Debriefings Phase I of Operation Homecoming was the POWs' repatriation. The exit point for all but nine returned POWs was Hanoi. Phase II of Operation Homecoming was debriefing at Clark Air Force Base by the Joint Debriefing and Casualty Reporting Center (JDCRC), under the direction of CINCPAC. JDCRC had representatives from each military service. Civilian and foreign returnees were debriefed by the Service with which they were associated or by members of the U.S. Embassy, Manila. Each Service handled its own debriefings, differing in approach, but following common debriefing instructions. The Army and Marine Corps used professional intelligence debriefers whose sole job was debriefing. The Navy and Air Force used a combination of escort and debriefer. The Navy used only Air Intelligence Officers. Air Force escort/debriefers were not chosen from specific specialties. The Committee attempted to examine the process of debriefing returning POWs at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, and again when they returned to the U.S. to determine: . the objectives of the debrief program; . its planning -- what assets were devoted to the task and how were they organized, deployed and funded? . its implementation -- how adequately DoD debriefed the POW returnees and how well they processed the POW/MIA debrief reports. What all-source information was requested and collected by DIA as a result of the debriefs? How were leads (such as names, photos, etc.) followed? How fully were the debriefing results reported to the Executive Branch and Congress? DIA made no final report aggregating the results of the individual debriefings after Operation Homecoming. While DoD has provided a substantial amount of material to the Committee, the collection suffered with the passage of time. Without a final report, and without complete files and access to information, it is difficult to fully assess the adequacy of Operation Homecoming debriefings nearly 20 years after the fact. The returnees were processed in five cycles. Each group consisted of 20-150 returnees, arriving at 8-10 day intervals. The debriefs were transcribed, edited by the senior officer of each service, and transmitted. When a returnee's debriefing was completed, the intelligence packet, including the debriefing tape, transcribed debrief and/or assessment report, would be assembled and sent by the escort officer for relay to the appropriate CONUS hospital. A summary of the debriefings included: Returnees Debriefed: USAF 324 USN 138 USA 71 USMC 22 US Civilians 23 Thai Civilians 2 German Civilians 2 Canadian Civilians 1 Total 583 Returnees Not Debriefed USAF Medical 1 USMC Higher HQ directed 4 USA Higher HQ directed 6 Total 11 The committee learned a great deal about the debriefing process from the testimony of Admiral and Mrs. Stockdale -- among them that POW wives were never debriefed by DIA, and that Admiral Stockdale's debriefing was limited to his 52-hour initial debriefing. Senator Daschle: . . . ..Do I understand, Mrs. Stockdale, that you have never been debriefed officially by the Federal Government? Mrs Stockdale: I think you understand correctly, yes never. Senator Daschle: And Admiral Stockdale, to what extent have you been debriefed, even in subsequent years, by DIA, by anybody, as we try to put together our best information? Admiral Stockdale: Nothing but my initial debrief, which was rather extensive. Phase III debriefings were conducted in the United States. A symposium was held June 20-23, 1973 to discuss lessons learned. The panelists thought the debriefings were accomplished without major problems, although some debriefers complained that emphasis was placed on familiarization with the POWS background and insufficient stress was given to basic debriefing techniques. Rapport between the POW and his debriefer facilitated the flow of information. Each service attempted to first establish an effective working relationship. The Navy allowed the debriefer to escort the POW from Clark Air Force Base to the U.S., hoping that this would cement a working relationship. The Army and Marine Corps sought to achieve good rapport by matching the debriefer and POW by rank, background and interest. Debriefers were primary collectors of all available data. While in captivity POWs had designated certain POWs to serve as "memory banks," this created initial pressure because many early returnees were hesitant to discuss information which they had not been directed to gather and commit to memory. This stumbling block was removed when senior POWS directed them to relate their entire experience to debriefers. Suspicions have surrounded the debriefing of returned POWs for nearly 20 years, primarily because access has been restricted based on debriefing agreements with the returnees. Did the government leave men behind? Did key officials know it? Were the returnees told to not report certain information? Was the prison system a closed circle of knowledge; could there have been separate prison systems not known to the returning POWS? Was the American public told the truth? Debriefing Results Life in Captivity Post-Homecoming debriefings and a DIA Intelligence Appraisal of them, now unclassified, provide a summary of the prisoners of war's experience in Southeast Asia. Captivity ranged from several hours in South Vietnam to more than eight years in the North. Most servicemen were captured during the height of the bombing of the North between 1966 and 1968. POWs captured prior to December 1971 were known as the "Old Guys." The majority of POWs were Air Force and Navy pilots shot down over North Vietnam and virtually all were captured within minutes because they descended directly into populated areas. Many suffered ejection injuries and shock which made evasion impossible; while others evaded successfully for up to 12 days. Evasion in Laos was somewhat easier and many more downed airmen were recovered in the sparsely populated and otherwise more permissive environment. POWs captured in Laos and taken to North Vietnam had spent less than three weeks in Laos itself. The PRG returned 122 U.S. POWs; 28 were released in South Vietnam. All but one had been captured by the Viet Cong and detained near the Cambodian border and the last POW was held in the Delta region. The remaining 94 POWs were captured north of Da Lat City after 1968 and moved to North Vietnam for detention. Living conditions in the South were primitive and life was hard. POWs often were chained or bound for long periods, primarily as a security precaution. Movement was frequent and involved walking several weeks between camp sites, and the daily survival routine varied little through the years. There was no overall policy or systematic torture of POWs in South Vietnam, but treatment varied by individual camp commanders and guards. It was more difficult to survive captivity in the South, but escape was easier, and 26 POWs (about 12 percent) captured in the South escaped. Treatment in North Vietnam varied over three eras. Until late 1965, there was little use of torture. From late 1965 until late 1969, torture and mistreatment was common. Beginning in late 1969, torture and mistreatment declined. "Camp rules" were the basis for punishment, and they specified that all American POWS were criminals. This was consistent with North Vietnamese protests that the Geneva Convention on prisoners did not apply to American POWs because the war was an undeclared one. The Prison System In North Vietnam, 13 camps were used for permanent detention, eight outside of Hanoi and five within the city. Three camps outside of Hanoi were used exclusively to hold POWs captured in South Vietnam and Laos. Four camps were used only for POWs captured in the North. POWs from all areas were confined in the remaining camps. The primary camps were Hoa Lo Prison and Cu Loc, dubbed by American POWs the "Hanoi Hilton" and the "Zoo," respectively. POWs arriving in Hanoi normally were moved directly to the Hanoi Hilton, a maximum security prison built in the heart of the city by the French in the early 1900's. It was divided into three parts: (1) "New Guy Village," called "Heartbreak" from 1965 to late 1971, served as the interrogation facility throughout the war; (2) "Little Vegas;" and (3) "Camp Unity," the largest section first used to detain Americans in 1970. After interrogation at the Hanoi Hilton, POWs would remain in Little Vegas or be transferred to either the Plantation or the Zoo. The Plantation was initially a showplace camp for visits and later held 108 POWS from Laos and South Vietnam. The Zoo housed nearly 200 POWs at one time and replaced the Plantation as the North Vietnamese showplace during the last years of the war and was the camp visited by Ramsey Clark, Jane Fonda, and Joan Baez. Prior to 1970, POWs were held in small to medium-sized camps or in small isolated groups within the camps. After the Son Tay raid, the smaller camps were closed, the POWs consolidated, and treatment of POWs improved. In late 1972, the North Vietnamese readjusted the camp system in anticipation of the POW release. The American POWS were released from North Vietnam in four increments: the first two from the Hanoi Hilton, the third from the Plantation, and the fourth from the Zoo. All POWs captured in South Vietnam and Laos who were held in North Vietnam were released from the Hanoi Hilton. Information About Unaccounted-For Servicemen A preliminary Committee staff analysis of a computer listing of non-returnees named in the debriefing report showed that 51 servicemen named by returnees had not returned from Southeast Asia. Upon the Committee's request, DIA prepared a case-by- case review of these 51 cases and determined that 51 names in the USAF listing were inaccurately correlated. A summary accompanying the DIA review explained: These debriefs were reviewed for intelligence value immediately after Operation Homecoming in 1973. It must be emphasized that the returnees were asked for information they may possess on unaccounted for Americans, not just for information on known prisoners of war. Of the 51 listed, the following observations remain true: . Many POWs reported on individuals they personally saw dead. . Many names reported to debriefers were heard in the prison communication system; when investigated after Operation Homecoming, most of these reports were cleared: . Many reports came from queries by one individual, about what happened to a particular individual; they were questions, not answers. (58 percent) . Where the source was identified, it was determined that he had never seen the listed man, (16 percent) . Some individuals were reported as seen in the company of a group, but no other member of the group reported having seen the individual. (14 percent) . Several reports of possible POWs in a particular camp were based upon phonetic spellings seen on camp walls or elsewhere, or on radio broadcasts. (6 percent) . One report correlates to an individual (Howard Lull) who was captured but killed before entering the camp system (Howard Lull, XX) . Five of the individuals on the list of 51 names are Vessey cases. (Hestle, Lane, Eidsmow, Entrican, and Finley)" Some of the returning POWs also provided debriefers with "memory lists" of fellow POWs believed to have been in the prison system at some point in time. These included the "LuLu Group" (POWs captured in Laos who entered the prison system in North Vietnam), the "Lost Sheep List" (POWs who "disappeared" in the prison system) and the "Lonely Hearts List" (POWs seen dead or dying in the prison system). The committee requested copies of all such lists. The DoD response is included here for the record and discussed elsewhere in this report chapter dealings with government knowledgeability and actions. No information about live Americans was reported from the debriefings of returned POWs to any member of the U.S. delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Commission. The DIA provided the Secretary of Defense weekly summaries of the Homecoming debriefings. These reports showed that, after collating all the debriefings, only three men named by some POWs (whose fate was not learned from other POWs) were not accounted for. The remains of these three men later were returned. On April 17, 1974, DIA provided the Military Service Intelligence Chiefs a review of all reports received since Operation Homecoming of prisoners still held in Southeast Asia: Cambodia: None of the 27 Americans released by the PRG at Loc Ninh, South Vietnam in February 1973 were held with, or had knowledge of, the fate of any other American or foreign POWs in Cambodia. DIA listed 27 Americans and approximately 20 foreign journalists missing at the time of this report. No information on the fate of either group was obtained during Operation Homecoming. Laos: Ten prisoners, nine Americans and one Canadian, were released at Gia Lam Airport on March 28, 1973. Since Operation Homecoming, the Pathet Lao claimed to hold no Americans prisoner except Mr. Emmet J. Kay. Live-sighting reports at the time of this report in 1974 remained unconfirmed, but DIA noted ." . . it is clear that the Pathet Lao had captured some personnel who were not released," and noted Eugene Debruin and Lt. Col. David Hrdlicka as examples of those known to have been captured by the Pathet Lao and not released. The Pathet Lao made various statements over the years indicating their knowledge of American POWs in Laos. DIA concluded in 1974 that the Pathet Lao had yet to provide even a partially satisfactory accounting of the approximate 300 American POWs unaccounted for in Laos. North Vietnam: In addition to the POWs released during Operation Homecoming, the list of 457 U.S. POWs contained the names of 23 servicemen reported by the North Vietnamese to have died in captivity. The remains were released in mid- March 1974. DIA noted in April 1974 that there were no intelligence reports of U.S. POWs alive in North Vietnam. Intelligence reporting was generally limited to sightings of U.S. personnel who were subsequently released or died in captivity. South Vietnam: 122 captured Americans were released during Operation Homecoming. The PRG provided a list of 40 more Americans who were reported died in captivity. DIA noted in 1974 that approximately 400 Americans remained unaccounted for in South Vietnam. Reports of American POWs in Tay Ninh, Chau Doc and Dar Lac provinces were unconfirmed, but two U.S. collaborators/deserters were identified, DIA reported. Other Indications After Operation Homecoming, U.S. officials and others looked to new information about POWs' experience for additional leads. For many years, POWs were not permitted to send or receive letters. When mail finally was allowed by the North Vietnamese, the U.S. gained new information about its POWs. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird recalled that about 5000 letters had been received and, through them, about 470 POWs in Vietnam and five in Laos had been identified. Five individuals verified in captivity by war-time letters but did not return at Operation Homecoming: Dennis W. Hammond (USMC) was captured on February 1968. He wrote a letter that was never mailed by his captors that positively identified him as captured. A 1968 Vietnamese radio broadcast indicated that Hammond made a statement. Hammond subsequently died in captivity; his death and burial were verified by a POW who returned. Hammond's remains have not been repatriated. PFC Donald L. Sparks (USA) was captured on June 17,1969. A letter written nearly a year after his capture was found on the body of a dead North Vietnamese soldier. PFC Sparks remains unaccounted for and is one of the 135 Vessey discrepancy cases. Capt. Robert Young, (USA) was captured on May 2, 1970. A statement dated in 1970 purported to have been made by Young was found among captured enemy documents. A 1971 FBIS report reported a statement from Young and other U.S. captives. Capt. Young's name appeared on the PRG's died-in- captivity list, but his remains have not been repatriated. Daniel Niehouse, a U.S. civilian captured on November 25, 1966 sent a letter to his family in Scotland by prisoners released in 1967. Niehouse appeared on the PRG died-in- captivity list, but his remains have not been repatriated. W4 John W. Frederick (USMC) was captured in December of 1965. He wrote letters to, and received letters from, his family while in captivity. Frederick died in captivity and his remains were repatriated to the U.S. in March, 1984. Were Specialists Kept Behind? Suspicions continued about whether some POWs with particular military specialties may have been segregated into a separate prison system and kept behind. The committee requested DoD to advise it about whether any abnormal statistical patterns were apparent based on military specialties; DoD's response included a student research report, "Analysis of Academic and Military Background of Released U.S. Prisoners of War and Those Unaccounted For," which was completed in March 1981. In the study, "the backgrounds of 478 USAF officer POWs/MIAs were statistically analyzed to determine if there were any significant differences between the backgrounds of those that returned and those that did not return." The analysis revealed that men with the following specialties returned in significantly lower numbers: . Officers with intelligence-gathering or technically oriented specialties (AFSCs); . Officers with prior assignments at or above Major Command level; . Officers lost in 1968; . Officers lost over water near or in the Southern regions of North Vietnam; . Officers on Special Operations or Armed Reconnaissance missions; and . Officers flying F-111As or multi-engine, propeller-type aircraft without ejection capabilities. In conclusion, the findings did indicated that there were some military background and mission characteristics frequently associated with non-returning POWs/MIAs, but the question of whether any POWs/MIAs were held back because of these or other characteristics remains an open one. The accompanying memorandum noted that the study was requested by the DIA and noted: . . . .Various studies of the themes suggested in your letter have been examined by individual analysts in that office, but in general the informal assessments were maintained by the analyst only. Their consistent conclusion was, however, as the above analysis concludes, that there is no factual basis for the inferences you suggest, and it is in fact contradicted anecdotally by several of the "specialized " returnees. This is summarized in an overall briefing prepared by the Special Officer and provided below. A recurring theme in the mythology of the PW-MIA issues is that U.S. personnel were exploited for their technical knowledge and skills. This theme is carried to the point of allegations that American personnel with certain specialized skills or knowledge were taken to third countries for exploitation, or were exploited by third- county interrogators in Vietnam. Although the argument is seductive, it simply is not correct. No evidence exists to suggest that any American personnel were singled out for exploitation because of their technical skills, educational background, previous assignments, or any other element of their background. The following facts must be considered definitive. . As indicated above, a review of the backgrounds of returnees versus missing men as regards previous assignments, technical skills, education level, mission assignment and many other aspects reveals no correlation to returned or non-returned status. Simply stated, U.S. personnel with technical backgrounds, previous assignments in technical areas, or any other specialized skill or background are not missing in any greater proportion than are individuals without those backgrounds. In the case of air crews, survival of a shootdown, capture, and eventual return can only be described as a crap shoot. . A review of debriefings of returnees reveals that prisoners were not interrogated to any extent on their technical knowledge. While some interrogations asked limited technical questions, the overwhelming thrust of interrogations and torture was to elicit political statements from the prisoners. Technical information was a very low or non-existent priority for questioning. . U.S. personnel were not subjected to interrogation by anyone other than Vietnamese, except: . In one incident involving several prisoners and a few cases where Americans were initially captured by Chinese military units operating in North Vietnam (these units did or did not conduct simple interrogations before turning the Americans over to the Vietnamese). . The KGB interrogated at least one American of Russian descent, who was on assignment to the Navy from the CIA. KGB officer Oleg Nechiporenko also prepared a questionnaire which may have been used in the interrogation of American POWs. . Some returned POWs report being interrogated by Cubans. . The idea that U.S, technical specialists, such as an "electronic warfare officer" or a radar navigator, could provide valuable engineering, design, and operational data to the Vietnamese or to some third country is questionable, In the first place, much technical information about even sensitive systems is available readily through exploitations of open sources. A magazine such as "Aviation Week and Space Technology" is a better source than an injured, frightened, hungry B-52 radar navigator. The Soviets provided to the Vietnamese technical data about U.S, systems which they had obtained through their normal intelligence operations. Second, the information which the Soviets sought on U.S. systems simply could not be provided by the tactical operators captured by the Vietnamese. The Soviets sought design, research and engineering data -- information available more reliably and readily through penetrations of the U.S. defense electronic industry. Possibility of POWs Outside Returnees' Knowledge Returning POWs could not fathom a parallel prison system in Vietnam, the possibility that there was another captive world outside their own. According to Stockdale, they first considered the possibility when asked by then Defense Secretary Elliott Richardson: In February or March 1973, I and several senior prisoners visited Secretary of Defense Elliott Richardson in his office at the Pentagon. He said, did you leave anybody over there? I answered as spokesman for the group and said no, and told him the story I just told you . . . .the farthest thing from my mind was anybody being left. I thought it was impossible. . . .I told him how we counted noses. He said, what about a second prison, a secret enclave -- the first time I'd ever heard that. . . . I told the Secretary I had spent the best part of seven years trying to judge just what the North Vietnamese are thinking about, what they were capable of, and what they could get away with to our detriment. . . and the thought never crossed my mind that they could have sort of a stash for special prisoners that could be kept secret from the rest of us for years. Senator McCain: Admiral, from your very strong statement it indicates to me that you do not believe that we knowingly left any Americans alive in Southeast Asia. . . Is that your view? Admiral Stockdale: . . . I know there are some things I don't know about Laos, but I'm positive there's nothing. . . ..I have no evident of anybody that was left intentionally alive in Laos or anywhere. Even the threats of their captors did not raise a serious possibility that there was anywhere else to be sent to: Senator Grassley: . . . returnees independently described . . . .instances in which Vietnamese interrogators threatened to send POW's to something referred to by the Vietnamese as survival camps if they did not cooperate. . . .Do you have any knowledge of such camps? Admiral Stockdale: . . . .I never heard that expression before, but it wasn't uncommon for them to make dire threats of death. . . . Senator Grassley: Admiral, as a prisoner and after your release, did you ever consider the possibility that the Vietnamese might have segregated prisoners soon after capture into two separate prison camps?. . . . Admiral Stockdale: . . . . . . I've always had the feeling that he [Secretary Richardson] thought I was right. Nor has any returned POW has ever suggested to Stockdale that he believed men were left behind, Stockdale testified. Vice Chairman Smith: To your knowledge, and with all of your contacts and communications with other POW's who have returned, did any POW ever report to you seeing or having seen, or knowing of a POW that they made direct contact with, who did not return? Admiral Stockdale: Never did that happen, in eight years,. . . .Never did anybody say, "We've got a guy over there." And if you find somebody that says, "I was in the Hanoi prison and I saw a guy, and then he didn't come home and I don't know what happened to him," he's not telling the truth. Vice Chairman Smith: Did any POW that you came back with, ever indicate to you that there was any type of segregation in the camp system, that you were a part of, concerning military specialty, where people or specialty in the military? Admiral Stockdale: No, I don't know of any. . . . At the Committee's request, Admiral Stockdale examined a list of men last known alive. Mulligan Stockdale's first concern was about a POW named Mulligan: Senator Reid: Admiral, it is my understanding that yesterday you reviewed a list that Senator Smith gave you of 324 names. . . .Did you review that list yesterday? Admiral Stockdale:. . . ..I was alarmed about the fact that eight of the entries were from the debrief of one James Mulligan. There were names I'd never heard of. . . .. So, I called Mulligan [a former POW in North Vietnam]. . . .We went through all eight. . . .He said not one of those was in my name [memory] bank. Vice Chairman Smith: I just want to say, Admiral, that I respect your answer. . . .But, I want to have the opportunity to enter into the record. . . the document which does mention those names in regard to Mulligan. The Mulligan extracts were provided to DoD for rechecking the names against the debriefs. JSSA's response of December 11, 1992 noted that: Col. Brown and his deputy, Mr. Dussault, personally went over each page of the lengthy transcript and list of POWs memorized by Capt. Mulligan. They found no reference to the MIA Collamore. However they did locate Homecoming debriefing reports that corrected "Collarmore" to "Col. Lamar." Due to the misinterpretation of the taped pronunciation the name Cullamore was in fact determined to have been Col. Lamar, who has been returned to U.S. control. A second response stated: 1. We have reviewed Capt. Mulligan's debriefing file and the following names of MIA personnel were apparently reported by Capt. Mulligan: Beene, James A. Collins, Richard F. Davies, Joseph E. Lawrence, Bruce E. Raymond, Paul D. Pierson, W. C. III 2. Capt. Mulligan also related knowledge of James Q. Collins (Capt. USAF) and William P. Lawrence (Cdr, USN) who were repatriated during Operation Homecoming." Committee staff telephoned Capt. James A. Mulligan on December 15, 1992. He stated that copies of the returnee debriefing report had been faxed to him by Admiral Stockdale and that the information listing him as the source is in error. Sponeyberger and Wilson Admiral Stockdale also discussed the fate of Captain Robert D. Sponeyberger and Lieutenant William Wilson. Admiral Stockdale:. . . We had two people in..well now, Sponeyberger was never in our camp system so..I mean he. . . he came home but he didn't come home via my prison. . . .Sponeyberger. . . .returned ..in March 73 and he's shown as a pilot of an F-111 and I don't know where he was held. . . . . . And Wilson. . . .He was not in our prison system but he was returned. . . .I never had anybody in my prison that had flown an F-111, so I don't know. DoD provided a response to the committee's request to determine where Captain Sponeyberger and Lt Wilson were held captive, if this was outside the normal prison system, and where the remaining F111 POWS were imprisoned. This stated: . . . . Captain Sponeyberger was captured on 22 December 1972 and held in Hoa lo prison from 25 December 1972 through 3 January 1973. He was then held at Cu Loc prison from 3 January 1973 through 29 March 1973. Lieutenant Wilson was captured with Captain Sponeyberger and held in Hoa Lo from 29 December 1972 through 3 January 1973 and at Cu Loc from 3 January 1973 through 29 March 1973. VADM Stockdale was in Hoa Lo prison from 25 January 1969 until his release on 12 February 1973. The three were inmates at Hoa Lo prison at the same time from 29 December 1972 through 3 January 1973. Thus, in fact, Captain Sponeyberger and Lieutenant Wilson were held in facilities in the normal prison system. Wilson and Sponeyberger were imprisoned quite late in the war, and their incarceration in Hoa Lo overlapped that of VADM Stockdale for only a few days. Because they were in the prison system for such a short time, it is possible that VADM Stockdale may not have remembered them or may never have know about them. DIA has found no credible intelligence to suggest that any prison system existed other than the "normal" North Vietnamese prison system. None of the other F-111 aviators lost are known to have survived their loss incidents. Col. Donald "Digger" Odell More recently, Col. Donald "Digger" Odell , a former POW, was also reported in the press as stating that two American POWs were taken away prior to Homecoming and not released. The Committee requested a DIA analysis of the news article, and DIA's response stated that Col. Odell mentioned the names of two individuals he speculated might have remained behind alive: Capt. Earl Cobell (USAF) and Lt. J. J. Connell (USN). DIA further noted: The record seems to indicate that both men died prior to Operation Homecoming. Their names appeared on the DRV died- in-captivity list, passed to the U.S. Government on 27 January 1973. . . . Both individuals' remains were repatriated in March 1974. . . .Other returnees reported that Captain Cobell, a particularly recalcitrant prisoner, had been beaten almost to the point of insanity, possibly by a Cuban, in August or September 1969 and had to be force-fed by his roommate. Lt. Connell reportedly tried to deceive the Vietnamese into believing that torture had crippled his hands and had caused him to be mentally deranged. The DIA's analysis was read to Col. Odell by phone. He acknowledged the press report accurately depicted his statement, said he had no knowledge of the reported deaths, and offered no challenge to the DIA statement of death. Defense Intelligence Agency Assessment Testimony by the DIA's Bob Sheetz included an undated paper entitled "Defense Intelligence Agency Commentary on Names Appearing in Returnee Debriefs," which makes the following points: The DoD position is that all Americans known to have been in prison system in North Vietnam are accounted for. In the prison communications system such as tap codes, using various signalling systems, clarity and completeness of communications sometimes suffered. Partial names, nicknames and names were arrived at phonetically. The fact that a name was mentioned by a returnee does not mean the individual was in the prison system, it could merely mean that someone was asking about him, introducing his name into the system. The objective of the debriefings was to get a listing of every name the returnee knew. DoD believed they could construct a "fairly tidy" list of names of men who did not return. The result, however, was not usable. The lists had full names, partial names, nicknames, garbled names, names of men seen alive and names with no explanation. It was clear detailed analysis was needed. This initial listing is the "pink pages." This is the list which the committee has now. That list, is a list of raw, unevaluated names from the debriefs at Clark AFB. Detailed briefings sorted out the names initially provided. Analysis sorted the names. Cross-checking took four years, the last published list was September 1977. The resulting list called "white pages" was published in 1977. In the final list of names these are no concrete indications that any of the men in the prison system and remains of some men on the 1977 list have been returned. On Dec. 23, 1992, DoD provided an additional response from the Defense Intelligence Agency. The substance is quoted in full: 1. In response to the Committee letter of 10 December 1992 on information found in the returnees' debriefs, the Defense Intelligence Agency wishes to clarify the facts at issue. In June 1992, at the request of the Committee, we re-analyzed a list of 51 names in debriefs which were presented as potential priority discrepancy cases, and found that they were, in fact, all references to accounted-for servicemen. We stated at that time informally, and again in our September letter, that we would be happy to provide specific analytic support on specific name questions, but would not provide analysis on the total set (that is, a reworking of the whole), requested once then, and now again in your 10 December letter. We are unaware of outstanding questions on the May 1978 computer listing. This complete listing was thoroughly analyzed in the 1973-77 time frame. We offer the following generic description of that process. 2. The Committee should be aware of the details of analysis devoted to names provided by returnees during Operation Homecoming and subsequent debriefings. When returning American prisoners arrived at Clark Air Base in Spring 1973, they were debriefed immediately and asked to provide the names of other Americans they had seen or heard of in the prison system. At this point, maximum effort was placed on collecting names; little attention was paid to accuracy, spelling, or circumstances under which the name was heard. An additional problem, here and later, was that many of the names were mistakenly identified from the actual tapes of the interviews and had not actually been stated by the debriefees. The names provided at this time were submitted by message to the military service casualty offices and to the Defense Intelligence Agency. On 24 April, 1973, this list of initially-reported names was printed on pink paper and became known as the "pink pages." Analysis of these names at the time showed a large number of duplications, names of returnees, names of men still missing, partial names, and phonetic names for which the correct spelling was not available. 3. The military services and DIA began analyzing these names. Their objective was to remove from the list names of men who had returned or names which were determined to be invalid. Throughout this process, each agency cross-checked its work with the other agencies and inter-agency agreement was reached on names which should be removed from the listing. As a result, on 9 May and 5 June 1973, a second list of names was published. Names in the "pink pages" which pertained to returnees or in other ways did not pertain to missing men were not on this May-June 1973 list. 4. The list which the Committee notes is dated May 1978 is, in fact, a reproduction of the April 1973 "pink pages." That is, the list of the initial, unevaluated listing of names provided by the returnees during their debriefings at Clark. This list contains names of men in the prison system as well as names of men who never appeared in the system but whose fates were the subject of discussion through the prison communication system. The appearance of a name on this list is no way offers definitive evidence that the man named was in the prison system. 5. By this time, the returnees had been dispersed from Clark to bases and homes in the United States and detailed debriefings were begun. During these debriefings, every effort was made to obtain from the returnees details of names they had provided during the initial debriefs at Clark. Especially important was the necessity to differentiate between the name of an individual who was actually in the prison system as opposed to the name of an individual who had been lost and whose name was being passed through the system in an attempt to locate him, though he was never in the prison system. 6. After this, the names provided by the returnees were subjected to exhaustive analysis over a four-year period. from April 1973 until September 1977. They were then checked, cross-checked, and analyzed by the services and by DIA. The objective still was to develop a list of men who did not return. When this process was completed, the resulting document, known as the "white pages." was published on 2 September 1977. This document is the definitive compilation of information on missing men provided by the returnees. In virtually every case, the information which the returnees furnished dealt with the missing man's loss incident of his death in captivity. Four years of analysis of information provided by the returnees led DOD to the following determination: all of the men who were known to be in the prison system either came home during Operations Homecoming or were accounted-for at that time. DoD stands by that conclusion. 7. To reiterate, the Department stands ready to assist the committee with specific , bounded requests for analytic assistance. We cannot honor the request to do all of this work over again especially since the initial work has been shown to be valid. Committee Review of Debriefing Reports To examine inconsistencies in the record and the hearings, the Committee requested Operation Homecoming records and information from DoD. The responses indicated that no final analysis had been completed of the debriefings other than the Air Force computer listing. The Committee advised DoD that records provided by DoD showed that the Army had been tasked to provide an historical record and the committee requested a copy, but none was received by publication of this report. The Secretary of Defense declined to allow Committee staff access to the actual debriefings, citing confidentiality commitments made to the POWs at the time of their debriefings. "The former POWs were assured that under no circumstances would these recorded debriefings be released to anyone. The Department of Defense has and will continue to honor that pledge." The DOD agreed to make transcripts of the debriefings available to the Chairman and Vice Chairman, however, although it retained control of the transcripts. Both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman reviewed several summaries and debriefing transcripts, but did not have time to conduct more than a limited review. The Committee also sought permission to review returnees' debriefings. DoD was unable to provide the addresses of the former POWs, but Nam-POW, Inc. gave the Committee an updated list and permission to use its mailing list. A survey was sent to the 483 former POWs with known addresses in October 1992. The Chairman and Vice Chairman directed that the mailing assure each former POW that the Select Committee's sole interest was information on non-returnees to provide casualty resolution. It was not a general screen of debriefing reports, but a specific search for names of those in captivity who did not return. Senator McCain, a former POW, approved the questionnaire before it was sent. At publication time, the committee had received 368 responses: 19 letters were returned, 285 returnees agreed to the review and 19 declined. Another 27 acknowledged the Committee's request, but had no information. In all, 18 had additional information or requested a committee interview; however, this information could not be followed up without access to the debriefing reports. Based on these returns, which included a formal release granting the Committee permission to review that portion of their debriefing that related to (1) the returnee's knowledge of any individual in the prison system or (2) to his knowledge of any individual who may have survived capture, the Committee on November 13, 1992 requested that the Secretary of Defense make available the debriefings of those returnees who had granted permission for review. Cheney declined the committee request. At the December 1, 1992 Hearing on DoD Oversight, Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in an exchange with Senator Kerry and Senator Smith agreed to work with the committee to seek a compromise on staff access to the returnee debriefings. In response to committee letters, Andrews noted on Dec. 28, 1992: We continue to allow the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select Committee access to the POW debriefings. We are aware that a number of returnees have consented to a review by staff of the Committee on POW/MIA Affairs of that portion of their debriefings which relates to their knowledge of the presence of other POWs in the prison system or of their knowledge of any individuals who may have survived their incident of capture. These former prisoners were asked to grant access to Department of Defense records that they do not control. If we were to permit staff access to those records where the Select Committee has obtained a release it would be unfair to the others who might feel pressured concerning their decisions to maintain the confidentiality of their experiences and would set an unacceptable precedent for returnees in future conflicts. If the Select Committee determines that the very significant cost is warranted, the Department could one again review all these debriefs and extract the text containing the names of the unaccounted for Americans. This effort would take several months to complete. We have a high degree of confidence that the effort to glean names of unaccounted for Americans from our returnees during Operation Homecoming was thorough and that those names are accurately reflected in the 1978 list referenced by Senator Smith on December 3, 1992, during the open hearings of the Committee. In the context of Senator Smith's concern that the 1978 list might be based on flawed analysis, the Joint Services SERE Agency (JSSA) conducted an extensive analysis of the Mulligan-Collamore example cited by Senator Smith. The original analysis was reconfirmed by the JSSA review which is summarized in enclosure 1. We believe that the accuracy of the remainder of the 1978 list wold be substantiated under similar scrutiny. JSSA has examined the four debriefs reviewed by Senator Smith for any name anomalies and none were found. The JSSA is willing to conduct a similar review of a limited number of Committee-selected debriefs of special concern, in order to satisfy any specific questions the Committee may have regarding the 1978 list. However, the transcript analysis process is lengthy and the analytical resources available to the JSSA necessarily limit the cases that can be reviewed prior to issuance of the Select Committee's final report. Your letter also asks whether returnees may review their own debriefs. We have a long standing policy that returnees may have visual access to the transcript of their debriefing but may not retain copies of the debriefing records. The debrief remains classified SECRET. Finally, Mr. Codinha's letter requests the source of information for the HOMECOMING computer listings and an unclassified copy of the final list of the names of missing men about whom the returnees offered information. The original sources for this database were principally the Phase I,II and III Egress Recap debriefer report messages. these reports were prepared by the officials who conducted the debriefings and were transmitted to Headquarters United States Air Force for entry into a database. As additional information was gained concerning the fate of missing Americans this database was updated. For example, names of individuals the returnees mentioned but who had returned to U.S.control, or whose remains were recovered, were not retained in this database. The Joint Services SERE Agency has researched its files for documentation relating to other possible sources for entry into this database, but has so far found none. The unclassified copy of the final list is at Enclosure 2. The committee request was in furtherance of a complete record, the suspicions surrounding the debriefing process, the DIA commentary on names appearing in returnee debriefs, and because the committee was denied access for a detailed review of the debriefings, the Committee again requested that DoD combine the work previously done on 51 of the approximated 350 names on the United States Air Force computer listing of the HOMECOMING debriefings, the work done on Senator Smith's list of 324 with those not completed to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the lists of names from the Homecoming debriefs. Discussion The Committee repeatedly requested that DoD again conduct a full review of returnee debriefings. DoD declined to do so. The Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman were allowed access to the debriefings, but the volume precluded more than a sampling. The Committee then requested access by staff to conduct this review. DoD declined. Therefore, the Committee has placed into the Archives the computer listings of the debriefing results and encourages the public to review these comments and draw their own conclusions. The Committee urges DoD to conduct a full, independent review to clarify this issue for the public. The review should be undertaken by DoD staff and not assigned to the DIA, and the results should be provided to the appropriate oversight committees of Congress and made public.