File: atbm0493.004 a-weu/proceedings This is the fourth part of a four-part document. ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE FOR EUROPE (IV) =============================== SYMPOSIUM Rome, 20th-21st April 1993 Official Record Office of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU ********************************************************************* FOURTH SITTING Wednesday, 21st April 1993 ______ (The sitting was opened at 3.06 p.m. with Mr. Lenzer, Vice- Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, in the Chair) Anti-missile defence and the law of outer space ----------------------------------------------- Mr. von KRIES (MST Aerospace GmbH, Cologne, Germany). - A. Introduction Anti-missile defence (AMD) has always been closely linked with space law and policy, and in particular with arms control in outer space. Historically, the following phases of AMD activities can be distinguished. In the late fifties and early sixties, the United States projects Argus and Starfish were aimed at creating, by nuclear explosions above the atmosphere, a radiation field to damage the control and guidance electronics of missiles and their warheads passing through outer space. At this stage, the use of outer space was not yet regulated by international law, the Outer Space Treaty dating to 1967 only. During the sixties both the United States and the USSR developed ground-based anti-missiles some of which were initially tipped with nuclear warheads (e.g. the United States Sprint and Spartan missiles). As of 1963, the testing of such AMD systems was restricted by the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTTB) which precluded nuclear explosions in and above the atmosphere. The fielding of AMD systems became furthermore severely constrained by the ABM Treaty of 1972. In the eighties, the United States embarked on the strategic defence initiative which was to rely heavily on space-based interceptors, amongst them nuclear-pumped lasers. The realisation of this concept would have necessitated an abrogation of the ABM Treaty of 1972. Also, a testing of its nuclear components in outer space was precluded by the LTTB. Finally, the setting-up of a permanent and exclusive military space infrastructure would seem at odds with the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 which ruled out any appropriation of outer space. The actual United States concept of a global protection against limited strikes (GPALS), although devoid of nuclear components, continues to raise military space law issues. In the following, AMD and military space law will be discussed in four steps: relationship of AMD with outer space; basic military space law elements; space law constraints on AMD; and the European legal setting. B. AMD and outer space When placing AMD in a space perspective, it is appropriate to recall an AMD system's generic functions, i.e. search, track and intercept. All functions may include the use of space-based elements. Even in theatre-missile defence systems, which rely on ground-based interceptors, the search functions may, to a considerable degree, be space-dependent. This could in particular apply to possible European AMD systems that would have to cope with missiles which are partially unknown both in number and characteristics, and which are geographically dispersed, potentially mobile and of a short-attack type. To be able to adequately assess this particular threat situation, the search performance of a European AMD system should include the detection of hostile pre-launch activities to enable pre-AMD countermeasures, which can be more effective than any form of post-boost engagement. Therefore, a surveillance system indicating the need for pre-emptive actions seems to be highly mandatory in association with any European AMD system development. The French-led Helios system, and WEU's satellite data interpretation training centre in Torrejon are important steps in this direction. Whilst the tracking function in strategic ("high frontier") AMD systems is vitally dependent on space-borne sensors and radars, theatre-type AMD systems would require close-range ground- and air-based tracking and acquisition components to ensure timely reaction. As regards the intercept function, space-based interceptors in the European context may be altogether inadequate or of a very limited effect since Scud-type missiles barely reach outer space and intermediate-range missiles only pass through outer space during a few minutes of their trajectory. In summary, any conceivable European AMD system or system complement would presumably rely on outer space for extensive search missions, for only limited track functions, and not at all for intercept missions. This prospect mitigates a European AMD's legal impact on outer space. C. The military space law regime 1. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 The "Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies" (OST) of 1967 is the principal instrument of international space law. The vast majority of nations and all European states are parties to the OST. To a large extent, the OST is an arms control agreement. Its Article 4 declares that "... parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner". It is important to note that the OST establishes no general ban on military space but only prohibits certain activities. This seems to imply that all other activities are permitted. Thus, there is no limitation on nuclear weapons passing through space (e.g. nuclear warheads on missiles). Nor is there any limitation on non-nuclear weapons in space other than the acknowledgement that bacterial and chemical weapons which could cause mass destruction are banned. It follows, therefore, that outer space, with the exception of the moon, is not reserved for exclusively peaceful purposes. Although the OST recognises "the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes" (preamble), military uses are permitted provided they comply with the United Nations Charter, which is applied to outer space. Article 2 (4) of the Charter obligates nations to refrain from threats or the use of force in international relations against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. On the other hand, Article 51 explicitly recognises the right to engage in individual or collective self-defence against armed attack and, by implication, against "imminent" attack. 2. ABM Treaty of 1972 The ABM Treaty continues to have a certain effect on the AMD debate. The treaty's thrust is to prohibit an effective defence of each side's (the United States and the Soviet Union) territory. Unlike the OST, the ABM Treaty and its 1976 protocol stipulates a general ban with specific, very limited exceptions (one AMD system for each side, their configurations depending on the chosen location). Mobile ABM systems, including those which are space-based, cannot be developed or tested. This restriction would apply to the High Frontier system envisaged under the strategic defence initiative. There are, however, important limitations to the ABM Treaty. First, it covers only AMD systems capable of countering "strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" (Art. II, 1). Other "lower" categories of AMD systems are not precluded, although the distinction presents a difficult definitional issue. Second, the treaty is of a bilateral nature, i.e. it is binding only on the United States and the USSR (and its successor states which endorse it). Finally, both the political and the technical situations have changed beyond recognition in the 20 years since the treaty was concluded. In particular, strategic ballistic missile threats no longer seem to emanate from the USSR's successor states but may arise in other parts of the world. Also, emerging new forms of ballistic missile threats to the United States and its allies require a reassessment of the AMD strategy. The ABM Treaty, however, does not distinguish between the territorial origins of missile threats but stipulates an absolute ban, thus confining the parties to the AMD activities agreed upon irrespective of changes and shifts in the global threat situation. The reluctance of Russia to modify or adjust the ABM Treaty (concluded for "unlimited duration"; Article XV, 1) presents a major obstacle to the United States for dealing with non-Russian strategic missile threats. If such threats should aggravate, the United States could be forced to evoke Article XV, 2 of the ABM Treaty which provides a right of withdrawal "if (a party) decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests". 3. European relevance of the ABM Treaty The ABM Treaty attempts to preclude circumvention of treaty obligations by arranging for action to be taken by third parties. Thus "each party undertakes not to transfer to other states, and not to deploy outside of its territory, ABM systems or components limited by this treaty" (Article IX). For Europe, the development of an autonomous anti-strategic ballistic missile system may in principle be possible. It is hardly conceivable, however, that Europe would do so given the continued strategic alliance with the United States and the common perception of the potentially destabilising effects of strategic ABM defences. More important, there so far seems to be no incentive for Europe to field AMD systems addressed by the ABM Treaty. Currently anticipated threats stem from short-range or intermediate-range missiles that are outside the scope of the ABM Treaty. As a consequence, therefore, the United States-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1976 would not curtail a European AMD system aimed at countering non-strategic ballistic missiles. 4. Later developments Since 1972, various ballistic arms control and disarmament treaties have been concluded between the United States and the USSR, namely the SALT I and II agreements of 1972 and 1979, the INF Treaty of 1987, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) of 1991 and 1993. None of these accords are AMD-related, but provide for the limitation or removal of certain categories of United States and Soviet ballistic and cruise missiles. Their only indirect relevance for AMD lies in the fact that in each of these treaties compliance is to be assured by "national technical means of verification" which are understood to comprise surveillance satellites. Thus, the establishment of space-based monitoring systems, even in the context of AMD activities, would seem to be recognised by international space law based on the OST and as further developed by the United States-Soviet treaties referred to above with the tacit acquiescence of the OST parties. Attempts to restrict the OST arms control provisions have been inconclusive. Italy's proposal of 1979 to prohibit not only weapons of mass destruction in outer space but also "any other types of devices designed for offensive purposes", by adding a respective protocol to the OST, as well as the Soviet treaty proposal of 1981 aimed at banning "weapons of any kind in outer space" did not come to fruition. The same holds for the various proposals made during the eighties to keep outer space free from anti-satellite weapons which could have an AMD potential. Also, efforts by certain nations to formally delineate an air/space boundary and thereby to clearly separate sovereign air spaces from the international outer space domain remained unsuccessful and very probably will not materialise in the foreseeable future. The military space law regime in place, as established by the LTTP and the OST in the sixties, therefore, has proven to be highly stable, and there are no signs of up-coming changes or alterations. D. Space law constraints on AMD In consequence, space law constraints on AMD activities can be quite clearly defined. There are no legal restrictions on auxiliary and complementary AMD systems like surveillance, reconnaissance and early-warning satellites. The stationing of space-based interceptors is permitted as long as they are non-nuclear and not of a similar mass destruction type, a configuration which at any rate is no longer pursued in modern AMD planning. For Europe, certain AMD restraints of a more political nature flow from the ABM Treaty of 1972. But these remain abstract as long as Europe does not face a strategic ballistic missile menace against which it would decide to arm itself. Finally, and as a more general observation, the persisting public sensitivity to "weapons in space" has to be taken into account. It would seem in fact highly improbable to obtain parliamentary and public consent to the fielding or even development of space-based ABM weapons unless a grave threat situation arises which cannot be overcome by political or conventional military means. E. The European setting A European AMD forerunner system consisting of surveillance and early-warning satellites, although unhindered by international space law, may nonetheless encounter specific European legal hurdles. They would not originate from the OST which has been ratified by all European nations without any reservations. Where executory national legislation has been enacted (Sweden, Great Britain, Germany), the OST's principles have not and could not have been modified since the OST in all European states became ipso jure the law of the land(s). But the setting-up of military space systems would require certain other clarifications. First, the question arises whether the European Space Agency (ESA) could be used to develop or operate such systems. According to the ESA convention of 1975, that organisation's activities are devoted to "exclusively peaceful purposes" (Article II), thus exluding any military space activities. This unambiguous mandate has not prevented ESA to develop space systems which are also being used for national security and military purposes (Spacelab, ERS). Such uses, however, occur incidentally, and do not formally figure in the respective programme agreements. As regards space-based surveillance, certain ESA Council resolutions seem to imply that ESA could be willing to participate in satellite-based verification misisons which are regarded as "stabilising" and therefore peaceful. It remains an open issue, however, whether ESA would be ready to become involved in space systems which are not strictly of an arms control nature but have a broader military application like strategic surveillance or target acquisition within or outside an overall AMD architecture. In case WEU, for instance, would determine to engage itself in such auxiliary AMD satellite systems a possible development partnership with ESA would require a prior definition by ESA of its military space role under the 1975 convention. If a satisfactory clarification cannot be achieved, WEU may opt to engage national space entities like CNES or directly contract with industry. ESA, as should be remembered, has been set up to "co- ordinate the European space programme and national programmes, and (to) integrate the latter progressively and as completely as possible into the European space programme" (Article II of the ESA Convention). But the fact remains that certain ESA member states like France regard national space security activities as a domaine reserve. There is room, therefore, for establishing European military space systems by inter-European arrangements outside ESA. Second, the availability of the Ariane launcher to which there is no European alternative may cause a problem. The Ariane family of satellite launchers has been and continues to be developed with public funds under an optional ESA programme. The production and marketing of Ariane vehicles has, on the other hand, been entrusted to the private European company Arianespace. This entity is not free in its choice of customers and launch procurements. According to a resolution by the Ariane programme member states passed in 1980 on the production of the Ariane launcher, the European satellite transportation system can only be made available for "peaceful purposes in conformity with the obligation under the ESA Convention and with the OST". This contradictory restriction highlights the paramount interest of certain Ariane programme member states like France in ensuring that Ariane may be employed for military missions, too. The exact boundaries of Ariane-supported military space activities remain, however, unclear. And the currently ongoing revision of the 1980 Ariane production resolution does not seem to bring about a clarification to this effect. Any intended use of Ariane for European AMD-related space missions is, therefore, prone to a politico-legal debate that should take place well before a decision to establish a European military space infrastructure is made. F. Concluding remarks A European AMD system would presumably rely on auxiliary space components for surveillance and acquisition, but will in all probability not comprise space-based interceptor weapons. This prospect mitigates any arising space law issues. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 allows non-aggressive military space uses. The ABM Treaty of 1972 will have no impact on a European AMD system tailored to counter non-strategic missiles. Within Europe, certain legal and political clarifications with regard to the engagement of ESA and the use of Ariane seem necessary as part of any planning activities relating to an anti-missile defence system comprising space-based elements. Mr. WILLEMS (Secretary of the Advisory Council for Military Production, Netherlands) found that the arguments regarding the need for a defence system against the threat of ballistic missiles raised more questions than answers. Possible attackers could learn lessons from the Gulf war in the same way as defenders. Attacks were possible by means other than ballistic missiles and could be launched by terrorist groups rather than countries. Counter-measures would then be very difficult. A defence system capable of handling such threats would be costly and very difficult to justify, however desirable. Did Western European Union see itself as an actor or as a catalyst? The latter would be necessary when a global system was considered to be the answer and, should such a system be implemented, what would be the role of smaller countries such as the Netherlands other than paying part of the bill? Mr. VALLEIX (France) as a member of parliament from Bordeaux and also a member of WEU wished to hear more about the WEU satellite centre at Torrejon in Spain and what future role it might play. Some countries had the technical know-how but not the financial means; others had the financial means but not the necessary know-how. Joint determination and good will were therefore necessary if decisions were to be taken before the threat materialised rather then once it was there. He therefore trusted that guidelines could be drawn before the end of the day to help individual member countries to adopt a common and positive attitude towards anti-missile defence. Mr. KNUDSEN (Ministry of Defence, Norway) reverted to General Stainier's comments on lessons from the Gulf war, expressing his appreciation for the General's broad political perspective. It was important to place the question of anti- missile defence for Europe in the larger framework of Europe's relations with the rest of the world and also to prevent any suspicion from the outside world that a kind of fortress Europe was being developed. General Stainer had said that deterrence did not work against Iraq since it had invaded Kuwait. This answer was too simple, however, since the question was more one of degree. Iraq had not used chemical weapons. Was that because it had been unable to do so or simply because they had been deterred from doing so? He recalled that the United Kingdom and Israel had issued firm warnings in that respect. He believed the experience of the Gulf war was not conclusive and it was important to study further under which conditions deterrence worked or might not work. He concluded that deterrence had a role to play in anti-missile defence as well and it was a question of striking a balance and not of just simply ruling deterrence out. General report -------------- Mr. MARTRE (President of GIFAS (Groupement des industries francaises aeronautiques et spatiales), France).- Introduction The questions that have been tackled during these two days are particularly complex and delicate. They are fairly typical of the way defence problems are arising in the world today following the end of bipolar confrontation and the dreams of a new world order: the numerous implications and uncertainties leave us in situations which are unclear. We have heard a large number of addresses of a very high standard setting out many aspects of the problem and it is particularly difficult to make a quick synthesis. Mr. Lenzer is responsible for drawing political conclusions from these presentations and discussions. I, for my part, will try to make a logical, reasoned summary, and I apologise in advance for not being able to bring out the full wealth of the thinking of the speakers. Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, has invited us to take note of the facts, which is what I shall therefore do. Proliferation Proliferation that would endanger the stability of the world and security in Europe stems from weapons systems that associate weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering those weapons, i.e. missiles. Hence it is the result of two types of material dissemination: nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles. This dissemination is a great danger because it leads to weapons systems that are highly effective from the standpoint of destructive power, range and accuracy at a cost that is relatively modest compared with the major conventional systems. The cost effectiveness of these systems is particularly low and, as a result, they have an enormous power of attraction for countries in the process of development, with very widespread regional contagion effects. To assess the state of proliferation, it is noted that there are now believed to be a dozen countries with nuclear weapons (five members of the Security Council, three more in the CIS and very probably four others); in the case of other weapons, it is said that there will be thirty developing countries with chemical weapons towards the end of the nineties and seven with biological weapons. For ballistic missiles, it is estimated that fifteen developing countries will have such missiles with a range of up to 1 000 km at the end of the nineties and six with a range over 3 000 km. The situation is similar for cruise missiles. The assessments which have been given are credible in view of the use that has already been made of missiles of this type in the last fifty years (V-1 and V-2 at the end of the second world war, the war between Iran and Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, the Gulf war) and of what we know about the efforts being made by various countries in respect of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. It can be seen that certain regional balances are already being established on these bases (Israel-Syria, India-Pakistan, etc.) although none of these systems has yet been used. It cannot be denied that several dozen countries wish to obtain such weapons, if they have not already done so, and the problem is whether it is possible for them to do so. The aim of the 1987 MTCR agreement is to prevent them having ballistic missiles and the agreement is well applied by countries that have acceded to it. Unfortunately, some countries are developing their capability without apparent foreign assistance, others are benefiting from open or clandestine foreign supplies and, finally, some have obtained deliveries of complete missiles from China or North Korea. The situation is different in the case of weapons of mass destruction since there do not seem to have been any deliveries of complete systems, but the circumvention of international agreements is still a very serious danger, particularly since the destabilisation of the Soviet Union. The American situation The escalation of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union first started to slow down in 1972 with the ABM treaties which authorised anti-missile defence only within the limits of a single site with a maximum of 100 weapons. The United States had, moreover, abandoned this possibility and has no anti-missile protection. Fearing a circumvention of the ABM treaties, in 1983 the United States launched an enormous programme (SDI) to study a nuclear shield system including missile-destroying weapons in space. In view of the astronomical cost of such a shield, the outlook after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the threats of proliferation, the Americans considerably modified their programme in 1991 to transform it into the three-part GPALS: - a shield against limited attack (200 weapons) by long- range missiles. This shield would comprise weapons on space platforms. It would contravene the ABM treaties and cost about $1 000 million; - protection for American deterrent capability. The purpose would be to protect a missile-launching site (Grand Forks) in accordance with the ABM treaties at a cost of about $25 000 milllion; - protection for United States forces abroad and theatres of operation: so-called tactical or ATBM systems not covered by the ABM treaties and costing about $10 000 million. It is noted, moreover, that the amount covered by the American draft budget would be about $4 000 million, mainly for the last two parts, the first and most ambitious being left at the research level. The Russian situation Following the 1972 ABM treaty, the Soviet Union equipped a site (Moscow) with about a hundred interceptors with nuclear warheads which they subsequently modernised: this is the only truly operational anti-ballistic missile system. In 1991, Soviet nuclear forces were split up between four countries: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In 1992, Russia said it was prepared to discuss co-operation in a global protection system, which should lead to a revision of the ABM treaties. In 1993, the debate is open in Russia in regard to such a possibility and the situation seems confused. American-Russian projects The link between the START 2 nuclear weapons limitation agreements and an anti-missile defence system that would lead to a revision of the ABM treaties has been raised. It is indeed clear that the START 2 negotiations were carried out in a twofold context: - East-West detente; - threats of proliferation, and that the two signatory powers wished to set up a system that took account of these two considerations and leading to: - the maintenance of nuclear deterrence between the two great powers at a level of mutual threat from ballistic missiles four times lower than the initial level; - protection against proliferators by: - limited anti-missile protection with or without revision of the ABM treaties; - specific deterrent capability (bombs, missiles, cruise missiles). Following the agreements of principle reached in 1991 and 1992 between the two Presidents, contacts between experts from the two countries were continued in order to study a GPS system (design studies, consideration of research and development programmes, the fight against proliferation). Furthermore, it is not certain whether it will be possible to ratify the START 2 treaty in view of the position of the other CIS states. The European problem An analysis of the present situation shows that Western Europe is not directly threatened. Conversely, it is surrounded by an environment that is particularly complex and unstable and involves very great risks at a time as yet unforeseeable. These risks are, moreover, destined to increase with time because of proliferation. To the East, there are four nuclear powers in the CIS and it is not known whether it will be possible to ratify the START 2 treaty or whether it will be respected. Nor is it known whether the ABM treaties will be revised, knowing that a substantial raising of the ceilings might destabilise the balance of deterrence in Europe (1) . Furthermore, the situation in the Balkans and in the south of the CIS is unstable and a breeding ground for local conflicts and clashes between powers. To the south of Europe, around the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, the situation is dangerous because of growing intolerance, the exacerbation of rivalry and proliferation. The Atlantic Alliance is still in force, but the repatriation of the majority of American forces and the changing shape of threats and risks are slackening links to some extent between the United States and Western Europe. The creation of a European Union responsible for defining a common foreign and security policy, the designation of WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and, in general, the Maastricht arrangements give Western Europe a framework for coping with this global situation. Europe and proliferation In order to counter proliferation, four means were analysed: - controlling transfers of weapons and means of delivery as well as sensitive technology: such controls must be strengthened, but they will slow down proliferation without being able to stop it; - preventive destruction of weapons or military or industrial installations: this means is particularly difficult to implement; - deterrence: this is an essential means, but the methods of implementation must be diversified to be able to respond to all situations and the dialectics are still uncertain; - anti-missile defence: since none of the abovementioned means can offer an absolute guarantee, anti-missile defence is recognised as being necessary in Western Europe for ensuring the defence of its vital interests and giving it freedom to intervene externally with no fear of blackmail. The establishment of an anti-missile defence system in Western Europe raises three problems: The institutional framework This should normally be the framework whose principles were defined in the Maastricht agreements in accordance with the three treaties: of the Atlantic Alliance, of WEU, of the European Union. Since it is a question of anti-missile defence, it should be specifically European in view of its particular geostrategic situation and, furthermore, on a continental scale. Hence it is mainly in the framework of WEU that the specifications of the systems, the conditions for carrying out the work and installing and commissioning them can be defined. Bringing them into service raises the problem of the devolution of powers and the delegation and architecture of command in view of the extreme rapidity with which decisions will have to be taken. Type of defence The risk stems from cruise missiles and ballistic missiles with ranges up to 3 000 km. The risk from the East was usually handled in the framework of planning by the Atlantic Alliance and member nations. Changes have been towards a reduction in the threat and, to date, nothing seems to justify including defence in the system. Things would be different if the ABM treaties were revised as this would make it necessary to reassess the situation. The risk from the south would initially be from ballistic missiles with a range up to 1 000 km. It might subsequently be from missiles with a range of about 3 000 km and from cruise missiles. In view of the re-entry speeds of these ballistic missiles, they would justify ATBM defence or, to use American terminology, theatre defence. Financial estimate According to the estimates given, ATBM defence would cost about $10 000 million. This can obviously not be an accurate figure because nothing has been defined in enough detail for that. To assess Western Europe's ability to finance such a programme, it should be recalled that the total military equipment budgets of its component countries amount to $60 000 million per year. If we assume that the achievement of the ATBM programme would be spread over ten years, it can be seen that the programme would represent only 1.5% of equipment budgets, which is a small proportion, and financing should not raise insuperable problems. Industrial production of systems It would appear that all the technology necessary for producing an ATBM defence system is available in Europe. For warning and targeting, infrared sensor satellites and communications satellites are necessary. Europe has produced few military satellites, but its effort in the civil space area has given it excellent capabilities and made it very competitive in the area of satellites and launchings. It may therefore be thought that the satellites necessary for an ATBM system might be derived from existing civil satellites and even that some communications satellites might be used in part for the ATBM system. In view of these capabilities and for a simple warning system adapted to the needs of Europe alone, the cost of a warning system might be about $250 million. The command and control system of an ATBM system raises the problem of the overall architecture of the system and depends on national and allied authorities who would be required to intervene in the process. Such a system may be conceived as an extension of existing air defence systems or as an independent system. It is essential to ensure the interoperability of the various components of the system to ensure its integrated operation. In all these areas, European countries have excellent mastery of the main systems and good experience. For firing units, there must be high performance electronic scanning radars and missiles on board infrared sensors and considerable mobility. Several types of missile might be considered, some endo-atmospheric and others upper endo- atmospheric or even exo-atmospheric. In this area, anti- missile systems are now being developed in Europe for defence against cruise and air-to-surface missiles, for instance the FSAF family being produced in the framework of EUROSAM. Consideration might be given to developing an ATBM system on the basis of these projects and research conducted elsewhere. Co-operation with the United States The only parts of the American GPALS programme that might interest Europe are the warning system and the ATBM system. The space-based weapons system cannot be transferred to foreign countries under the ABM treaties in their present form and its achievement seems very improbable. Defence of the Grand Forks site against intercontinental ballistic missiles is a specifically American defence matter. For the warning system, there might be co-operation between Europe and the United States, but this raises the problem of access to data in all circumstances. For ATBM systems, the Americans are studying certain types of missiles suited to such defence: Erint, Thaad and the terminal stage Leap which might be adapted for Patriot, for instance. Co-operation between Europe and the United States for the establishment of an ATBM system in Europe seems possible and is certainly desirable if it can lead to savings being made. However, we must start from the idea that no system of this type exists at present and there is therefore no question of procuring a system off the shelf. Conclusion In the light of all the information obtained, it can but be recommended that WEU take the initiative of promoting the launching of basic studies to allow Western Europe to have, in about fifteen years' time, an anti-missile defence system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3 000 km. The most urgent studies concern the warning system and the architecture of the command and control system. It would probably be useful, at the same time, to launch feasibility studies for the associated firing systems (radars and missiles). Mr. TCHUVAKHIN (Deputy Director for Missile Technology, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) responding to comments concerning aspects of Russian policy and first Mr. Martre's report on the discussions, was surprised that there had been suggestions that Russian doctrine was an offensive one. Russia's defence doctrine could be confirmed by its stance in the framework of European security and the conventional arms reductions. There were questions and problems regarding Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus where the START II Treaty was concerned. It was hoped, however, that Ukraine would adopt a positive stance and fulfil the obligations and commitments under the Lisbon Protocol. Regarding the official position towards the GPS, in all democratic societies these matters were debated by parliamentarians, industry, scientists and so on, but the official attitude towards the ABM Treaty had not changed since 1972. Regarding the statement by Mr. von Kries on legal outer space regimes, under the ABM Treaty, Brilliant Pebble interceptors would be strictly banned and there could be no question of offensive or defensive weapons. If they were designed and tested against strategic ballistic missiles, this should be banned. There were three main treaties relating to strategic armaments and reductions, some aspects of which related to outer space and national technical means of verification. The START I Treaty contained a provision for avoiding intervention in such national technical means. It was well-known that this was a space-based surveillance and intelligence satellite. Mr. MARTRE (GIFAS, France) had tried to make a synthesis of all that had been said and thought these details were very important and allowed the discussions to be clarified. He noted that Russia was attached to respecting the ABM Treaties and that the Brilliant Pebbles aspect of the GPALS was not in conformity with these treaties and should not, therefore, be stationed in space. He thought it was therefore very important to note this position. He did not believe, however, that after all the discussions on the financial difficulties in Europe regarding participation in such a vast programme the abovementioned problem really concerned Europe, since Europe was interested only in the ATBM system and in international agreements which might be concluded in that case. (Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, took the Chair) Conclusions ----------- Mr. LENZER (Vice-Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee) thanked the Italian authorities for their hospitality and all participants for their valuable contributions. He thought the best way to summarise this symposium might be to recall what a Dutch participant had said during one of the discussions: At the present juncture, there were still more questions than answers. The architecture of a system discussed in the last two days was of course complex. This symposium could therefore merely assess risks, take stock of the situation and define possible options in response to the risks. Regarding the contributions of representatives of industry, the whole problem could be reduced to the question of whether there was a possibility of preventing a ballistic missile threat by means of a global protection system, hence a new security architecture, in which Europe could play an autonomous role. Would this be possible in the framework of WEU member countries and also in a wider context to give the international community of states the wherewithal to repulse any sort of blackmail in whatever area of the world? It was known from events in former Yugoslavia how difficult it was within the United Nations, NATO, WEU and other organisations to reach decisions or even to take action in order to end atrocities. With the end of the bipolar world we had to come to grips with different kinds of threat arising from national disputes, ethnic conflicts and terrorist activities - even state terrorism. The choice was not between measures of non-proliferation and arms control, on the one hand, and active protection or active defence against a threat on the other; no, the aim of the symposium was to make a contribution in a broader framework which of course was not conceivable without political measures and treaty systems to preclude the risks. The question had to be asked, however: what could be done if someone failed to observe the treaties even after signing them? In these cases, which were based on real experience and not theoretical considerations, one had to have the ability to repulse a threat, and this would be possible only by reaching decisions on technical and military options. The process of European integration could not be separated from security questions which today had to be placed in a global context. Even with the end of the cold war, the risks had not diminished. One could imagine the horrible devastation had the V-2 rockets at the end of the second world war been equipped with warheads capable of mass destruction. As a first conclusion, one should recognise, as already concluded at a previous symposium organised by the Technological and Aerospace Committee, the need to create a space-based monitoring and early-warning system after which it would be possible to consider the option of an anti-ballistic missile defence system. Experience during the Gulf war and at this symposium had shown that high technology could offer certain options and answers in this matter. This, of course, was not a political answer, but giving political answers was not the aim of the symposium. In the framework of the WEU Assembly, it would be necessary to work out recommendations regarding a protection system with due regard to European requirements and taking into account the work already done by the United States. This might lead to a co-operative system, perhaps drawing other countries into what might be a security partnership. First, however, there would have to be risk assessment and risk description. In a second stage, WEU member countries should define their security requirements, and pool the means at their disposal to find an appropriate answer to the different risks. In doing this, it was obvious that Europe also had to consider the American offer of participation in a global protection system. Technical options could not replace political decisions. But a policy could function only if it had operational leeway and for this it needed technical and military options. It was therefore necessary to come to grips with reality. (The sitting was closed at 4.40 p.m.) (1). During the discussion, the Russian representative said his country was not in favour of revising the ABM treaties. ------- For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com