This file contains selected documents regarding the signing of the "Paris Peace Accord" to end the hostilities in South Vietnam. The file contains the following items: (1) Letter from President Nixon to President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam, January 5, 1973. [Reassuring Vietnam of US support.] (2) "Peace With Honor": Radio-television broadcast, President Nixon re: initialing of the Vietnam Agreement, 23 Jan. 1973 (3) News conference statement by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 24, 1973. [Chapter-by-Chapter analysis of the Paris Agreement, excerpts.] (4) Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, signed in Paris and entered into force January 17, 1973. (5) Act of the International Conference on Vietnam, Signed at Paris and entered into force March 2, 1973 (6) Complaints of Violations of the Cease-fire: United States Note Verbale transmitted April 10, 1973 for delivery to participants in the International Conference on Vietnam. Collected, transcribed, and edited by: Larry W. Jewell jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu --------------------------------------------------------------- (1) Letter from President Nixon to President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam, January 5, 1973. (Released Apr. 30, 1975) January 5, 1973 Dear Mr. President: This will acknowledge your letter of December 20, 1972. There is nothing substantial that I can add to my many previous messages, including my December 17 letter, which clearly stated my opinions and intentions. With respect to the question of North Vietnamese troops, we will again present your views to the Communists as we have done vigorously at every ether opportunity in the negotiations. The result is certain to be once more the rejection of our position. We have explained to you repeatedly why we believe the problem of North Vietnamese troops is manageable under the agreement, and I see no reason to repeat all the arguments. We will proceed next week in Paris along the lines that General Haig explained to you. Accordingly, if the North Vietnamese meet our concerns on the two outstanding substantive issues in the agreement, concerning the DMZ and type method of signing and if we can arrange acceptable supervisory machinery, we will proceed to conclude the settlement. The gravest consequence would then ensue if your government chose to reject the agreement and split off from the United States. As I said in my December 17 letter, "I am convinced that your refusal to join us would be an invitation to disaster-to the loss of all that we together have fought for over the past decade. It would be inexcusable above all because we will have lost a just and honorable alternative. " As we enter this new round of talks, I hope that our countries will now show a united front. It is imperative for our common objectives that your government take no further actions that complicate our task and would make more difficult the acceptance of the settlement by all parties. We will keep you informed of the negotiations in Paris through daily briefings of Ambassador [Pham Dang] Lam. I can only repeat what I have so often said: The best guarantee for the survival of South Vietnam is the unity of our two countries which would be gravely jeopardized if you persist in your present course. The actions of our Congress since its return have clearly borne out the many warnings we have made. Should you decide, as I trust you will, to go with us, you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam. So once more I conclude with an appeal to you to close ranks with us. Sincerely, RICHARD NIXON His Excellency Nguyen Van Thieu President of the Republic of Vietnam Saigon. ---------------------------------------------------------------- (2) "Peace With Honor": Radio-television broadcast, President Nixon re: initialing of the Vietnam Agreement, 23 Jan. 1973 (Text from PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, vol. 9 (1973), pp. 43-5) Good evening. I have asked for this radio and television time tonight for the purpose of announcing that we today have concluded an agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia. The following statement is being issued at this moment in Washington and Hanoi: At 12:30 Paris time today [Tuesday], January 23, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was initialed by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United States, and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The agreement will be formally signed by the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973, at the International Conference Center in Paris. The cease-fire will take effect at 2400 Greenwich Mean Time, January 27, 1973. The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the hope that this agreement will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia. . That concludes the formal statement. Throughout the years of negotiations, we have insisted on peace with honor. In my addresses to the Nation from this room of January 25 and May 8, [1972] I set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace with honor. In the settlement that has now been agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met. A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m., this Saturday, January 27, Washington time. Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are missing in action. During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam. The people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future, without outside interference. By joint agreement, the full text of the agreement and the protocols to carry it out, will be issued tomorrow. Throughout these negotiations we have been in the closest consultation with President Thieu and other representatives of the Republic of Vietnam. This settlement meets the goals and has the full support of President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, as well as that of our other allies who are affected. The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam. We shall continue to aid South Vietnam within the terms of the agreement and we shall support efforts by the people of South Vietnam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves. We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that heals, and a peace that not only ends the war in Southeast Asia, but contributes to the prospects of peace in the whole world. This will mean that the terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained. As this long and very difficult war ends, I would like to address a few special words to each of those who have been parties in the conflict. First, to the people and Government of South Vietnam: By your courage, by your sacrifice, you have won the precious right to determine your own future and you have developed the strength to defend that right. We look forward to working with you in the future, friends in peace as we have been allies in war. To the leaders of North Vietnam: As we have ended the war through negotiations, let us now build a peace of reconciliation. For our part; we are prepared to make a major effort to help achieve that goal. But just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, so, too, will it be needed to build and strengthen the peace. To the other major powers that have been involved even indirectly: Now is the time for mutual restraint so that the peace we have achieved can last. And finally, to all of you who are listening, the American people: Your steadfastness in supporting our insistence on peace with honor has made peace with honor possible. I know that you would not have wanted that peace jeopardized. With our secret negotiations at the sensitive stage they were in during this recent period, for me to have discussed publicly our efforts to secure peace would not only have violated our understanding with North Vietnam, it would have seriously harmed and possibly destroyed the chances for peace. Therefore, I know that you now can understand why, during these past several weeks, I have not made any public statements about those efforts. The important thing was not to talk about peace, but to get peace and to get the right kind of peace. This we have done. Now that we have achieved an honorable agreement, let us be proud that America did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war, or that would have ended the war for us but would have continued the war for the 50 million people of Indochina. Let us be proud of the 2 1/2 million young Americans who served in Vietnam, who served with honor and distinction in one of the most selfless enterprises in the history of nations. And let us be proud of those who sacrificed, who gave their lives so that the people of South Vietnam might live in freedom and so that the world might live in peace. In particular, I would like to say a word to some of the bravest people I have ever met-the wives, the children, the families of our prisoners of war and the missing in action. When others called on us to settle on any terms, you had the courage to stand for the right kind of peace so that those who died and those who suffered would not have died and suffered in vain, and so that, where this generation knew war, the next generation would know peace. Nothing means more to me at this moment than the fact that your long vigil is coming to an end. Just yesterday, a great American, who once occupied this office, died. In his life President [Lyndon B.] Johnson endured the vilification of those who sought to portray him as a man of war. But there was nothing he cared about more deeply than achieving a lasting peace in the world. I remember the last time I talked with him. It was just the day after New Year's. He spoke then of his concern with bringing peace, with making it the right kind of peace, and I was grateful that he once again expressed his support for my efforts to gain such a peace. No one would have welcomed this peace more than he. And I know he would join me in asking for those who died and for those who live, let us consecrate this moment by resolving together to make the peace we have achieved a peace that will last. Thank you and good evening. -------------------------------------------------------------- (3) News conference statement by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 24, 1973. (Presidential Documents, Vol. 9 (1973), pp. 64-70) (Excerpts) DR. KISSINGER. Ladies and gentlemen, the President last evening presented the outlines of the agreement and by common agreement between us and the North Vietnamese we have today released the texts. And I am here to explain, to go over briefly what these texts contain, and how we got there, what we have tried to achieve in recent months and where we expect to go from here. Let me begin by going through the agreement, which you have read. PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT Chapter 1: Vietnamese National Rights The agreement, as you know, is in nine chapters. The first affirms the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, agreements which established two zones, divided by a military demarcation line. Chapter II: Cease-fire and Withdrawal Chapter II deals with the cease-fire. The cease-fire will go into effect at 7 o'clock Washington time on Saturday night [January 27]. The principal provisions of Chapter II deal with permitted acts during the cease-fire and with what the obligations of the various parties are with respect to the cease-fire. Chapter II also deals with the withdrawal of American and all other foreign forces from Vietnam within a period of 60 days. And it specifies the forces that have to be withdrawn. These are in effect all military personnel and all civilian personnel dealing with combat operations. We are permitted to retain economic advisers and civilian technicians serving in certain of the military branches. Chapter II further deals with the provisions for resupply and for the introduction of outside forces. There is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any military force into South Vietnam from outside of South Vietnam, which is to say that whatever forces may be in South Vietnam from outside South Vietnam, specifically North Vietnamese forces, cannot receive reinforcements replacements or any other form of augmentation by any means whatsoever. With respect to military equipment, both sides are permitted to replace all existing military equipment on a one-to-one basis under international supervision and control. There will be established, as I will explain when I discuss the protocols, for each side, three legitimate points of entry through which all replacement equipment has to move. These legitimate points of entry will be under international supervision. Chapter III: Return of POW's Chapter III deals with the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians as well as with the question of civilian detainees within South Vietnam. This, as you know, throughout the negotiations, presented enormous difficulties for us. We insisted throughout that the question of American prisoners of war and of American civilians captured throughout Indochina should be separated from the issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel detained-partly because of the enormous difficulty of classifying the Vietnamese civilian personnel by categories of who was detained for reasons of the civil war and who was detained for criminal activities, and secondly, because it was foreseeable that negotiations about the release of civilian detainees would be complex and difficult and because we did not want to have the issue of American personnel mixed up with the issues of civilian personnel in South Vietnam. This turned out to be one of the thorniest issues, that was settled at some point and kept reappearing throughout the negotiations. It was one of the difficulties we had during the December negotiations. As you can see from the agreement, the return of American military personnel and captured civilians is separated in terms of obligation, and in terms of the time frame, from the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel. The return of American personnel and the accounting of missing in action is unconditional and will take place within the same time frame as the American withdrawal. The issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel will be negotiated between the two Vietnamese parties over a period of 3 months, and as the agreement says, they will do their utmost to resolve this question within the 3 month period. So I repeat, the issue is separated, both in terms of obligation and in terms of the relevant time frame from the return of American prisoners, which is unconditional. We expect that American prisoners will be released at intervals of 2 weeks or fifteen days in roughly equal installments. We have been told that no American prisoners are held in Cambodia. American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be returned to us in Hanoi. They will be received by American medical evacuation teams and flown on American airplanes from Hanoi to places of our own choice, probably Vientiane. There will be international supervision of both this provision and of the provision for the missing in action. And all American prisoners will, of course, be released, within 60 days of the signing of the agreement. The signing will take place on January 27, in two installments, the significance of which I will explain to you when I, have run through the provisions of the agreement and the associated protocols. Chapter IV: Self-determination for South Vietnam Chapter IV of the agreement deals with the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. Its first provision contains a joint statement by the United States and North Vietnam in which those two countries jointly recognize the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, in which those two countries jointly affirm that the South Vietnamese people shall decide for themselves the political system that they shall choose and jointly affirm that no foreign country shall impose any political tendency on the South Vietnamese people. The other principal provisions of the agreement are that in implementing the South Vietnamese people's right to self- determination, the two South Vietnamese parties will decide, will agree among each other, on free elections, for offices to be decided by the two parties, at a time to be decided by the two parties. These elections will be supervised and organized first by an institution which has the title of National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, whose members will be equally appointed by the two sides, which will operate on the principle of unanimity, and which will come into being after negotiation between the two parties, who are obligated by this agreement to do their utmost to bring this institution into being within 90 days. Leaving aside the technical jargon, the significance of this part of the agreement is that the United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose any political solution on the people of South Vietnam. The United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose a coalition government or a disguised coalition government on the people of South Vietnam. If you examine the provisions of this chapter, you will see, first, that the existing government in Saigon can remain in office; secondly, that the political future of South Vietnam depends on agreement between the South Vietnamese parties and not on an agreement that the United States has imposed on these parties; thirdly, that the nature of this political evolution, the timing of this political evolution, is left to the South Vietnamese parties, and that the organ that is created to see to it that the elections that are organized will be conducted properly, is one in which each of the South Vietnamese parties has a veto. The other significant provision of this agreement is the requirement that the South Vietnamese parties will bring about a reduction of their armed forces, and that the forces being reduced will be demobilized. Chapter V: Reunification and the DMZ The next chapter deals with the reunification of Vietnam and the relationship between North and South Vietnam. In the many negotiations that I have conducted over recent weeks, not the least arduous was the negotiation conducted with the ladies and gentlemen of the press, who constantly raised issues with respect to sovereignty, the existence of South Vietnam as a political entity, and other matters of this kind. I will return to this issue at the end when I sum up the agreement, but it is obvious that there is no dispute in the agreement between the parties that there is an entity called South Vietnam, and that the future unity of Vietnam, as it comes about, will be decided by negotiation between North and South Vietnam, that it will not be achieved by military force, indeed, that the use of military force with respect to bringing about unification, or any other form of coercion, is impermissible according to the terms of this agreement. Secondly, there are specific provisions in this chapter with respect to the Demilitarized Zone. There is a repetition of the agreement of 1954 which makes the demarcation line along the 17th Parallel provisional, which means pending reunification. There is a specific provision that both North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line, and there is another provision that indicates that among the subjects that can be negotiated will be modalities of civilian movement across the demarcation line, which makes it clear that military movement across the Demilitarized Zone is in all circumstances prohibited. Now, this may be an appropriate point to explain what our position has been with respect to the DMZ. There has been a great deal of discussion about the issue of sovereignty and about the issue of legitimacy, which is to say which government is in control of South Vietnam, and, finally, about why we laid such great stress on the issue of the Demilitarized Zone. We had to place stress. on the issue of the Demilitarized Zone because the provisions of the agreement with respect to infiltration, with respect to replacement, with respect to any of the military provisions, would have made no sense whatsoever if there was not some demarcation line that defined where South Vietnam began. If we had accepted the preposition that would have in effect eroded the Demilitarized Zone, then the provisions of the agreement with respect to restrictions about the introduction of men and materiel into South Vietnam would have been unilateral restrictions applying only to the United States and only to our allies. Therefore, if there was to be any meaning to the separation of military and political issues, if there was to be any permanence to the military provisions that had been negotiated, then it was essential that there was a definition of where the obligations of this agreement began. As you can see from the text of the agreement, the principles that we defended were essentially achieved. Chapters VI and VII: International Machinery; Laos and Cambodia Chapter VI deals with the international machinery, and we will discuss that when I talk about the associated protocols of the agreement. Chapter VII deals with Laos and Cambodia. Now, the problem of Laos and Cambodia has two parts. One part concerns those obligations which can be undertaken by the parties signing the agreement-that is to say, the three Vietnamese parties and the United States-those measures that they can take which affect the situation in Laos and Cambodia. A second part of the situation in Laos has to concern the nature of the civil conflict that is taking place within Laos and Cambodia and the solution of which, of course, must involve as well the two Laotian parties and the innumerable Cambodian factions. Let me talk about the provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and Cambodia and our firm expectations as to the future in Laos and Cambodia. The provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and Cambodia reaffirm, as an obligation to all the parties, the provisions of the 1954 agreement on Cambodia and of the 1962 agreement on Laos, which affirm the neutrality and right to self-determination of those two countries. They are, therefore, consistent with our basic position with respect also to South Vietnam. In terms of the immediate conflict, the provisions of the agreement specifically prohibit the use of Laos and Cambodia for military and any other operations against any of the signatories of the Paris Agreement or against any other country. In other words, there is a flat prohibition against the use of base areas in Laos and Cambodia. There is a flat prohibition against the use of Laos and Cambodia for infiltration into Vietnam or, for that matter, into any other country. Finally, there is a requirement that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia, and it is clearly understood that North Vietnamese troops are considered foreign with respect to Laos and Cambodia. Now, as to the conflict within these countries which could not be formally settled in an agreement which is not signed by the parties of that conflict, let me make this statement, without elaborating it: It is our firm expectation that within a short period of time there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos which, in turn, will lead to a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laos and, of course, to the end of the use of Laos as a corridor of infiltration. Secondly, the situation in Cambodia, as those of you who have studied it will know, is somewhat more complex because there are several parties headquartered in different countries. Therefore, we can say about Cambodia that it is our expectation that a de facto cease-fire will come into being over a period of time relevant to the execution of this agreement. Our side will take the appropriate measures to indicate that it will not attempt to change the situation by force. We have reason to believe that our position is clearly understood by all concerned parties, and I will not go beyond this in my statement. Chapters VIII and IX: Normalizing Relations; Implementation Chapter VIII deals with the relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As I have said in my briefings on October 26 and on December 16, and as the President affirmed on many occasions, the last time in his speech last evening, the United States is seeking a peace that heals. We have had many armistices in Indochina. We want a peace that will last. And, therefore, it is our firm intention in our relationship to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to move from hostility to normalization, and from normalization to conciliation and cooperation. And we believe that under conditions of peace we can contribute throughout Indochina to a realization of the humane aspirations of all the people of Indochina, And we will, in that spirit, perform our traditional role of helping people realize these aspirations in peace. Chapter IX of the agreement is the usual implementing provision. So much for the agreement. PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOLS Prisoners of War Now, let me say a word about the protocols. There are four protocols or implementing instruments to the agreement: on the return of American prisoners, on the implementation and institution of an international control commission, on the regulations with respect to the cease-fire and the implementation and institution of a joint military commission among the concerned parties, and a protocol about the deactivation and removal of mines. I have given you the relevant provisions of the protocol concerning the return of prisoners. They will be returned at periodic intervals in Hanoi to American authorities and not to American private groups. They will be picked up by American airplanes, except for prisoners held in the southern part of South Vietnam, which will be released at designated points in the South, again, to American authorities. We will receive on Saturday, the day of the signing of the agreement, a list of all American prisoners held throughout Indochina. And both parties, that is to say, all parties have an obligation to assist each other in obtaining information about the prisoners, missing in action, and about the location of graves of American personnel throughout Indochina. The International Commission has the right to visit the last place of detention of the prisoners, as well as the place from which they are released. International Commission of Control and Supervision [ICCS] Now, to the International Control Commission. You will remember that one of the reasons for the impasse in December was the difficulty of agreeing with the North Vietnamese about the size of the International Commission, its function, or the location of its teams. On this occasion, there is no point in rehashing all the differences. It is, however, useful to point out that at that time the proposal of the North Vietnamese was that the International Control Commission have a membership of 250, no organic logistics or communication, dependent entirely for its authority to move on the party it was supposed to be investigating; and over half of its personnel were supposed to be located in Saigon, which is not the place where most of the infiltration that we were concerned with was likely to take place. We have distributed to you an outline of the basic structure of this Commission. Briefly stated, its total number is 1,160, drawn from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. It has a headquarters in Saigon. It has seven regional teams, 26 teams based in localities throughout Vietnam which were chosen either because forces were in contact there or because we estimated that these were the areas where the violations of the cease-fire were most probable. There are 12 teams at border crossing points. There are seven teams that are set aside for points of entry, which have yet to be chosen, for the replacement of military equipment. That is for Article 7 of the agreement. There will be three on each side and there will be no legitimate point of entry into South Vietnam other than those three points. The other border and coastal teams are there simply to make certain that no other entry occurs, and any other entry is by definition illegal. There has to be no other demonstration except the fact that it occurred. This leaves one team free for use, in particular, at the discretion of the Commission. And, of course, the seven teams that are being used for the return of the prisoners can be used at the discretion of the Commission after the prisoners are returned. There is one reinforced team located at the Demilitarized Zone and its responsibility extends along the entire Demilitarized Zone. It is in fact a team and a, half. It is 50 percent larger than a normal border team and it represents one of the many compromises that were made, between our insistence on two teams and their insistence on one team. By a brilliant stroke, we settled on a team and a half. With respect to the operation of the International Commission, it is supposed to operate on the principle of unanimity, which is to say that its reports, if they are Commission reports, have to have the approval of all four members. However, each member is permitted to submit his own opinion, so that as a practical matter any member of the Commission can make a finding of a violation and submit a report, in the first instance to the parties. The International Commission will report for the time being to the four parties to the agreement. An international conference will take place, we expect, at the Foreign Ministers' level within a month of signing the agreement. That international conference will establish a relationship between the International Commission and itself, or any other international body that is mutually agreed upon, so that the International Commission is not only reporting to the parties that it is investigating. But, for the time being, until the international conference has met, there was no other practical group to which the International Commission could report. Cease-fire and Joint Military Commissions In addition to this international group, there are two other institutions that are supposed to supervise the cease-fire. There is, first of all, an institution called the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, which is composed of ourselves and the three Vietnamese parties, which is located in the same place as the International Commission, charged with roughly the same functions, but, as a practical matter, it is supposed to conduct the preliminary investigations, its disagreements are automatically referred to the International Commission, and, moreover, any party can request the International Commission to conduct an investigation regardless of what the Four-Party Commission does and regardless of whether the Four-Party Commission has completed its investigation or not. After the United States has completed its withdrawal, the Four- Party Military Commission will be transformed into a Two-Party Commission composed of the two South Vietnamese parties. The total number of supervisory personnel, therefore, will be in the neighborhood of 4,500 during the period that the Four-Party Commission is in existence, and in the neighborhood of about 3,000 after the Four-Party Commission ceases operating and the Two-Party Commission comes into being. Deactivation and Removal of Mines Finally, there is a protocol concerning the removal and deactivation of mines which is self-explanatory and simply explains-discusses the relationship between our efforts and the efforts of the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] concerning the removal and deactivation of mines which is one of the obligations we have undertaken in the agreement. Signing The Documents Now, let me point another problem. On Saturday, January 27, the Secretary of State on behalf of the United States, will sign the agreement bringing the cease-fire and all the other provisions of the agreement and the protocols into force. He will sign in the morning a document involving four parties, and in the afternoon a document between us and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. these documents are identical, except that the preamble differs in both cases. The reason for this somewhat convoluted procedure is that, while the agreement provides that the two South Vietnamese parties should settle their disputes in an atmosphere of national reconciliation and concord, I think it is safe to say that they have not yet quite reached that point; indeed, that they have not yet been prepared to recognize each other's existence. This being the case, it was necessary to devise one document in which neither of the South Vietnamese parties was mentioned by name and, therefore, no other party could be mentioned by name, on the principle of equality. So the four-party document, the document that will have four signatures can be read with great care and you will not know until you get to the signature page whom exactly it applies to. It refers only to the parties participating in the Paris Conference, which are, of course, well known to the parties participating in the Paris Conference. It will be signed on two separate page. The United States and the GVN [Government of the Republic of Vietnam] are signing on one page and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its ally are signing on a separate page. And this procedure has aged us all by several years. Then there is another document which will be signed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the afternoon. That document, in its operative provisions, is word for word the same as the document which will be signed in the morning, and which contains the obligations to which the two South Vietnamese parties are obligated. It differs from that document only in the preamble and in its concluding paragraph. In the preamble, it says the United States; with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, and the DRV, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and the rest is the same, and then the concluding paragraph has the same adaptation. That document, of course, is not signed by ether Saigon or its opponent and, therefore, their obligations are derived from the Four-party document. I do not want to take any time in going into the abstruse legalisms, I simply wanted to explain to you why there were two different signature ceremonies, and why, when we handed out the text of the agreement, we appended to the document which contains the legal obligations which apply to everybody-namely, the four parties-why we appended another section that contained a different preamble and a different implementing paragraph which is going to be signed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This will be true with respect to the agreement and three of the protocols. The fourth protocol, regarding the removal of mines, applies only to the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and, therefore, we are in the happy position of having to sign only one document. SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS Now, then let me summarize for you how we got to this point, and some of the aspects of the agreement that we consider significant, and then I will answer your questions. As you know, when I met with this group on December 16, we had to report that the negotiations in Paris seemed to have reached a stalemate. We had not agreed at that time, although we didn't say so on the-we could not find a formula to take into account the conflicting views with respect to signing. There were disagreements with respect to the DMZ and with the associated aspects of what identity South Vietnam was to have in the agreement. There was a total deadlock with respect to the protocols, which I summed up in the December 16 press conference. The North Vietnamese approach to international control and ours were so totally at variance that it seemed impossible at that point to come to any satisfactory conclusion. And there began to be even some concern that the separation which we thought we had achieved in October between the release of our prisoners and the question of civilian prisoners in South Vietnam was breaking down. When we reassembled on January 8, we did not do so in the most cordial atmosphere that I remember. However, by the morning of January 9, it became apparent that both sides were determined to make a serious effort to break the deadlock in negotiations. And we adopted a mode of procedure by which issues in the agreement and issues of principle with respect to the protocols were discussed at meetings between Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and myself, while concurrently an American team headed by Ambassador Sullivan and a Vietnamese team headed by Vice Minister Thach would work on the implementation of the principles as they applied to the protocols. For example, the Special Adviser and I might agree on the principle of border control posts and their number, but then the problem of how to locate them, according to what criteria, and with what mode of operation presented enormous difficulties. Let me on this occasion also point out that these negotiations required the closest cooperation throughout our Government, between the White House and the State Department, between all the elements of our team, and that, therefore, the usual speculation of who did what to whom is really extraordinarily misplaced. Without a cooperative effort by everybody, we could not have achieved what we have presented last night and this morning, The Special Adviser and I then spent the week, first on working out the unresolved issues in the-agreement, and then the unresolved issues with respect to the protocols, and finally, the surrounding circumstances of schedules and procedures. Ambassador Sullivan remained behind to draft the implementing provisions of the -agreements that had been achieved during the week. The Special Adviser and I remained in close contact. So by the time we met again yesterday, the issues that remained were very few, indeed, were settled relatively rapidly. And I may on this occasion also point out that while the North Vietnamese are the most difficult people to negotiate with that I have ever encountered when they do not want to settle, they are also the most effective that I have dealt with when they finally decide to settle. So that we have gone through peaks and valleys in these negotiations Of extraordinary intensity. Now then, let me sum up where this agreement bas left us, first, with respect to what we said we would try to achieve, then with respect to some of its significance, and, finally, with respect to the future. First, when I met this group on October 26 and delivered myself of some epigrammatic phrases, we obviously did not want to give a complete checklist and we did not want to release the agreement as t then stood, because it did not seem to us desirable to provide a checklist against which both sides would then have to measure success and failure in terms of their prestige. At that time, too, we did not say that it had always been foreseen that there would be another three or four days of negotiation after this tentative agreement, had been reached. The reason why we asked for another negotiation was because it seemed to us at that point that for a variety of reasons, which I explained then and again on December 16, those issues could not be settled within the time frame that the North Vietnamese expected. It is now a matter of history, and it is, therefore, not essential to go into a debate of on what we based this judgment. But that was the reason why the agreement was not signed on October 31, and not any of the speculations that have been so much in print and on television. Now, what did we say on October 26 we wanted to achieve? We said, first of all, that we wanted to make sure that the control machinery would be in place at the time of the cease-fire. We did this because we had information that there were plans by the other side to mount a major offensive to coincide with the signing of the cease-fire agreement. This objective has been achieved by the fact that the protocols will be signed on the same day as the agreement, by the fact that the International Control Commission and the Four-Party Military Commission will meet within 24 hours of the agreement going into effect, or no later than Monday morning, Saigon time, that the regional teams of the International Control Commission will be in place 48 hours thereafter, and that all other teams will be in place within 15 and a maximum of 30 days after that. Second, we said that we wanted to compress the time interval between the cease-fires we expected in Laos and Cambodia and the cease-fire in Vietnam. For reasons which I have explained to you, we cannot be as specific about the cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia as we can about the agreements that are being signed on Saturday, but we can say with confidence that the formal cease-fire in Laos will go into effect in a considerably shorter period of time than was envisaged in October, and since the cease-fire in Cambodia depends to some extent on developments in Laos, we expect the same to be true there. We said that certain linguistic ambiguities should be removed. The linguistic ambiguities were produced by the somewhat extraordinary negotiating procedure whereby a change in the English text did not always produce a correlative change in the Vietnamese text. All the linguistic ambiguities to which we referred in October have, in fact, been removed. At that time I mentioned only one, and therefore I am free to recall it. I pointed out that the United States position had consistently been a rejection of the imposition of a coalition government on the people of South Vietnam. I said then that the National Council of Reconciliation was not a coalition government, nor was it conceived as a coalition government. The Vietnamese language text, however, permitted an interpretation of the words "administrative structure" as applied to the National Council of Reconciliation which would have lent itself to the interpretation that it came close or was identical with a coalition government. You will find that in the text of this agreement the words "administrative structure" no longer exist and therefore this particular, shall we say, ambiguity has been removed. I pointed out in October that we had to find a procedure for signing which would be acceptable to all the parties for whom obligations were involved. This has been achieved. I pointed out on October 26 that we would seek greater precision with respect to certain 'obligations particularly, without spelling them out, as they applied to the Demilitarized Zone and to the obligations with respect to Laos and Cambodia. That too, has been achieved. And I pointed out in December that we were looking for some means, some expression, which would make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force. This is now explicitly provided, and we have achieved formulations in which in a number of paragraphs, such as Article 14, 18(e) and 20, there are specific references to the sovereignty of South Vietnam. There are specific references, moreover, to the same thing in Article 6 and Article 11 of the ICCS protocol. There are specific references to the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. And, therefore, we believe that we have achieved the substantial adaptations that we asked for on October 26. We did not increase our demands after October 26 and we substantially achieved the clarifications which we sought. Now then, it is obvious that a war that has lasted for 10 years will have many elements that cannot be completely satisfactory to all the parties concerned. And in the two periods where the North Vietnamese were working with dedication and seriousness on a conclusion, the period in October and the period after we resumed talks on January 8, it was always clear that a lasting peace could come about only if neither side sought to achieve everything that it had wanted; indeed, that stability depended on the relative satisfaction and therefore on the relative dissatisfaction of all of the parties been a rejection of the imposition of a coalition government on the people of South Vietnam. I said then that the National Council of Reconciliation was not a coalition government, nor was it conceived as a coalition government. The Vietnamese language text, however, permitted an interpretation of the words "administrative structure" as applied to the National Council of Reconciliation which would have lent itself to the interpretation that it came close or was identical with a coalition government. You will find that in the text of this agreement the words "administrative structure" no longer exist and therefore this particular, shall we say, ambiguity has been removed. I pointed out in October that we had to find a procedure for signing which would be acceptable to all the parties for whom obligations were involved. This has been achieved. I pointed out on October 26 that we would seek greater precision with respect to certain obligations particularly, without spelling them out, as they applied to the Demilitarized Zone and to the obligations with respect to Laos and Cambodia. That, too, has been achieved. And I pointed out in December that we were looking for some means, some expression, which would make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force. This is now explicitly provided, and we have achieved formulations in which in a number of paragraphs, such as Article 14, IB(e) and 20, there are specific references to the sovereignty of South Vietnam. There are specific references, moreover, to the same thing in Article 6 and Article 11 of the ICCS protocol. There are specific references to the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. And, therefore, we believe that we have achieved the substantial adaptations that we asked for on October 26. We did not increase our demands after October 26 and we substantially achieved the clarifications which we sought. Now then, it is obvious that a war that has lasted for 10 years will have many elements that cannot be completely satisfactory to all the parties concerned. And in the two periods where the North Vietnamese were working with dedication and seriousness on a conclusion, the period in October and the period after we resumed talks on January 8, it was always clear that a lasting peace could come about only if neither side sought to achieve everything that it had wanted; indeed, that stability depended on the relative satisfaction and therefore on the relative dissatisfaction of all of the parties concerned. And therefore, it is also clear that whether this agreement brings a lasting peace or not depends not only on its provisions but also on the spirit in which it is implemented. It will be our challenge in the future to move the controversies that could not be stilled by any one document from the level of military conflict to the level of positive human aspirations, and to absorb the enormous talents and dedication of the people of Indochina in tasks of construction rather than in tasks of destruction. We will make a major effort to move to create a framework where we hope in a short time the animosities and the hatred and the suffering of this period will be seen as aspects of the past, and where the debates concern differences of opinion as to how to achieve positive goals. Of course, the hatreds will not rapidly disappear, and, of course, people who have fought for 25 years will not easily give up their objectives, but also people who have suffered for 25 years may at last come to know that they can achieve their real satisfaction by other and less brutal means. The President said yesterday that we have to remain vigilant, and so we shall, but we shall also dedicate ourselves to positive efforts. And as for us at home, it should be clear by now that no one in this war has had a monopoly of moral insight. And now that at last we have achieved an agreement in which the United States did not prescribe the political future to its allies, an agreement which should preserve the dignity and the self-respect of all of the parties, together with healing the wounds in Indochina we can begin to heal the wounds in America. Now, I will be glad to answer any questions. --------------------------------------------------------------- (4) Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, signed in Paris and entered into force January 17, 1973. (Text from TIAS 7542 (24 UST 4-23) AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIET-NAM The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam, With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self- determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world, Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them: Chapter I THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL RIGHTS Article 1 The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet- Nam. Chapter II CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES - WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, Article 2 A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Viet-Nam as of 2400 hours G.M.T. [Greenwich Mean Time], on January 27, 1973. At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of North Viet-Nam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect. The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this Article shall be durable and without limit of time. Article 3 The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and to ensure a lasting and stable peace. As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect: (a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam shall remain in-place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities. (b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in-place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing. (c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations: - All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the sea shall be prohibited; - All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned. Article 4 The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Viet-Nam. Article 5 Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time. Article 6 The dismantlement of all military bases in South Viet-Nam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this agreement. Article 7 From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Article 9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Viet-Nam. The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision. THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL Article 8 (a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement. (b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action. (c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Viet-Nam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect. Chapter IV THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION Article 9 The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination: (a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries. (b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision. (c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people. Article 10 The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease- fire and maintain peace in South Viet-Nam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict. Article 11 Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will: - achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other; - ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise. Article l2 (a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non- elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The Council shall operate on the principle of unanimity, After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet-Nam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease- fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy. (b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and ensurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9 (b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon. Article 13 The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible. Article 14 South Viet-Nam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Viet-Nam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Viet- Nam provided for in Article 9 (b). Chapter V THE REUNIFICATION OF VIET-NAM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM Article 15 The reunification of Viet-Nam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Viet-Nam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Viet-Nam- Pending reunification: (a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference. (b) North and South Viet-Nam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line. (c) North and South Viet-Nam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to reestablishing-normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line, (d) North and South Viet-Nam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops; military advisers, and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam. THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE Article 16 (a) The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet- Nam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four- Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement: - The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Viet-Nam; - Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article; - Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Viet-Nam; - Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a); - Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Viet-Nam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a); - Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties; - Article 8 (b), regarding the mutual assistance of the parties in getting information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action. (b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision. (c) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this Agreement and end its activities in sixty days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) and the completion of the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties. (d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity, and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Article 1 7 (a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement: - The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Viet-Nam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities; - Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties; - Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Viet-Nam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities; - Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Viet-Nam and all other provisions of this Article; - Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Viet-Nam; - Article 1 3, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced. (b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision. (c) After the signing of this Agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Viet-Nam, Article 18 (a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately. (b) Until the International Conference provided for in Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement: - The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Viet-Nam; - Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article; - Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all the parties in South Viet-Nam; - Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a); - Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Viet-Nam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a); - Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties. The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The four parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their operation. (c) Until the International Conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement: - The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Viet-Nam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities; - Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties; - Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Viet-Nam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities; - Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Viet-Nam and all other provisions of this Article; - Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Viet-Nam; - Article 9 (b), regarding the free and democratic general elections in South Viet-Nam; - Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced. The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operation. (d) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be composed of representatives of four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The chairmanship of this Commission will rotate among the members for specific periods to be determined by the Commission. (e) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Viet-Nam. (f) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. (g) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes into force in Viet-Nam. As regards the provisions in Article 18 (b) concerning the four parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities when the Commission's tasks of control and supervision regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. As regards the provisions in Article 18 (c) concerning the two South Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities on the request of the government formed after the general elections in South Viet-Nam provided for in Article 9 (b). (h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, means of activity, and expenditures of the International Commission of Control and Supervision. The relationship between the International Commission and the International Conference will be agreed upon by the International Commission and the International Conference. Article 19 The parties agree on the convening of an International Conference within thirty days of the signing of this Agreement to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Viet-Nam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina. The United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam will propose to the following parties that they participate in this International Conference: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the four countries of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, together with the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam. Chapter VII REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS Article 20 (a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet- Nam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia's and the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos. The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries. (b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material. (c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference. (d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Chapter VIII THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM Article 21 The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Viet- Nam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and throughout Indochina. Article 22 The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam, and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will ensure stable peace in Viet-Nam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Chapter IX OTHER PROVISIONS Article 23 This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam. All the parties concerned shall strictly implement this Agreement and its Protocols. Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three, in English and Vietnamese. The English and Vietnamese texts are official and equally authentic. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM: (Signed): (Signed): William P. Rogers Tran Van Lam Secretary of State Minister for Foreign Affairs FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE PROVISIONAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM: OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET-NAM: (Signed): (Signed): Nguyen Duy Trinh Nguyen Thi Binh Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs ---------------------------------------------------------------- (5) Act of the International Conference on Vietnam, Signed at Paris and entered into force March 2, 1973 (Text from TIAS; 24 UST 486-91) ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF VIET-NAM The Government of the United States of America; The Government of the French Republic; The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam; The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic; The Government of the Republic of Indonesia; The Government of the Polish People's Republic; The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam; The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam; The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; The Government of Canada; and The Government of the People's Republic of China; In the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; With a view to acknowledging the signed Agreements; guaranteeing the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Viet-Nam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; and contributing to and guaranteeing peace in Indochina; Have agreed on the following provisions, and undertake to respect and implement them; Article 1 The Parties to this Act solemnly acknowledge, express their approval of, and support the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, and the four Protocols to the Agreement signed on the same date (hereinafter referred to respectively as the Agreement and the Protocols). Article 2 The Agreement responds to the aspirations and fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, to the right of the South Vietnamese people to self- determination, and to the earnest desire for peace shared by all countries in the world. The Agreement constitutes a major contribution to peace, self-determination, national independence, and the improvement of relations among countries. The Agreement and the Protocols should be strictly respected and scrupulously implemented. Article 3 The Parties to this Act solemnly acknowledge the commitments and scrupulously implement the Agreement and the Protocols. Article 4 The Parties to this Act solemnly recognize and strictly respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, i.e. , the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, as well as the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. The Parties to this Act shall strictly respect the Agreement and the Protocols by refraining from any action at variance with their provisions. Article 5 For the sake of a durable peace in Viet-Nam, the Parties to this Act call on all countries to strictly respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, i.e. , the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam and the right of the South Vietnamese people to self- determination and to strictly respect the Agreement and the Protocols by refraining from any action at variance with their provisions. Article 6 (a) The four parties to the Agreement or the two South Vietnamese parties may, either individually or through joint action inform the other Parties to this Act about the implementation of the Agreement and the Protocols. Since the reports and views submitted by the International Commission of Control and Supervision concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of those provisions of the Agreement and the Protocols which are within the tasks of the Commission will be sent to either the four parties signatory to the Agreement or to the two South Vietnamese parties, those parties shall be responsible, either individually or through joint action, for forwarding them promptly to the other Parties to this Act. (b) The four parties to the Agreement or the two South Vietnamese parties shall also, either individually or through joint action, forward this information and these reports and views to the other participant in the International Conference on Viet-Nam for his information. Article 7 (a) In the event of a violation of the Agreement or the Protocols which threatens the peace, the independence, sovereignty, unit, or territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, or the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination, the parties signatory to the Agreement and the Protocols shall, either individually or jointly, consult with the other Parties to this Act with a view to determining necessary remedial measures. (b) The International Conference on Viet-Nam shall be reconvened upon a joint request by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet- Nam on behalf of the parties signatory to the Agreement or upon a request by six or more of the Parties to this Act. Article 8 With a view to contributing to and guaranteeing peace in Indochina,- the Parties to this Act acknowledge the commitment of the parties to the Agreement to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos as stipulated in the Agreement, agree also to respect them and to refrain from any action at variance with them, and call on other countries to do the same. Article 9 This Act shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all twelve Parties and shall be strictly implemented by all the Parties. Signature of this Act does not constitute recognition of any Party in any case in which it has not previously been accorded. Done in twelve copies in Paris this second day of March, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in English, French, Russian, Vietnamese, and Chinese. All texts are equally authentic. For the Government of the United States of America The Secretary of State (Signed): WILLIAM P. ROGERS For the Government of the French Republic The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Signed): MAURICE SCHUMANN For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Signed): NGUYEN THI BINH For the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Signed) : JANOS PETER For the Government of the Republic of Indonesia The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Signed): ADAM MALIK For the Government of the Polish People's Republic The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Signed) : STEFAN OLSZOWSKI For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Signed): NGUYEN DUY TRINH For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Signed) : ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME For the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Signed): TRAN VAN LAM For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Signed): ANDREI A. GROMYKO For the Government Canada The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Signed): MITCHELL SHARP For the Government of the People's Republic of China The Minister for Foreign Affairs [SEAL] (Signed): CHI PENG-FEI -------------------------------------------------------------- (6) Complaints of Violations of the Cease-fire: United States Note Verbale transmitted April 10, 1973 for delivery to participants in the International Conference on Vietnam. (Department of State Press Release 117, Apr. 24; text from Department of State BULLETIN, vol. 68 (1973), pp. 599-603) 1. The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of External Affairs of [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Republic of China, Great Britain, France, Republic of Vietnam, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, Canada; and Secretary General of the U.N. Kurt Waldheim] and has the honor to refer to a note" dated April 16, 1973, transmitted by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Government of the United States and, it is assumed, also to the other signatories of the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam. 2. In its Note, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on its own behalf and occasionally also in the name of the "Provisional Revolutionary Government", purports to describe the situation of South Vietnam and lodges charges against the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. 3 . The United States rejects as utterly groundless the accusations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and views this note as an ill-disguised attempt by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, to divert attention away from its own numerous and extremely serious violations of the cease-fire. 4. Contrary to the contentions listed in the note, it is abundantly clear that the main obstruction to peace consists of the military activities carried out by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and forces under its control in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in direct and inexcusable contravention of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and of the Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos. 5. Of extreme concern is the vast quantity of military equipment shipped clandestinely since January 28 from North Vietnam into South Vietnam without the least effort to observe Articles 7 and 20 of the Peace Agreement of January 27. Evidence is overwhelming of continued illegal movement of equipment and supplies out of North Vietnam into or through Laos and Cambodia and into South Vietnam for the use of the military forces opposing the legitimate governments of those countries. Included in the supplies reaching South Vietnam are over 400 tanks and armored vehicles, 300 artillery pieces of various types and vast quantities of ammunition, vehicles, etc. For example, from the time of the Vietnam cease-fire through April 18, 1973, over 27,000 short tons of military supplies have been moved through the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. In the same period, over 26,000 short tons were moved from North Vietnam into Laos. Also during this period, we have detected over 17,000 military truck movements from North Vietnam into Laos and over 7,000 crossing the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. None of the peace-keeping organs established by the Peace Agreement has been given the opportunity to monitor these shipments. 6. Evidence of an intention to persist in violations of Article 20 of the Agreement is the substantial effort being made to upgrade the road system within Laos and adjoining parts of South Vietnam. Bridge and drainage ditch construction have been observed on Route 7, the primary route into the Plain of Jars from North Vietnam and on Routes 4 and 4/7 which transit the northern plain in an east-west direction. Furthermore, there is evidence of continuing North Vietnamese efforts to construct a road from southern Laos into Quang Tri and Quang Ngai Provinces. This cross-border route is not close to any of the designated entry points and its only logical use could be as a clandestine supply highway into the central coastal regions of South Vietnam. 7. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam also has moved military personnel and military equipment in and through the demilitarized zone is direct violation of Articles 7 and 15 (B) of the Peace Agreement and of Article 7 of the Cease-fire Protocol. 8. In most serious violation of the Agreement, more than 30,000 North Vietnamese army personnel are known to have continued moving through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam after the cease-fire on January 28. These combat replacements have greatly increased the capability of North Vietnamese army units in the south. In addition there is evidence that new North Vietnamese army organizations, such as anti-aircraft artillery units, entered South Vietnam after January 28. For example, the Khe Sanh airfield complex has recently been ringed with SA-2 missiles, which clearly were not present prior to the cease- fire. 9. Not content with illegally building up its military potential, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has since the cease-fire actually employed these and other forces under its command to launch attacks on hamlets, villages and Republic of Vietnam military positions throughout the country in unequivocal violation of the fundamental purpose of the Peace Agreement as embodied in Articles 2 and 3. The assaults have generally consisted of mortarings and shellings, frequently followed by ground attacks in an obvious effort to expand the area controlled by forces under North Vietnamese command. In some cases the assaults were of such intensity as to require withdrawal of government defending forces, for example, from positions at Hoang Hau near Hue, on the Cambodian border in Chau Duc Province and in Bac Lieu Province. Other beleaguered outposts long occupied by the Republic of Vietnam armed forces continue to hold out despite persistent harassment, such as at Tonle Cham in Tay Ninh, at Rach Bap in Binh Duong and in the Hong Ngu and Cai Cai districts of Kien Phong Province. 10. North Vietnamese forces, moreover, continue larger military offensives aimed at opening up new supply routes and expanding their control, such as in the Sa Huynh area of southern Quang Ngai Province. 11. Troops under the control of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam also have placed many mines in violation of Article 5 of the Cease-fire Protocol and have tried to interfere with resumed train service. Earlier this month, in Phu Yen Province, a mine was set under a train and a ground attack was launched on a track repair crew. 12. These forces, moreover, have fired mortars and artillery indiscriminately into many cities, refugee camps and other centers of population, for example in Tan Chau and Phan Thiet, causing heavy civilian casualties. They have even mortared the team locations of the International Commission of Control and Supervision at Tri Ton and Hong Ngu. 13. In addition to widespread attacks on Republic of Vietnam territorial security forces, agents of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have continued their acts of terrorism including assassinations, tossing grenades in public places, minings of public thoroughfares and widespread abductions. 14. Another serious impediment to peace is the record of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the "Provisional Revolutionary Government " of clear and calculated obstructionism in the Four Party Joint Military Commission. Both consistently refused to participate meaningfully in any Four Party Joint Military Commission investigation which would not benefit their cause. Accordingly, they blocked or prevented investigation of the downing of a CH-47 helicopter, of the Sa Huynh attack and the Khe Sanh missile installation, to cite only three representative examples. 15. The tactic to stall and obstruct was also clearly evident in the refusal to deploy fully to the field. The North Vietnamese deployed to only five of the seven regional headquarters, and their associates of the "Provisional Revolutionary Government " to only one. Deployment to sub- regional teams was minimal. The "Provisional Revolutionary Government had less than one quarter of its authorized contingent functional at any one time. 16. Thus the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the "Provisional Revolutionary Government" must bear the responsibility for failure of the Four Party Joint Military Commission to fulfill its assigned functions. 17. Of particular concern to the United States is the failure to date of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to provide information about Americans missing in action in Indochina or those known to have died there, as required by Article 8 (B) of the Paris Agreement. 18. The charges levied against the United States by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its note, include the allegation that the United States gave "backing" to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in failing to observe the cease-fire and thereby seriously violated Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. The entire charge is without foundation, The United States concentrated instead after January 28 on observing the terms of the Agreement scrupulously by withdrawing its own military forces from Vietnam and refraining from participating in any hostilities in Vietnam. Any arms and military equipment provided to the Republic of Vietnam have been strictly in accordance with Article 7 of the Paris Agreement and Article 7 of the Cease-fire Protocol. 19. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam also alleges that the withdrawal of United States forces has been concluded in a manner at variance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Paris Agreement and accuses the United States of failing to withdraw its armaments and dismantle its bases as required by those Articles. Article 5, however, required withdrawal only of those armaments, munitions, and war material which the United States (or allies of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam) may have owned in South Vietnam at the date of or subsequent to the date of entry into force of the Agreement. It did not require the withdrawal from South Vietnam of any armaments which the United States, prior to the entry into force of the Agreement, no longer owned because of prior transfer. This was the meaning of the phrase "of the United States" in Article 5. The same phrase with the same meaning was used in Article 6 with respect to military bases to be dismantled. The United States has fully complied with these provisions. All military equipment and military base facilities formerly owned by the United States forces in South Vietnam which remained there after March 28, had been transferred to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam prior to January 27. 20. The referenced note makes the further charge that the United States has supplied arms, munitions, and war materials to the Republic of Vietnam in violation of the Agreement and its Cease-fire Protocol. This charge is simply without merit. Article 7 of the Agreement permits the South Vietnamese parties to replace, on a piece-for-piece basis, destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up armaments, munitions and war material. The United States and the Republic of Vietnam have established procedures for monitoring arms shipments, to ensure compliance with these restrictions, and records are being maintained which verify this compliance. Introduction 'of these replacements, as well as these records and procedures, arc always open to inspection and observation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision and the Two Party Joint Military Commission. Introduction of these replacements has been restricted to those three points of entry that have been designated by the Republic of Vietnam under the terms of the Agreement. 21. The contention in the note of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the United States has left behind over 10,000 military personnel disguised as civilian advisers has no basis in fact and is undoubtedly an attempt to draw attention from the large numbers of North Vietnamese armed forces in the South. The United States, in accordance with Article 5 of the Peace Agreement, has withdrawn its troops and its military and police advisers. There remain in South Vietnam only about 200 American military personnel, belonging to the Defense Attache Office, the Embassy Marine Security Guard and the team attempting to resolve the status of the missing in action, There are no military persons disguised as civilians. As publicly stated, the total number of official American personnel in South Vietnam is less than 9,000, the large majority of whom are filling logistics and maintenance functions which are soon to be taken over by the South Vietnamese. 22. Other Americans are performing the kinds of functions conducted by diplomatic, consular and AID [Agency for International Development] missions throughout the world. The purposes and functions of the personnel of the United States remaining in South Vietnam are fully known to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and are completely in keeping with the January 27 Agreement. 23. The United States also is accused of violating Article 8 of the Act of Paris" by virtue of its military activities in Laos immediately after the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement between the Lao parties. United States military activities since the cease-fire have been very limited. They were conducted at the request of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. They were made necessary by, and were in direct response to, major and flagrant violations of that agreement by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces, specifically the post-cease-fire attacks at Pak Song on February 23 and Tha Vieng on April 13. 24. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam further alleges United States violation of the "independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and neutrality" of Cambodia by continuing to conduct military activities in that country. In fact, these activities are limited to air support operations in response to the continued military operations in Cambodia by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and were requested by the Khmer Republic itself. In late January, the Government of the Khmer Republic suspended all offensive operations and the United States likewise halted offensive air operations. However the reaction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Cambodian forces under its control was a total military offensive, despite obligations assumed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Article 20 of the Agreement and Article 8 of the Act of Paris. In order to induce compliance with those essential provisions, without which the entire Vietnam Agreement would be endangered, the United States is giving air support to the Khmer forces. 25. With respect to allegations by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam concerning the continued detention of South Vietnamese civilians, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam will doubtless wish to rebut them, but the Government of the United States wishes to point out that the "Provisional Revolutionary Government" has offered to release only several hundred civilian prisoners despite the fact it has captured many thousands. This is an issue where reciprocity is clearly essential. 26. The allegation that the United States Government was deliberately delaying mine-clearing operations is patently false. The United States mine-clearing operation has progressed as rapidly as safety, available forces, weather and restrictions imposed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would allow. We have been able to adhere to our agreed schedule despite the loss of two helicopters. Every available United States mine counter- measures unit has been marshalled for this operation. In fact, a force significantly greater than that originally proposed by the United States and accepted by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has been employed. 27. The fact that only a few mines have been observed to explode is completely understandable and not at all surprising. As has been carefully explained to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam representatives on numerous occasions, the mines have a variable neutralization capability that can be programmed and which has resulted in the neutralization of most of them by now. Nevertheless, adequate safety cannot be guaranteed unless all affected areas are methodically swept with proper equipment by highly trained personnel, 28. However, in view of the many serious violations of other provisions of the Agreement by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which have been discussed above, the United States has decided to suspend its mine clearance operations. This suspension is justified as a response to the numerous material breaches of the Agreement by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in accordance with the rule of international law that a material breach of an international agreement by one party entitles the other party to suspend operation of the Agreement in whole or in part. This rule of customary international law is set forth in Article 60 of the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties. The United States is, of course, prepared to resume mine clearance operations as soon as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam begins to act in compliance with its obligations under the Agreement. 29. The Government of the United States thus categorically rejects the general and the specific charges that it has violated the terms of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. For its part, except as noted above, the Government of the United States again affirms its intention to adhere to the terms of the Agreement of January 27 and will exert its best efforts to help bring about a lasting peace in Indochina. It calls on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and all other parties to the Final Act of the International Conference on Vietnam to lend their support to this endeavor.