serbia. In all the cases reported by observers, the goods transported came from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It may therefore be wondered what our country should do. If we do not let the oil through, we are accused of being cruel to that republic. If we do let it through, we are accused of complicity with the Serbs. In other words, when we apply the embargo on the former Yugoslav Repubic of Macedonia - the only country of former Yugoslavia with which we have a common frontier - we are accused of smothering it because we do not like the name it has chosen, and if we give in we become guilty of pro-Serb activities." B. Recent affirmations The important legislative and administrative measures taken by Greece in conformity with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 757/92, 787/92 and 820/93 were all and in detail made available to the sanctions liaison group at its meeting in Vienna on 4th June 1993. These measures were presented in the form of answers to a questionnaire sent to all member states of the CSCE by Ambassador Napolitano, the sanctions co-ordinator. It is interesting to underline the fact that only five countries - including Greece - answered his request for information before 4th June 1993. The Greek answer quotes, inter alia, Law 92/1967 setting out the penalties for violating presidential decrees on the application of Security Council resolutions. In order to be able to apply the resolutions imposing the confiscation of means of transport and goods, the Greek Parliament has just passed an amendment to the abovementioned Law 92/1967 making it possible to seize and confiscate such means of transport and goods (Law 2145/93, Official Journal A/88/28.5.93). Penal procedure has already been started against persons violating the sanctions. Ships flying the Greek flag or belonging to Greeks have been searched and, where appropriate, legal proceedings have been initiated (cf. appendix). In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 820/93, penalties have been increased and texts adopted (Law 2145/93) allowing the confiscation of goods and their means of transport. Lorry drivers have been accused of violating the embargo: - a driver whose action was reported by United Nations observers stationed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; - a driver who was denounced by the German authorities; - five lorry drivers from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia who were transporting Serb goods and were denounced by the customs authorities in Thessalonica. Serb bank accounts were frozen after a series of circulars had been sent to the relevant financial authorities and in agreement with United Nations resolutions banning all financial transactions with the Yugoslav Federation. C. An example of libel On 9th June 1993 and the following days, the Danish press accused the Greek firm Econ Optics Mechanics of selling gun sights to the belligerents in former Yugoslavia. The sole basis for these accusations was affirmations by Danish businessmen who had visited the firm's premises in Greece. The firm rejected these accusations and sued the Danish paper Judske Vestkysten. The relevant authorities at the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs called for an inquiry to held immediately. For the time being, no proof has been found of any export whatsoever of products by this firm to Balkan countries. According to the same Danish paper, the European Commissioner, Mr. Milan, has refused to give this firm any financial assistance. These statements have not been corroborated. ------- Ships flying the Greek flag or belonging to Greeks that have been accused of violating the embargo and foreign ships inspected by the relevant Greek authorities ______________________________________________________________________ Ship Flag Owner Measures taken ______________________________________________________________________ Artemis Greece Greek Penal action (Thita Volcano) Thita Triton Malta Greek Ditto Thita Apollo Panama Greek Ditto Maria (Vana) Maio Greece Greek Ditto Dimitrakis Malta Greek Ditto Penelope (East River) Liberia Former Greek Ditto owner Rosario St. Greek Ditto Vincent Salem VIII Egypt Egyptian Inquiry held; released for lack of proof; penal action started on the basis of new proof Dniepr II Ukraine Ukrainian Inquiry held; released for lack of proof Bayamo Malta Yugoslav Hold sealed in accordance with Article 8 of EEC regulation 990/93 ______________________________________________________________________ (1) . Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention. (2) . Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); MM. De Decker, de Puig (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld- Schlaman, MM. Borderas, Briane, Brito, Chevalier, Cox, De Carolis, Dees, Dumont, Fernandes Marques, Ferrarini, Hardy, Irmer, Jacquat, Kelchtermans, Leccisi, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Mannino, Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Pecchioli, Reis Leite, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Lopez Valdivielso, Vazquez (Alternate: Cuco), Zierer. (3) 1. AFP, 29th April 1993. (4) 2. Document 1360. (5) 3. Thomas L. Friedman, International Herald Tribune, 2nd-3rd October 1993. (6) 4. International Herald Tribune, 27th May 1993. (7) 5. International Herald Tribune, 30th September 1993. (8) 6. International Herald Tribune, 24th September 1993. (9) 7. International Herald Tribune, 9th-10th October 1993. (10) 8. Le Monde, 25th June 1992. (11) 9. International Herald Tribune, May 1993. (12) 10. These areas, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Zepa, Turla, Sarajevo and Bihac, were identified in earlier Security Council resolutions. (13) 11. International Herald Tribune, 22nd-23rd May 1993. (14) 12. Le Monde, 25th May 1993. (15) 13. International Herald Tribune, 25th May 1993. (16) . Le Monde, 25th May 1993. (17) 15. International Herald Tribune and Financial Times, 25th, 26th and 27th May 1993. (18) 16. International Herald Tribune, 27th May 1993. (19) 17. International Herald Tribune, 3rd June 1993. (20) 18. Financial Times, 28th May 1993 and Le Monde, 29th May 1993. (21) 19. International Herald Tribune, 29th May 1993. (22) 20. Financial Times, 3rd June 1993. (23) 21. Financial Times, 31st August 1993. (24) 22. Le Monde, 13th October 1993. (25) 23. Le Monde, 13th October 1993. (26) 24. Le Monde, 2nd October 1993. (27) 25. Le Monde, 31st October-1st November 1993. (28) 26. Le Monde, 13th October 1993. (29) 27. Financial Times, 19th October 1993. (30) 28. International Herald Tribune, 28th October 1993. (31) 29. Le Monde, 13th October 1993. (32) 30. The Economist, 28th August 1993. (33) 31. Financial Times, 25th October 1993. (34) 32. International Herald Tribune, 30th September 1993. (35) 33. International Herald Tribune, 6th and 30th August 1993. (36) 34. The Times, 29th October 1993. ------- A French version of this report may be obtained upon request. For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com