CooperationClapper
12/01/92If we are to have true resolution of
these cases that so consume so many
Americans, it is in the hands of the
Vietnamese.CooperationDeStatte
12/04/92Chairman Kerry:  Are we on the road
to resolving this?

DeStatte:  Yes, sir.  I'm quite
confident.  As I said earlier, I
think we're getting the kind of
cooperation -- I think that Vietnam's
top leaders have made the decision to
try to solve this issue.  I think
they issued the instruction to their
bureaucracy to do so, and I believe
that at the working level, where we
are, at least the people that I've
been working with, I believe we're
getting the kind of cooperation,
we're getting good cooperation.

I do, however, believe that there's
some distance to go, and I think that
if there's an obstacle, that obstacle
is at the mid-level.  And I believe
that Vietnam's leaders can solve that
problem.  I think that's the proper
solution.CooperationFord
12/04/92...the fact is that in many cases
it's clear that the Vietnamese don't
always know what they have there and
that they've got a lot of valuable
information.  We know it's valuable,
but it wasn't necessarily valuable to
them or they weren't quite sure what
it was.

Allowing us access into that is
extremely important... We are just
now getting into these archives and
all of us are wanting to move forward
as rapidly as we can.CooperationFord
12/01/92I frankly, in looking at that period,
I think that I give the most credit
to the Vietnamese.  I think they
sought us out.CooperationFord
12/01/92...I would argue that the reason that
we have been is because we have won
most of the battles of being fair and
firm with the Vietnamese.  And when
they produce results, we have
delivered, State has delivered,
Defense has delivered, NSC has
delivered.  We have no history that
if we give something to the
Vietnamese for nothing, that we get
reciprocal benefit from it.CooperationGadoury
11/06/91Progress has, up to this point,
however, been rather disappointing in
terms of results. Despite Vietnamese
claims of total freedom of travel to
pursue first-hand live sightings,
both captive and living free, our
investigator has not yet been
permitted by the Vietnamese to travel
outside Hanoi to complete his
investigations. CooperationGrassley   
11/06/91...I think they [the Vietnamese
Government] ought to know that we
would all welcome and would not hold
past history against them at all if
there was a dramatic change of
practice on the part of the
Vietnamese Government for total
cooperation along the lines of our
people could go any place that they
want to go. 

If the Vietnamese Government came up
with an American there who they
previously said was not there, that
we would not look at it as an
opportunity for punitive action
against the Vietnamese Government,
but that we would look at it as an
opportunity for a further opening of
relations and normalization of
relations. CooperationGriffiths
12/01/92It was quite difficult in earlier
years, and it evolved and got more
effective and the priority began to
be understood in the far reaches of
the government.  But it was not
really an easy process, especially
when you were building from zero.CooperationKerry
12/01/92And I would lay unfortunate odds that
if we were to apply that standard to
ourselves at this point in time about
Vietnamese MIAs, we would be sorely
wanting.CooperationKerry
12/04/92We kind of did a great, double-team
effort here between General Vessey,
the Committee, your efforts.  But the
distinction is that at that point in
time the Politburo and the decisions
had not been made.

I sat with the General Secretary of
Vietnam.  I was the first United
States citizen to meet with the
leading official of Vietnam -- and it
only happened a year and a half ago -
- at which point he turns to me, and
I have got to tell you I was stunned
and the people with me were stunned,
because he could not understand in
1991, what this issue meant, why it
was real, or if we were serious.

And he turned to me and he said:
Senator, I do not understand this;
when I was negotiating with Jimmy
Carter in 1978 for normalization,
nobody raised this issue with us.

It was not on the table. So he had no
sense that this was anything but an
American trick in the 1980s and '90s
to sort of find a different way to
prosecute the war against Vietnam.

So I went through this long
explanation to him of what happened
with the problems of Jimmy Carter's
presidency and what happened in the
desert in Iran and the sense of lack
of power in the country, and along
came Ronald Reagan and he made this a
big issue, to his credit, and raised
the consciousness, and then movies
appeared and books appeared and Sly
Stallone made a cult, and off we
went, and it entered the American
consciousness and body politic...

We [sent them] a whole lot of
articles and sent them information
and tried to give them a sense of the
reality of it....
                                     
So finally they say: Hey, you know,Cooperation
continuedKerry 
12/04/92with it.
                                     
So if they have admitted, and you
say, yes, they have admitted, and
this high visibility Senate
delegation arrives in Hanoi and I say
to them, you know what really is
going to make a difference to our
going back to America and being able
to say good things about you? 
Remains.
                                     
And Ted Schweitzer spends 24 hours
with them privately, using the
respect and friendship he's built up,
and he says:  You know what you have
got to give these guys?  Remains. 
And as you heard him testify today
under oath, he said:  You know, their
faces sank, and they sat in that room
and they said:  If the success of
this mission or failure depends on
remains, then it will fail.CooperationLarson
12/04/92Chairman Kerry:  Now I ask you,
Admiral, General, and General, is the
process corrupt?  Are these people
not cooperating broadly, or do you
feel there is this genuine commitment
to getting this process to work?  The
Committee wants to know the truth,
not some preordained answer.

Larson:  Mr. Chairman, I think their
senior leadership in their central
government has made a political
decision to cooperate and to try to
move forward.  The level of that
cooperation, I think we have a system
in place that will test the level of
that cooperation and put pressure on
them to produce and evaluate how far
they are willing to go.

Right or wrong for what they've done
for the last 20 years, I think
they've made a political decision
now, we've got to change and we've
got to move forward, particularly in
the archival research area.CooperationNeedham
12/04/92Chairman Kerry:  General, can you
speak now to the issue of the level
of cooperation that you receive? 
Where are we?  What kind of judgment
can the committee make, based on your
experience now, over this year, in
Vietnam?

Needham:  Sir, in my opinion, in the
last year the cooperation in Vietnam
has been steadily improving since I
assumed my position in January. 
Recently... there have been some
dramatic improvements.

I think the Vietnamese could still do
more, but right now we see
cooperation getting better and better
every day at the central level.  In
the field level, cooperation is
mixed... in the provinces, it's
mixed.

Chairman Kerry: ...You have provinces
in Vietnam that were very heavily
bombed, and their support to the
United States is less than others...CooperationNeedham
12/04/92Sir, I think it is going to produce
results.  I think we're starting to
see a little bit in Hanoi.  I think
it's too early to tell exactly how
much we're going to get, but I
believe we're off to a positive start
and I'm hoping that we can -- by the
information requests that Mr.
DeStatte has given them, that we can
lead this archival research program a
little bit more to the way we want to
go, which is looking at supporting
the work plan and supporting cases
that we want to get answers to rather
than just getting information for the
sake of getting information.CooperationPerroots
08/12/92Vietnam can easily account for
hundreds of Americans that have not
yet exercised their requisite will to
do so.CooperationQuinn
12/01/92Mr. Chairman, the vastly improved
level of cooperation is a clear
indication that our policy of both
sides taking a series of commensurate
steps is working.CooperationSchweitzer
12/04/92Following years of distrust among
many of the parties trying to resolve
this MIA issue, there have however
now been new approaches which have
taken place in Hanoi over the past
few weeks and cooperation has reached
a new level.  But there still appear
to me to be three basic questions
which have remained unanswered up to
this point.

The first question concerns just how
much information we can hope to learn
about the Americans still unaccounted
for in Vietnam.  

The second remaining question
involves the source of this
information.  The third question
concerns, it has taken 19 years for
the U.S. and Vietnam to come to this
starting point in addressing these
questions.CooperationSchweitzer
12/04/92Well, the central government has made
it clear to me that the key element
in getting that material brought to
Hanoi is in U.S. hands, not in their
hands.  They
had -- the leadership of Vietnam
cannot simply order 70 million
Vietnamese citizens to bring this
mountain of material to Hanoi.

It has to be something that the
Vietnamese, the common Vietnamese
citizen, feels in his heart he wants
to do for America.  If he has a
souvenir, war memorabilia, something
that he picked up from a crash or a
war site in the highlands in '67 or
from a crash up in the mountains
someplace, say a piece of an airplane
that he's been using as a side of his
house or a little package of things
he picked up somehow, maybe the man
who picked it up is even dead and his
children have it and have no idea
what it is even.

But they're not going to make -- the
common person of Vietnam just isn't
going to come forward with all that
mountain of information unless they
really have the feeling in the heart
that they want to do this for
America.  It can't be dictated from
on high that you will bring forward
everything that you possess on
America.  It just won't happen that
way.CooperationSchweitzer
12/04/92Schweitzer:  ...with the steps that
have been taken so far, especially
the last one involving AT&T, people
are coming forward with more
materials than they've ever come
forward with before.  I brought two
examples with me.

Chairman Kerry:  You see a
significant shift now suddenly in the
production of some of these
documents?

Schweitzer:  I certainly do.  And the
more steps the United States takes to
ease the hardships on Vietnam, the
more warmth the common Vietnamese
citizens will feel towards us and
will come forward with materials.CooperationSheetz 
06/25/92Mr. Sheetz:  I'd like to underscore. 
There's something that Senator Smith
and Senator Kerry, you could both, I
think, help us with.  I recognize
you'll probably be making another
trip to Southeast Asia before your
committee completes its work. If you
do, or if another opportunity
presents itself -- I wish you would
underscore to both the Laos
Government and the Vietnamese
Government the need for unfettered
access on conducting live sighting
investigations.  Basically, not
frustrating our officers when they're
out there in the field trying to
facilitate the process.  We're making
progress, it's getting better, but
it's got to get a lot better before
I'm going to be happy.  And if
there's anything this committee could
do to underscore with those two
governments.CooperationSheridan
12/02/92...To my way of thinking, the answers
are in Hanoi and in Vientiane and in
Cambodia, and it could be over with
in a very short period of time if
those governments would be
forthcoming with the information that
they have.CooperationVessey
12/04/92However, when we look at the issue of
Vietnamese cooperation, it would be a
mistake to forget the progress in
reuniting several hundred thousand
separated Vietnamese family members,
getting over 60,000 Amerasian
children and family members out of
Vietnam and getting the former South
Vietnamese officers and Government
officials out of the re-education
camps and getting them and their
families out of Vietnam if they
wanted to go.CooperationVessey 
06/25/92My first instructions came from
President Reagan in 1987... President
Reagan started an effort in 1982 to
bring more focus to this issue.
Negotiations had been underway for
about four years and they stalled in
1986, in late 1986, and I was asked
to take on the job in early 1987.
      
I was instructed by the President to
conduct negotiations with the
Vietnamese Government to attempt to
get cooperation on a number of
humanitarian issues, and the
specifics goals were as follows:
      
The first goal, and the number one
priority, was to get the cooperation
required to achieve the fullest
possible accounting for all Americans
missing from the war in Vietnam.

Within that goal of fullest possible
accounting, as the first priority,
was to go after the business of
whether or not live American
prisoners were continuing to be held
by the Vietnamese Government. And if
there were live Americans either in
captivity or living freely, to seek
their immediate return.

Then the third point was to get
Vietnamese cooperation and an
expanded effort in the return of
remains that had already been
recovered, and in searching for and
recovering and return those remains
which had not yet been recovered.CooperationVessey 
06/25/92It is worth remembering that those
instructions were given in light of
conditions which existed in 1987. 
Vietnam's military forces were in
Cambodia. We had no relations with
the Government of Vietnam other than
those preliminary talks I mentioned
earlier. We had consistently said
that the POW/MIA issue should be
settled as a humanitarian issue. We
had regularly told the Vietnamese
that resolution of the POW/MIA issue
was not a requirement for discussing
normalization, but we'd also said
consistently that pace and scope of
cooperation on POW/MIA matters would
affect the pace and scope of our
talks on normalization.CooperationVessey 
06/25/92... certainly, the one area of
cooperation... is the business of
archival research, is diligent. Both
the prime minister and the foreign
minister promised a complete and
diligent search of their archives for
all information about missing
Americans. That's difficult to do. We
need to work with them to guide them
to do it. But at the same time, it
can only be done with their
cooperation and work. They have to do
it. It's just tough work.CooperationVessey 
06/25/92Chairman Kerry:  Within the last five
or six months we have gotten
different signals from both state and
DoD regarding how cooperative the
Vietnamese have been... State
basically says they are being very
cooperative or more cooperative and
DoD says they are not being as
cooperative as they should be, we
need more information.  Where do you
see it?

Vessey:  The cooperation is far
greater today. One of the problems
with evaluating Vietnamese
cooperation is we don't know how
capable they are of cooperating.CooperationVessey 
06/25/92In the area of POW/MIA, a lot of work
has been done but the resolution of
individual cases has been slow and
plodding... We've had some
preliminary talks trying to get
investigations underway for cases of
individuals lost in the border areas
of Cambodia and Laos, that were then
under the control of Vietnamese
forces. In 1988 we agreed to joint
field investigations in Vietnam with
American and Vietnamese investigators
participating. We are entering now
into our 18th set of joint field
investigations.Declassificatio
nGrassley
06/24/92Until these documents become
declassified and tell the story
themselves without the debunkers,
without the conspirators, and the
spin doctors, it is incumbent upon
us, those of us on this committee
and, of course, the media as well, to
counter the misrepresentations that
there is no evidence.Declassificatio
nKerrey
09/21/92...As said, it does not surprise me
that the North Vietnamese would
either lie to their people and to us,
or withhold information from their
people or from us.

But it seems to me that it is
reasonable for me to conclude that I
should have a higher standard for our
own government.  And thus, the
release of the information, redacted
and carefully examined -- the
decision by President Bush to release
that information, pressured by this
committee to do so, I think has
performed a very valuable service
even though we may never get, as I
said, to the bottom of it...I must
say that had that information been
provided in  1973 -- had we just said
to the American people, here are the
facts, here is what we know and what
we do not know, I think the outcome
also would have been much different
over the next 19 years.DesertersTrowbridge
06/24/92Deserters are excluded from the
official DoD Southeast Asia casualty
files.DesertersTrowbridge
06/24/92Chairman Kerry:  Mr. Trowbridge, are
you saying that the Defense
Intelligence Agency carries only 15
people as deserters in country?
         
Trowbridge:  Based on what we have
been able to obtain from the
services, that is correct, sir.
         
Chairman Kerry:  Can you tell me why,
then, this committee got a list from
the Defense Department, the National
Archives, which we were about to
submit to the FBI of 1,284 deserter
names last known with their units in
Vietnam?
         
Trowbridge:  Sir, I cannot answer
that.  As I said, we had an analyst
that went through the records
ourselves in 1988.  Again, if you
have got a list -- you know, I do not
know where these lists come and what
the criteria was to make these lists.
         
Chairman Kerry:  Does that not say
something to you?  You are supposed
to be analyzing live sighting
reports.  You have got a potential
base of some 1,200 people who
supposedly deserted in country.  I am
not suggesting -- this committee,
incidentally, is not focusing on
deserters.  This committee is focused
on POW's, military people who had
been taken prisoner.  But obviously
there is a possibility that someone
who is a deserter could be the source
of a live sighting report.

Trowbridge:  That is absolutely
correct.DesertersVessey
11/05/91It is my understanding that none were
classified as deserters. Now, there
is some evidence in some very few
cases that some might have been there
under their own free will. Later on
there was some evidence that came up,
but the evidence is pretty scanty...
I would not want to accuse any of
these guys of being deserters...
there is just not evidence to do
that. DIA - ClustersBrooks
12/01/92Sen. McCain: ...General Perroots has
previously testified that they did,
and have used, this so-called cluster
theory in part of their analysis on
many occasions.  Are you aware of
that, Admiral?

Brooks:  No, I was not aware,
Senator.DIA - CriticsBrooks
12/01/92I was disappointed with the lack of
rigor in the analytic process, I was
disappointed, for example, with the
way in which files were kept, I was
disappointed with the lack of
disciplined analytic techniques which
I would anticipate to be used in any
analytic process...DIA - CriticsBrooks
12/01/92Senator, I would comment that when I
first arrived there -- I was there
for a period of almost four months,
from June of 1985 until September of
1985, perhaps the beginning of
October of 1985 -- I was surprised to
see how few people were dedicated to
analysis of the POW/MIA issue...DIA - CriticsBrooks
12/01/92There was not adequate management of
the analytic process to assure that
the mindset to debunk did not color
potentially valid reports as well as
those which were apparently invalid.DIA - CriticsBrooks
12/01/92...a certain degree of cynicism, I
think, crept into our intelligence
analysis.  And it is human nature. 
We had been confronted with so many
reports that were either deliberate
fabrications or were grossly
inaccurate that I think the analyst
becomes cynical... there also is a
category of people at work
surrounding the POW/MIA issue which I
will categorize as professional
predators...DIA - CriticsBrooks
12/01/92Bureaucratic ineptitude certainly
characterized the situation in 1985.DIA - CriticsBrooks
12/01/92...yes, indeed, there were cases that
I thought should have been reopened
and should have been looked into in
much more depth.DIA - CriticsBrooks
12/01/92I think probably the desire to
believe that we had accounted for the
POWs perhaps accounted for some of
the attitude.  Also, of course, the
fact that the returned POWs did in
fact state that all of the POWs known
to be in captivity to them, to them
known to be in the official prison
system, were accounted for perhaps
led to the mindset that this was not
as important a problem as it should
have been...

The case files had not been
maintained properly, leads had not
been followed up, the normal things
that you would...do in trying to
maintain continuity on a problem had
not been done during that period 1973
to 1983.DIABrooks
12/01/92My own experience with the analysts
is that they were a very dedicated
and very frustrated lot.  There were
too few of them... your observation
about paucity of assets is accurate.DIA - CriticsChildress
12/01/92...I know exactly what you're doing,
you're really following it up -- by
using such words you give the
impression that you don't believe
it's true at the outset, alleged or
alleged with three other adjectives
and this sort of thing.  I got the
impression in the period before the
Reagan Administration that there was
almost a fear to put in a report that
wasn't hedged and guarded by enough
adjectives.  

What we were trying to bring to them
is don't fear it, say it objectively,
drop the kind of adjectives, and so
forth.  Don't overdo it but be
objective and we'll handle it,
everybody will handle it when they
get back.DIA - CriticsChildress
12/01/92By the time the Tighe Report had come
out, the Vietnamese had released the
largest number of remains in 1985
than at any time since the end of the
war, and I think it was 26 at the
time.  They had also agreed that they
wanted to work with us on a 2-year
plan to try to resolve these major
core issues of the POW/MIA issue
within a 2-year plan.  And we were --
had been negotiating and had several
high-level trips.  

The Tighe Report popped in the middle
of this, and they were obviously not
up to date on negotiations, but that
wasn't why they were there anyway, it
was to look to DIA.  So they were
filling this document up with
presumptions that I felt were years
old that they had brought to the
table.  And I went over and briefed
them on policy and, you know, our 10-
point plan and the rest, on one
occasion, but that was just to give
them background.  So I felt that they
-- you know, they were good people
and well committed and had their
experience, but I wanted them to stay
with the knitting that they were
hired for.DIA - CriticsChildress
12/01/92Chairman Kerry:  What you said in
your letter, and let me quote you: 
"There are several flat untruths in
it, many distortions and
inaccuracies, an abundance of
speculation with no basis in fact, an
obvious lack of understanding of the
overall issue and judgments or
perceptions of the Vietnamese mystery
combined with popular mythology." 
Did all of those criticisms get
addressed? 

Childress:  Well, I was not in a
position to -- I wasn't on the
report.  I was giving my impressions
to General Perroots.

Chairman Kerry:  I understand.  But
when the final report came out, did
you hold those same conclusions about
the report?

Childress:  Not as strongly, but I
still saw some popular mythology in
it.DIA - CriticsChildress
12/01/92Chairman Kerry:  Mr. Childress, you
made some criticisms of the Tighe
Report which were really very
strong...

Childress:  This was a first draft
that they had done and it was full of
policy things, not intelligence
things.  So General Perroots sent it
over to me and said take a look at
this, they're making policy
recommendations.  I was, needless to
say, from reading that outraged that
they were into policy things.  And I
also took the opportunity to make
what I felt was the case that if
you're going to talk about live
prisoners, we're talking about last
known alive, that's where I had put
my focus.  And a look of 16 or 18
reports, or 32 case files could not
lead to those kinds of conclusions
that I felt that they were heading
towards.DIAClapper
12/01/92I have to say one other thing,
Senator Kerry, in all due respect. 
We talked about who has been
responsible for this over the years. 
The Congress, in all fairness, bears
a certain amount of responsibility
for this.  Every year we, in
intelligence, and the director of DIA
as the manager of the General Defense
Intelligence Program, gets very
specific and very intrusive guidance
from the Congress on what
authorizations we will have and for
what purpose.  DIA - CriticsClapper
12/01/92...the criticisms arise from the
simple and abundant frustration at
our inability to resolve the ultimate
fate of the POW/MIAs.  And the reason
is, and again Colonel Schlatter
alluded to it, is that because
intelligence, given its inherent
limitations, simply on its own cannot
resolve these issues.DIAClapper
08/04/92...I have always been deeply
concerned about accounting for the
missing and will ensure that DIA's
efforts to achieve the fullest
possible accounting will not waiver
during my tenure as
director...POW/MIA intelligence
investigations, collection, and
analysis comprise one of DIA's
highest priorities...DIA - CriticsGaines
12/01/92The DIA analysts had no buffer
between themselves and anybody else. 
In other words, they had no buffer
between themselves and members of
Congress.  There is no buffer between
themselves and outside interests...
unofficial but powerful members,
personnel such as Ann Mills
Griffiths... had direct access, in
fact, had direct access not only to
files and intelligence information,
but was allowed to task the analysts
on her behest.DIA - CriticsGaines
12/01/92They were beset by so many outside
tasks and so many outside similar-
dissimilar influences, that they were
constantly running from one crisis to
another, and they did not have time
to do the kind of hard, pick and
spade work such as something like
this, studies on, say, the prison
system...DIA Grassley
10/15/92Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by
stating that this issue is too
important for us to rely on DIA's
analysis exclusively for our
judgment.  This may be the only
evidence that we find that possibly
points to specific men.  We need an
independent assessment, not just a
DIA assessment.  Five different
reports have raised the issue of
DIA's mind set to debunk.  The public
is skeptical of DIA's continued
debunking of evidence.  No matter
what DIA says, we need an independent
evaluation of the evidence, as well. 
These photos may, in fact, show
shadows.  But I want an independent
analysis to tell me that, not just
DIA.DIA - CriticsHargis
12/01/92The conclusion or finding.  DIA did
release names and addresses of
witnesses under the Freedom of
Information Act, but the information
released was mostly a compilation of
documents which originated outside
DIA.  Not one of the names or
addresses released was of a person
who had had direct contact with DIA
or had requested confidentiality.DIA - CriticsHargis
12/01/92The Office of the Inspector General,
DIA, conducted an investigation in
the Office of the Prisoners of
War/Missing in Action, PW/MIA
Division in the Directorate of
Collection Management, between 20
November 1984 and 2 February 1985, at
the direction of General Williams,
who was the Director of DIA at that
time...

The next conclusion; these
allegations of mistreatment were
judged to be responses from
individuals who had attempted to use
the PW/MIA issue for their own
purposes...

There was no indication that DIA
interviewers used any procedures that
intentionally downgraded, humiliated,
embarrassed or abused the witness.  

There was no evidence to suggest that
any truly knowledgeable witness could
be discouraged by DIA methods for
making information known.DIA - CriticsHargis
12/01/92Next conclusion; there can be no
improvement to the worsening
situation until the policy and public
relations interface is inserted
between the DIA and the rest of the
world.DIA - CriticsHargis
12/01/92We had one other finding and one
other recommendation.  There was
evidence that DIA had been and
continued to be manipulated on the
PW/MIA issue by entities outside the
U.S. Government.DIA - CriticsHrdlicka
12/03/92...I would add that if you want to
talk about fraud I would call the DIA
one of the biggest perpetrators.  I
have spent 2 years trying to get
answers out of those people on
specifics.  I had a meeting in July
with Mr. Sheetz and Mr. Gray and they
were going to get right back to me. 
Well I sit here today, and they have
not gotten right back to me.

I file a Freedom of Information;
reports that I have don't even come
through on the Freedom of
Information.  Now you want to call
fraud, I call that fraud, and I feel
like I've been the person that's had
the fraud perpetrated on me.  I can
appreciate these other scams, but I
have to tell you that if our
Government had done their job in the
first place, I wouldn't be in the
situation where I could be a victim
or Carol Collins be a victim.DIAKerry 
06/25/92...on 4 January of 1974, in fact,
significant personnel reductions were
proposed to take place in the POW/MIA
section of DIA.  And literally, the
personnel within that section had to
go to bat to explain to superiors why
they were important to the resolution
of the accountability process.DIA - CriticsKnecht
12/01/92In defense of the senior management
of DIA, I could not find any case
where somebody had said we need to do
this to fix this and they said don't
do that.DIA - CriticsKnecht
12/01/92Mindset to debunk: everybody's
discussed it.  I absolutely could not
find anything on it.  I absolutely
disagree with it.DIA - CriticsKnecht
12/01/92I agree with Colonel Peck where he
criticized the fact that the special
office was being used for tasks that
were not appropriate for an
intelligence activity.DIA - CriticsKnecht
12/01/92I am also saying that Colonel Peck
basically recycled... the Gaines
report to us, as if there had been no
intervening change.  And then when
pressed for the details of those
criticisms that he made, I could not
find any specifics to support them. 
When I looked at those specific
criticisms which I was then aware of
in the intervening period, then I
could not find those.DIA - ClustersMaguire
08/04/92Senate investigators called Dak Chung
a cluster because of six hearsay
reports that recounted the same
story...But in depth analysis showed
that all the reports were similar
because one of the six sources had
told the same story to the other
five.  What we are left with is not a
cluster of six, but a cluster of one. 
And that one source admitted lying
about his original story, so now we
have no cluster...So DIA has
concluded that Dak Chung is not a
cluster, but we could only reach that
conclusion by carefully reading and
investigating each report.DIA - ClustersMaguire
08/04/92...there were some areas where the
reporting tends to be heavier and
gives a clustered appearance.  Some
members of the Senate Committee staff
believe that the reports within some
of these areas prove that a U.S. POW
was held past Operation Homecoming. 
Our understanding is that Senate
staffers used three criteria to reach
that conclusion.

These three criteria are shown here. 
However, to reach these conclusions
about clusters, other types of
intelligence were ignored and only a
handful of the over 1,500 source
reports were used.DIA - ClustersNagy
12/01/92It was not with the process or the
procedure of mapping reporting.  That
process is underway in DIA, has been
underway in DIA, and is being used
today in support of General Vessey
and his activities.  So I certainly
cannot let the comment lie that it is
not being done.  That is not true.DIA - CriticsNagy
12/01/92I was asked to address circumstances
of an early 1985 internal DIA
examination of the analytic and
collection tasking activities of
DIA's POW/MIA office.  The
examination was somewhat unusual in
that it was an analyst's critique of
other analysts' activities.DIA - CriticsNagy
12/01/92I have reviewed the study group's
report.  In summary, it concluded
that:  One, the analytic effort was
of high quality; two, analyst
retention was likely to be a future
problem unless the division's grade
structure was increased; three,
access to the DIA online ADP system
should be improved, and additional
terminals provided; four, the POW/MIA
analysts should travel to both Hawaii
and Thailand to meet and interact
with counterpart analysts and
collectors; five, a senior executive
should be appointed to speak for the
organization; six, the POW/MIA
analysts should receive greater
recognition.

The details of the report included
other comments... the suspicion that
the analytic activities of the
division were diminished by the need
to respond to numerous outside
requests... the implicit view that
inordinate time was spent on a
somewhat legalistic approach to
evidence and analysis that was
probably necessary, given the
importance of and outside interest in
the issue... it was felt that if this
were a normal intelligence activity,
some of the cases that were being
held open could be closed... the
possibility that human intelligence
in the field could be improved by
adding additional collectors...DIANagy
12/01/92In the wake of the end of the
Vietnamese conflict, in 1973 the
intelligence community underwent a
very severe contraction, 35 to 40
percent of the personnel, and this
can be easily documented, were let
go, moved out of the business... The
POW/MIA analytic effort was certainly
caught up in that set of reductions
beginning in 1973.DIA - CriticsNagy
12/01/92Chairman Kerry:  The themes are
repetitive that there was a diffusion
of the mission, there was a lack of
management, lack of guidance, not a
direction of effort, and so forth. 
The politics that entered into it
from outside influences, the
analysis, itself.

Nagy:  It is my view that from 1973
until the issue from an
administration's standpoint was
revived in the early 1980's, that for
all practical purposes you had three
organizations struggling in the dark,
without a great deal of policy
support, that were working this issue
for the Untied States Government. 
Those were the two that were based in
Hawaii, the Joint Casualty Resolution
Center in CILHI, and the office in
DIA...

Beginning in 1983...DIA has added
personnel to the effort, expanded the
effort of the office, expanded the
operations, as you are well aware, in
Southeast Asia that were under DIA's
direct control...  DIAPerot
08/11/92You need an organization who goes in
every morning and says, here is a new
shred of evidence.  Let's really look
at it objectively.  Let's not try to
debunk it.  Let's not discredit the
person who brought it in.  Let's not
spend all of our energy discrediting
the person who brought it in.DIA - CriticsPerroots
12/01/92Another criticism that I believe
invalid, at least during my tenure,
was that the DIA only responded to
sanitized or selected queries...I
remember coming under criticism from
circles that I was paying too much
attention to the Rambo faction.  I
can tell you that I responded to any
query that was deemed appropriate.DIA  - CriticsPerroots
08/12/92No one ever approached me to take on
General Tighe.  It was solely and
exclusively my idea for good and
honorable reasons... now, as to what
influence I had over [the Tighe
Commission Report] conclusions and
recommendations.  Well, the answer is
absolutely none.DIA - CriticsPerroots
12/01/92Another valid criticism was the lack
of adequate and follow up effort
within the intelligence community. 
The National Collection Priority for
POW/MIA prior to 1985 ranged from
priority 7 to priority 3.  We raised
it to priority l...DIA - CriticsPerroots
12/01/92Chairman Kerry: ...there is just
ample evidence of occasions where the
Government just stumbles over itself
in kind of defensiveness or
inefficiency or something which
has -- I think you would agree --
significantly contributed to people's
anger and frustration.  Is that
correct?

Perroots:  Therein lies the problem.DIA - CriticsPerroots
08/12/92I repeatedly asked General Tighe and
the review group if they were getting
the support they needed and never
received anything but a positive
answer.DIA - CriticsPerroots
08/12/92Never, never did he or any task force
member mention that they had even a
suspicion of any bugging of their
facility...Also the statement by
General Tighe that it was unanimous
conclusion of all the task force
members that the room was bugged is
false...All of the comments
implicitly accept the allegation that
there was a bugging.  Gentlemen, I do
not believe there was.  There is no
evidence there was.DIAPerroots
08/12/92President Reagan assumed office with
a personal commitment to resolving
the issue... the Administration was
determined to pursue the issue as a
matter of highest national
priority....Frankly, a mess was
inherited.DIA - ClustersPerroots
12/01/92In terms of that big evidence to
support the existence of Americans
being held against their will, it is
nonsense.  You have to take each
report, factor the credibility of
that report, determine what other
reports you have... That is a rather
simplistic approach to the analytical
effort required to determine whether
Americans are held against their will
in Southeast Asia.DIA - ClustersPerroots
12/01/92Sen. McCain: General Perroots, let us
get back again to the famous cluster
theory.  Now, this has been portrayed
by the staff -- or some members of
the staff of this committee -- as
some kind of earth-shaking brand new
idea, something that no one ever
thought of before... What is your
view of this cluster theory?  Have
you ever used it?  What do you view
the validity of it?

Perroots:  Well, let me first say
that trend analyses, the clustering
of reports is not only not new, but
it has been done.  I directly was
involved as part of the preliminary
for the Stony Beach operation.  
I said listen, I not only want to
have a capability but I want to be
able to move even on the basis of a
lack of sufficient evidence, but if I
say well, if we are going to do
something, if we are going to put a
team in, where would be the best
place to put them in on the basis
simply of where the most reports are,
even if you assume that all of them
are true.  So we clustered and we
clustered and we clustered.  It was a
continuing process. DIA - CriticsPerroots
12/01/92Another valid criticism, in my
judgment, is that we not always
adequately conducted timely follow up
of reports.DIA - CriticsPerroots
12/01/92I believe we implemented virtually
all of the 30 or more recommendations
of the Gaines Report and virtually
all of the recommendations of the
Tighe Report, save for one, as I
recall, or perhaps two.DIA - CriticsPerroots
12/01/92Another valid criticism that we
ultimately fixed was the criticism
that there was insufficient
coordination among the intelligence
agencies to ensure an effective
database and integrated collection
and analysis effort.DIA - CriticsPerroots
12/01/92Of course, a major criticism that for
the most part was invalid, from my
view, was the alleged mindset to
debunk.  
It is very easy for me to say that
there was very little to debunk. 
There was no debunking.  There was no
calculated effort to debunk.  I took
whatever steps possible to make sure
that there could be no debunking, as
much as you can humanly possibly do
that... We did that by establishing
review boards.

In retrospect, Mr. Chairman, I don't
believe there was any calculated
effort to debunk.DIA - CriticsPerroots
12/01/92Another valid criticism:  DIA was too
involved in activities which
detracted from its primary mission...DIA - CriticsPerroots
12/01/92A major valid criticism was that
insufficient resources were being
expended to adequately do the
collecting, analysis, and follow up
mission...Now, this was especially
true from '73 to '85...DIA - CriticsSchlatter
12/01/92In the case of the Tighe Report, we
implemented every one of those that
we could implement... There were
certain of the Tighe recommendations
that simply really did not apply to
DIA...DIA - CriticsSchlatter
12/01/92...I do not believe the mindset to
debunk exists... in terms of the
Gaines Report, we adopted virtually
every one of the recommendations.DIA - CriticsSchlatter
12/01/92I was to find, and it took me a year
to wake up and realize this, that the
answers are simply not that simple
and the answers were not that
available... DIA - CriticsSchlatter
12/01/92Another problem I found was one of
confusion of management and analytic
resources.DIA - CriticsSchlatter
12/01/92There are two criticisms that I
consider particularly invalid... I
came into that office feeling that,
number one, what we had was
essentially an intelligence analytic
problem.DIASheetz
12/04/92...we at DIA recognize that the
answers to the haunting questions
surrounding our unaccounted for men
are to be found in Southeast Asia. 
We clearly understand that our duty
as intelligence officers is to
provide timely support to those
assigned the POW/MIA operational
mission in Southeast Asia.DIASheetz
12/04/92...DIA and the entire intelligence
community recently collaborated in
the development of a collection
posture statement and overall
collection strategy for the POW/MIA
issue.  This effort was a major
undertaking which we believe goes a
long way toward ensuring that all
appropriate capabilities of the U.S.
intelligence system continue to be
brought to bear.DIA Shields 
06/25/92DIA as an intelligence gathering and
interpreting body should be free and
unconstrained in its own internal
efforts to develop information about
missing and captured Americans. I
believe that [standard] provided a
more effective and complete
intelligence effort than forcing DIA
to conform to service decisions about
what happened to a man.